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THE FATES
From a painting by Paul Thumann
Discourses of Epictetus
Translated by
George Long
With a Critical and Biographical Introduction
by John Lancaster Spalding
Illustrated
New York
D. Appleton and Company
1904
Copyright, 1900,
By D. APPLETON AND COMPANY.
EPICTETUS
OF the life of Epictetus little need be said. His
biography is his character, and this lies open in
his books, where the fine spirit of an earnest and
noble soul still breathes. He was born in Phrygia, about
the middle of the first century. His mother was a slave;
his father is unknown. Epictetus is not his name, but is
a Greek word which denotes his servile condition. In his
youth he became the property of Epaphroditus, a freed-
man of Nero's, who permitted him to attend the lectures
of Musonius Rufus, one of the most celebrated teachers
in Rome. Having acquired freedom, he began himself to
give lessons; but he was soon sent into exile, together with
the other philosophers, by the Emperor Domitian.
Settling at Nicopolis, in Epirus (the modern Albania),
he opened a school, and continued to teach the doctrines
of stoicism to the time of his death, at the age, it is sup-
posed, of nearly a hundred years. He was feeble in body,
lame, poor, and unmarried, living alone until he took an
old woman into his house to care for an orphan whom
he had adopted. He wrote nothing, but talked with his
pupils in a familiar way of whatever concerns the conduct
of life. Arrian, his favourite disciple, took notes of his
conversations, not with a view to publication, but for his
own use. When, however, without his knowledge, they
had fallen into the hands of several, he edited them him-
iv EPICTETUS
self. Thus we owe to an accident the existence of these
" Discourses," which form one of the world's vital books.
The " Manual " is a collection of aphorisms taken sub-
stantially from the larger work.
Epictetus was not the founder of a new philosophy.
Zeno, the originator of the Stoic system, was his master,
and Zeno himself derived his fundamental principles from
Antisthenes, the author of the cynic school and the friend
of Socrates.
The Greeks are the creators of philosophy, and their
earliest attempt at systematic thought was an effort to
understand Nature. But they soon learned that it was
necessary to begin from within, since to know3nything
man must first know himself. Thus the problem of the
conduct of life forced itself upon them. This is the con-
stant preoccupation of Socrates, who was born five hun-
dred years before Epictetus. He taught that the good is"
to be sought not in outward things, nor in the indulgence
of appetite, but in virtue, which for him, however, is an
intellectual rather than a moral habit. His calm and ra-
tional temper led him to the belief that man always acts
in accordance with his knowledge, does what insight shows
him to be useful to himself. He who does evil, does it from
a mistake of judgment. Sin is error. Virtue, then, being
chiefly knowledge, may be taught, and to teach it is the
philosopher's life work. But Socrates moved in a circle
from which there was no escape. To know the useful is vir-
tue. But what is the useful? That which makes for virtue.
Antisthenes does not attempt to determine the mean-
ing of the good. He simply declares that virtue is the
only good, and, in his view, virtue is the intelligent con-
duct of life. Right life is the essential good; virtue is its
own reward, and one need not look to its results. It is,
in the midst of whatever vicissitudes, a sure possession.
The virtuous man is independent of events, and stands
c
r
EPICTETUS V
secure against fate and fortune. The world is full of things
he does not need; he seeks not wealth, nor fame, nor hon-
our, nor pleasure.
Zeno, the Stoic, born in Cyprus about 340 b. c, is the
heir of the Cynics. The sage, as he conceives the truly
wise and virtuous man, is first of all independent of the
world, since only on this condition can he be free and find
happiness in himself alone; and as what is external is but
little subject to human will, he must overcome the worlH"
within himself by gaining the mastery over the feelings
and desires which it excites. To be self-contained and
self-sufficient, to remain unmoved in the presence of good
or of evil fortune, imperturbable though the universe be
shattered, is the goal he must strive to reach. If he can
not defend himself against the excitations of feeling, he
will at least refuse his assent, and thereby prevent them
from becoming passions. His ideal is apathy, absence of
emotion. The course of things may bring him pleasure
and pain, but since he holds that the one is not a good,
the other not an evil, he retains his equanimity. Virtue
is his sole good, and the only evil is to^permit passion to
conquer reason. This withdrawal of the individual within
himself, however it may be modified and supplemented, is
an essential element in the Stoic's conception of life.
Reason, from his point of view, is not only man's nature,
but that of the universe, while the impulses of the senses
are irrational. The soul, as part of the World-Reason,
must therefore exclude from itself all excitation of feeling,
~" To live in harmony with Nature is to rise into a sphere
where the senses cease to trouble; it is to live in com-
munion with the cosmic power, from which all things
proceed, in cheerful obedience to the eternal destiny,
which, being the will of God, is the divine law. The wise
ijman accepts this life as his first and highest duty. It is
the task which Reason imposes upon him. The Stoics,
Vi EPICTETUS
however, holding that man is by nature social, require
that he lead a social life. The social ideal of the sage is
that of a universal ethical community, and he is indiffer-
ent to forms of government and to actually existing states.
I He is a citizen of the world, demands justice and sympathy
I for all, and refuses to recognise the division of mankind
\^into Greeks and barbarians.
/ The chief stress is laid upon the worth of moral person-
/ality, upon the paramount value of the good that lies
within, though the duty of co-operating with one's fellow-
1 men for the general welfare is inculcated. The metaphys-
ical principle is pantheistic, and involves fatalism; but the
Stoics, preoccupied exclusively with moral ideas and in-
terests, cared little for logical consistency, and stoutly as-
serted the freedom of the will, holding fast to liberty of
choice and to the universality of causation.
Though of Greek origin, stoicism attained its highest
practical significance in Rome, where its doctrines seemed
to be suited to the character of the people. Those stern,
self-controlled, and brave men were attracted by a system
which emphasized the value of independence, courage, and
imperturbability. They found in it a source of the moral
enthusiasm which the pagan religions had no power to
inspire. They were drawn to the society of the philoso-
phers, received them into their houses, and became their
disciples. By daily intercourse with these earnest and
austere teachers, such men as Scipio and Laelius, as Brutus,
Cato, and Cicero, were formed. The prestige and authority
of the preachers of stoicism were heightened by the general
corruption which was undermining the state, and the public
calamities which were becoming more and more frequent.
The noblest souls, despairing of the cause of liberty,
withdrew from politics, and sought consolation in a phi-
losophy which taught them how to bear the ills of life
and how to die. In Rome, where only what is practical
EPICTETUS vii
was rightly appreciated, little attention was given to the
metaphysical presuppositions of stoicism, and the great
teachers, losing sight of the logical requirements of the
system, took what seemed to them true and to the pur-
pose wherever it was found. Indeed, contradiction and
inconsistency did not repel, as we have seen, the early
Stoics, and in its Roman development the philosophy be-
came more and more eclectic.
Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius are the three
famous names of this later school of stoicism, and they are
all teachers of the conduct of life, in love with inner per-
fection, and comparatively heedless of mere speculation.
In the midst of the general decadence and threatening col-
lapse of the civilized world, they sought to rouse con-
science; and as the pagan religion could do nothing for
them, they strove to give a kind of sacredness to human
wisdom. To derive profit from their works it is not neces-
sary to understand their theories. All that is required is an
open mind and a tractable heart. What is speculative dis-
appears in the presence of the practical worth of the truths,
they utter. To read them aright we need an attentive andi
devout spirit rather than an acute and curious intellect. \
Of these three teachers of the later stoicism, Epictetus is
the noblest character and the greatest authority. His life
is more completely in harmony with his doctrine. He rises
in moral elevation to the level of his maxims and precepts.
His purity equals his insight. He is the venerable sage.
He is the saint of a philosophical religion, a man who from
an abject condition raised himself to the worthiest dis-
positions of mind and heart, who in the midst of a cor-
rupt society remained unstained and faithful, his thought
fixed on the highest moral ideals, and following to the
end his vocation as a preacher of righteousness — a slave,
a cripple, a pauper, as his epitaph declares, but dear to the
gods. He has drawn for us an ideal of the Stoic sage, in
Viii EPICTETUS
which his own character is portrayed. He accuses neither
God nor man; he controls desire; he knows not anger, nor
resentment, nor envy, nor pity; he fences himself with vir-
tuous shame. He has nothing to conceal; he does not fear
exile or death, for wherever and however he is there also
is God. But it is not enough that he be good in and for
himself. He is a messenger sent by Zeus to instruct men
concerning good and evil, to point out to them that they
walk in wrong ways. He must cry out: " Oh, mortals,
whither are ye hasting? Why do ye tumble about, like
the blind? The good is not in the body; it is not in wealth,
or power, or empire; it lies in yourselves. God has sent
you one to teach you by his example. Take notice of me
that I am without a country, without a house, without an
estate, without a servant: I lie on the ground; have no
wife, no children, no coat, but have only earth and heaven
and one poor cloak. And what need I? Am I not with-
out sorrow, without fear? Am I not free? Did I ever
blame God or man? Did I ever accuse any one? Have
any of you seen me look discontented?" Epictetus is
direct, plain, and earnest in his speech. His style is bare
of ornament, vigorous, and incisive. He is always serious,
often stern, and at times pathetic. He does not deliver
finished discourses, is heedless of rhetorical ornament, and
wholly intent on improving his hearers by inciting them
to the love and practice of virtue. He is not so much an
orator as a brave, genuine man, whose whole being vibrates
in his words, which are vital and electric. They are the
honest and fearless expression of what he thinks in his
heart, of what he feels and lives. They are the utterance
of what is deepest and permanent in man, and therefore
they never lose the power to stimulate and nourish faith in
the worth of a life led in obedience to the divine com-
mands. The simple and straightforward manner in which
he speaks the highest truth has made him a favourite not
EPICTETUS ix
with scholars merely, but with all classes of readers. Who-
ever is persuaded that life is chiefly conduct may derive
help from him. Only the learned can read Plato with
profit, and the fewest of these study him, but an ordinary
mind may find in Epictetus a friend and teacher, for his
philosophy is of the most practical character and easily
understood. Wisdom consists in knowing how to distin-
guish between what is our own and what is not ours.
Our will, our opinions, desires, inclinations, and aversionsi
are ours; the rest — body, possessions, honour, and reputa-l
tion — is not ours. The divine law bids us hold fast to what !
is our own, and make no claim to what is not ours. God
in endowing us with free will gives us control over what/
is ours, but other things he has not placed in our powers
A man's business is with himself, with learning to think'^
rightly and will wisely. Here he is master, here he has'\
full control. Let him give heed to this, and in other things
resign himself with a cheerful heart to the guidance of
the all-wise Father, who rules the whole. Since we can/
not determine the course of Nature, it is our duty to ac-i
cept with courage and resignation whatever befalls. Is\
money, or friend, or wife, or child taken from us, let us re-
member that they never were ours; they were but lent
to us, and have been returned to the owner. Shall we
complain when he asks us to restore what belongs to him?
But it lies with us to have an independent soul and a vic-
torious will, to remain imperturbable, serene, reverent, and
thankful, despite disgrace and misfortune, which can not
touch our inmost being or deprive us of freedom and
virtue. These are the sole good, and so long as they are
ours all else is unimportant. Will that things happen as
they do, and nothing shall happen contrary to thy will.
But how shall I bear the wrongs which the wicked inflict?
May not God choose his agents to demand of thee what
he has lent. Thou art but a player to whom a role has
X EPICTETUS
been assigned. Take cheerfully whatever character is given
thee, whether it be that of a beggar or that of a king. Thyj
sole business is to act well the part to which God has ap-]
pointed thee. Think of him as often as thou breathest, and'
let thy whole study and desire be to know and do his willi
For Epictetus a virtuous life is not a means, but an
end. The sage does right not from the hope of prosperity
and good name, not that he may have health of body and
mind, not because wise behaviour produces a contented
and happy temper, but he does what is just, avoids what
is base, without thought of reward or punishment, im-
pelled solely by a sense of duty. He clings to virtue
though virtue be his death sentence, and though he have
no expectation of a future life. He makes no sacrifice in
abandoning all things for virtue, for virtue is his only
good. He who wishes to please men, who desires to be
known and praised even for his virtue, is not a lover of
virtue, as he who loves money or pleasure or glory is not
a lover of mankind. The wise man's will rolls like a wheel
with steady and even motion toward the one eternal goal,
to which the universe also is drawn. " If there be any!
worth in thee, O man, learn to walk alone and to conj
verse with thyself! "
In the " Manual " Epictetus appears as a stern, uncom-
promising Stoic. In the " Discourses " we find him in the
midst of his friends and disciples, where he takes a more
human and sympathetic tone. Here he infuses into his
morality the glow of religion, which makes it vital and
effective. We are not always made to feel that virtue lacks
vigour, unless it be hard and repellent, that pride heightens
truth, or that insolence is a mark of goodness, or that
harshness is zeal, or modest assertion of opinion a com-
promise with error. We almost seem to hear Thrasea
declare that he fears to hate even vice too much, lest per-
chance he come to hate his fellow-men. It is in the " Dis-
EPICTETUS xi
courses " that he tells us that the true Stoic is " the father
of mankind; that all men are his sons and all women his
daughters. He attends to all, takes care of all. Is it from
impertinence that he rebukes those he meets? He does it
as a father, as a brother, as a minister of the common
parent, Zeus." He does not marry, he has no children,
he accepts no office, that nothing may interfere with the
work which God has given him to do. He is careful of
his health and appearance, lest he repel those whom he
wishes to attract. Above all, he is clean of heart, for how,'^
if he is himself guilty, shall he reprove others? He watches ''■
and labours for men, becomes purer day by day; he rules
all his thoughts as the friend, as the minister of the gods,
as a partner in the empire of Zeus. He has, besides, so
much patience as to appear to the vulgar insensible and
like a stone; " for there is this fine circumstance connected
with the character of a Cynic: that he must be beaten like
an ass, and yet when beaten must love those who beat
him as the father, as the brother of all."
Epictetus does not reject the pantheism of the Stoics
nor the polytheism of his age, but whatever his theological
opinions, which seem to have been vague, he does not
think of God as an indeterminate somewhat, but as a per-
son to whom he is bound by ties of obedience, reverence,
and love; and though he often speaks of the gods, the
Supreme Being is never absent from his mind. He is the
creator of the world and the ruler of all things. He can
not conceive that the universe should have come into ex-|
istence or should continue without God. The glory and
harmony of the creation fill him with devout enthusiasm.
*' What can I, a lame old man, do other than praise God?
Were I a nightingale, I should perform the office of a
nightingale; were I a swan, that of a swan; but as I am
a rational being, I must praise God. This is my work,
this I do, nor shall I cease from the task while life is left
Xii EPICTETUS
me. And upon you also I call to intone this hymn." With
his last breath he hopes still to continue his sacred song:
f " Nothing but thanks to thee do I utter, because thou
hast deemed me worthy to partake with thee of life's feast,
to behold thy works, and to follow thy government of
the world." Day and night he is mindful of the divine
commands; his thoughts are raised to Heaven, and in
earthly things he sees God, not as the Creator alone, but
also as the Father who watches over his children and has
care of even the least among them.
Epictetus takes what seems to him true and good
wherever it be found. He has no respect for mere theory,
and prizes only the knowledge which is brought to bear
on the conduct of life. The beginning of philosophy, he
says, is the turning from intellectual conceit and the recog-
nition of one's own helplessness in the most indispensable
things. To talk like a Stoic is easy; to live like one is)
difficult. He challenges his hearers to show him one whose
life is in harmony with his principles. And yet all that
is needed is the will. Will, and thou art free. From with-*
in come salvation and ruin. If the heart is set upon ex-
ternal things, a god can not rescue thee. But let us forget
the past, he cries, and begin anew. God has placed us in?
the midst of the battle of life ; we have sworn to be true to
him, our king and leader, to defend at whatever cost the
post he has assigned us. " I am thine. Where will'st thouj
that I live — in Rome, or Athens, or Thebes, or on the des-
ert island of Gyara? Only, be mindful of me there."
Epictetus is not a Christian : he knows nothing of God's
anger and mercy, of guilt and punishment, of redemption
and forgiveness. In contradiction with his doctrine of
providence, he holds to the old Stoic tradition which per-
mits suicide, and in certain cases makes it a duty. He
who can live content wherever God places him is ready
to quit the tabernacle of the soul if the house is too full
EPICTETUS Xiii
of smoke. Though not a Christian, he certainly knew
something of the Christian religion. He lived in Rome
as student and teacher of philosophy from the year 73 to
95, and at this time Christianity had penetrated even the
higher circles of Roman society; and the charge of atheism
which caused Domitian to send the philosophers into exile
led him also to banish the Christians, many of whom suf-
fered martyrdom while Epictetus was delivering his dis-
courses at Nicopolis. He takes occasion to mention the
heroism with which these Galileans, as he calls them, met
death. They die without fear, he says, not from ignorance
of the danger, nor from weariness of life, nor from mad-
ness, nor yet from philosophic conviction, but from habit.
Galileans is not the name by which the Roman writers of
this period designate the Christians. They did not call
themselves Galileans, and to the Jews they were known as
Nazarenes. It is probable, therefore, that Epictetus found
the word in the New Testament writings, where the epithet
is not infrequently applied to the followers of Jesus. Galen,
who was educated in the Stoic philosophy and who lived
but a short time after Epictetus, speaks of the contempt
for death shown by " those men who are called Chris-
tians." He goes on to say that their doctrines are deliv-
ered in parables, which are more easily understood than
abstruse arguments, and that their lives are in many re-
spects like to that of the true philosophers. In fact, while
the world view of the Stoic differs radically from the Chris-
tian, the moral teaching of the pagan philosopher and of
the follower of Christ is often much the same. Both at-
tach the highest importance to religious faith and senti-
ment; both hold that virtue is the chief good; both em-
phasize the principle of liberty, and draw from it that of
free personality; both declare that man holds his earthly
possessions as a steward of the divine owner, to whom he
is responsible for the use he makes of them.
xiv EPICTETUS
The early Stoics had taught in a general way that men
are the children of God, but in Epictetus the doctrine is
developed with a fulness which is found in no writer before
the birth of Christ. He preaches with fiery zeal that all
men are children of God, and that even slaves must be con-
sidered and treated as brothers. For him, as in the Gos-
pel, every human being is one's neighbour. His ideal of
the Cynic or perfect Stoic is that of a Christian apostle;
his view of celibacy seems to have been taken from St.
Paul. The portrait he draws of Hercules, as a conscious
son of God and saviour of the world, is very like the char-
acter of the divine Master as revealed in the New Testa-
ment, and unlike that of the traditional Hercules, who
stands at the parting of the ways.
But Epictetus — though he certainly knew something of
the Christian faith, and though his " Manual " was a favour-
ite book of some of the early Christians, and became, with
simply a change of certain words, a kind of rule for St.
Nilus and the anchorets of Mount Sinai — remains a Stoic.
For him God is not love, but the eternal destiny, and his
enthusiasm for humanity is dominated by his resignation
to fate. His religion is a philosophical piety founded on
self-surrender to the inexorable laws of Nature. He is,
nevertheless, one of those who have had the clearest in-
sight into the duties of man, and his utterances have now
for eighteen hundred years been a source of patience, cour-
age, and strength to minds of widely varying opinions and
beliefs. He is a genuine man, whose true image looks out
upon us from these " Discourses." In reading him we
lose sight of his metaphysical theories, and are mindful
only of the great principles which he expresses with rare
force and which underlie all right human life.
John Lancaster Spalding.
THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE
ARRIAN to LUCIUS GELLIUS, zvith wishes for his
happiness: I neither^ wrote these " Discourses ^ of
Epictetus " in the way in which a man might write
such things; nor did I make them public myself, inasmuch
as I declare that I did not even write them. But whatever
I heard him say, the same I attempted to write down in
his own words as nearly as possible, for the purpose of pre-
serving them as memorials to myself afterward of the
thoughts and the freedom of speech of Epictetus. Ac-
cordingly, the " Discourses " are naturally such as a man
would address without preparation to another, not such
as a man would write with the view of others reading
them. Now, being such, I do not know how they fell
into the hands of the public, without either my consent or
my knowledge. But it concerns me little if I shall be con-
sidered incompetent to write; and it concerns Epictetus
not at all if any man shall despise his words; for at the.
time when he uttered them it was plain that he had no
other purpose than to move the minds of his hearers to
the best things. If, indeed, these " Discourses " should
produce this eflfect, they will have, I think, the result which
the words of philosophers ought to have. But if they shall
not, let those who read them know that, when Epictetus
delivered them, the hearer could not avoid being affected
in the way that Epictetus wished him to be. But if the
xvi EPICTETUS
" Discourses " themselves, as they are written, do not effect
this result, it may be that the fault is mine, or, it may be,
that the thing is unavoidable.
Farewell!
Note
* A. Gellius (i, 2, and xvii, 19) speaks of the " Discourses of Epictetus "
as arranged by Arrian ; Gellius (xix, i) speaks of a fifth book of these
" Discourses," but only four are extant and some fragments. The whole
number of books was eight, as Photius (Cod. 58) says. There is also an
" Encheiridion " or " Manual," consisting of short pieces selected from
the " Discourses of Epictetus," and the valuable commentary on the
" Encheiridion" written by Simplicius in the sixth century a. d., in the
reign of Justinian.
Arrian explains in a manner what he means by saying that he did not
write these " Discourses of Epictetus" ; but he does not explain his mean-
ing when he says that he did not make them public. He tells us that he
did attempt to write down in the words of Epictetus what the philosopher
said ; but how it happened that they were first published, without his
knowledge or consent, Arrian does not say. It appears, however, that he
did see the "Discourses" when they were published; and as Schweig-
Jiauser remarks, he would naturally correct any errors that he detected,
and so there would be an edition revised by himself. Schweighauser
has a note (i, ch. 26, 13) on the difficulties which we now find in the
" Discourses."
CONTENTS
BOOK I
CHAPTHR PACK
I, Of the things that are in our power, and not in our power . i
II. How a man on every occasion can maintain his proper
character 6
III. How a man should proceed from the principle of God being
the Father of all men to the rest lo
IV. Of progress or improvement 12
V. Against the academics 16
VI. Of Providence 17
VII. Of the use of sophistical, hypothetical, and the like argu-
ments . . . . . . . . . .21
VIII. That the faculties are not safe to the uninstructed . . 25
IX. How from the fact that we are akin to God a man may
proceed to the consequences 27
X. Against those who eagerly seek preferment at Rome . . 31
XI. Of natural aflfection 33
XII. Of contentment 37
XIII. How everything may be done acceptably to the gods . . 41
XIV. That the Deity oversees all things 42
XV. What philosophy promises 44
XVI. Of Providence 45
XVII. That the logical art is necessary 47
XVIII. That we ought not to be angry with the errors (faults) of
others 51
XIX. How we should behave to tyrants 55
XX. How reason contemplates itself 58
XXI. Against those who wish to be admired . . , .61
XXII. Of prascognitions 62
XXIII. Against Epicurus 65
XXIV. How we should struggle with circumstances . . .66
XXV. On the same subject 69
XXVI. What the law of life is 73
xvii
XVlll
EPICTETUS
CHAPTER
XXVIl.
XXVIII.
, XXIX.
XXX.
In how many ways appearances exist, and what aids
we should provide against them 76
That we ought not to be angry with men ; and what are
the small and great things among men ... 79
On constancy (or firmness) 83
What we ought to have ready in difficult circumstances 91
92
98
Id
102
104
108
112
114
119
123
127
130
BOOK II
I. That courage is not inconsistent with caution .
II. Of tranquility (freedom from perturbation)
III. To those who recommend persons to philosophers.
IV. Against a person who had once been detected in adul
tery .......
V. How magnanimity is consistent with care
VI. Of indifference ......
VII. How we ought to use divination
VIII. What is the nature of the good
IX. That when we can not fulfil that which the character of
a man promises, we assume the character of a philoso-
pher
X. How we may discover the duties of life from names
XI. What the beginning of philosophy is ....
XII. Of disputation or discussion
XIII. On anxiety (solicitude) 133
XIV. To Naso 137
XV. To or against those who obstinately persist in what they
have determined 141
XVI. That we do not strive to use our opinions about good
and evil
XVII. How we must adapt preconceptions to particular cases .
XVIII. How we should struggle against appearances .
XIX. Against those who embrace philosophical opinions only
in words
XX. Against the Epicureans and Academics ....
XXI. Of inconsistency 170
XXII. On friendship 173
XXIII. On the power of speaking 179
XXIV. To (or against) a person who was one of those who
were not valued (esteemed) by him . . . .186
XXV. That logic is necessary 190
XXVI. What is the property of error 191
144
150
155
159
164
CONTENTS
XIX
BOOK III
CHAPTER FACE
I. Of finery in dress 192
II. In what a man ought to be exercised who has made profi-
ciency; and that we neglect the chief things . . . 198
III. What is the matter on which a good man should be em-
ployed, and in what we ought chiefly to practise ourselves 201
IV. Against a person who showed his partisanship in an un-
seemly way in a theatre 204
V. Against those who on account of sickness go away home . 206
VI. Miscellaneous 209
VII. To the administrator of the free cities who was an Epi-
curean • . . .211
VIII. How we must exercise ourselves against appearances . 216
IX. To a certain rhetorician who was going up to Rome on a
suit 217
X. In what manner we ought to bear sickness . . . 220
XI. Certain miscellaneous matters 223
XII. About exercise 224
XIII. What solitude is, and what kind of person a solitary man is 227
XIV. Certain miscellaneous matters 231
XV. That we ought to proceed with circumspection in every-
thing 233
XVI. That we ought with caution to enter into familiar inter-
course with men 236
XVII. Of Providence 238
XVIII. That we ought not to be disturbed by any news . . 239
XIX. What is the condition of a common kind of man and of a
philosopher 240
XX. That we can derive advantage from all external things . . 241
XXI. Against those who readily come to the profession of
sophists 244
XXII. About cynicism 248
XXIII. To those who read and discuss for the sake of ostentation 263
XXIV. That we ought not to be moved by a desire for those
things which are not in our power 269
XXV. To those who fall off (desist) from their purpose . . 285
XXVI. To those who fear want 287
BOOK IV
I. About freedom , .
II. Of familiar intimacy
III. What things we should exchange for other things
293
319
321
XX EPICTETUS
CHAPTER TAGM
IV. To those who are desirous of passing life in tranquility . 323
V. Against the quarrelsome and ferocious .... 330
VI. Against those who lament over being pitied . . . 336
VII. On freedom from fear 342
VIII. Against those who hastily rush into the use of the philo-
sophic dress 349
IX, To a person who had been changed to a character of
shamelessness 355
X. What things we ought to despise and what things we
ought to value 358
XI. About purity (cleanliness) 364
XII. On attention 369
XIII. Against or to those who readily tell their affairs . . 372
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
FACING
PAGE
The Fates Frontispiece
From a painting by Paul Thumann.
Diogenes 66
From a painting by Jean L£an G6r6me.
The Augurs 202
From a painting by Jean Ldon G^rflme.
I
MEDITATIONS
Marcus Aurelhjs Frontispiece
From a bust in Rome.
Hadrian's Tomb 78
DISCOURSES
BOOK I
CHAPTER I
OF THE THINGS WHICH ARE IN OUR POWER, AND NOT IN OUR
POWER
OF all the faculties (except that which I shall soon
mention), you will find not one which is capable of
contemplating itself, and, consequently, not capa-
ble either of approving or disapproving. How far
does the grammatic art possess the contemplating power?
As far as forming a judgment about what is written and
spoken. And how far music? As far as judging about
melody. Does either of them then contemplate itself? By
no means. But when you must write something to your
friend, grammar will tell you what words you should write ;
but whether you should write or not, grammar will not tell
you. And so it is with music as to musical sounds; but
whether you should sing at the present time and play on the
lute, or do neither, music will not tell you. What faculty
then will tell you? That which contemplates both itself
and all other things. And what is this faculty? The
rational faculty ; for this is the only faculty that we have re-
ceived which examines itself, what it is, and what power it
has, and what is the value of this gift, and examines all other
faculties: for what else is there which tells us that golden
X 1
2 EPICTETUS
things are beautiful, for they do not say so themselves?
Evidently it is the faculty which is capable of judging of ap-
pearances.* What else judges. of music, grammar, and the
other faculties, proves their uses, and points out the occa-
sions for using them? Nothing else.
As then it was fit to be so, that which is best of all
and supreme over all is the only thing which the gods have
placed in our power, the right use of appearances; but all
other things they have not placed in our power. Was it be-
cause they did not choose ? I indeed think that, if they had
been able, they would have put these other things also in our
power, but they certainly could not.^ For as we exist on the
earth, and are bound to such a body and to such companions,
how was it possible for us not to be hindered as to these
things by externals ?
But what says Zeus? Epictetus, if it were possible, I
would have made both your little body and your little prop-
erty free and not exposed to hindrance. But now be not
ignorant of this : this body is not yours, but it is clay finely
tempered. And since I was not able to do for you what I
have mentioned, I have given you a small portion of us,^ this
faculty of pursuing an object and avoiding it, and the faculty
of desire and aversion, and, in a word, the faculty of using
the appearances of things ; and if you will take care of this
faculty and consider it your only possession, you will never
be hindered, never meet with impediments; you will not
lament, you will not blame, you will not flatter any person.
Well, do these seem to you small matters? I hope not.
Be content with them then and pray to the gods. But now
when it is in our power to look after one thing, and
to attach ourselves to it, we prefer to look after many
things, and to be bound to many things, to the body
and to property, and to brother and to friend, and to
child and to slave. Since then we are bound to many
things, we are depressed by them and dragged down. For
this reason, when the weather is not fit for sailing, we sit
down and torment ourselves, and continually look out to see
what wind is blowing. It is north. What is that to us?
When will the west wind blow? When it shall choose, my
good man, or when it shall please .^olus; for God has not
DISCOURSES 3
made you the manager of the winds, but ^olus. What
then ? We must make the best use that we can of the things
which are in our power, and use the rest according to their
nature. What is their nature then ? As God may please.
Must I then alone have my head cut off? What, would
you have all men lose their heads that you may be con-
soled? Will you not stretch out your neck as Lateranus*
did at Rome when Nero ordered him to be beheaded ? For
when he had stretched out his neck, and received a feeble
blow, which made him draw it in for a moment, he stretched
it out again. And a little before, when he was visited by
Epaphroditus,"^ Nero's freedman, who asked him about the
cause of offence which he had given, he said, "If I choose to
tell anything, I will tell your master."
What then should a man have in readiness in such circum-
stances ? What else than this ? What is mine, and what is
not mine ; and what is permitted to me, and what is not per-
mitted to me. I must die. Must I then die lamenting? I
must be put in chains. Must I then also lament? I must
go into exile. Does any man then hinder me from going
with smiles and cheerfulness and contentment ? Tell me the
secret which you possess. I will not, for this is in my power.
But I will put you in chains.® Man, what are you talking
about? Me in chains? You may fetter my leg, but my
will not even Zeus himself can overpower. I will throw you
into prison. My poor body, you mean. I will cut your
head off. When then have I told you that my head alone
can not be cut off ? These are the things which philosophers
should meditate on, which they should write daily, in which
they should exercise themselves.
Thrasea"^ used to say, I would rather be killed to-day than
be banished to-morrow. What then did Rufus^ say to him ?
If you choose death as the heavier misfortune, how great
is the folly of your choice? But if, as the lighter, who has
given you the choice ? Will you not study to be content with
that which has been given to you ?
What then did Agrippinus® say? He said, "I am not a
hindrance to myself." When it was reported to him that
his trial was going on in the Senate, he said, "I hope it may
turn out wellj but it is the fifth hour of the day" — this was
^ EPICTETUS
the time when he was used to exercise himself and then take
the cold bath — "let us go and take our exercise." After he
had taken his exercise, one comes and tells him, "You have
been condemned." "To banishment," he replies, "or to
death?" "To banishment." "What about my property?"
"It is not taken from you." "Let us go to Aricia, then,"^^
he said, "and dine."
This it is to have studied what a man ought to study;
to have made desire, aversion, free from hindrance, and free
from all that a man would avoid. I must die. If now, I
am ready to die. If, after a short time, I now dine because
it is the dinner-hour ; after this I will then die. How ? Like
a man who gives up what belongs to another.
NOTES
* The Stoics gave the name of appearances ( <f)avra6tat) to all im-
pressions received by the senses, and to all emotions caused by external
things.
* Compare Antoninus, ii. 3. Epictetus does not intend to limit the
power of the gods, but he means that the constitution of things being
what it is, they can not do contradictories. They have so constituted
things that man is hindered by externals. How then could they give
to man a power of not being hindered by externals? Seneca (De
Providentia) says : "But it may be said, many things happen which
cause sadness, fear, and are hard to bear. Because (God says) I could
not save you from them, I have armed your minds against all." This is
the answer to those who imagine that they have disproved the common
assertion of the omnipotence of God, when they ask whether He can
combine inherent contradictions, whether He can cause two and two to
make five. This is indeed a very absurd way of talking.
* Schweighauser observes that these faculties of pursuit and avoid-
ance, and of desire and aversion, and even the faculty of using appear-
ances, belong to animals as well as to man ; but animals in using ap-
pearances are moved by passion only, and do not understand what they
are doing, while in man these passions are under his control. Salmasius
proposed to change rifiiTspov into vjuerepov, to remove the difficulty
about these animal passions being called "a small portion of us (the
gods)." Schweighauser, however, though he sees the difficulty, does
not accept the emendation. Perhaps Arrian has here imperfectly repre-
sented what his master said, and perhaps he did not.
* Plautius Lateranus, consul-elect, was charged with being engaged
in Piso's conspiracy against Nero. He was hurried to execution without
being allowed to see his children ; and though the tribune who executed
him was privy to the plot, Lateranus said nothing. (Tacit. Ann. xv.
49, 60.)
Epaphroditus was a freedman of Nero, and once the master of
Epictetus. He was Nero's secretary. One good act is recorded of
him : he helped Nero to kill himself, and for this act he was killed by
Domitian (Suetonius, Domitian, c. 14).
DISCOURSES 5
' This is an imitation of a passage in the Bacchae of Euripides (v.
492, etc.), which is also imitated by Horace (Epp. i. 16).
' Thrasea Paetus, a Stoic philosopher, who was ordered in Nero's
time to put himself to death (Tacit. Ann. xvi. 21-35). He was the
husband of Arria, whose mother Arria, the wife of Caecina Paetus,
in the time of the Emperor Claudius, heroically showed her husband
the way to die (Plinius, Letters, iii. 16). Martial has immortalised the
elder Arria in a famous epigram (i. 14) : —
"When Arria to her Paetus gave the sword
Which her own hand from her chaste bosom drew,
'This wound,' she said, 'believe me, gives no pain,
But that will pain me which thy hand will do.' "
• C. Musonius Rufus, a Tuscan by birth, of equestrian rank, a phi-
losopher and Stoic (Tacit. Hist. iii. 81).
* Paconius Agrippinus was condemned in Nero's time. The charge
against him was that he inherited his father's hatred of the head of the
Roman state (Tacit. Ann. xvi. 28). The father of Agrippinus had been
put to death under Tiberius (Suetonius, Tib. c. 61).
" Aricia, about twenty Roman miles from Rome, on the Via Appia.
CHAPTER II
HOW A MAN ON EVERY OCCASION CAN MAINTAIN HIS PROPER
CHARACTER
TO the rational animal only is the irrational intolerable ;
but that which is rational is tolerable. Blows are
not naturally intolerable. How is that? See how
the Lacedaemonians^ endure whipping when they
have learned that whipping is consistent with reason. To
hang yourself is not intolerable. When then you have the
opinion that it is rational, you go and hang yourself. In
short, if we observe, we shall find that the animal man is
pained by nothing so much as by that which is irrational;
and, on the contrary, attracted to nothing so much as to that
which is rational.
But the rational and the irrational appear in a different
way to different persons, just as the good and the bad, the
profitable and the unprofitable. For this reason, particu-
larly, we need discipline, in order to learn how to adapt the
preconception of the rational and the irrational to the several
things comformably to nature. But in order to determine
the rational and the irrational, we use not only the estimates
of external things, but we consider also what is appropriate
to each person. For to one man it is consistent with reason
to hold a chamber pot for another, and to look to this only,
that if he does not hold it, he will receive stripes, and he will
not receive his food : but if he shall hold the pot, he will not
suffer anything hard or disagreeable. But to another man
not only does the holding of a chamber pot appear intolerable
for himself, but intolerable also for him to allow another to
do this office for him. If then you ask me whether you
should hold the chamber pot or not, I shall say to you that
the receiving of food is worth more than the not receiving of
it, and the being scourged is a greater indignity than not
being scourged; so that if you measure your interests by
these things, go and hold the chamber pot. "But this," you
say, "would not be worthy of me." Well then, it is you
6
DISCOURSES 7
who must introduce this consideration into the inquiry, not
I ; for it is you who know yourself, how much you are worth
to yourself, and at what price you sell yourself ; for men sell
themselves at various prices.
For this reason, when Florus was deliberating whether he
should go down to Nero's^ spectacles, and also perform in
them himself, Agrippinus said to him, "Go down" : and
when Florus asked Agrippinus, "Why do not you go down?"
Agrippinus replied, "Because I do not even deliberate about
the matter." For he who has once brought himself to delib-
erate about such matters, and to calculate the value of exter-
nal things, comes very near to those who have forgotten their
own character. For why do you ask me the question,
whether death is preferable or life? I say life. Pain or
pleasure? I say pleasure. "But if I do not take a part in the
tragic acting, I shall have my head struck off." Go then and
take a part, but I will not. "Why?" Because you con-
sider yourself to be only one thread of those which are in the
tunic. Well then it was fitting for you to take care how you
should be like the rest of men, just as the thread has no de-
sign to be anything superior to the other threads. But I
wish to be purple,' that small part which is bright, and makes
all the rest appear graceful and beautiful. Why then do
you tell me to make myself like the many ? and if I do, how
shall I still be purple ?
Priscus Helvidius* also saw this, and acted conformably.
For when Vespasian sent and commanded him not to go into
the senate, he replied, "It is in your power not to allow me
to be a member of the senate, but so long as I am, I must go
in." "Well, go in then," says the emperor, "but say noth-
ing." "Do not ask my opinion, and I will be silent." "But
I must ask your opinion." "And I must say what I think
right." "But if you do, I shall put you to death." "When
then did I tell you that I am immortal? You will do your
part, and I will do mine : it is your part to kill ; it is mine to
die, but not in fear : yours to banish me ; mine to depart with-
out sorrow."
What good then did Priscus do, who was only a single
person? And what good does the purple do for the toga?
Why, what else than this, that it is conspicuous in the toga as
8 EPICTETUS
purple, and is displayed also as a fine example to all other
things? But in such circumstances another would have
replied to Caesar who forbade him to enter the senate, "I
thank you for sparing me." But such a man Vespasian
would not even have forbidden to enter the senate, for he
knew that he would either sit there like an earthen vessel, or,
if he spoke, he would say what Caesar wished and add even
more.
In this way an athlete also acted who was in danger of
dying unless his private parts were amputated. His brother
came to the athlete, who was a philosopher, and said, "Come,
brother, what are you going to do ? Shall we amputate this
member and return to the gymnasium?" But the athlete
persisted in his resolution and died. When some one asked
Epictetus, how he did this, as an athlete or a philosopher?
"As a man," Epictetus replied, "and a man who had been
proclaimed among the athletes at the Olympic games and
had contended in them, a man who had been familiar with
such a place, and not merely anointed in Baton's '^ school."
Another would have allowed even his head to be cut off, if
he could have lived without it.-* Such is that regard to char-
acter which is so strong in those who have been accustomed
to introduce it of themselves and conjoined with other things
into their deliberations.
"Come then, Epictetus, shave^ yourself." If I am a philo-
sopher, I answer, I will not shave myself. "But I will take
off your head ?" If that will do you any good, take it off.
Some person asked, how then shall every man among us
perceive what is suitable to his character? "How," he re-
plied, "does the bull alone, when the lion has attacked, dis-
cover his own powers and put himself forward in defence
of the whole herd ? It is plain that with the powers the per-
ception of having them is immediately conjoined : and, there-
fore, whoever of us has such powers will not be ignorant of
them. Now a bull is not made suddenly, nor a brave man ;
but we must discipline ourselves in the winter for the sum-
mer campaign, and not rashly run upon that which does not
concern us,"
Only consider at what price you sell your own will : if
for no other reason, at least for this, that you sell it not for
DISCOURSES 9
a small sum. But that which is great and superior perhaps
belongs to Socrates and such as are like him. Why then,
if we are naturally such, are not a very great number of us
like him ? Is it true then that all horses become swift, that
all dogs are skilled in tracking footprints? What then,
since I am naturally dull, shall I, for this reason, take no
pains ? I hope not. Epictetus is not superior to Socrates ;
but if he is not inferior, this is enough for me; for I shall
never be a Milo,'^ and yet I do not neglect my body; nor
shall I be a Croesus, and yet I do not neglect my property;
nor, in a word, do we neglect looking after anything be-
cause we despair of reaching the highest degree.
NOTES
* The spartan boys used to be whipped at the altar of Artemis Orthia
till blood flowed abundantly, and sometimes till death; but they never
uttered even a groan (Cicero, Tuscul. ii. 14; v. 27).
' Nero was passionately fond of scenic representations, and used to
induce the descendants of noble families, whose poverty made them
consent, to appear on the stage (Tacitus, Annals, xiv. 14, Suetonius,
Nero, 21).
* The "purple" is the broad purple border on the toga named the toga
prcBtexta, worn by certain Roman magistrates and some others, and by
senators, it is said, on certain days (Cic. Phil. ii. 43).
* Helvidius Priscus, a Roman senator and a philosopher, is com-
mended by Tacitus (Hist. iv. 4, 5) as an honest man: "He followed
the philosophers who considered those things only to be good which
are virtuous, those only to be bad which are foul ; and he reckoned
power, rank, and all other things which are external to the mind as
neither good nor bad." Vespasian, probably in a fit of passion, being
provoked by Helvidius, ordered him to be put to death, and then re-
voked the order when it was too late (Suetonius, Vespasianus, 15).
° Baton was elected for two years gymnasiarch or superintendent of
a gymnasium in or about the time of Marcus Aurelius Antoninus.
This is supposed, as Casaubon says, to refer to Domitian's order to
the philosophers to go into exile. Some of them, in order to conceal
their profession of philosophy, shaved their beards. Epictetus would
not take oflF his beard.
' Milo of Croton, a great athlete.
CHAPTER III
HOW A MAN SHOULD PROCEED FROM THE PRINCIPLE OF GOD
BEING THE FATHER OF ALL MEN TO THE REST
IF a man should be able to assent to this doctrine as he
ought, that we are all sprung from God^ in an especial
manner, and that God is the father of both men and of
gods, I suppose that he would never have any ignoble
or mean thoughts about himself. But if Caesar (the em-
peror) should adopt you, no one could endure your arro-
gance; and if you know that you are the son of
Zeus, will you not be elated? Yet we do not so;
but since these two things are mingled in the gen-
eration of man, body in common with the animals,
and reason and intelligence in common with the
gods, many incline to this kinship, which is miserable and
mortal; and some few to that which is divine and happy.
Since then it is of necessity that every man uses everything
according to the opinion which he has about it, those, the
few, who think that they are formed for fidelity and modesty
and a sure use of appearances, have no mean or ignoble
thoughts about themselves ; but with the many it is quite the
contrary. For they say. What am I? A poor, miserable
man, with my wretched bit of flesh. Wretched, indeed ; but
you possess something better than your bit of flesh. Why
then do you neglect that which is better, and why do you
attach yourself to this?
Through this kinship with the flesh, some of us inclining
to it become like wolves, faithless and treacherous and mis-
chievous ; some become like lions, savage and bestial and un-
tamed; but the greater part of us become foxes, and other
worse animals. For what else is a slanderer and a malig-
nant man than a fox, or some other more wretched and
meaner animal? See* then and take care that you do not
become some one of these miserable things.
NOTES
• Epictetus speaks of God (6 Oeos) and the gods. Also conformably
xo
DISCOURSES 1 1
to the practice of the people, he speaks of God under the name of Zeus.
The gods of the people were many, but his God was perhaps one.
"Father of men and gods," says Homer of Zeus, and Virgil says, of
Jupiter, "Father of gods and king of men." Salmasius proposed ana
Tov Qeov.
**0/oare Kai it^odex^^^ MV ^* tovtcov ccico/S'^ts t&v arvxv^o.'^^i^-
Upton compares Matthew xvi. 6; opars Kai itpo6ix'^Te dito r^s ^vf^Viy
etc. Upton remarks that many expressions in Epictetus are not unlike
the style of the Gospels, which were written in the same period in which
Epictetus was teaching. Schweighauser also refers to Wetstein's New
Testament.
CHAPTER IV
OF PROGRESS OR IMPROVEMENT
HE who is making progress, having learned from phi-
losophers that desire means the desire of good
things, and aversion means aversion from bad
things ; having learned too that happiness and tran-
quillity are not attainable by man otherwise than by not fail-
ing to obtain what he desires, and not falling into that which
he would avoid ; such a man takes from himself desire alto-
gether and defers it, and he employs his aversion only on
things which are dependent on his will. For if he attempts
to avoid anything independent of his will, he knows that
sometimes he will fall in with something which he wishes
to avoid, and he will be unhappy. Now if virtue promises
good fortune and tranquillity and happiness, certainly also
the progress towards virtue is progress towards each of these
things. For it is always true that to whatever point the per-
fecting of anything leads us, progress is an approach towards
this point.
How then do we admit that virtue is such as I have said,
and yet seek progress in other things and make a display of
it? What is the product of virtue? Tranquillity. Who
then makes improvement ? Is it he who has read many books
of Chrysippus?^ But does virtue consist in having under-
stood Chrysippus ? If this is so, progress is clearly nothing
else than knowing a great deal of Chrysippus. But now we
admit that virtue produces one thing, and we declare that
approaching near to it is another thing, namely, progress
or improvement. Such a person says one, is already able to
read Chrysippus by himself. Indeed, sir, you are making
great progress. What kind of progress ? But why do you
mock the man ? Why do you draw him away from the per-
ception of his own misfortunes? Will you not show him the
effect of virtue that he may learn where to look for improve-
ment? Seek it there, wretch, where your work lies. And
where is your work? In desire and in aversion, that you
DISCOURSES 13
may not be disappointed in your desire, and that you may
not fall into that which you would avoid; in your pursuit
and avoiding, that you commit no error; in assent and sus-
pension of assent, that you be not deceived. The first
things, and the most necessary, are those which I have
named. But if with trembling and lamentation you seek not
to fall into that which you avoid, tell me how you are im-
proving.
Do you then show me your improvement in these things ?
If I were talking to an athlete, I should say, Show me your
shoulders; and then he might say, "Here are my Halteres."
You and your Halteres^ look to that. I should reply, I
wish to see the effect of the Halteres. So, when |^ou say :
"Take the treatise on the active powers ( opuri), and see how
I have studied it." I reply. Slave, I am not inquiring about
this, but how you exercise pursuit and avoidance, desire and
aversion, how you design and purpose and prepare yourself,
whether conformably to nature or not. If conformably,
give me evidence of it, and I will say that you are making
progress : but if not conformably, be gone, and not only ex-
pound your books, but write such books yourself ; and what
will you gain by it ? Do you not know that the whole book
costs only five denarii? Does then the expounder seem to
be worth more than five denarii ? Never then look for the
matter itself in one place, and progress towards it in another.
Where then is progress? If any of you, withdrawing
himself from externals, turns to his own will {irpoaipea-i?) to
exercise it and to improve it by labour, so as to make it con-
formable to nature, elevated, free, unrestrained, unimpeded,
faithful, modest ; and if he has learned that he who desires
or avoids the things which are not in his power can neither
be faithful nor free, but of necessity he must change with
them and be tossed about with them as in a tempest, and of
necessity must subject himself to others who have the power
to procure or prevent what he desires or would avoid ; finally,
when he rises in the morning, if he observes and keeps these
rules, bathes as a man of fidelity, eats as a modest man ; in
like manner, if in every matter that occurs he works out his
chief principles (rd icporfyovMeva) as the runner does with
14 EPICTETUS
reference to running, and the trainer of the voice
with reference to the voice — this is the man who
has not travelled in vain. But if he has strained
his efforts to the practice of reading books, and
labours only at this, and has travelled for this, I tell him to
return home immediately, and not to neglect his affairs
there; for this for which he has travelled is nothing. But
the other thing is something, . to study how a man can rid
his life of lamentation and groaning, and saying, "Woe to
me," and, "Wretched that I am," and to rid it also of mis-
fortune and disappointment, and to learn what death is, and
exile, and prison, and poison, that he may be able to say
when he is in fetters, "Dear Crito, if it is the will of the
gods that it be so, let it be so" ; and not to say, "Wretched
am I, an old man; have I kept my grey hairs for this?"
Who is it that speaks thus ? Do you think that I shall name
some man of no repute and of low condition? Does not
Priam say this? Does not (Edipus say this? Nay, all
kings say it !^ For what else is tragedy than the perturba-
tions (ndOTj) of men who value externals, exhibited in this
kind of poetry ? But if a man must learn by fiction that no
external things which are independent of the will concern
us, for my part I should like this fiction, by the aid of which
I should live happily and undisturbed. But you must con-
sider for yourselves what you wish.
What then does Chrysippus teach us? The reply is, to
know that these things are not false, from which happiness
comes and tranquillity arises. Take my books, and you will
learn how true and conformable to nature are the things
which make me free from perturbations. O great good for-
tune ! O the great benefactor who points out the way ! To
Triptolemus all men have erected temples and altars, because
he gave us food by cultivation; but to him who discovered
truth and brought it to light and communicated it to all, not
the truth which shows us how to live, but how to live well,
who of you for this reason has built an altar, or a temple, or
has dedicated a statue, or who worships God for this ? Be-
cause the gods have given the vine, or wheat, we sacrifice to
them : but because they jiave produced in the human mind
DISCOURSES 1 5
that fruit by which they designed to show us the truth which
relates to happiness, shall we not thank God for this?
NOTES
* Diogenes Laertius (Chrysippus, lib. vii) states that Chrysippus
wrote seven hundred and five books, or treatises, or whatever the word
crvyypa.jxjj,aTa means. He was born at Soli, in Cilicia, or at Tarsus,
in B.C. 280, as it is reckoned, and on going to Athens he became a pupil
of the Stoic Cleanthes.
' Halteres are gymnastic instruments, literally "leapers." They are
said to have been masses of lead, used for exercise and in making
jumps. The effect of such weights in taking a jump is well known to
boys who have used them. A couple of bricks will serve the purpose.
Martial says (xiv, 49) : —
"Quid pereunt stulto fortes haltere lacerti?
Exercet melius vinea fossa viros."
Juvenal (vi. 421) writes of a woman who uses dumb-bells till she
sweats, and is then rubbed dry by a man,
"Quum lassata gravi ceciderunt brachia massa."
' So kings and such personages speak in the Greek tragedies. Compare
what Marcus Aurelius (xi. 6) says of Tragedy.
CHAPTER V
AGAINST THE ACADEMICS
IF a man, said Epictetus, opposes evident truths, it is not
easy to find arguments by which we shall make him
change his opinion. But this does not arise either from
the man's strength or the teacher's weakness ; for when
the man, though he has been confuted, is hardened like a
stone, how shall we then be able to deal with him by argu-
ment?
Now there are two kinds of hardening, one of the under-
standing, the other of the sense of shame, when a man is
resolved not to assent to what is manifest nor to desist from
contradictions. Most of us are afraid of mortification of
the body, and would contrive all means to avoid such a thing,
but we care not about the soul's mortification. And indeed
with regard to the soul, if a man be in such a state as not to
apprehend anything, or understand at all, we think that he is
in a bad condition : but if the sense of shame and modesty
are deadened, this we call even power (or strength).
Do you comprehend that you are awake? "I do not," the
man replies, "for I do not even comprehend when in my
sleep I imagine that I am awake." Does this appearance
then not differ from the other? "Not at all," he replies.
Shall I still argue with this man? And what fire or what
iron shall I apply to him to make him feel that he is dead-
ened? He does perceive, but he pretends that he does not.
He is even worse than a dead man. He does not see the
contradiction : he is in a bad condition. Another does see it,
but he is not moved, and makes no improvement : he is even
in a worse condition. His modesty is extirpated, and his
sense of shame; and the rational faculty has not been cut
oflf from him, but it is brutalised. Shall I name this strength
of mind ? Certainly not, unless we also name it such in cat-
amites, through which they do and say in public whatever
comes into their head.
i6
CHAPTER VI
OF PROVIDENCE
FROM everything which is or happens in the world, it
is easy to praise Providence, if a man possesses these
two qualities, the faculty of seeing what belongs and
happens to all persons and things, and a grateful dis-
position. If he does not possess these two qualities, one
man will not see the use of things which are and which hap-
pen : another will not be thankful for them, even if he does
know them. If Grod had made colours, but had not made
the faculty of seeing them, what would have been their use ?
None at all. On the other hand, if He had made the faculty
of vision, but had not made objects such as to fall under the
faculty, what in that case also would have been the use of
it ? None at all. Well, suppose that He had made both, but
had not made light? In that case, also, they would have
been of no use. Who is it then who has fitted this to that
and that to this ? And who is it that has fitted the knife to
the case and the case to the knife ? Is it no one?^ And, in-
deed, from the very structure of things which have attained
their completion, we are accustomed to show that the work
is certainly the act of some artificer, and that it has not been
constructed without a purpose. Does then each of these
things demonstrate the workman, and do not visible things
and the faculty of seeing and light demonstrate Him ? And
the existence of male and female, and the desire of each for
conjunction, and the power of using the parts which are con-
structed, do not even these declare the workman? If they
do not, let us consider the constitution of our understanding
according to which, when we meet with sensible objects,
we do not simply receive impressions from them, but we also
select something from them, and subtract something, and
add, compound by means of them these things or those, and,
in fact, pass from some to other things which, in a manner,
resemble them : is not even this sufficient to move some men,
and to induce them not to forget the workman ? If not so,
i 17
1 8 EPICTETUS
let them explain to us what it is that makes each several
thing, or how it is possible that things so wonderful and like
the contrivances of art should exist by chance and from their
own proper motion ?
What, then, are these things done in us only? Many,
indeed, in us only, of which the rational animal had pecu-
liarly need ; but you will find many common to us with irra-
tional animals. Do they then understand what is done ? By
no means. For use is one thing, and understanding is an-
other. God had need of irrational animals to make use of
appearances, but of us to understand the use of appearances.
It is therefore enough for them to eat and drink, and to sleep
and to copulate, and to do all the other things which they
severally do. But for us, to whom He has given also the
intellectual faculty, these things are not sufficient ; for unless
we act in a proper and orderly manner, and conformably to
the nature and constitution of each thing, we shall never at-
tain our true end. For where the constitutions of living be-
ings are different, there also the acts and the ends are differ-
ent. In those animals then whose constitution is adapted
only to use, use alone is enough: but in an animal (man),
which has also the power of understanding the use, unless
there be the due exercise of the understanding, he will never
attain his proper end. Well then God constitutes every ani-
mal, one to be eaten, another to serve for agriculture, an-
other to supply cheese, and another for some like use; for
which purposes what need is there to understand appear-
ances and to be able to distinguish them? But God has
introduced man to be a spectator of God and of His works ;
and not only a spectator of them, but an interpreter. For
this reason it is shameful for man to begin and to end where
irrational animals do; but rather he ought to begin where
they begin, and to end where nature ends in us ; and nature
ends in contemplation and understanding, and in a way of
life conformable to nature. Take care then not to die with-
out having been spectators of these things.
But you take a journey to Olympia to see the work of
Phidias,^ and all of you think it a misfortune to die without
having seen such things. But when there is no need to take
a journey, and where a man is, there he has the works (of
DISCOURSES 19
God) before him, will you not desire to see and understand
them ? Will you not perceive either what you are, or what
you were born for, or what this is for which you have re-
ceived the faculty of sight? But you may say, there are
some things disagreeable and troublesome in life. And are
there none at Olympia? Are you not scorched? Are you
not pressed by a crowd ? Are you not without comfortable
means of bathing ? Are you not wet when it rains ? Have
you not abundance of noise, clamour, and other disagreeable
things? But I suppose that setting all these things off
against the magnificence of the spectacle, you bear and en-
dure. Well then and have you not received faculties by
which you will be able to bear all that happens ? Have you
not received greatness of soul? Have you not received
manliness? Have you not received endurance? And why
do I trouble myself about anything that can happen if I pos-
sess greatness of soul ? What shall distract my mind or dis-
turb me, or appear painful? Shall I not use the power for
the purposes which I received it, and shall I grieve and la-
ment over what happens?
Yes, but my nose runs. For what purpose then, slave,
have you hands ? Is it not that you may wipe your nose ? —
Is it then consistent with reason that there should be run-
ning of noses in the world? — Nay, how much better it is
to wipe your nose than to find fault. What do you think
Hercules would have been if there had not been such a lion,
and hydra, and stag, and boar, and certain unjust and bes-
tial men, whom Hercules used to drive away and clear out?
And what would he have been doing if there had been noth-
ing of the kind ? Is it not plain that he would have wrapped
himself up and have slept ? In the first place then he would
not have been a Hercules, when he was dreaming away all
his life in such luxury and ease; and even if he had been
one, what would have been the use of him ? and what the use
of his arms, and of the strength of the other parts of his
body, and his endurance and noble spirit, if such circum-
stances and occasions had not roused and exercised him?
Well then must a man provide for himself such means of ex-
ercise, and seek to introduce a lion from some place into his
country, and a boar, and a hydra ? This would be folly and
20 EPICTETUS
madness: but as they did not exist, and were found, they
were useful for showing what Hercules was and for exer-
cising him. Come then do you also having observed these
things look to the faculties which you have, and when you
have looked at them, say : Bring now, O Zeus, any difficulty
that thou pleasest, for I have means given to me by thee and
powers' for honouring myself through the things which hap-
pen. You do not so : but you sit still, trembling for fear
that some things will happen, and weeping, and lamenting,
and groaning for what does happen : and then you blame
the gods. For what is the consequence of such meanness
of spirit but impiety? And yet God has not only given us
these faculties ; by which we shall be able to bear everything
that happens without being depressed or broken by it; but,
like a good king and a true father. He has given us these
faculties free from hindrance, subject to no compulsion, un-
impeded, and has put them entirely in our own power, with-
out even having reserved to Himself any power of hindering
or impeding. You, who have received these powers free
and as your own, use them not : you do not even see what you
have received, and from whom ; some of you being blinded
to the giver, and not even acknowledging your benefactor,
and others, through meanness of spirit, betaking yourselves
to fault-finding and making charges against God. Yet I
will show to you that you have powers and means for great-
ness of soul and manliness: but what powers you have for
finding fault and making accusations, do you show me.
NOTES
* Goethe has a short poem, entitled "Gleich und Gleich" (Like and
Like) :
" Ein Blumenglockchen
Vom Boden hervor
War friih gesprosset
In lieblichem Flor;
Da kam ein Bienchen
Und naschte fein : —
Die miissen wohl beyde
Fur einander seyn."
' This work was the colossal chryselephantine statue of Zeus (Jupiter)
by Phidias, which was at Olympia.
'Antoninus (ix. i). Epictetus says that the powers which man has
were given by God : Antoninus says, from nature. They mean the same
thing. See Schweighauser's note.
CHAPTER VII
OF THE USE OF SOPHISTICAL, HYPOTHETICAL, AND LIKE
ARGUMENTS
THE handling of sophistical and hypothetical argu-
ments, and of those which derive their conclusions
from questioning, and in a word the handling of
all such arguments, relates to the duties of life,
though the many do not know this truth. For in every
matter we inquire how the wise and good man shall discover
the proper path and the proper method of dealing with it.
Let then people either say that the grave man will not de-
scend into the contest of question and answer, or, that if he
does descend into the contest, he will take no care about not
conducting himself rashly or carelessly in questioning and
answering. But if they do not allow either the one or the
other of these things, they must admit that some inquiry
ought to be made into those topics {TOJtGJv) on which question-
ing and answering are particularly employed. For what
is the end proposed in reasoning? To establish true propo-
sitions, to remove the false, to withhold assent from those
which are not plain. Is it enough then to have learned only
this? It is enough, a man may reply. Is it then also
enough for a man, who would not make a mistake in the
use of coined money, to have heard this precept, that he
should receive the genuine drachmae and reject the spuri-
ous? It is not enough. What then ought to be added to
this precept? What else than the faculty which proves and
distinguishes the genuine and the spurious drachmae? Con-
sequently also in reasoning what has been said is it not
enough ; but is it necessary that a man should acquire the
faculty of examining and distinguishing the true and the
false, and that which is not plain? It is necessary. Be-
sides this, what is proposed in reasoning? That you should
accept what follows from that which you have properly
granted. Well, is it then enough in this case also to know
this ? It is not enough ; but a man must learn how one thing
21
22 EPICTETUS
is a consequence of other things, and when one thing follows
from one thing, and when it follows from several collect-
ively. Consider then if it be not necessary that this power
should also be acquired by him who purposes to conduct
himself skilfully in reasoning, the power of demonstrating
himself the several things which he has proposed, and the
power of understanding the demonstrations of others, and of
not being deceived by sophists, as if they were demonstra-
ting. Therefore there has arisen among us the practice and
exercise of conclusive arguments and figures, and it has been
shown to be necessary.
But in fact in some cases we have properly granted the
premises or assumptions, and there results from them some-
thing ; and though it is not true, yet none the less it does re-
sult. What then ought I to do? Ought I to admit the
falsehood ? And how is that possible ? Well, should I say
that I did not properly grant that which we agreed upon?
But you are not allowed to do even this. Shall I then say
that the consequence does not arise through what has been
conceded? But neither is this allowed. What then must
be done in this case ? Consider if it is not this : as to have
borrowed is not enough to make a man still a debtor, but to
this must be added the fact that he continues to owe the
money and that the debt is not paid, so it is not enough to
compel you to admit the inference that you have granted the
premises (rd: Xrjutiard), but you must abide by what you have
granted. Indeed, if the premises continue to the end such as
they were when they were granted, it is absolutely necessary
for us to abide by what we have granted, and we must ac-
cept their consequences : but if the premises do not remain
such as they were when they were granted, it is absolutely
necessary for us also to withdraw from what we granted,
and from accepting what does not follow from the words in
which our concessions were made. For the inference is now
not our inference, nor does it result with our assent, since
we have withdrawn from the premises which we granted.
We ought then both to examine such kinds of premises, and
such change and variation of them (from one meaning to
another) , by which in the course of questioning or answer-
ing, or in making the syllogistic conclusion, or in any other
DISCOURSES 23
such way, the premises tindergo variations, and give occasion
to the fooHsh to be confounded, if they do not see what con-
clusions (consequences) are. For what reason ought we to
examine? In order that we may not in this matter be em-
ployed in an improper manner nor in a confused way.
And the same in hypotheses and hypothetical arguments ;
for it is necessary sometimes to demand the granting of
some hypothesis as a kind of passage to the argument which
follows. Must we then allow every hypothesis that is pro-
posed, or not allow every one ? And if not every one, which
should we allow ? And if a man has allowed an hypothesis,
must he in every case abide by allowing it? or must he
sometimes withdraw from it, but admit the consequences and
not admit contradictions? Yes; but suppose that a man
says, "If you admit the hypothesis of a possibility, I will
draw you an impossibility." With such a person
shall a man of sense refuse to enter into a con-
test, and avoid discussion and conversation with him?
But what other man than the man of sense can
use argumentation and is skilful in questioning and
answering, and incapable of being cheated and deceived
by false reasoning ? And shall he enter into the contest, and
yet not take care whether he shall engage in argument not
rashly and not carelessly? And if he does not take care, how
can he be such a man as we conceive him to be ? But without
some such exercise and preparation, can he maintain a contin-
uous and consistent argument ? Let them show this ; and all
these speculations (^eooptifiara) become superfluous, and are ab-
surd and inconsistent with our notion of a good and serious
man.
Why are we still indolent and negligent and sluggish, and
why do we seek pretences for not labouring and not being
watchful in cultivating our reason? If then I shall make a
mistake in these matters may I not have killed my father?.
Slave, where was there a father in this matter that you could
kill him ? What then have you done ? The only fault that
was possible here is the fault which you have committed.
This is the very remark which I made to Rufus* when he
blamed me for not having discovered the one thing omitted
in a certain syllogism : I suppose, I said, that I have burnt
24 EPICTETUS
the Capitol. "Slave," he replied, "was the thing omitted here
the Capitol ? Or are these the only crimes, to burn the Cap-
itol and to kill your father?" But for a man to use the ap-
pearances presented to him rashly and foolishly and care-
lessly, and not to understand argument, nor demonstration,
nor sophism, nor, in a word, to see in questioning and an-
swering what is consistent with that which we have granted
or is not consistent ; is there no error in this ?
* Rufus is Musonius Rufus (i. i). To kill a father and to burn the
Roman Capitol are mentioned as instances of the greatest crimes. Comp.
Horace, Epode, iii; Cicero, De Amicit. ii; Plutarch, Tib. Gracchus,
C 20.
CHAPTER VIII
THAT THE FACULTIES ARE NOT SAFE TO THE UNINSTRUCTED
IN as many ways as we can change things which are
equivalent to one another, in just so many ways we
can change the forms of arguments {tTtixEiprjMcera) and
enthymemes {iv6vjuT^/iara\ in argumentation. This is
an instance : if you have borrowed and not repaid, you owe
me the money : you have not borrowed and you have not re-
paid ; then you do not owe me the money. To do this skil-
fully is suitable to no man more than to the philosopher ; for
if the enthymeme is an imperfect syllogism, it is plain that
he who has been exercised in the perfect syllogism must be
equally expert in the imperfect also.
Why then do we not exercise ourselves and one another
in this manner ? Because, I reply, at present, though we are
not exercised in these things and not distracted from the
study of morality, by me at least, still we make no progress
in virtue. What then must we expect if we should add this
occupation? and particularly as this would not only be an
occupation which would withdraw us from more necessary
things, but would also be a cause of self-conceit and arro-
gance, and no small cause. For great is the power of argu-
ing and the faculty of persuasion, and particularly if it
should be much exercised, and also receive additional orna-
ment from language: and so universally, every faculty ac-
quired by the uninstructed and weak brings with it the dan-
ger of these persons being elated and inflated by it. For by
what means could one persuade a young man who excels in
these matters, that he ought not to become an appendage^
to them, but to make them an appendage to himself ? Does
he not trample on all such reasons, and strut before us elated
and inflated, not enduring that any man should reprove him
and remind him of what he has neglected and to what he
has turned aside?
What then was not Plato a philosopher?* I reply, and
was not Hippocrates a physician? but you see how Hippo-
25
26 EPICTETUS
crates speaks. Does Hippocrates then speaK thus in respect
of being a physician? Why do you mingle things which
have been accidentally united in the same men? And if
Plato was handsome and strong, ought I also to set to work
and endeavour to become handsome or strong, as if this was
necessary for philosophy, because a certain philosopher was
at the same time handsome and a philosopher? Will you
not choose to see and to distinguish in respect to what men
become philosophers, and what things belong to them in
other respects? And if I were a philosopher, ought you
also to be made lame ?' What then ? Do I take away these
faculties which you possess? By no means; for neither do
I take away the faculty of seeing. But if you ask me what
is the good of man, I can not mention to you anything else
than that it is a certain disposition of the will with respect
to appearances.
NOTES
* A man, as Wolf explains it, should not make oratory, or the art of
speaking, his chief excellence. He should use it to set off something
which is superior.
* Plato was eloquent, and the adversary asks, if that is a reason for
not allowing him to be a philosopher. To which the rejoinder is that
Hippocrates was a physician, and eloquent too, but not as a physician.
' Epictetus was lame.
CHAPTER IX
HOW FROM THE FACT THAT WE ARE AKIN TO GOD A MAN
MAY PROCEED TO THE CONSEQUENCES
IF the things are true which are said by the philosophers
about the kinship between Grod and man, what else re-
mains for men to do than what Socrates did? Never
in reply to the question, to what country you belong,
say that you are an Athenian or a Corinthian, but that you
are a citizen of the world {Koafiioi). For why do you say
that you are an Athenian, and why do you not say that
you belong to the small nook only into which your poor body
was cast at birth? Is it not plain that you call yourself an
Athenian or a Corinthian from the place which has a greater
authority and comprises not only that small nook itself and
all your family, but even the whole country from which the
stock of your progenitors is derived down to you? He then
who has observed with intelligence the administration of
the world, and has learned that the greatest and supreme and
the most comprehensive community is that which is com-
posed of men and God, and that from God have descended
the seeds not only to my father and grandfather, but to all be-
ings which are generated on the earth and are produced, and
particularly to rational beings — for these only are by their
nature formed to have communion with God, being by means
of reason conjoined with him — why should not such a man
call himself a citizen of the world, why not a son of God,*
and why should he be afraid of anything which happens
among men? Is kinship with Caesar (the emperor) or with
any other of the powerful in Rome sufficient to enable us
to live in safety, and above contempt, and without any fear at
all ? and to have God for your maker (flroi77r7?v), and father and
guardian, shall not this release us from sorrows and fears?
But a man may say, "Whence shall I get bread to eat when
I have nothing?"
And how do slaves, and runaways — on what do they rely
when they leave their masters ? Do they rely on their lands
27
28 EPICTETUS
or slaves, or their vessels of silver ? They rely on nothing
but themselves; and food does not fail them.^ And shall it
be necessary for one among us who is a philosopher to travel
into foreign parts, and trust to and rely on others, and not
to take care of himself ; and shall he be inferior to irrational
animals and more cowardly, each of which being self-suffi-
cient, neither fails to get its proper food, nor to find a suit-
able way of living, and one conformable to nature?
I indeed think that the old man' ought to be sitting here,
not to contrive how you may have no mean thoughts nor
mean and ignoble talk about yourselves, but to take care that
there be not among us any young men of such a mind, that
when they have recognised their kinship to God, and that we
are fettered by these bonds — the body, I mean, and its po-
sessions, and whatever else on account of them is necessary
to us for the economy and commerce of life — they should in-
tend to throw off these things as if they were burdens pain-
ful and intolerable, and to depart to their kinsmen. But this
is the labour that your teacher and instructor ought to be
employed upon, if he really were what he should be. You
should come to him and say, "Epictetus, we can no longer
endure being bound to this poor body, and feeding it, and
giving it drink, and rest, and cleaning it, and for the sake of
the body complying with the wishes of these and of those.*
Are not these things indifferent and nothing to us; and is
not death no evil ? And are we not in a manner kinsmen of
God, and did we not come from him ? Allow us to depart
to the place from which we came; allow us to be released at
last from these bonds by which we are bound and weighed
down. Here there are robbers and thieves and courts of
justice, and those who are named tyrants, and think that they
have some power over us by means of the body and its pos-
sessions. Permit us to show them that they have no power
over any man." And I on my part would say, "Friends,
wait for God : when He shall give the signal and release you
from this service, then go to Him ; but for the present endure
to dwell in this place where He has put you : short indeed
is this time of our dwelling here, and easy to bear for those
who are so disposed : for what tyrant or what thief, or what
courts of justice, are formidable to those who have thus con-
DISCOURSES 29
sidered as things of no value the body and the possessions of
the body ? Wait then, do not depart without a reason."
Something like this ought to be said by the teacher to
ingenuous youths. But now what happens? The teacher
is a lifeless body, and you are lifeless bodies. When you
have been well filled to-day, you sit down and lament about
the morrow, how you shall get something to eat. Wretch,
if you have it, you will have it ; if you have it not, you will
depart from life. The door is open. '^ Why do you grieve?
where does there remain any room for tears? and where is
there occasion for flattery ? why shall one man envy another ?
why should a man admire the rich or the powerful, even if
they be both very strong and of violent temper? for what
will they do to us? We shall not care for that which they
can do ; and what we do care for, that they can not do. How
did Socrates behave with respect to these matters ? Why, in
what other way than a man ought to do who was convinced
that he was a kinsman of the gods? "If you say to me
now," said Socrates to his judges,' "we will acquit you on
the condition that you no longer discourse in the way in
which you have hitherto discoursed, nor trouble either our
young or our old men, I shall answer, you make yourselves
ridiculous by thinking that, if one of our commanders has
appointed me to a certain post, it is my duty to keep and
maintain it, and to resolve to die a thousand times rather
than desert it ; but if God has put us in any place and way of
life, we ought to desert it." Socrates speaks like a man
who is really a kinsman of the gods. But we think about
ourselves, as if we were only stomachs, and intestines, and
shameful parts; we fear, we desire; we flatter those who
are able to help us in these matters, and we fear them also.
A man asked me to write to Rome about him, a man who,
as most people thought, had been unfortunate, for formerly
he was a man of rank and rich, but had been stripped of all,
and was living here. I wrote on his behalf in a submissive
manner; but when he had read the letter, he gave it back
to me and said, "I wished for your help, not your pity: no
evil has happened to me."
Thus also Musonius Rufus, in order to try me, used to
say: This and this will befall you from your master; and
30 EPICTETUS
when I replied that these were things which happen In the or-
dinary course of human affairs. Why then, said he, should I
ask him anything when I can obtain it from you? For, in
fact, what a man has from himself, it is superfluous and fool-
ish to receive from another? Shall I then, who am able
to receive from myself greatness of soul and a generous
spirit, receive from you land and money or a magisterial
office ? I hope not : I will not be so ignorant about my own
possessions. But when a man is cowardly and mean, what
else must be done for him than to write letters as you would
about a corpse. Please to grant us the body of a certain per-
son and a sextarius of pure blood. For such a person is, in
fact, a carcase and a sextarius (a certain quantity) of blood
and nothing more. But if he were anything more, he would
know that one man is not miserable through the means of
another.
NOTES
^ So Jesus said, "Our Father which art in heaven." Cleanthes, in his
hymn to Zeus, writes, iK arov yap yivoi; ecrfisv. Compare Acts of
the Apostles, xvii. 28, where Paul quotes these words. It is not true
then that the "conception of a parental deity," as it has been asserted,
was unknown before the teaching of Jesus, and, after the time of
Jesus, unknown to those Greeks who were unacquainted with His teach-
ing.
' In our present society there are thousands who rise in the morning
and know not how they shall find something to eat. Some find their
food by fraud and theft, some receive it as a gift from others, and some
look out for any work that they can find and get their pittance by
honest labour. You may see such men everywhere, if you will keep
your eyes open. Such men, who live by daily labour, live an heroic life,
which puts to shame the well-fed philosopher and the wealthy Christian.
Epictetus has made a great misstatement about irrational animals.
Millions die annually for want of sufficient food ; and many human
beings perish in the same way. We can hardly suppose that he did
not know these facts.
Compare the passage in Matthew vi. 25-34. It is said, v. 26: "Be-
hold the fowls of the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor
gather into bams; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not
much better than they?" The expositors of this passage may be con-
sulted.
* The old man is Epictetus.
* He means, as Wolf says, "on account of the necessities of the body
seeking the favour of the more powerful by disagreeable compliances.''
' Compare Matthew vi. 31 : "Therefore take no thought, saying, What
shall we eat? or, What shall we drink? or. Wherewithal shall we be
clothed? (For after all these things do the Gentiles seek), for your
heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things," etc.
* This passage is founded on and is in substance the same as liiat in
Plato's "Apology," 17.
CHAPTER X.
AGAINST THOSE WHO EAGERLY SEEK PREFERMENT AT ROME
IF we applied ourselves as busily to our own work as the
old men at Rome do to those matters about which they
are employed, perhaps we also might accomplish some-
thing. I am acquainted with a man older than myself,
who is now superintendent of corn^ at Rome, and I remember
the time when he came here on his way back from exile, and
what he said as he related the events of his former life, and
how he declared that with respect to the future after his re-
turn he would look after nothing else than passing the rest
of his life in quiet and tranquillity. "For how little of life,"
he said, "remains for me." I replied, you will not do it, but
as soon as you smell Rome, you will forget all tliat you have
said ; and if admission is allowed even into the imperial pal-
ace, he^ will gladly thrust himself in and thank God. "If
you find me, Epictetus," he answered, "setting even one foot
within the palace, think what you please." Well, what then
did he do ? Before he entered the city, he was met by letters
from Caesar, and as soon as he received them, he forgot
all, and ever has added one piece of business to another. I
wish that I were now by his side to remind him of what he
said when he was passing this way, and to tell him how much
better a seer I am than he is.
Well then do I say that man is an animal made for doing
nothing?* Certainly not. But why are we not active?*
(We are active.) For example, as to myself, as soon as
day comes, in a few words I remind myself of what I must
read over to my pupils ; then forthwith I say to myself. But
what is it to me how a certain person shall read? the first
thing for me is to sleep. And indeed what resemblance is
there between what other persons do and what we do? If
you observe what they do, you will understand. And what
else do they do all day long than make up accounts, enquire
among themselves, give and take advice about some small
quantity of grain, a bit of land, and such kind of profits ? Is
32 EPICTETUS
it then the same thing to receive a petition and to read in it :
I intreat you to permit me to export** a small quantity of
corn; and one to this effect: "I intreat you to learn from
Chrysippus what is the administration of the world, and
what place in it the rational animal holds ; consider also who
you are, and what is the nature of your good and bad." Are
these things like the other, do they require equal care, and
is it equally base to neglect these and those ? Well then are
we the only persons who are lazy and love sleep ? No ; but
much rather you young men are. For we old men when we
see young men amusing themselves are eager to play with
them ; and if I saw you active and zealous, much more should
I be eager myself to join you in your serious pursuits.
NOTES
* A "Praefectus Annonae," or superintendent of the supply of com
at Rome is first mentioned by Livy (iv. 12) as appointed during a
scarcity. At a later time this office was conferred on Cneius Pompeius
for five years. Maecenas advised Augustus to make a Praefectus
Annonae or permanent officer over the corn market and all other mar-
kets. He would thus have the office formerly exercised by the aediles.
' I can not explain why the third person is used here instead of the
second.
* The Stoics taught that man is adapted by his nature for action. He
ought not therefore to withdraw from human affairs, and indulge in a
lazy life, not even a life of contemplation and religious observances only.
* Schweighauser proposes a small alteration in the Greek text, but
I do not think it necessary. When Epictetus says, "Why are we not
active?" He means. Why do some say that we are not active? And
he intends to say that, We are active, but not in the way in which some
people are active. I have therefore added in ( ) what is necessary
to make the text intelligible.
' A plain allusion to restraints put on the exportation of grain.
CHAPTER XI
OF NATURAL AFFECTION
WHEN he was visited by one of the magistrates,
Epictetus inquired of him about several particu-
lars, and asked if he had children and a wife.
The man replied that he had ; and Epictetus in-
quired further, how he felt under the circumstances. "Miser-
able," the man said. Then Epictetus asked, In what respect,
for men do not marry and beget children in order to be
wretched, but rather to be happy. "But I," the man replied,
"am so wretched about my little children that lately, when my
little daughter was sick and was supposed to be in danger, I
could not endure to stay with her, but I left home till a person
sent me news that she had recovered." Well, then, said Epic-
tetus, do you think that you acted right? 'T acted natur-
ally," the man replied. But convince me of this that you
acted naturally, and I will convince you that everything
which takes place according to nature takes place rightly.
"This is the case," said the man, "with all or at least most
fathers." I do not deny that : but the matter about which
we are inquiring is whether such behaviour is right ; for in
respect to this matter we must say that tumours also come
for the good of the body, because they do come ; and gener-
ally we must say that to do wrong is natural, because nearly
all or at least most of us do wrong. Do you show me then
how your behaviour is natural. "I can not," he said ; "but
do you rather show me how it is not according to nature, and
is not rightly done."
Well, said Epictetus, if we were inquiring about white and
black, what criterion should we employ for distinguishing
between them ? "The sight," he said. And if about hot and
cold, and hard and soft, what criterion ? "The touch." Well
then, since we are inquiring about things which are accord-
ing to nature, and those which are done rightly or not
rightly, what kind of criterion do you think that we should
employ? "I do not know," he said. And yet not to know
3 33
34 EPICTETUS
the criterion of colours and smells, and also of tastes, is per-
haps no great harm ; but if a man do not know the criterion
of good and bad, and of things according to nature and
contrary to nature, does this seem to you a small harm?
"The greatest harm (I think)." Come tell me, do all things
which seem to some persons to be good and becoming,
rightly appear such; and at present as to Jews and Syrians
and Egyptians and Romans, is it possible that the opinions
of all of them in respect to food are right? "How is it pos-
sible?" he said. Well, I suppose, it is absolutely necessary
that, if the opinions of the Egyptians are right, the opinions
of the rest must be wrong : if the opinions of the Jews are
right, those of the rest can not be right. "Certainly." But
where there is ignorance, there also there is want of learning
and training in things which are necessary. He assented
to this. You then, said Epictetus, since you know this, for
the future will employ yourself seriously about nothing else,
and will apply your mind to nothing else than to learn the
criterion of things which are according to nature, and by
using it also to determine each several thing. But in the
present matter I have so much as this to aid you towards
what you wish. Does affection to those of your family
appear to you to be according to nature and to be good?
"Certainly." Well, is such affection natural and good, and is
a thing consistent with reason not good? "By no means."
Is then that which is consistent with reason in contradiction
with affection? "I think not." You are right, for if it is
otherwise, it is necessary that one of the contradictions being
according to nature, the other must be contrary to nature.
Is it not so ? "It is," he said. Whatever then we shall dis-
cover to be at the same time affectionate and also consistent
with reason, this we confidently declare to be right and good.
"Agreed." Well then to leave your sick child and to go away
is not reasonable, and I suppose that you will not say that it
is; but it remains for us to inquire if it is consistent with
affection. "Yes, let us consider." Did you then, since you
had an affectionate disposition to your child, do right when
you ran off and left her ; and has the mother no affection for
the child? "Certainly, she has." Ought then the mother
also to have left her, or ought she not? "She ought not."
DISCOURSES 35
And the nurse, does she love her ? "She does." Ought then
she also to have left her? "By no means." And the peda-
gogue.* Does he not love her ? "He does love her." Ought
then he also to have deserted her? and so should the child
have been left alone and without help on account of the great
affection of you the parents and of those about her, or should
she have died in the hands of those who neither loved her nor
cared for her? "Certainly not." Now this is unfair and un-
reasonable, not to allow those who have equal affection with
yourself to do what you think to be proper for yourself to do
because you have affection. "It is absurd." Come then, if
you were sick, would you wish your relations to be so affec-
tionate, and all the rest, children and wife, as to leave you
alone and deserted ? "By no means." And would you wish
to be so loved by your own that through their excessive affec-
tion you would always be left alone in sickness ? or for this
reason would you rather pray, if it were possible, to be loved
by your enemies and deserted by them? But if this is so,
it results that your behaviour was not at all an affectionate
act. Well then, was it nothing which moved you and in-
duced you to desert your child ?
"How is that possible ?" But it might be something of the
kind which moved a man at Rome to wrap up his head while
a horse was running which he favoured; and when
contrary to expectation the horse won, he required
sponges to recover from his faintingfit. "What then
was the motive?" The exact discussion of this does
not belong to the present occasion perhaps; but it
is enough to be convinced of this, if what the philoso-
phers say is true, that we must not look for it anywhere with-
out, but in all cases it is one and the same thing which is the
cause of our doing or not doing something, of saying or not
saying something, of being elated or depressed, of avoiding
any thing or pursuing : the very thing which is now the cause
to me and to you, to you of coming to me and sitting and
hearing, and to me of saying what I do say. "And what is
this ?" Is it any other than our will to do so ? "No other."
But if we had willed otherwise, what else should we have
been doing than that which we willed to do ? This then was
the cause of Achilles' lamentation, not the death of Patro-
36 EPICTETUS
clus ; for another man does not behave thus on the death of
his companion; but it was because he chose to do so. And
to you this was the very cause of your then running away,
that you chose to do so ; and on the other side, if you should
(hereafter) stay with her, the reason will be the same. And
now you are going to Rome because you choose ; and if you
should change your mind, you will not go hither. And in
a word, neither death nor exile nor pain nor anything of
the kind is the cause of our doing anything or not doing ; but
our own opinions and our wills {Soy^ara).
Do I convince you of this or not? "You do convince me."
Such then as the causes are in each case, such also are
the effects. When then we are doing anything not rightly
from this day we shall impute it to nothing else than to the
will {Soyfia or opinion), from which we have done it; and it
is that which we shall endeavour to take away and to extir-
pate more than the tumours and abscesses out of the body.
And in like manner we shall give the same account of the
cause of the things which we do right; and we shall no
longer allege as causes of any evil to us, either slave or
neighbour, or wife or children, being persuaded, that if we
do not think things to be what we do think them to be, we
do not the acts which follow from such opinions ; and as to
thinking or not thinking, that is in our power and not in ex-
ternals. "It is so," he said. From this day then we shall in-
quire into and examine nothing else, what its quality is, or
its state, neither land nor slaves nor horses nor dogs — noth-
ing else than opinions. "I hope so." You see than that you
must become a Scholasticus,^ an animal whom all ridicule,
if you really intend to make an examination of your own
opinions : and that this is not the work of one hour or day,
you know yourself.
NOTES
' " When we are children our parents put us in the hands of a peda-
gogue to see on all occasions that we take no harm." — Epictetus, Frag.
97.
*A Scholasticus is one who frequents the schools; a studious and
literary person, who does not engage in the business of active life.
CHAPTER XII
OF CONTENTMENT
WITH respect to gods, there are some who say that a
divine being does not exist : others say that it ex-
ists, but is inactive and careless, and takes no
forethought about any thing; a third class say
that such a being exists and exercises forethought, but only
about great things and heavenly things, and about nothing
on the earth ; a fourth class say that a divine being exercises
forethought both about things on the earth and heavenly
things, but in a general way only, and not about things sev-
erally. There is a fifth class to whom Ulysses and Soc-
rates belong, who say: "I move not without thy know-
ledge."^
Before all other things then it is necessary to inquire
about each of these opinions, whether it is affirmed truly or
not truly. For if there are no gods, how is it our proper
end to follow them ? And if they exist, but take no care of
anything, in this case also how will it be right to follow
them? But if indeed they do exist and look after things,
still if there is nothing communicated from them to men,
nor in fact to myself, how even so is it right (to follow
them) ? The wise and good man then after considering all
these things, submits his own mind to him who administers
the whole, as good citizens do to the law of the state. He
who is receiving instruction ought to come to be instructed
with this intention, "How shall I follow the gods in all
things, how shall I be contented with the divine administra-
tion, and how can I become free?" For he is free to
whom every thing happens according to his will,
and whom no man can hinder. What then is free-
dom, madness?" Certainly not: for madness and free-
dom do not consist. "But, you say, I would have
every thing result just as I like, and in whatever way
I like." You are mad, you are beside yourself. Do you not
know that freedom is a noble and valuable thing? But for
37
38 EPICTETUS
me inconsiderately to wish for things to happen as I incon-
siderately like, this appears to be not only not noble, but even
most base. For how do we proceed in the matter of writ-
ing? Do I wish to write the name of Dion as I choose?
No, but I am taught to choose to write it as it ought to be
written. And how with respect to music? In the same
manner. And what universally in every art or science?
Just the same. If it were not so, it would be of no value to
know anything, if knowledge were adapted to every man's
whim. Is it then in this alone, in this which is the greatest
and the chief thing, I mean freedom, that I am permitted to
will inconsiderately ? By no means ; but to be instructed is
this, to learn to wish that every thing may happen as it does.
And how do things happen? As the disposer has disposed
them? And he has appointed summer and winter, and
abundance and scarcity, and virtue and vice, and all such
opposites for the harmony of the whole; and to each of us he
has given a body, and parts of the body, and possessions, and
companions.
Remembering then this disposition of things, we ought
to go to be instructed, not that we may change the consti-
tution of things, — for we have not the power to do it, nor is
it better that we should have the power, — but in order that,
as the things around us are what they are and by nature
exist, we may maintain our minds in harmony with the
things which happen. For can we escape from men? and
how is it possible? And if we associate with them, can we
change them? Who gives us the power? What then re-
mains, or what method is discovered of holding commerce
with them? Is there such a method by which they shall
do what seems fit to them, and we not the less shall be in
a mood which is conformable to nature? But you are un-
willing to endure and are discontented : and if you are alone,
you call it solitude ; and if you are with men, you call them
knaves and robbers; and you find fault with your own
parents and children, and brothers and neighbours. But you
ought when you are alone to call this condition by the name
of tranquillity and freedom, and to think yourself like to the
gods ; and when you are with many, you ought not to call it
DISCOURSES 39
crowd, nor trouble, nor uneasiness, but festival and assembly,
and so accept all contentedly.
What then is the punishment of those who do not accept?
It is to be what they are. Is any person dissatisfied with
being alone ? let him be alone. Is a man dissatisfied with his
parents ? let him be a bad son, and lament. Is he dissatisfied
with his children? let him be a bad father. Cast him into
prison. What prison ? Where he is already, for he is there
against his will ; and where a man is against his will, there
he is in prison. So Socrates was not in prison, for he was
there willingly,
"Must my leg then be lamed?" Wretch, do you
then on account of one poor leg find fault with the world?
Will you not willingly surrender it for the whole ? Will you
not withdraw from it? Will you not gladly part with it to
him who gave it ? And will you be vexed and discontented
with the things established by Zeus, which he with the
Moirse (fates) who were present and spinning the thread
of your generation, defined and put in order? Know you
not how small a part you are compared with the whole. I
mean with respect to the body, for as to intelligence you are
not inferior to the gods nor less ; for the magnitude of intelli-
gence is not measured by length nor yet by height, but by
thoughts. Will you not then choose to place your good in
that in which you are equal to the gods ?
"Wretch that I am to have such a father and mother." —
What then, was it permitted to you to come forth
and to select and to say: "Let such a man at this
moment unite with such a woman that I may be pro-
duced ?" It was not permitted, but it was a necessity for your
parents to exist first, and then for you to be begotten. Of
what kind of parents? Of such as they were. Well then,
since they are such as they are, is there no remedy given to
you? Now if you did not know for what purpose you possess
the faculty of vision, you would be unfortunate and wretched
if you closed your eyes when colours were brought before
them ; but in that you possess greatness of soul and nobility
of spirit for every event that may happen, and you know
not that you possess them, are you not more unfortunate and
wretched ? Things are brought close to you which are pro-
40 EPICTETUS
portionate to the power which you possess, but you turn away
this power most particularly at the very time when you ought
to maintain it open and discerning. Do you not rather
thank the gods that they have allowed you to be above these
things which they have not placed in your power, and have
made you accountable only for those which are in your
power? As to your parents, the gods have left you free
from responsibility; and so with respect to your brothers,
and your body, and possessions, and death and life. For
what then have they made you responsible? For that which
alone is in your power, the proper use of appearances. Why
then do you draw on yourself the things for which you are
not responsible? It is, indeed, a giving of trouble to your-
self.
NOTE
* The line is from the prayer of Ulysses to Athena : "Hear me child
of Zeus, thou who standest by me always in all dangers, nor do I even
move without thy knowledge." Iliad, x. 278. Socrates said that the gods
know everything, what is said and done and thought (Xenophon, Mem.
i. I. 19). Compare Cicero, De Nat. Deorum, i. i, 2; and Dr. Price's
Dissertation on Providence, sect. i. Epictetus enumerates the various
opinions about the gods in ancient times. The reader may consult the
notes in Schweighauser's edition. The opinions about God among
modern nations, who are called civilized, and are so more or less, do
not seem to be so varied as in ancient times ; but the contrasts in modern
opinions are striking. These modern opinions vary between denial of a
God, though the number of those who deny is perhaps not large, and the
superstitious notions about God and his administration of the world,
which are taught by teachers, learned and ignorant, and exercise a great
power over the minds of those who are unable or do not dare to exer-
cise the faculty of reason.
CHAPTER XIII
HOW EVERYTHING MAY BE DONE ACCEPTABLY TO THE GODS
WHEN some one asked, how may a man eat accept-
ably to the gods, he answered : If he can eat justly
and contentedly, and with equanimity, and tem-
perately and orderly, will it not be also acceptably
to the gods ? But when you have asked for warm water and
the slave has not heard, or if he did hear has brought only
tepid water, or he is not even found to be in the house, then
not to be vexed or to burst with passion, is not this accept-
able to the gods? — "How then shall a man endure such per-
sons as this slave?" Slave yourself, will you not bear with
your own brother, who has Zeus for his progenitor, and is
like a son from the same seeds and of the same descent from
above ? But if you have been put in any such higher place,
will you immediately make yourself a tyrant ? Will you not
remember who you are, and whom you rule? that they are
kinsmen, that they are brethren by nature, that they are the
ofiFspring of Zeus?^ — "But I have purchased them, and they
have not purchased me." Do you see in what direction you
are looking, that it is towards the earth, towards the pit, that
it is towards these wretched laws of dead men ?^ but towards
the laws of the gods you are not looking.
NOTES
* Mrs. Carter compares Job xxxi. 15 : "Did not he that made me in
the womb make him (my man-servant) ? And did not one fashion us
in the womb?"
' I suppose he means human laws, which have made one man a slave
to another ; and when he says "dead men," he may mean mortal men, as
contrasted with the gods or God, who has made all men brothers.
CHAPTER XIV^
THAT THE DEITY OVERSEES ALL THINGS
WHEN a person asked him how a man could be con-
vinced that all his actions are under the inspec-
tion of Grod, he answered, Do you not think that
all things are united in one? "I do," the person
replied. Well, do you not think that earthly things have a
natural agreement and union with heavenly things? "I do."
And how else so regularly as if by God's command, when
He bids the plants to flower, do they flower ? when He bids
them to send forth shoots, do they shoot? when He bids them
to produce fruit, how else do they produce fruit? when He
bids the fruit to ripen, does it ripen? when again He bids
them to cast down the fruits, how else do they cast them
down ? and when to shed the leaves, do they shed the leaves ?
and when He bids them to fold themselves up and to remain
quiet and rest, how else do they remain quiet and rest ? And
how else at the growth and the wane of the moon, and at the
approach and recession of the sun, are so great an alteration
and change to the contrary seen in earthly things ? But are
plants and our bodies so bound up and united with the whole,
and are not our souls much more? and our souls so bound
up and in contact with God as parts of Him and portions of
Him ; and does not God perceive every motion of these parts
as being his own motion connate with himself? Now are
you able to think of the divine administration, and about all
things divine, and at the same time also about human affairs,
and to be moved by ten thousand things at the same time in
your senses and in your understanding, and to assent to
some, and to dissent from others, and again as to some things
to suspend your judgment; and do you retain in your soul
so many impressions from so many and various things, and
being moved by them_, do you fall upon notions similar to
those first impressed, and do you retain numerous arts and
the memories of ten thousand things ; and is not God able to
oversee all things, and to be present with all, and to receive
43
DISCOURSES 43
from all a certain communication? And is the sun able to
illuminate so large a part of the All, and to leave so little not
illuminated, that part only which is occupied by the earth's
shadow; and He who made the sun itself and makes it go
round, being a small part of himself compared with the
whole, can not He perceive all things ?
"But I can not/' the man may reply, "comprehend all these
things at once." But who tells you that you have equal power
with Zeus? Nevertheless he has placed by every man a
guardian, every man's Daemon, to whom he has committed
the care of the man, a guardian who never sleeps, is never
deceived. For to what better and more careful guardian
could He have intrusted each of us ? When then you have
shut the doors and made darkness within, remember never to
say that you are alone, for you are not; but God is within,
and your Daemon is within, and what need have they of light
to see what you are doing ? To this God you ought to swear
an oath just as the soldiers do to Caesar. But they who are
hired for pay swear to regard the safety of Caesar before all
things ; and you who have received so many and such great
favours, will you not swear, or when you have sworn, will
you not abide by your oath? And what shall you swear?
Never to be disobedient, never to make any charges, never to
find fault with any thing that he has given, and never unwill-
ingly to do or to suffer any thing that is necessary. Is this
oath like the soldier's oath ? The soldiers swear not to prefer
any man to Caesar : in this oath men swear to honour them-
selves before all.'
CHAPTER XV
WHAT PHILOSOPHY PROMISES
WHEN a man was consulting him how he should per-
suade his brother to cease being angry with him,
Epictetus replied, Philosophy does not propose to
secure for a man any external thing. If it did
(or, if it were not, as I say), Philosophy would be allowing
something which is not within its province. For as the car-
penter's material is wood, and that of the statuary is copper,
so the matter of the art of living is each man's life. — "What
then is my brother's life?" — That again belongs to his
own art ; but with respect to yours, it is one of the external
things, like a piece of land, like health, like reputation. But
Philosophy promises none of these. In every circumstance
I will maintain, she says, the governing part conformable to
nature. Whose governing part? His in whom I am, she
says.
"How then shall my brother cease to be angry with me?"
Bring him to me and I will tell him. But I have nothing to
say to you about his anger.
When the man, who was consulting him, said, "I seek to
know this. How, even if my brother is not reconciled to me,
shall I maintain myself in a state conformable to nature?"
Nothing great, said Epictetus, is produced suddenly, since
not even the grape or the fig is. If you say to me now that
you want a fig, I will answer to you that it requires time : let
it flower^ first, then put forth fruit, and then ripen. Is then
the fruit of a fig-tree not perfected suddenly and in one hour,
and would you possess the fruit of a man's mind in so short a
time and so easily ? Do not expect it, even if I tell you.
* " The philosopher had forgot that fig-trees do not blossom" (Mrs.
Carter). The flowers of a fig are inside the fleshy receptacle which
becomes the fruit.
44
CHAPTER XVI
OF PROVIDENCE
DO not wonder if for other animals than man all things
are provided for the body, not only food and drink,
but beds also, and they have no need of shoes nor
bed materials, nor clothing ; but we require all these
additional things. For animals not being made for them-
selves, but for service, it was not fit for them to be made so
as to need other things. For consider what it would be for
us to take care not only of ourselves, but also about cattle and
asses, how they should be clothed, and how shod, and how
they should eat and drink. Now as soldiers are ready for
their commander, shod, clothed, and armed : but it would be
a hard thing for the chiliarch (tribune) to go round and shoe
or clothe his thousand men : so also nature has formed the
animals which are made for service, all ready, prepared, and
requiring no further care. So one little boy with only a stick
drives the cattle.
But now we, instead of being thankful that we need not
take the same care of animals as of ourselves, complain of
God on our own account ; and yet, in the name of Zeus and
the gods, any one thing of those which exist would be
enough to make a man perceive the providence of God, at
least a man who is modest and grateful. And speak not to
me now of the great things, but only of this, that milk is
produced from grass, and cheese from milk, and wool from
skins. Who made these things or devised them? No one,
you say. O amazing shamelessness and stupidity !
Well, let us omit the works of nature, and contemplate her
smaller (subordinate, jrdp«p;KQr) acts. Is there anything
less useful than the hair on the chin ? What then, has not
nature used this hair also in the most suitable manner pos-
sible? Has she not by it distinguished the male and the
female ? does not the nature of every man forthwith proclaim
from a distance, I am a man : as such approach me, as such
speak to me ; look for nothing else ; see the signs ? Again, in
45
46 EPICTETUS
the case of women, as she has mingled something softer in
the voice, so she has also deprived them of hair (on the
chin). You say, not so: the human animal ought to have
been left without marks of distinction, and each of us should
have been obliged to proclaim, "I am a man." But how is not
the sign beautiful and becoming and venerable? how much
more beautiful than the cock's comb, how much more becom-
ing than the lion's mane ? For this reason we ought to pre-
serve the signs which God has given, we ought not to throw
them away, nor to confound, as much as we can, the distinc-
tions of the sexes.
Are these the only works of providence in us ? And what
words are sufficient to praise them and set them forth accord-
ing to their worth? For if we had understanding, ought
we to do any thing else both jointly and severally than to sing
hymns and bless the deity, and to tell of his benefits ? Ought
we not when we are digging and ploughing and eating to
sing this hymn to God? "Great is God, who has given us
such implements with which we shall cultivate the earth :
great is God who has given us hands, the power of swallow-
ing, a stomach, imperceptible growth, and the power of
breathing while we sleep." This is what we ought to sing
on every occasion, and to sing the greatest and most divine
hymn for giving us the faculty of comprehending these
things and using a proper way. Well then, since most of
you have become blind, ought there not to be some man to
fill this office, and on behalf of all to sing the hymn to God?
For what else can I do, a lame old man, than sing hymns to
God? If then I was a nightingale, I would do the part of
a nightingale, if I were a swan, I would do like a swan. But
now I am a rational creature, and I ought to praise Grod : this
is my work; I do it, nor will I desert this post, so long as I
am allowed to keep it; and I exhort you to join in this same
song.
CHAPTER XVII
THAT THE LOGICAL ART IS NECESSARY
SINCE reason is the faculty which analyses* and perfects
the rest, and it ought itself not to be unanalysed, by
what should it be analysed? for it is plain that this
should be done either by itself or by another thing.
Either then this other thing also is reason, or something else
superior to reason ; which is impossible. But if it is reason,
again who shall analyse that reason? For if that reas®n
does this for itself, our reason also can do it. But if we
shall require something else, the thing will go on to infinity
and have no end.^ Reason therefore is analysed by itself.
Yes: but it is more urgent to cure (our opinions^) and the
•like. Will you then hear about those things ? Hear. But
if you should say, "I know not whether you are arguing truly
or falsely," and if I should express myself in any way am-
biguously, and you should say to me "Distinguish," I will
bear with you no longer, and I shall say to you, "It is more
urgent."* This is the reason, I suppose, why they (the Stoic
teachers) place the logical art first, as in the measuring of
corn we place first the examination of the measure. But if
we do not determine first what is a modius, and what is a
balance, how shall we be able to measure or weigh any-
thing? .
In this case then if we have not fully learned and accu-
rately examined the criterion of all other things, by which
the other things are learned, shall we be able to examine accu-
rately and to learn fully anything else ? How is this possi-
ble ? Yes ; but the modius is only wood, and a thing which
produces no fruit. — But it is a thing which can measure
corn. — Logic also produces no fruit. — As to this indeed we
shall see: but then even if a man should grant this, it is
enough that logic has the power of distinguishing and ex-
amining other things, and, as we may say, of measuring and
weighing them. Who says this? Is it only Chrysippus,
and Zeno, and Cleanthes? And does not Antisthenes say
47
48 EPICTETUS
SO ?* And who is it that has written that the examination of
names is the beginning of education? And does not Soc-
rates say so? And of whom does Xenophon write, that
he began with the examination of names, what each name
signified?® Is this then the great and wondrous thing to
understand or interpret Chryisippus? Who says this? —
What then is the wondrous thing? — To understand the will
of nature. Well then do you apprehend it yourself by your
own power ? and what more have you need of ? For if it is
true that all men err involuntarily, and you have learned the
truth, of necessity you must act right. — But in truth I do not
apprehend the will of nature. Who then tells us what it is ?
— They say that it is Chrysippus. — I proceed, and I inquire
what this interpreter of nature says. I begin not to under-
stand what he says : I seek an interpreter of Chrysippus. —
Well, consider how this is said, just as if it were said in the
Roman tongue.'^ — What then is the superciliousness of the
interpreter? There is no superciliousness which can justly
be charged even to Chrysippus, if he only interprets the will
of nature, but does not follow it himself ; and much more is
this so with his interpreter. For we have no need of Chry-
sippus for his own sake, but in order that we may under-
stand nature. Nor do we need a diviner (sacrificer) on his
own acount, but because we think that through him we shall
know the future and understand the signs given by the gods ;
nor do we need the viscera of animals for their own sake,
but because through them signs are given; nor do we look
with wonder on the crow or raven, but on God, who through
them gives signs?
I go then to the interpreter of these things and the sacri-
ficer, and I say, "Inspect the viscera for me, and tell me what
signs they give." The man takes the viscera, opens them, and
interprets : "Man," he says, "you have a will free by nature
from hindrance and compulsion; this is written here in the
viscera." I will show you this first in the matter of assent.
Can any man hinder you from assenting to the truth ? No
man can. Can any man compel you to receive what is false.
No man can. You see that in this matter you have the
faculty of the will free from hindrance, free from compul-
sion, unimpeded. Well, then, in the matter of desire and
DISCOURSES 49
pursuit of an object, is it otherwise? And what can over-
come pursuit except another pursuit? And what can over-
come desire and aversion ( eKKXiatv ) except another desire
and aversion ? But, you object : "If you place before me the
fear of death, you do compel me." No, it is not what is
placed before you that compels, but your opinion that it is
better to do so and so than to die. In this matter then it is
your opinion that compelled you : that is, will compelled will.
For if God had made that part of himself, which he took
from himself and gave to us, of such a nature as to be hin-
dered or compelled either by himself or by another, he would
not then be God nor would he be taking care of us as he
ought. This, says the diviner, I find in the victims: these
are the things which are signified to you. If you choose, you
are free; if you choose, you will blame no one: you will
charge no one. All will be at the same time according to
your mind and the mind of God. For the sake of this divin-
ation I go to this diviner and to the philosopher, not admir-
ing him for this interpretation, but admiring the things
which he interprets.
^OTES
^Aoyoi kcrriv 6 SiapQp&v. /ItapQovv means "to divide a thing into
its parts or members."The word "analyse" seems to be the nearest
equivalent.
* This is obscure. The conclusion, "Reason therefore is analysed by
itself" is not in Epictetus; but it is implied. Antoninus writes: "These
are the properties of the rational soul ; it sees itself, analyses itself." If
reason, our reason, requires another reason to analyse it, that other
reason will require another reason to analyse that other reason; and so
on to infinity. If reason then, our reason, can be analysed, it must be
analysed by itself.
' " Our opinions." There is some defect in the text, as Wolf remarks.
"The opponent," he says, "disparages Log^c (Dialectic) as a thing
which is not necessary to make men good, and he prefers moral teaching
to Logic: but Epictetus informs him, that a man who is not a Dialecti-
cian will not have a sufficient perception of moral teaching."
* He repeats the words of the supposed opponent ; and he means that
his adversary's difficulty shows the necessity of Dialectic.
• Antisthenes who professed the Cynic philosophy, rejected Logic and
Physic.
• Epictetus knew what education ought to be. We learn language, and
we ought to learn what it means. When children learn words, they
should learn what the thing is which is signified by the word. In the
case of children this can only be done imperfectly as to som.e words, but
it may be done even then in some degree; and it must be done, or the
word signifies nothing, or, what is equally bad, the word is misunder-
50
EPICTETUS
stood. All of us pass our lives in ignorance of many words which we
use; some of us in greater ignorance than others, but all of us in ig-
norance to some degree.
' The supposed interpreter says this. When Epictetus says "the Ro-
man tongue," perhaps he means that the supposed opponent is a Roman
and does not know Greek well.
CHAPTER XVIII
THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH THE ERRORS
(faults) of OTHERS
IF what philosophers say is true, that all men have one
principle, as in the case of assent the persuasion that
a thing is so, and in the case of dissent the persuasion
that a thing is not so, and in the case of a suspense of
judgment the persuasion that a thing is uncertain, so also
in the case of a movement towards any thing the persuasion
that a thing is for a man's advantage, and it is impossible to
think that one thing is advantageous and to desire another,
and to judge one thing to be proper and to move towards an-
other, why then are we angry with the many?^ They are
thieves and robbers, you may say. What do you mean by
thieves and robbers? They are mistaken about good and
evil. Ought we then to be angry with them, or to pity
them? But show them their error, and you will see how
they desist from their errors. If they do not see their errors,
they have nothing superior to their present opinion.
Ought not then this robber and this adulterer to be des-
troyed ? By no means say so, but speak rather in this way :
This man who has been mistaken and deceived about the
most important things, and blinded, not in the faculty of
vision which distinguishes white and black, but in the faculty
which distinguishes good and bad, should we not destroy
him? If you speak thus, you will see how inhuman this is
which you say, and that it is just as if you would
say, "Ought we not to destroy this blind and deaf
man?" But if the greatest harm is in the priva-
tion of the greatest things, and the greatest thing
in every man is the will or choice such as it
ought to be, and a man is deprived of this will, why are you
also angry with him? Man, you ought not to be affected
contrary to nature by the bad things of another. Pity him
rather : drop this readiness to be offended and to hate, and
these words which the many utter: "these accursed and
51
52 EPICTETUS
odious fellows." How have you been made so wise at once?
and how are you so peevish ? Why then are we angry ? Is
it because we value so much the things of which these men
rob us ? Do not admire your clothes, and then you will not
be angry with the thief. Do not admire the beauty of your
wife, and you will not be angry with the adulterer. Learn
that a thief and an adulterer have no place in the things
which are yours, but in those which belong to others and
which are not in your power. If you dismiss these things
and consider them as nothing, with whom are you still
angry? But so long as you value these things, be angry
with yourself rather than with the thief and the adulterer.
Consider the matter thus : you have fine clothes ; your neigh-
bour has not: you have a window; you wish to air the
clothes. The thief does not know wherein man's good con-
sists, but he thinks that it consists in having fine clothes, the
very thing which you also think. Must he not then come
and take them away ? When you show a cake to greedy per-
sons, and swallow it all yourself, do you expect them not to
snatch it from you ? Do not provoke them : do not have a
window : do not air your clothes. I also lately had an iron
lamp placed by the side of my household gods : hearing a
noise at the door, I ran down, and found that the lamp had
been carried off. I reflected that he who had taken the lamp
had done nothing strange. What then? To-morrow, I
said, you will find an earthen lamp : for a man only loses that
which he has. 'T have lost my garment." The reason is that
you had a garment. "1 have pain in my head." Have you
any pain in your horns? Why then are you troubled? for
we only lose those things, we have only pains about those
things which we possess.*
But the tyrant will chain — what? the leg. He will take
away — what? the neck. What then will he not chain and
not take away ? the will. This is why the ancients taught the
maxim. Know thyself. Therefore we ought to exercise our-
selves in small things, and beginning with them to proceed to
the greater. "I have pain in the head." Do not say, alas ! "I
have pain in the ear." Do not say, alas! And I do not say,
that you are not allowed to groan, but do not groan in-
wardly ; and if your slave is slow in bringing a bandage, do
DISCOURSES 53
not cry out and torment yourself, and say, "Everybody hates
me" : for who would not hate such a man? For the future,
relying on these opinions, walk about upright, free; not
trusting to the size of your body, as an athlete, for a man
ought not to be invincible in the way that an ass is.^
Who then is the invincible? It is he whom none of the
things disturb which are independent of the will. Then ex-
amining one circumstance after another I observe, as in the
case of an athlete ; he has come off victorious in the first con-
test : well then, as to the second ? and what if there should
be great heat ? and what, if it should be at Olympia ? And
the same I say in this case: if you should throw money in
his way, he will despise it. Well, suppose you put a young
girl in his way, what then? and what, if it is in the dark?*
what if it should be a little reputation, or abuse ; and what, if
it should be praise ; and what if it should be death ? He is
able to overcome all. What then if it be in heat, and what
if it is in the rain, and what if he be in a melancholy (mad)
mood, and what if he be asleep ? He will still conquer. This
is my invincible athlete.
NOTES
* Mrs. Carter says : "The most ignorant persons often practice what
they know to be evil ; and they, who voluntarily suffer, as many do, their
inclinations to blind their judgment, are not justified by following it.
(Perhaps she means "them," "their inclinations.") The doctrine of
Epictetus therefore, here and elsewhere, on this head, contradicts the
voice of reason and conscience ; nor is it less pernicious than ill-
grounded. It destroys all guilt and merit, all punishment and reward,
all blame of ourselves or others, all sense of misbehaviour towards our
fellow-creatures, or our Creator. No wonder that such philosophers
did not teach repentance towards God."
Mrs. Carter has not understood Epictetus; and her censure is mis-
placed. It is true that "the most ignorant persons often practise what
they know to be evil," as she truly says. But she might have said more.
It is also true that persons, who are not ignorant, often do what they
know to be evil, and even what they would condemn in another, at least
before they had fallen into the same evil themselves; for when they
have done what they know to be wrong, they have a fellow-feeling with
others who are bad as themselves. Nor does he say, as Mrs. Carter
seems to imply that he does, for her words are ambiguous, that they
who voluntarily suffer their inclinations to blind their judgment are justi-
fied by following them. He says that men will do as they do, so long as
they think as they think. He only traces to their origin the bad acts
which bad men do; and he says that we should pity them and try to
mend them. Now the best man in the world, if he sees the origin and
direct cause of bad acts in men, may pity them for their wickedness,
and he will do right. He will pity, and still he will punish severely, if
54
EPICTETUS
the interests of society require the guilty to be punished : but he will not
punish in anger. Epictetus says nothing about legal penalties; and I
assume that he would not say that the penalties are always unjust, if I
understand his principles. His discourse is to this effect, as the title tells
us, that we ought not to be angry with the errors of others : the matter
of the discourse is the feeling and disposition which we ought to have
towards those who do wrong, "because they are mistaken about good
arid evil."
He does not discuss the question of the origin of these men's mistake
further than this : men think that a thing or act is advantageous ; and
it is impossible for them to think that one thing is advantageous and to
desire another thing. Their error is in their opinion. Then he tells us to
show them their error, and they will desist from their errors. He is not
here examining the way of showing them their error ; by which I sup-
pose that he means convincing them of their error. He seems to admit
that it may not be possible to convince them of their errors ; for he says,
"if they do not see their errors, they have nothing superior to their pres-
ent opinion."
This is the plain and certain meaning of Epictetus which Mrs. Carter
in her zeal has not seen.
* The conclusion explains what precedes. A man can have no pain in
his horns, because he has none. A man can not be vexed about the loss
of a thing if he does not possess it.
* That is obstinate, as this animal is generally ; and sometimes very
obstinate. The meaning then is, as Schweighauser says : "a man should
be invincible, not with a kind of stupid obstinacy or laziness and slow-
ness in moving himself like an ass, but he should be invincible through
reason, reflection, meditation, study, and diligence."
* " From the rustics came the old proverb, for when they commend
a man's fidelity and goodness they say he is a man with whom you may
play the game with the fingers in the dark." Cicero, "De Officiis," iii. 19.
CHAPTER XIX
HOW WE SHOULD BEHAVE TO TYRANTS
IF a man possesses any superiority, or thinks that he does,
when he does not, such a man, if he is uninstructed, will
of necessity be puffed up through it. For instance, the
tyrant says, "I am master of all !" And what can you do
for me? Can you give me desire which shall have no hin-
drance ? How can you ? Have you the infallible power of
avoiding what you would avoid? Have you the power of
moving towards an object without error? And how do you
possess this power ? Come, when you are in a ship, do you
trust to yourself or to the helmsman? And when you are
in a chariot, to whom do you trust but to the driver ? And
how is it in all other arts? Just the same. In what then
lies your power? "All men pay respect to me." Well, I also
pay respect to my platter, and I wash it and wipe it ; and for
the sake of my oil flask, I drive a peg into the wall. "Well
then, are these things superior to me?" No, but they supply
some of my wants, and for this reason I take care of them.
Well, do I not attend to my ass? Do I not wash his feet?
Do I not clean him ? Do you not know that every man has
regard to himself, and to you just the same as he has regard
to his ass? For who has regard to you as a man? Show
me. Who wishes to become like you ? Who imitates you,
as he imitates Socrates ? "But I can cut off your head." You
say right. I had forgotten that I must have regard to you,
as I would to a fever and the bile, and raise an altar to you,
as there is at Rome an altar to Fever.
What is it then that disturbs and terrifies the multitude? is
it the tyrant and his guards ? [By no means.] I hope that
it is not so. It is not possible that what is by nature free can
be disturbed by anything else, or hindered by any other thing
than by itself. But it is a man's own opinions which disturb
him : for when the tyrant says to a man, "I will chain your
leg," he who values his leg says, "Do not ; have pity :" but
he who values his own will says, "If it appears more advan-
55
56 EPICTETUS
tageous to you, chain it." Do you not care? "I do not care."
I will show you that I am master. You can not do that.
Zeus has set me free ; do you think that he intended to allow
his own son to be ashamed? But you are master of my
carcase : take it. "So when you approach me, you have no
regard to me ?" No, but I have regard to myself ; and if you
wish me to say that I have regard to you also, I tell you that
I have the same regard to you that I have to my pipkin.
This is not a perverse self-regard, for the animal is con-
stituted so as to do all things for itself. For even the sun
does all things for itself ; nay, even Zeus himself. But when
he chooses to be the Giver of rain and the Giver of fruits, and
the Father of Gods and men, you see that he can not obtain
these functions and these names, if he is not useful to man;
and, universally, he has made the nature of the rational
animal such that it can not obtain any one of its own proper
interests, if it does not contribute something to the common
interest. In this manner and sense it is not unsociable for a
man to do everything for the sake of himself. For what do
you expect? that a man should neglect himself and his own
interest? And how in that case can there be one and the
same principle in all animals, the principle of attachment
(regard) to themselves ?
What then ? when absurd notions about things independ-
ent of our will, as if they were good and (or) bad, lie at the
bottom of our opinions, we must of necessity pay regard to
tyrants; for I wish that men would pay regard to tyrants
only, and not also to the bedchamber men. How is it that
the man becomes all at once wise, when Caesar has made him
superintendent of the close stool ? How is it that we say im-
mediately, "Felicion spoke sensibly to me." I wish he were
ejected from the bedchamber, that he might again appear to
you to be a fool.
Epaphroditus^ had a shoemaker whom he sold because he
was good for nothing. This fellow by some good luck was
bought by one of Caesar's men, and became Caesar's shoe-
maker. You should have seen what respect Epaphroditus
paid to him: "How does the good Felicion do, I pray?"
Then if any of us asked, "What is master (Epaphroditus)
doing?" the answer was, "He is consulting about something
DISCOURSES 57
with Felicion." Had he not sold the man as good for noth-
ing? Who then made him wise all at once? This is an
instance of valuing something else than the things which
depend on the will.
Has a man been exalted to the tribuneship? All who
meet him offer their congratulations: one kisses his eyes,
another the neck, and the slaves kiss his hands.^ He goes to
his house, he finds torches lighted. He ascends the Capitol :
he offers a sacrifice on the occasion. Now who ever sacri-
ficed for having had good desires ? for having acted conform-
ably to nature? For in fact we thank the gods for those
things in which we place our good.
A person was talking to me to-day about the priesthood of
Augustus.* I say to him : "Man, let the thing alone : you
will spend much for no purpose." But he replies, "Those
who draw up agreements will write my name." Do you
then stand by those who read them, and say to such persons,
"It is I whose name is written there" ? And if you can now
be present on all such occasions, what will you do when you
are dead ? My name will remain. — Write it on a stone, and
it will remain. But come, what remembrance of you will
there be beyond Nicopolis? — But I shall wear a crown of
gold. — If you desire a crown at all, take a crown of roses and
put it on, for it will be more elegant in appearance.
*Such a man was named in Greek Koiroovirtji in Latin "cubicu-
larius," a lord of the bedchamber, as we might say. Seneca, "De Con-
stantia Sapientis," speaks "of the pride of the nomenclator (the an-
nouncer of the name), of the arrogance of the bedchamber man."
' Once the master of Epictetus.
• Hand-kissing was in those times of tyranny the duty of a slave, not
of a free man. This servile practice still exists among men called free.
* Casaubon, in a learned note on Suetonius, "Augustus," c. i8, in-
forms us that divine honours were paid to Augustus at Nicopolis, which
town he founded after the victory at Actium. The priesthood of Au-
gustus at Nicopolis was a high office, and the priest gave his name to
the year ; that is, when it was intended in any writing to fix the year,
either in any writing which related to public matters, or in instruments
used in private affairs, the name of the priest of Augustus was used,
and this was also the practice in most Greek cities. In order to establish
the sense of this passage, Casaubon changed the text from rd? (poovdi
into TO. (TVfKpQova., which emendation Schweighauser has admitted into
his text
CHAPTER XX
HOW REASON CONTEMPLATES ITSELF
EVERY art and faculty contemplates certain things
especially. When then it is itself of the same kind
with the objects which it contemplates, it must of
necessity contemplate itself also: but when it is of
an unlike kind, it can not contemplate itself. For instance,
the shoemaker's art is employed on skins, but itself is entirely
distinct from the material of skins : for this reason it does not
contemplate itself. Again, the grammarian's art is em-
ployed about articulate speech ; is then the art also articulate
speech? By no means. For this reason it is not able to
contemplate itself. Now reason, for what purpose has it
been given by nature? For the right use of appearances.
What is it then itself? A system (combination) of certain
appearances. So by its nature it has the faculty of contem-
plating itself also. Again, sound sense, for the contempla-
tion of what things does it belong to us ? Good and evil, and
things which are neither. What is it then itself? Good.
And want of sense, what is it ? Evil. Do you see then that
good sense necessarily contemplates both itself and the oppo-
site ? For this reason it is the chief and th6 first work of a
philosopher to examine appearances, and to distinguish them
and to admit none without examination. You see even in
the matter of coin, in which our interest appears to be some-
what concerned, how we have invented an art, and how many
means the assayer uses to try the value of coin, the sight, the
touch, the smell, and lastly the hearing. He throws the coin
(denarius) down, and observes the sound, and he is not con-
tent with its sounding once, but through his great attention
he becomes a musician. In like manner, where we think that
to be mistaken and not to be mistaken make a great differ-
ence, there we apply great attention to discovering the things
which can deceive. But in the matter of our miserable
ruling faculty, yawning and sleeping, we carelessly admit
every appearance, for the harm is not noticed.
58
DISCOURSES 59
When then you would know how careless you are with
respect to good and evil, and how active with respect to
things which are indifferent (neither good nor evil), ob-
serve how you feel with respect to being deprived of the sight
of the eyes, and how with respect to being deceived, and you
will discover that you are far from feeling as you ought to do
in relation to good and evil. But this is a matter which re-
quires much preparation, and much labour and study. Well
then do you expect to acquire the greatest of arts with small
labour ? And yet the chief doctrine of philosophers is very
brief. If you would know, read Zeno's^ writings and you
will see. For how few words it requires to say that man's
end (or object) is to follow the gods, and that the nature of
good is a proper use of appearances. But if you say What
is God, what is appearance, and what is particular and what
is universal^ nature ? then indeed many words are necessary.
If then Epicurus should come and say, that the good must be
in the body ; in this case also many words become necessary,
and we must be taught what is the leading principle in us,
and the fundamental and the substantial ; and as it is not
probable that the good of a snail is in the shell, is it probable
that the good of a man is in the body? But you yourself,
Epicurus, possess something better than this. What is that
in you which deliberates, what is that which examines every
thing, what is that which forms a judgment about the body
itself, that it is the principal part? and why do you light your
lamp and labour for us, and write so many books ? is it that
we may not be ignorant of the truth, who we are, and what
we are with respect to you? Thus the discussion requires
many* words.
NOTES
' A comparison of lib. i. chap, i, will help to explain this chapter.
Compare also lib. i. chap. 17.
' Zeno, a native of Citium, in the island of Cyprus, is said to have
come when he was young to Athens, where he spent the rest of a long
life in the study and teaching of Philosophy. He was the founder of
the Stoic sect, and a man respected for his ability and high character.
He wrote many philosophical works. Zeno was succeeded in his school
by Cleanthes.
* Epictetus never attempts to say what God is. He was too wise to
attempt to do what man can not do. But man does attempt to do it, and
only shows the folly of his attempts, and, I think, his presumption also.
< Epicurus is said to have written more than any other person, as
6o EPICTETUS
many as three hundred vohimes(i<'t'Arv5/c»oz, rolls). Chrysippus was
his rival in this respect. For if Epicurus wrote anything, Chrysippus
vied with him in writing as much ; and for this reason he often repeated
himself, because he did not read over what he had written, and he left
his writirgs uncorrected in consequence of his hurry.
CHAPTER XXI
AGAINST THOSE WHO WISH TO BE ADMIRED
WHEN a man holds his proper station in life, he does
not gape after things beyond it. Man, what do
you wish to happen to you?
I am satisfied if I desire and avoid conforma-
bly to nature, if I employ movements towards and from an
object as I am by nature formed to do ; and purpose and de-
sign and assent."
Why then do you strut before us as if you had swallowed
a spit ?
''My wish has always been that those who meet me
should admire me, and those who follow me should exclaim
O the great philosopher,"
Who are they by whom you wish to be admired ? Are they
not those of whom you are used to say, that they are mad?
Well then do you wish to be admired by madmen ?
6l
CHAPTER XXII
ON PRAECOGNITIONS^
PRECOGNITIONS are common to all men, and prae-
cognition is not contradictory to praecognition. For
who of us does not assume that Good is useful and
eligible, and in all circumstances that we ought to
follow and pursue it ? And who of us does not assume that
Justice is beautiful and becoming? When then does the
contradiction arise ? It arises in the adaptation of the prae-
cognitions to the particular cases. When one man says, "He
has done well : he is a brave man," and another says, "Not
so ; but he has acted foolishly ;" then the disputes arise among
men. This is the dispute among the Jews and the Syrians
and the Egyptians and the Romans; not whether holiness
should be preferred to all things and in all cases should be
pursued, but whether it is holy to eat pig's flesh or not holy.
You will find this dispute also between Agamemnon and
Achilles f for call them forth. What do you say, Agamem-
non? ought not that to be done which is proper and right?
"Certainly." Well, what do you say, Achilles? do you not
admit that what is good ought to be done? "I do most cer-
tainly." Adapt your praecognitions then to the present mat-
ter. Here the dispute begins. Agamemnon says, "I ought
not to give up Chryseis to her father." Achilles says, "You
ought." It is certain that one of the two makes a' wrong
adaptation of the praecognition of "ought" or "duty."
Further, Agamemnon says, "Then if I ought to restore
Chryseis, it is fit that I take his prize from some of you."
Achilles replies, "Would you then take her whom I love?"
"Yes, her whom you love." "Must I then be the only man
who goes without a prize ? and must I be the only man who
has no prize?" Thus the dispute begins.^
What then is education? Education is the learning how
to adapt the natural praecognitions to the particular things
conformably to nature; and then to distinguish that of
things some are in our power, but others are not: in our
62
DISCOURSES 63
power are will and all acts which depend on the will ; things
not in our power are the body, the parts of the body, posses-
sions, parents, brothers, children, country and generally,
all with whom we live in society. In what then should we
place the good ? To what kind of things {ova-iqt) shall we
adapt it? To the things which are in our power? Is not
health then a good thing, and soundness of limb, and life?
and are not children and parents and country? Who will
tolerate you if you deny this?
Let us then transfer the notion of good to these things.
Is it possible then, when a man sustains damage and does
not obtain good things, that he can be happy ? It is not pos-
sible. And can he maintain towards society a proper beha-
viour? He can not. For I am naturally formed to look
after my own interest. If it is my interest to have an estate
in land, it is my interest also to take it from my neighbour.
If it is my interest to have a garment, it is my interest also to
steal it from the bath.* This is the origin of wars, civil
commotions, tyrannies, conspiracies. And how shall I be
still able to maintain my duty towards Zeus ? for if I sustain
damage and am unlucky, he takes no care of me ; and what
is he to me if he can not help me ; and further, what is he to
me if he allows me to be in the condition in which I am ? I
now begin to hate him. Why then do we build temples,
why set up statues to Zeus, as well as to evil daemons, such
as to Fever ; and how is Zeus the Saviour, and how the giver
of rain, and the giver of fruits? And in truth if we place
the nature of Good in any such things, all this follows.
What should we do then? This is the inquiry of the true
philosopher who is in labour. Now I do not see what the
Good is nor the Bad. Am I not mad ? Yes. But suppose
that I place the good somewhere among the things which
depend on the will : all will laugh at me. There will come
some greyhead wearing many gold rings on his fingers, and
he will shake his head and say, "Hear, my child. It is right
that you should philosophize; but you ought to have some
brains also : all this that you are doing is silly. You learn
the syllogism from philosophers ; but you know how to act
better than philosophers do." — Man, why then do you blame
me, if I know? What shall I say to this slave? If I am
64 EPICTETUS
silent, he will burst. I must speak in this way: "Excuse
me, as you would excuse lovers ; I am not my own master ;
I am mad."
NOTES
^ Praecognitions {itpoXrjipEtz) is translated Praecognita by John
Smith, Select Discourses,^ p. 4. Cicero says (Topica, 7): "Notionem
appello quod Graeci turn evvoiav, turn 7Cp6A.rfrf>iv dicunt. Ea est insita
et ante percepta cujusque formas cognitio, enodationis indigens." In
the De Natura Deorum (i. 16) he says: "Quae est enim gens aut quod
genus hominum, quod non habeat sine doctrina anticipationem quan-
dam deorum, quam appellat TtpoXrftpiv Epicurus ? id est, anteceptam
animo rei quandam informationem, sine qua nee intelligi quidquam
nee quaeri nee disputari potest." Epicurus, as^ Cicero says in the follow -
ing chapter (17), was the first who used TtpoXr^ipii m this sense, which
Cicero applies to what he calls the ingrafted or rather innate cognitions
of the existence of gods, and these cognitions he supposes to be uni-
versal ; but whether this is so or not, I do not know. See i. c. 2; Tuscul.
i. 24 ; De Fin. iii. 6, and TtpoXTftpn in iv. 8. 6.
" Horace, Epp. i. 2.
■ Iliad, i. The quarrel of Achilles and Agamemnon about giving up
Chryseis to her father.
* The bath was a place of common resort, where a thief had the op-
portunity of carrying off a bather's clothes. From men's desires to have
what they have not, and do not choose to labour for, spring the disorders
of society, as it is said in the epistle of James, c. iv., v. i, to which Mrs.
Carter refers.
CHAPTER XXIII
AGAINST EPICURUS
EVEN Epicurus perceives that we are by nature social,
but having once placed our good in the husk he is no
longer able to say anything else. For on the other
hand he strongly maintains this, that we ought not
to admire nor to accept any thing which is detached from
the nature of good; and he is right in maintaining this.
How then are we [suspicious], if we have no natural affec-
tion to our children ? Why do you advise the wise man not
to bring up children? Why are you afraid that he may
thus fall into trouble? For does he fall into trouble on ac-
count of the mouse which is nurtured in the house? What
does he care if a little mouse in the house makes lamenta-
tion to him? But Epicurus knows that if once a child is
bom, it is no longer in our power not to love it nor care
about it. For this reason, Epicurus says, that a man who
has any sense also does not engage in political matters ; for
he knows what a man must do who is engaged in such
things; for indeed, if you intend to behave among men as
you would among a swarm of flies, what hinders you ? But
Epicurus, who knows this, ventures to say that we should
not bring up children. But a sheep does not desert its own
offspring, nor yet a wolf ; and shall a man desert his child ?
What do you mean ? that we should be as silly as sheep ? but
not even do they desert their offspring: or as savage as
wolves, but not even do wolves desert their young. Well,
who would follow your advice, if he saw his child weeping
after falling on the ground ? For my part I think that even
if your mother and your father had been told by an oracle,
that you would say what you have said, they would not have
cast you away.
CHAPTER XXIV
HOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE WITH CIRCUMSTANCES
IT is circumstances (difficulties) that show what men
are. Therefore when a difficulty falls upon you, re-
member that God, like a trainer of wrestlers, has
matched you with a rough young man. For what pur-
pose? you may say. Why that you may become an Olym-
pic conqueror ; but it is not accomplished without sweat. In
my opinion no man has had a more profitable difficulty than
you have had, if you choose to make use of it as an ath-
lete would deal with a young antagonist. We are now
sending a scout to Rome ;^ but no man sends a cowardly
scout, who, if he only hears a noise and sees a shadow any
where, comes running back in terror and reports that the
enemy is close at hand. So now if you should come and
tell us, Fearful is the state of affairs at Rome, terrible is
death, terrible is exile; terrible is calumny; terrible is pov-
erty; fly, my friends; the enemy is near — we shall answer.
Be gone, prophesy for yourself; we have committed only
one fault, that we sent such a scout.
Diogenes,^ who was sent as a scout before you, made a
different report to us. He says that death is no evil, for
neither is it base: he says that fame (reputation) is the
noise of madmen. And what has this spy said about pain,
about pleasure, and about poverty? He says that to be
naked is better than any purple robe, and to sleep on the
bare ground is the softest bed; and he gives as a proof of
each thing that he affirms his own courage, his tranquillity,
his freedom, and the healthy appearance, and compactness
of his body. "There is no enemy near," he says; "all is
peace." How so, Diogenes? "See," he replies, "if I am
struck, if I have been wounded, if I have fled from any man.'*
This is what a scout ought to be. But you come to us and
tell us one thing after another. Will you not go back, and
you will see clearer when you have laid aside fear ?
What then shall I do ? What do you do when you leave a
66
B ^
s .5
DISCOURSES 67
ship? Do you take away the helm or the oars? What
then do you take away ? You take what is your own, your
bottle and your wallet; and now if you think of what is
your own, you will never claim what belongs to others.
The emperor (Domitian) says, "Lay aside your laticlave.^"
See, I put on the angnsticlave. "Lay aside this also." See,
I have only my toga. "Lay aside your toga." See, I am now
naked. "But you still raise my envy." Take then all my
poor body: when, at a man's command, I can throw away
my poor body, do I still fear him ?
But a certain person will not leave to me the succession
to his estate. What then? had I forgotten that not one of
these things was mine. How then do we call them mine?
Just as we call the bed in the inn. If then the innkeeper
at his death leaves you the beds; all well; but if he leaves
them to another, he will have them, and you will seek an-
other bed. If then you shall not find one, you will sleep on
the grounjl : only sleep with a good will and snore, and re-
member that tragedies have their place among the rich and
kings and tyrants, but no poor man fills a part in a tragedy,
except as one of the Chorus. Kings indeed commence with
prosperity : "ornament the palace with garlands" : then
about the third or fourth act they call out, "Oh, Cithseron,*
why didst thou receive me" ? Slave, where are the crowns,
where the diadem? The guards help thee not at all.
When then you approach any of these persons, remember
this that you are approaching a tragedian, not the actor, but
CEdipus himself. But you say, such a man is happy ; for
he walks about with many, and I also place myself with the
manyandwalk about with many. In sum remember this : the
door is open f be not more timid than little children, but as
they say, when the thing does not please them, "I will play
no longer," so do you, when things seem to you of such a
kind, say "I will no longer play," and be gone : but if you
stay, do not complain.
NOTES
• In the time of Domitian philosophers were banished from Rome and
Italy by a Senatiisconsultum (Sueton. Domitian, c. 10; Dion, 67, c.
13), and at that time Epictetus. as Gellius says (xv. 11). went from
Rome to Nicopolis in Epirus, where he opened a school. We may sup-
68 EPICTETUS
pose that Epictetus is here speaking of some person who had gone from
Nicopolis to Rome to inquire about the state of affairs there under the
cruel tyrant Domitian. (Schweighauser.)
" Diogenes was brought to King Philip after the battle of Chaeronea
as a spy (iii. 22, 24). Plutarch in the treatise, Quomodo assentator ab
amico dignoscatur, c. 30, states that when Philip asked Diogenes if he
was a spy, he replied, "Certainly I am a spy, Philip, of your want of
judgment and of your folly, which lead you without any necessity to
put to the hazard your kingdom and your life in one single hour."
• The garment with the broad border, the laticlave, was the dress of a
senator; the garment with the narrow border, the angusticlave, was the
dress of a man of the equestrian order.
*The exclamation of CEdipus in the CEdipus Tyrannus of Sopho-
cles, V. 1391.
* This means "you can die when you please." Comp. i. c. 9. The
power of dying when you please is named by Plinius (N. H. ii. c. 7)
the best thing that God has given to man amidst all the sufferings of
life. Horace, Epp. ii. 2, 213, —
" Vivere si recte nescis, decede peritis :
Lusisti satis, edisti satis atque bibisti;
Tempus abire tibi."
CHAPTER XXV
ON THE SAME SUBJECT
IF these things are true, and if we are not silly, and are
not acting hypocritically when we say that the good of
man is in the will, and the evil too, and that every-
thing else does not concern us, why are we still dis-
turbed, why are we still afraid? The things about which
we have been busied are in no man's power : and the things
which are in the power of others, we care not for. What
kind of trouble have we still?
"But give me directions." Why should I give you direc-
tions? has not Zeus given you directions? Has he not
given to you what is your own free from hindrance and
free from impediment, and what is not your own subject
to hindrance and impediment ? What directions then, what
kind of orders did you bring when you came from him?
Keep by every means what is your own; do not desire what
belongs to others. Fidelity (integrity) is your own, virtu-
ous shame is your own ; who then can take these things from
you? who else than yourself will hinder you from using
them? But how do you act? when you seek what is not
your own, you lose that which is your own. Having such
promptings and commands from Zeus, what kind do you
still ask from me? Am I more powerful than he, am I
more worthy of confidence? But if you observe these, do
you want any others besides? Well, but he has not given
these orders, you will say. Produce your praecognitions
{itpoXif^Eii), produce the proofs of philosophers, produce
what you have often heard, and produce what you have said
yourself, produce what you have read, produce what you
have meditated on; and you will then see that all these
things are from God. "How long then is it fit to observe
these precepts from God, and not to break up the play ?" As
long as the play is continued with propriety. In the Sa-
turnalia^ a king is chosen by lot, for it has been the custom
to play at this game. The king commands : "Do you drink,
69
70 EPICTETUS
Do you mix wine with me, Do you sing, Do you go, Do you
come." I obey that the game may not be broken up through
me. — But if he says, "Think that you are in evil pUght:" I
answer, I do not think so ; and who will compel me to think
so? Further, we agreed to play Agamemnon and Achilles.
He who is appointed to play Agamemnon says to me, "Go to
Achilles and tear from him Briseis." I go. He says, "Come,"
and I come.
For as we behave in the matter of hypothetical arguments,
so ought we to do in life. Suppose it to be night. I sup-
pose that it is night. Well then ; is it day ? No, for I ad-
mitted the hypothesis that it was night. Suppose that you
think that it is night? Suppose that I do. But also think
that it is night. That is not consistent with the hypothesis.
So in this case also : Suppose that you are unfortunate.
Well, suppose so. Are you then unhappy? Yes. Well
then are you troubled with an unfavourable daemon (for-
tune) ? Yes. But think also that you are in misery. This
is not consistent with the hypothesis: and another (Zeus)
forbids me to think so.
How long then must we obey such orders ? As long as it
is profitable; and this means as long as I maintain that which
is becoming and consistent. Further, some men are sour
and of bad temper, and they say, "I can not sup with this
man to be obliged to hear him telling daily how he fought in
Mysia" : "I told you, brother, how I ascended the hill : then
I began to be besieged again." But another says, "I prefer
to get my supper and to hear him talk as much as he likes."
And do you compare these estimates (judgments) : only do
nothing in a depressed mood, nor as one afflicted, nor as
thinking that you are in misery, for no man compels you to
that. — Has it smoked in the chamber? If the smoke is
moderate, I will stay ; if it is excessive ; I go out : for you
must always remember this and hold it fast, that the door is
open. — Well, but you say to me, "Do not live in Nicopolis."
I will not live there. "Nor in Athens." I will not live in
Athens. "Nor in Rome." I will not live in Rome. "Live in
Gyarus."^ I will live in Gyarus, but it seems like a great
smoke to live in Gyarus ; and I depart to the place where no
man will hinder me from living, for that dwelling place is
DISCOURSES 71
open to all ; and as to the last garment, that is the poor body,
no one has any power over me beyond this. This was the
reason why Demetrius^ said to Nero, "You threaten me
with death, but nature threatens you." If I set my admira-
tion on the poor body, I have given myself up to be a slave :
if on my little possessions, I also make myself a slave : for I
immediately make it plain with what I may be caught; as
if the snake draws in his head, I tell you to strike that part
of him which he guards ; and do you be assured that what-
ever part you choose to guard, Ihat part your master will
attack. Remembering this whom will you still flatter or
fear?
"But I should like to sit where the Senators sit."^ Do you
see that you are putting yourself in straits, you are squeez-
ing yourself. "How then shall I see well in any other way in
the amphitheatre?" Man, do not be a spectator at all; and
you will not be squeezed. Why do you give yourself
trouble? Or wait a little, and when the spectacle is over,
seat yourself in the place reserved for the Senators and sun
yourself. For remember this general truth, that it is we
who squeeze ourselves, who put ourselves in straits; that is
our opinions squeeze us and put us in straits. For what is
it to be reviled ? Stand by a stone and revile it ; and what
will you gain? If then a man listens like a stone, what
profit is there to the reviler ? But if the reviler has as a step-
ping-stone (or ladder) the weakness of him who is reviled,
then he accomplishes something. "Strip him." What do
you mean by him? "Lay hold of his garment, strip it off. I
have insulted you." Much good may it do you.
This was the practice of Socrates: this was the reason
why he always had one face. But we choose to practise and^
study any thing rather than the means by which we shall be
unimpeded and free. You say. Philosophers talk para-
doxes.*^ But are there no paradoxes in the other arts ? and
what is more paradoxical than to puncture a man's eye in
order that he may see? If any one said this to a man igno-
rant of the surgical art, would he not ridicule the speaker?
Where is the wonder then if in philosophy also many things
which are true appear paradoxical to the inexperienced ?
72 . EPICTETUS
* NOTES
*A festival at Rome in December, a season of jollity and license
(Livy, xxii. i). Compare the passage in Tacitus, Ann. xiii. 15, in which
Nero is chosen by lot to be king : and Seneca, De Constant. Sapient, c.
12, "lUi (pueri) inter ipsos magistratus gerunt, et prsetextam fascesque
ac tribunal imitantur."
■ * Gyarus or Gyara a wretched island in the /Egean sea, to which
criminals were sent under the empire at Rome. Juvenal, Sat. i. TZ-
• Demetrius was a Cynic philosopher, of whom Seneca says : "He was
in my opinion a great man, even if he is compared with the greatest."
One of his sayings was : "You gain more by possessing a few precepts
of philosophy, if you have them ready and use them, than by learning
many if you have them not at hand." Seneca often mentions Demetrius.
The saying in the text is also attributed to Anaxagoras (Life by Di-
ogenes Laertius) and to Socrates by Xenophon (Apologia, 27).
* At Rome, and probably in other towns, there were seats reserved for
the different classes of men at the public spectacles.
"Paradoxes (7ra/od5o|a), "things contrary to opinion," are contrasted
with paralogies {xapaXoya), "things contrary to reason." Cicero
says (Prooemium to his Paradoxes), that paradoxes are "something
which cause surprise and contradict common opinion;" and in an-
other place he says that the Romans gave the name of "admirabilia" to
the Stoic paradoxes. — The puncture of the eye is the operation for cat-
aract
CHAPTER XXVI
WHAT THE LAW OF LIFE IS
WHEN a person was reading hypothetical argu-
ments, Epictetus said, This also is an hypothet-
ical law that we must accept what follows from
the hypothesis. But much before this law is the
'aw of life, that we must act conformably to nature. For
if in every matter and circumstance we wish to observe what
is natural, it is plain that in every thing we ought to make
it our aim that neither that which is consequent shall escape
us, and that we do not admit the contradictory. First then
philosophers exercise us in theory^ (contemplation of things),
which is easier; and then next they lead us to the more
difficult things ; for in theory, there is nothing which draws
us away from following what is taught; but in the mat-
ters of life, many are the things which distract us. He is
ridiculous then who says that he wishes to begin with the
matters of real life, for it is not easy to begin with the more
difficult things ; and we ought to employ this fact as an argu-
ment to those parents who are vexed at their children learn-
ing philosophy: Am I doing wrong then my father, and
do I not know what is suitable to me and becoming? If
indeed this can neither be learned nor taught, why do you
blame me? but if it can be taught, teach me; and if you can
not, allow me to learn from those who say that they know
how to teach. For what do you think ? do you suppose that
I voluntarily fall into evil and miss the good? I hope that
it may not be so. What is then the cause of my doing
wrong ? Ignorance. Do you not choose then that I should
get rid of my ignorance? Who was ever taught by anger
the art of a pilot or music? Do you think that by means
of your anger I shall learn the art of life? He only is al-
lowed to speak in this way who has shown such an inten-
tion.2 But if a man only intending to make a display at a
banquet and to show that he is acquainted with hypothetical
arguments reads them and attends the philosophers, what
^ 73
74 EPICTETUS
Other object has he than that some man of senatorial rank
who sits by him may admire? For there (at Rome) are
the really great materials (opportunities), and the riches
here (at Nicopolis) appear to be trifles there. This is the
reason why it is difficult for a man to be master of the ap-
pearances, where the things which disturb the judgment are
great. I know a certain person who complained, as he em-
braced the knees of Epaphroditus, that he had only one hun-
dred and fifty times ten thousand denarii^ remaining.
What then did Epaphroditus do ? Did he laugh at him, as
we slaves of Epaphroditus did ? No, but he cried out with
amazement, "Poor man, how then did you keep silence, how
did you endure it?"
When Epictetus had reproved (called) the person who
was reading the hypothetical arguments, and the teacher
who had suggested the reading was laughing at the reader,
Epictetus said to the teacher, "You are laughing at your-
self : you did not prepare the young man nor did you ascer-
tain whether he was able to understand these matters; but
perhaps you are only employing him as a reader." Well
then said Epictetus, if a man has not ability enough to un-
derstand a complex (syllogism), do we trust him in giving
praise, do we trust him in giving blame, do we allow that
he is able to form a judgment about good or bad? and if
such a man blames any one, does the man care for the
blame? and if he praises any one, is the man elated, when in
such small matters as an hypothetical syllogism he who
praises can not see what is consequent on the hypothesis ?
This then is the beginning of philosophy, a man's percep-
tion of the state of his ruling faculty ; for when a man knows
that it is weak, then he will not employ it on things of the
greatest difficulty. But at present, if men can not swallow
even a morsel, they buy whole volumes and attempt to de-
vour them ; and this is the reason why they vomit them up
or suffer indigestion : and then come gripings, defluxes, and
fevers.'* Such men ought to consider what their ability
is. In theory it is easy to convince an ignorant person;
but in the affairs of real life no one offers himself to be con-
vinced, and we hate the man who has convinced us. But
DISCOURSES 75
Socrates advised us not to live a life which is not subjected
to examination.
NOTKS
*This is a profound and useful remark of Epictetus. General prin-
ciples are most easily understood and accepted. The difficulty is in the
application of them. What is more easy, for example, than to under-
stand general principles of law which are true and good ? But in practice
cases are presented to us which as Bacon says, are "immersed in mat-
ter;" and it is this matter which makes the difficulty of applying the
principles, and requires the ability and study of an experienced man. It
is easy, and it is right, to teach the young the general principles of the
rules of life; but the difficulty of applying them is that in which the
young and the old too often fail. So if you ask whether virtue can be
taught, the answer is that the rules for a virtuous life can be delivered;
but the application of the rules is the difficulty, as teachers of religion
and morality know well, if they are fit to teach. If they do not know
this truth, they are neither fit to teach the rules, nor to lead the way to
the practice of them by the only method which is possible; and this
method is by their own example, assisted by the example of those who
direct the education of youth, and of those with whom young persons
live.
* "Such an intention" appears to mean "the intention of learning."
"The son alone can say this to his father, when the son studies philoso-
phy for the purpose of living a good life, and not for the purpose of dis-
play."— Wolf.
* This was a large sum. He is speaking of drachmas, or of the Roman
equivalents denarii. In Roman language the amount would be briefly ex-
pressed by "sexagies centena millia H. S.," or simply by "sexagies."
* Seneca, "De Tranquillitate animi," says : "What is the use of count-
less books and libraries, when the owner scarcely reads in his whole life
the tables of contents? The number only confuses a learner, does not
instruct him. It is much better to give yourself up to a few authors than
to wander through many."
CHAPTER XXVII
IN HOW MANY WAYS APPEARANCES EXIST, AND WHAT AIDS
WE SHOULD PROVIDE AGAINST THEM
APPEARANCES are to us in four ways: for either
things appear as they are; or they are not, and do
not even appear to be; or they are, and do not ap-
pear to be; or they are not, and yet appear to be.
Further, in all these cases to form a right judgment (to hit
the mark) is the office of an educated man. But whatever
it is that annoys (troubles) us, to that we ought to apply
a remedy. If the sophisms of Pyrrho^ and of the Academ-
ics are what annoys (troubles), we must apply the remedy
to them. If it is the persuasion of appearances, by which
some things appear to be good, when they are not good, let
us seek a remedy for this. If it is habit which annoys us,
we must try to seek aid against habit. What aid then can we
find against habit? The contrary habit. You hear the
ignorant say : "That unfortunate person is dead : his father
and mother are overpowered with sorrow;^ he was cut ofif
by an untimely death and in a foreign land." Hear the
contrary way of speaking : Tear yourself from these expres-
sions: oppose to one habit the contrary habit; to sophistry
oppose reason, and the exercise and discipline of reason;
against persuasive (deceitful) appearances we ought to have
manifest prsecognitions (ytpoXi^ipsi?), cleared of all impurities
and ready to hand.
When death appears an evil, we ought to have this rule in
readiness, that it is fit to avoid evil things, and that death
is a necessary thing. For what shall I do, and where shall
I escape it? Suppose that I am not Sarpedon, the son of
Zeus, nor able to speak in this noble way : I will go and I am
resolved either to behave bravely myself or to give to an-
other the opportunity of doing so; if I can not succeed in
doing any thing myself, I will not grudge another the doing
of something noble. — Suppose that it is above our power
to act thus ; is it not in our power to reason thus ? Tell me
76
DISCOURSES *n
where I can escape death : discover for me the country, show
me the men to whom I must go, whom death does not visit.
Discover to me a charm against death. If I have not one,
what do you viish me to dor I can not escape from death.
Shall I not escape from the fear of death, but shall I die la-
menting and trembling? For the origin of perturbation is
this, to wish for something, and that this should not happen.
Therefore if I am able to change externals according to my
wish, I change them ; but if I can not, I am ready to tear out
the eyes of him who hinders me. For the nature of man is
not to endure to be deprived of the good, and not to endure
the falling into evil. Then at last, when I am neither able
to change circumstances nor to tear out the eyes of him who
hinders me, I sit down and groan and abuse whom I can,
Zeus and the rest of the gods. For if they do not care for
me, what are they to me ? — Yes, but you will be an impious
man. — In what respect then will it be worse for me than it
is now? — To sum up, remember this that unless piety and
your interest be in the same thing, piety can not be main-
tained in any man. Do not these things seem necessary
(true) ?
Let the followers of Pyrrho and the Academics come and
make their objections. For I, as to my part, have no leisure
for these disputes, nor am I able to undertake the defence
of common consent (opinion). If I had a suit even about
a bit of land, I would call in another to defend my interests.
With what evidence then am I satisfied? With that which
belongs to the matter in hand.^ How indeed perception is
effected, whether through the whole body or any part, per-
haps I can not explain : for both opinions perplex me. But
that you and I are not the same, I know with perfect cer-
tainty. How do you know it? When I intend to swallow
anything, I never carry it to your mouth, but to my own.
When I intend to take bread, I never lay hold of a broom,
but I always go to the bread as to a mark. And you your-
selves (the Pyrrhonists), who take away the evidence of the
senses, do you act otherwise? Who among you, when he
intended to enter a bath, ever went into a mill ?
What then ? Ought we not with all our power to hold to
this also, the maintaining of general opinion, and fortify-
78
EPICTETUS
ing ourselves against the arguments which are directed
against it? Who denies that we ought to do this? Well,
he should do it who is able, who has leisure for it; but as
to him who trembles and is perturbed and is inwardly
broken in heart (spirit), he must employ his time better
on something else.
NOTES
* Pyrrho was a native of Elis, in the Peloponnesus. He is said to have
accompanied Alexander the Great in his Asiatic expedition. The time
of his birth is not stated, but it is said that he lived to the age of ninety.
*A7t(bX£To does not mean that the father is dead, and that the mother
is dead. They survive and lament. Compare Euripides, Alcestis, v. 825 :
a.7CooA.6ju£(76a itdyreg, ov Keivrf fiov
* " The chief question which was debated between the Pyrrhonists and
the Academics on one side, and the Stoics on the other, was this:
whether there is a criterion of truth ; and in the first place, the question
is about the evidence of the senses, or the certainty of truth in those
things which are perceived by the senses." — Schweighftuser.
The strength of the Stoic system was that "it furnishes a ground-
work of common sense, and the universal belief of mankind, on which
to found sufficient certitude for the requirements of life : on the other
hand, the real question of knowledge, in the philosophical sense of the
word, was abandoned." Levin's Six Lectures, p, 70.
CHAPTER XXVIII
THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE ANGRY WITH MEN ; AND WHAT
ARE THE SMALL AND THE GREAT THINGS AMONG MEN^
WHAT is the cause of assenting to anything? The
fact that it appears to be true. It is not possible
then to assent to that which appears not to be
true. Why? Because this is the nature of the
understanding, to incline to the true, to be dissatisfied with
the false, and in matters uncertain to withhold assent.
What is the proof of this? Imagine (persuade yourself),
if you can, that it is now night. It is not possible. Take
away your persuasion that it is day. It is not possible.
Persuade yourself or take away your persuasion that the
stars are even in number.^ It is impossible. When then
any man assents to that which is false, be assured that he did
not intend to assent to it as false, for every soul is unwill-
ingly deprived of the truth, as Plato says; but the falsity
seemed to him to be true. Well, in acts what have we of
the like kind as we have here truth or falsehood ? We have
the fit and the not fit (duty and not duty), the profitable
and the unprofitable, that which is suitable to a person and
that which is not, and whatever is like these. Can then a
man think that a thing is useful to him and not choose it?
He can not. How says Medea ?' —
" 'Tis true I know what evil I shall do,
But passion overpowers the better counsel."
She thought that to indulge her passion and take vengeance
on her husband was more profitable than to spare her chil-
dren. It was so; but she was deceived. Show her plainly
that she is deceived, and she will not do it ; but so long as you
do not show it, what can she follow except that which ap-
pears to herself (her opinion) ? Nothing else. Why then
are you angry with the unhappy woman that she has been
bewildered about the most important things, and is become
a viper instead of a human creature? And why not, if
79
8o EPICTETUS
it is possible, rather pity, as we pity the blind and the lame,
so those who are blinded and maimed in the faculties which
are supreme?
Whoever then clearly remembers this, that to man the
measure of every act is the appearance (the opinion), —
whether the thing appears good or bad : if good, he is free
from blame; if bad, himself suffers the penalty, for it is
impossible that he who is deceived can be one person, and
he who suffers another person — whoever remembers this
will not be angry with any man, will not be vexed at any
man, will not revile or blame any man, nor hate nor quarrel
with any man.
So then all these great and dreadful deeds have this
origin, in the appearance (opinion) ? Yes, this origin and
no other. The Iliad is nothing else than appearance and
the use of appearances. It appeared^ to Alexander to carry
off the wife of Menelaus : it appeared to Helene to follow
him. If then it had appeared to Menelaus to feel that it
was a gain to be deprived of such a wife, what would have
happened? Not only would the Iliad have been lost, but
the Odyssey also. On so small a matter then did such great
things depend? But what do you mean by such great
things ? Wars and civil commotions, and the destruction of
many men and cities. And what great matter is this? Is
it nothing? — But what great matter is the death of many
oxen, and many sheep, and many nests of swallows or storks
being burnt or destroyed ? Are these things then like those?
Very like. Bodies of men are destroyed, and the bodies of
oxen and sheep; the dwellings of men are burnt, and the
nests of storks. What is there in this great or dreadful?
Or show me what is the difference between a man's house
and a stork's nest, as far as each is a dwelling; except that
man builds his little houses of beams and tiles and bricks,
and the stork builds them of sticks and mud. Are a stork
and a man then like things ? What say you ? — In body they
are very much alike.
Does a man then differ in no respect from a stork ? Don't
suppose that I say so ; but there is no difference in these mat-
ters (which I have mentioned). In what then is the differ-
ence? Seek and you will find that there is a difference in
another matter. See whether it is not in a man the under-
DISCOURSES 8 1
Standing of what he does, see if it is not in social community,
in fidelity, in modesty, in steadfastness, in intelligence.
Where then is the great good and evil in men ? It is where
the difference is. If the difference is preserved and remains
fenced round, and neither modesty is destroyed, nor fidelity,
nor intelligence, then the man also is preserved; but if any
of these things is destroyed and stormed like a city, then the
man too perishes ; and in this consist the great things. Alex-
ander, you say, sustained great damage then when the
Hellenes invaded and when they ravaged Troy, and when
his brothers perished. By no means ; for no man is damaged
by an action which is not his own; but what happened at
that time was only the destruction of stork's nests : now the
ruin of Alexander was when he lost the character of
modesty, fidelity, regard to hospitality, and to decency.
When was Achilles ruined? Was it when Patroclus died?
Not so. But it happened when he began to be angry, when
he wept for a girl, when he forgot that he was at Troy not
to get mistresses, but to fight. These things are the ruin
of men, this is being besieged, this is the destruction of
cities, when right opinions are destroyed, when they are
corrupted.
When then women are carried off, when children are
made captives, and when the men are killed, are these not
evils? How is it then that you add to the facts these
opinions? Explain this to me also. — I shall not do that;
but how is it that you say that these are not evils ? — Let us
come to the rules; produce the praecognitions {npoXriipei'i):.
for it is because this is neglected that we can not sufficiently
wonder at what men do. When we intend to judge of
weights, we do not judge by giiess : where we intend to
judge of straight and crooked, we do not judge by guess.
In all cases where it is our interest to know what is true in
any matter, never will any man among us do anything by
guess. But in things which depend on the first and on the
only cause of doing right or wrong, of happiness or un-
happiness, of being unfortunate or fortunate, there only we
are inconsiderate and rash. There is then nothing like
scales (balance), nothing like a rule: but some appearance
is presented, and straightway I act according to it. Must I
82 EPICTETUS
then suppose that I am superior to Achilles or Agamemnon,
so that they by following appearances do and suffer so many
evils : and shall not the appearance be sufficient for me ? —
And what tragedy has any other beginning? The Atreus
of Euripides, what is it? An appearance. The CEdipus of
Sophocles, what is it ? An appearance. The Phoenix ? An
appearance. The Hippolytus? An appearance. What
kind of a man then do you suppose him to be who pays no
regard to this matter ? And what is the name of those who
follow every appearance? They are called madmen. Do
we then act at all differently?
NOTES
* See Chapter i8 of this book.
* We can not conceive that the number of stars is either even or odd.
The construction of the word drtoTtdcrxsty is uncertain, for says
Schweighauser, the word is found only here.
' The Medea of Euripides, 1079.
* This is the literal version. It does not mean "that it appeared right,"
as Mrs. Carter translates it. Alexander never thought whether it was
right or wrong. All that appeared to him v/as the possessing of Helene,
and he used the means for getting possession of her, as a dog who spies
and pursues some wild animad.
CHAPTER XXIX
ON CONSTANCY (OR FIRMNESS )
THE being (nature) of the Good is a certain Will; the
being of the Bad is a certain kind of Will. What
then are externals? Materials for the Will, about
which the will being conversant shall obtain its own
good or evil. How shall it obtain the good. If it does not
admire (overvalue) the materials; for the opinions about
the materials, if the opinions are right, make the will good :
but perverse and distorted opinions make the will bad.
God has fixed this law, and says, "If you would have any
thing good, receive it from yourself." You say, No, but I
will have it from another. — Do not so: but receive it from
yourself. Therefore when the tyrant threatens and calls
me, I say, Whom do you threaten? If he says, I will put
you in chains, I say. You threaten my hands and my feet.
If he says, I will cut off your head, I reply, You threaten my
head. If he says, I will throw you into prison, I say, You
threaten the whole of this poor body. If he threatens me
with banishment, I say the same. Does he then not threaten
you at all? If I feel that all these things do not concern
me, he does not threaten me at all ; but if I fear any of them,
it is I whom he threatens. Whom then do I fear? the
master of what? The master of things which are in my
own power ? There is no such master. Do I fear the mas-
ter of things which are not in my power? And what are
these things to me?
Do you philosophers then teach us to despise kings? I
hope not. Who among us teaches to claim against them the
power over things which they possess ? Take my poor body,
take my property, take my reputation, take those who are
about me. If I advise any persons to claim these things,
they may truly accuse me. — Yes, but I intend to command
your opinions also. — And who has given you this power?
How can you conquer the opinion of another man? By
applying terror to it, he replies, I will conquer it. Do you
83
84 EPICTETUS
not know that opinion conquers itself, and is not conquered
by another? But nothing else can conquer Will except the
Will itself. For this reason too the law of God is most
powerful and most just, which is this : Let the stronger
always be superior to the weaker. Ten are stronger than
one. For what? For putting in chains, for killing, for
dragging whither they choose, for taking away what a man
has. The ten therefore conquer the one in this in which
they are stronger. In what then are the ten weaker? If
the one possesses right opinions and the others do not.
Well then, can the ten conquer in this matter? How is it
possible? If we were placed in the scales, must not the
heavier draw down the scale in which it is.
How strange then that Socrates should have been so
treated by the Athenians. Slave, why do you say Socrates ?
Speak of the thing as it is : how strange that the poor body
of Socrates should have been carried off and dragged to
prison by stronger men, and that any one should have
given hemlock to the poor body of Socrates, and that it
should breathe out the life. Do these things seem strange,
do they seem unjust, do you on account of these things
blame God? Had Socrates then no equivalent for these
things? Where then for him was the nature of good?
Whom shall we listen to, you or him? And what does
Socrates say? Anytus and Melitus^ can kill me, but they
can not hurt me : and further, he says, "If it so pleases God,
so let it be."
But show me that he who has the inferior principles over-
powers him who is superior in principles. You will never
show this, nor come near showing it ; for this is the law of
nature and of God that the superior shall always overpower
the inferior. In what? In that in which it is superior.
One body is stronger than another : many are stronger than
one : the thief is stronger than he who is not a thief. This
is the reason why I also lost my lamp, because in wakeful-
ness the thief was superior to me. But the man bought the
lamp at this price : for a lamp he became a thief, a faithless
fellow, and like a wild beast. This seemed to him a good
bargain. Be it so. But a man has seized me by the cloak,
and is drawing me to the public place : then others bawl out,
DISCOURSES 85
"Philosopher, what has been the use of your opinions? see
you are dragged to prison, you are going to be beheaded."
And what system of philosophy {eia-ayaoyriv) could I have
made so that, if a stronger man should have laid hold of my
cloak, I should not be dragged off; that if ten men should
have laid hold of me and cast me into prison, I should not
be cast in? Have I learned nothing else then? I have
learned to see that everything which happens, if it be inde-
pendent of my will, is nothing to me. I may ask, if you
have not gained by this. Why then do you seek advantage
in any thing else than in that in which you have learned that
advantage is?
Then sitting in prison I say: The man who cries out
in this way neither hears what words mean, nor understands
what is said, nor does he care at all to know what philoso-
phers say or what they do. Let him alone.
But now he says to the prisoner, Come out from your
prison. — If you have no further need of me in prison, I
come out : if you should have need of me again, I will enter
the prison. — How long will you act thus ? — So long as reason
requires me to be with the body : but when reason does not
require this, take away the body, and fare you well. Only
we must not do it inconsiderately, nor weakly, nor for any
slight reason; for, on the other hand, God does not wish it
to be done, and he has need of such a world and such inhabit-
ants in it. But if he sounds the signals for retreat, as he
did to Socrates, we must obey him who gives the signal, as
if he were a general.^
Well then, ought we to say such things to the many?
Why should we? Is it not enough for a man to be per-
suaded himself ? When children come clapping their hands
and crying out, "To-day is the good Saturnalia," do we say,
"The Saturnalia are not good" ? By no means, but we clap
our hands also. Do you also then, when you are not able to
make a man change his mind, be assured that he is a child,
and clap your hands with him ; and if you do not choose to
do this, keep silent.
A man must keep this in mind; and when he is called to
any such difficulty, he should know that the time is come
for showing if he has been instructed. For he who is come
86 EPICTETUS
into a difficulty is like a young man from a school who has
practised the resolution of syllogisms ; and if any person pro-
poses to him an easy syllogism, he says, rather propose to
me a syllogism which is skilfully complicated that I may
exercise myself on it. Even athletes are dissatisfied with
slight young men, and say, "He can not lift me." — "This is
a youth of noble disposition." [You do not so] ; but when
the time of trial is come, one of you must weep and say, "I
wish that I had learned more." A little more of what? If
you did not learn these things in order to show them in prac-
tice, why did you learn them? I think that there is some
one among you who are sitting here, who is suffering like a
woman in labour, and saying, "Oh, that such a difficulty
does not present itself to me as that which has come to this
man ; oh, that I should be wasting my life in a corner, when
I might be crowned at Olympia. When will any one an-
nounce to me such a contest?" Such ought to be the dis-
position of all of you. Even among the gladiators of Caesar
(the Emperor) there are some who complain grievously that
they are not brought forward and matched, and they offer
up prayers to God and address themselves to their superin-
tendents intreating that they may fight.^ And will no one
among you show himself such? I would willingly take a
voyage [to Rome] for this purpose and see what my athlete
is doing, how he is studying his subject. — I do not choose
such a subject, he says. Why, is it in your power to take
what subject you choose? There has been given to you
such a body as you have, such parents, such brethren, such
a country, such a place in your country : — then you come to
me and say. Change my subject. Have you not abilities
which enable you to manage the subject which has been
given to you? [You ought to say] : It is your business to
propose ; it is mine to exercise myself well. However, you
do not say so, but you say, "Do not propose to me such a
tropic,* but such [as I would choose] :do not urge against me
such an objection, but such [as I would choose]." There
will be a time perhaps when tragic actors will suppose that
they are [only] masks and buskins and the long cloak.*^ I
say, these things, man, are your material and subject. Utter
something that we may know whether you are a tragic actor
DISCOURSES 87
or a buffoon ; for both of you have all the rest in common.
If any one then should take away the tragic actor's buskins
and his mask, and introduce him on the stage as a phantom,
is the tragic actor lost, or does he still remain? If he has
voice, he still remains.
An example of another kind. "Assume the governorship
of a province." I assume it, and when I have assumed it, I
show how an instructed man behaves. "Lay aside the lati-
clave (the mark of senatorial rank), and clothing yourself
in rags, come forward in this character." What then have I
not the power of displaying a good voice (that is, of doing
something that I ought to do) ? How then do you now ap-
pear (on the stage of life) ? As a witness summoned by
Grod. "Come forward,® you, and bear testimony for me, for
you are worthy to be brought forward as a witness by me:
is any thing external to the will good or bad ? Do I hurt any
man? have I made every man's interest dependent on any
man except himself? What testimony do you give for
God?" — I am in a wretched condition, Master*^ (Lord), and
I am unfortunate; no man cares for me, no man gives me
anything ; all blame me, all speak ill of me. — Is this the evi-
dence that you are going to give, and disgrace his summons,
who has conferred so much honour on you, and thought you
worthy of being called to bear such testimony ?
But suppose that he who has the power has declared, "I
judge you to be impious and profane." What has happened
to you? I have been judged to be impious and profane?
Nothing else? Nothing else. But if the same person had
passed judgment on an hypothetical syllogism {avrjvnfxivov\
and had made a declaration, "the conclusion that, if it is day,
it is light, I declare to be false," what has happened to the
hypothetical syllogism? who is judged in this case? who has
been condemned ? the hypothetical syllogism, or the man who
has been deceived by it? Does he then who has the power
of making any declaration about you know what is pious or
impious? Has he studied it, and has he learned it?
Where? From whom? Then is it the fact that a musician
pays no regard to him who declares that the lowest chord
in the lyre is the highest ; nor yet a geometrician, if he de-
clares that the lines from the centre of a circle to the circum-
88 EPICTETUS
ference are not equal; and shall he who is really instructed
pay any regard to the uninstructed man when he pronounces
judgment on what is pious and what is impious, on what is
just and unjust? Oh, the signal wrong done by the in-
structed. Did they learn this here ?
Will you not leave the small arguments (Xordftia) about
these matters to others, to lazy fellows, that they may sit
in a corner and receive their sorry pay, or grumble that no
one gives them any thing; and will you not come forward
and make use of what you have learned ? For it is not these
small arguments that are wanted now: the writings of the
Stoics are full of them. What then is the thing which is
wanted? A man who shall apply them, one who by his
acts shall bear testimony to his words. Assume, I intreat
you, this character, that we may no longer use in the schools
the examples of the ancients, but may have some example
of our own.
To whom then does the contemplation of these matters
(philosophical inquiries) belong? To him who has leisure,
for man is an animal that loves contemplation. But it is
shameful to contemplate these things as runaway slaves do :
we should sit, as in a theatre, free from distraction, and listen
at one time to the tragic actor, at another time to the lute-
player; and not do as slaves do. As soon as the slave has
taken his station he praises the actor and at the same time
looks round : then if any one calls out his master's name, the
slave is immediately frightened and disturbed. It is shame-
ful for philosophers thus to contemplate the works of nature.
For what is a master? Man is not the master of man; but
death is, and life and pleasure and pain; for if he comes
without these things, bring Caesar to me and you will see
how firm I am. But when he shall come with these things,
thundering and lightning,* and when I am afraid of them,
what do I do then except to recognize my master like the
runaway slave? But so long as I have any respite from
these terrors, as a runaway slave stands in the theatre, so do
I : I bathe, I drink, I sing ; but all this I do with terror and
uneasiness. But if I shall release myself from my masters,
that is from those things by means of which masters are
DISCOURSES 89
formidable, what further trouble have I, what master have
I still?
What then, ought we to publish these things to all men ?
No, but we ought to accommodate ourselves to the ignorant®
(roii idtojraii) and to say: "This man recommends to
me that which he thinks good for himself : I excuse him."
For Socrates also excused the jailor, who had the charge of
him in prison and was weeping when Socrates was going to
drink the poison, and said, "How generously he laments over
us."^* Does he then say to the jailor that "for this reason we
have sent away the women?" No, but he says it to his
friends who were able to hear (understand) it; and he treats
the jailor as a child.
NOTES
*The two chief prosecutors of Socrates (Plato, Apology, c. 18;
Epictetus, ii. 2, 15).
' Socrates was condemned by the Athenians to die, and he was con-
tent to die, and thought that it was a good thing; and this was the
reason why he made such a defence as he did, which brought on him
condemnation ; and he preferred condemnation to escaping it by entreat-
ing the dicasts (judges), and lamenting, and saying and doing things
unworthy of himself, as others did. — Plato, Apology, cc. 29-33.
* The Roman emperors kept gladiators for their own amusement and
that of the people (Lipsius, Saturnalia, ii. 16). Seneca says (De Provid.
c. 4), "I have heard a mirmillo (a kind of gladiator) in the time of
C. Caesar (Caligula) complaining of the rarity of gladiatorial exhibi-
tions: 'What a glorious period of life is wasting.'" "Virtue," says Sen-
eca, "is eager after dangers ; and it considers only what it seeks, not
what it may suffer." — Upton.
*Tropic (jpoitiKov) a logical term used by Stoics, which Schweig-
hauser translates "propositio connexa in syllogismo hypothetico."
The meaning of the whole is this. You do not like the work which is
set before you : as we say, you are not content "to do your duty in that
state of life unto which it shall please God to call you." Now this is as
foolish, says Wolf, as for a man in any discussion to require that his ad-
versary should raise no objection except such as may serve the man's
own case.
' There will be a time when Tragic actors shall not know what their
business is, but will think that it is all show. So. says Wolf, philoso-
phers will be only beard and cloak, and will not show by their life and
morals what they really are ; or they will be like false monks, who only
wear the cowl, and do not show a life of piety and sanctity.
• God is introduced as speaking. — Schweighauser.
' The word is Kvpto^, the name by which a slave in Epictetus ad-
dresses his master (dominus), a physician is addressed by his patient,
and in other cases also it is used. It is also used by the Evangelists.
They speak of the angel of the Lord (Matt. i. 24), and Jesus is ad-
dressed by the same term (Matt. viii. 2), Lord or master.
90 EPICTETUS
Mrs. Carter has the following note : "It hath been observed that this
manner of expression is not to be met with in the heathen anthors be-
fore Christianity, and therefore it is one instance of Scripture language
coming early into common use."
But the word (Kvptoi) is used by early Greek writers to indicate one
who has power or authority, and in a sense like the Roman "dominus"
as by Sophocles for instance. The use of the word then by Epictetus
was not new, and it may have been used by the Stoic writers long before
his time. The language of the Stoics was formed at least two cen-
turies before, the Christian era, and the New Testament writers would
use the Greek word which was current in their age. The notion of
"Scripture language coming early into common use" is entirely un-
founded, and is even absurd. Mrs. Carter's remark implies that Epicte-
tus used the Scripture language, whereas he used the particular lan-
guage of the Stoics, and the general language of his age, and the New
Testament writers would do the same. There are resemblances between
the language of Epictetus and the New Testament writers, such as
the expression MV ysvoiro of Paul, which Epictetus often uses; but this
is a slight matter. The words of Peter (Ep. ii. i, 4), "that by these
ye might be partakers of the divine nature," are a Stoic expression, and
the writer of this Epistle, I think, took them from the language of the
Stoics.
* Upton supposes that Epictetus is alluding to the verse of Aristo-
phanes. (Acharn. 531), where it is said of Pericles:
"He flashed, he thundered, and confounded Hellas."
•He calls the uninstructed and ignorant by the Greek word "Idiotae,"
"idiots," which we now use in a peculiar sense. An Idiota was a pri-
vate individual as opposed to one who filled some public office ; and
thence it had generally the sense of one who was ignorant of any par-
ticular act, as, for instance, one who had not studied philosophy.
"Compare the Phaedon of Plato (p. 116). The children of Socrates
were brought in to see him before he took the poison by which he died ;
and also the wives of the friends of Socrates who attended him to his
death. Socrates had ordered his wife Xanthippe to be led home before
he had his last conversation with his friends, and she was taken away
lamenting and bewailing.
CHAPTER XXX
WHAT WE OUGHT TO HAVE READY IN DIFFICULT CIRCUM-
STANCES*
WHEN you are going in to any great personage, re-
member that another also from above sees what
is going on, and that you ought to please him
rather than the other. He then who sees from
above asks you : "In the schools what used you to say about
exile and bonds and death and disgrace?" I used to say that
they are things indifferent (neither good nor bad). "What
then do you say of them now ? Are they changed at all ?"
No. "Are you changed then?" No. "Tell me then what
things are indifferent?" The things which are independent
of the will. "Tell me, also, what follows from this." The
things which are independent of the will are nothing to me.
"Tell me also about the Good, what was your opinion ?" A
will such as we ought to have and also such a use of appear-
ances. "And the end (purpose), what is it?" To follow
thee. "Do you say this now also ?" I say the same now also.
Then go in to the great personage boldly and remember
these things; and you will see what a youth is who has
studied these things when he is among men who have not
studied them. I indeed imagine that you will have such
thoughts as these : Why do we make so great and so many
preparations for nothing? Is this the thing which men
name power ? Is this the antechamber ? this the men of the
bed-chamber? this the armed guards? Is it for this that I
listened to so many discourses? All this is nothing: but I
have been preparing myself as for something great.
NOTE
* The reader may understand why Epictetus gave such a lesson as
this, if he will remember the tyranny under which men at that time lived.
9X
BOOK II
CHAPTER I
THAT COURAGE IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH CAUTION
THE opinion of the philosophers perhaps seems to some
to be a paradox ; but still let us examine as well as
we can, if it is true that it is possible to do every-
thing both with caution and with confidence. For
caution seems to be in a manner contrary to confidence, and
contraries are in no way consistent. That which seems to
many to be a paradox in the matter under consideration in
my opinion is of this kind : if we asserted that we ought to
employ caution and confidence in the same things, men might
justly accuse us of bringing together things which can not be
united. But now where is the difficulty in what is said?
for if these things are true, which have been often said and
often proved, that the nature of good is in the use of appear-
ances, and the nature of evil likewise, and that things inde-
pendent of our will do not admit either the nature of evil nor
of good, what paradox do the philosophers assert if they say
that where things are not dependent on the will, there you
should employ confidence, but where they are dependent on
the will, there you should employ caution? For if the bad
consists in a bad exercise of the will, caution ought only to
be used where things are dependent on the will. But if
things independent of the will and not in our power are noth-
ing to us, with respect to these we must employ confidence;
and thus we shall both be cautious and confident, and indeed
confident because of our caution. For by employing cau-
tion towards things which are really bad, it will result that
we shall have confidence with respect to things which are not
so.
93
DISCOURSES 93
We are then in the condition of deer ;^ when they flee from
the huntsmen's feathers in fright, whither do they turn and
in what do they seek refuge as safe ? They turn to the nets,
and thus they perish by confounding things which are ob-
jects of fear with things that they ought not to fear. Thus
we also act : in what cases do we fear ? In things which are
independent of the will. In what cases on the contrary do
we behave with confidence, as if there were no danger? In
things dependent on the will. To be deceived then, or to
act rashly, or shamelessly or with base desire to seek some-
thing, does not concern us at all, if we only hit the mark in
things which are independent of our will. But where there
is death, or exile or pain or infamy, there we attempt to run
away, there we are struck with terror. Therefore as we
may expect it to happen with those who err in the greatest
matters, we convert natural confidence (that is, according to
nature, into audacity, desperation, rashness, shamelessness ;
and we convert natural caution and modesty into cowardice
and meanness, which are full of fear and confusion. For if
a man should transfer caution to those things in which the
will may be exercised and the acts of the will, he will imme-
diately by willing to be cautious have also the power of
avoiding what he chooses : but if he transfer it to the things
which are not in his power and will, and attempt to avoid
the things which are in the power of others, he will of neces-
sity fear, he will be unstable, he will be disturbed. For
death or pain is not formidable, but the fear of pain or death.
For this reason we commend the poet* who said
" Not death is evil, but a shameful death."
Confidence (courage) then ought to be employed against
death, and caution against the fear of death. But now we
do the contrary, and employ against death the attempt to
escape; and to our opinion about it we employ carelessness,
rashness and indifference. These things Socrates properly
used to call tragic masks; for as to children masks appear
terrible and fearful from inexperience, we also are affected
in like manner by events (the things which happen in life)
for no other reason than children are by masks. For what
94 EPICTETUS
is a child ? Ignorance. What is a child ? Want of know-
ledge. For when a child knows these things, he is in no way
inferior to us. What is death? A tragic mask. Turn it
and examine it. See, it does not bite. The poor body must
be separated^ from the spirit either now or later as it was sep-
arated from it before. Why then are you troubled, if it be
separated now? for if it is not separated now, it will be sep-
arated afterwards. Why ? That the period of the universe
may be completed,* for it has need of the present, and of the
future, and of the past. What is pain? A mask. Turn it
and examine it. The poor flesh is moved roughly, then on
the contrary smoothly. If this does no.t satisfy (please)
you, the door is open: if it does, bear (with things). For
the door ought to be open for all occasions ; and so we have
no trouble.
What then is the fruit of these opinions? It is that which
ought to be the most noble and the most becoming to those
who are really educated ; release from perturbation, release
from fear, freedom. For in these matters we must not be-
lieve the many, who say that free persons only ought to be
educated, but -we should rather believe the philosophers who
say that the educated only are free. How is this ? In this
manner. Is freedom any thing else than the power of liv-
ing as we choose? Nothing else. Tell me then, ye men,
do you wish to live in error? We do not. No one then
who lives in error is free. Do you wish to live in fear?
Do you wish to live in sorrow ? Do you wish to live in per-
turbation? By no means. No one then who is in a state
of fear or sorrow or perturbation is free; but whoever is de-
livered from sorrows and fears and perturbations, he is at
the same time also delivered from servitude. How then can
we continue to believe you, most dear legislators, when you
say, We only allow free persons to be educated ? For phi-
losophers say we allow none to be free except the educated ;
that is, God does not allow it. When then a man has turned'
round before the praetor his own slave, has he done nothing?
He has done something. What? He has turned round his
own slave before the praetor. Has he done nothing more?
Yes : he is also bound to pay for him the tax called the twen-
tieth. Well then, is not the man who has gone through this
DISCOURSES 95
ceremony become free? No more than he is become free
from perturbations. Have you who are able to turn round
(free) others no master? is not money your master, or a girl
or a boy, or some tyrant, or some friend of the tyrant ? why
do you tremble then when you are going off to any trial
(danger) of this kind? It is for this reason that I often
say, study and hold in readiness these principles by which
you may determine what those things are with reference to
which you ought to have confidence (courage), and those
things with reference to which you ought to be cautious:
courageous in that which does not depend on your will ; cau-
tious in that which does depend on it.
Well have I not read to you,® and do you not know what
I was doing ? In what ? In my little dissertations. — Show me
how you are with respect to desire and aversion (eKKXta-tv) :
and show me if you do not fail in getting what you wish,
and if you do not fall into the things which you would avoid :
but as to these long and laboured sentences you will take
them and blot them out.
What then did not Socrates write? And who wrote so
much ?'' — But how ? As he could not always have at hand
one to argue against his principles or to be argued against
in turn, he used to argue with and examine himself, and he
was always treating at least some one subject in a practical
way. These are the things which a philosopher writes. But
little dissertations and that method, which I speak of, he
leaves to others, to the stupid, or to those happy men who
being free from perturbations® have leisure, or to such as
are too foolish to reckon consequences.
And will you now, when the opportunity invites, go and
display those things which you possess, and recite them, and
make an idle show, and say, See how I make dialogues ? Do
not so, my man; but rather say; See how I am not disap-
pointed of that which I desire: See how I do not fall into
that which I would avoid. Set death before me, and you
will see. Set before me pain, prison, disgrace and condem-
nation. This is the proper display of a young man who is
come out of the schools. But leave the rest to others, and
let no one ever hear you say a word about these things ; and
if any man commends you for them, do not allow it; but
^6 EPICTETUS
think that you are nobody and know nothing. Only show
that you know this, how never to be disappointed in your
desire and how never to fall into that which you would
avoid. Let others labour at forensic causes, problems and
syllogisms : do you labour at thinking about death,^ chains,
the rack, exile ;^" and do all this with confidence and reliance
on him who has called you to these sufferings, who has
judged you worthy of the place in which being stationed
you will show what things the rational governing power
can do when it takes its stand against the forces which are
not within the power of our will. And thus this paradox
will no longer appear either impossible or a paradox, that a
man ought to be at the same time cautious and courageous :
courageous towards the things which do not depend on the
will, and cautious in things which are within the power of
the will.
NOTES
* It was the fashion of hunters to frighten deer by displaying feathers
of various colours on ropes or strings and thus frightening them towards
the nets. Virgil, Georg. iii. 372 —
Puniceaeve ag^tant pavidos formidine pennae.
' Euripides, Frag^ments.
* It was the opinion of some philosophers that the soul was a portion
of the divinity sent down into human bodies.
* This was a doctrine of Heraclitus and of Zeno. Zeno (Diog. Laert.
vii. 137) speaks of God as "in certain periods or revolutions of time
exhausting into himself the universal substance {ovaia) and again
generating it out of himself." Antoninus (xi. i) speaks of the periodi-
cal renovation of all things. For man, whose existence is so short, the
doctrine of all existing things perishing in the course of time and then
being renewed, is of no practical value. The present is enough for most
men. But for the few who are able to embrace in thought the past, the
present and the future, the contemplation of the perishable nature of
all existing things may have a certain value by elevating their minds
above the paltry things which others prize above their worth.
' This is an allusion to one of the Roman modes of manumitting a
slave before the praetor.
■ The sum paid on manumission was a tax of five per cent., established
in B.C. 356 and paid by the slave. Epictetus here speaks of the tax
being paid by the master; but in iii. 26, he speaks of it as paid by the
enfranchised slave.
* These are the words of some pupil who is boasting of what he has
written.
' No other author speaks of Socrates having written any thing. It
is therefore very difficult to explain this passage in which Arrian, who
took down the words of Epictetus, represents him as saying that Soc-
DISCOURSES 97
rates wrote so much. Socrates talked much, and Epictetus may have
spoken of talking as if it were writing ; for he must have known that
Socrates was not a writer.
*The word is vitb drapa^iai. Mrs. Carter thinks that the true
reading is vitb dicpa^iai, ' through idleness ' or ' having nothing to do ' ;
and she remarks that 'freedom from perturbations' is the very thing
that Epictetus had been recommending through the whole chapter and
is the subject of the next chapter, and therefore can not be well supposed
to be the true reading in a place where it is mentioned with contempt
It is probable that Mrs. Carter is right. Upton thinks that Epictetus
is alluding to the Sophists, and that we should understand him as
speaking ironically; and this may also be right. Schweighftuser at-
tempts to explain the passage by taking 'free from perturbations' in
the ordinary simple sense ; but I doubt if he has succeeded.
*"The whole life of philosophers," says Cicero (Tusc. i. 30), follow-
ing Plato, "is a reflection upon death."
"Some English readers, too happy to comprehend how chains, tor-
ture, exile and sudden executions, can be ranked among the common
accidents of life, may be surprised to find Epictetus so frequently en-
deavouring to prepare his hearers for them. But it must be recollected
that he addressed himself to persons who lived under the Roman em-
perors, from whose tyranny the very best of men were perpetually lia-
ble to such kind of dangers." — Mrs. Carter. All men even now are
exposed to accidents and misfortunes against which there- is no security,
and even the most fortunate of men must die at last. The lessons of
Epictetus may be as useful now as they were in his time.
CHAPTER II
OF TRANQUILLITY (FREEDOM FROM PERTURBATION)
CONSIDER, you who are going into court, what you
wish to maintain and what you wish to succeed in.
For if you wish to maintain a will conformable to
nature, you have every security, every facility, you
have no troubles. For if you wish to maintain what is in
your own power and is naturally free, and if you are content
with these, what else do you care for ? For who is the mas-
ter of such things? Who can take them away? If you
choose to be modest and faithful, who shall not allow you to
be so ? If you choose not to be restrained or compelled, who
shall compel you to desire what you think that you ought not
to desire? who shall compel you to avoid what you do not
think fit to avoid? But what do you say? The judge will
determine against you something that appears formidable;
but that you should also suffer in trying to avoid it, how can
he do that ? When then the pursuit of objects and the avoid-
ing of them are in your power, what else do you care for?
Let this be your preface,^ this your narrative, this your con-
firmation, this your victory, this your peroration, this your
applause (or the approbation which you will receive).
Therefore Socrates said to one who was reminding him
to prepare for his trial,^ "Do you not think then that I have
been preparing for it all my life?" By what kind of prepara-
tion? "I have maintained that which was in my own
power." How then? "I have never done anything unjust
either in my private or in my public life."
But if you wish to maintain externals also, your poor
body, your little property and your little estimation, I advise
you to make from this moment all possible preparation, and
then consider both the nature of your judge and your adver-
sary. If it is necessary to embrace his knees, embrace his
knees ; if to weep, weep ; if to groan, groan. For when you
have subjected to externals what is your own, then be a slave
and do not resist, and do not sometimes choose to be a slave,
98
DISCOURSES 99
and sometimes not choose, but with all your mind be one or
the other, either free or a slave, either instructed or unin-
structed, either a well bred cock or a mean one, either endure
to be beaten until you die or yield at once ; and let it not hap-
pen to you to receive many stripes and then to yield. But if
these things are base, determine immediately. Where is the
nature of evil and good ? It is where truth is : where truth is
and where nature is, there is caution : where truth is, there
is courage where nature is.
For what do you think? do you think that, if Socrates
had wished to preserve externals, he would have come for-
ward and said : "Anytus and Melitus can certainly kill me,
but to harm me they are not able ?" Was he so foolish as not
to see that this way leads not to the preservation of life and
fortune, but to another end ? What is the reason then that
he takes no account of his adversaries, and even irritates
them ? Just in the same way my friend Heraclitus, who had
a little suit in Rhodes about a bit of land, and had proved to
the judges ( StKaaraU ) that his case was just, said when he
had come to the peroration of his speech, "I will neither in-
treat you nor do I care what judgment you will give, and it
is you rather than I who are on your trial." And thus he
ended the business. What need was there of this? Only
do not intreat; but do not also say, "I do not intreat;" unless
there is a fit occasion to irritate purposely the judges, as was
the case with Socrates. And you, if you are preparing such
a peroration, why do you wait, why do you obey the order
to submit to trial ? For if you wish to be crucified, wait and
the cross will come : but if you choose to submit and to plead
your cause as well as you can, you must do what is consist-
ent with this object, provided you maintain what is your
own (your proper character).
For this reason also it is ridiculous to say. Suggest some-
thing to me' (tell me what to do). What should I suggest
to you? Well, form my mind so as to accommodate itself
to any event. Why that is just the same as if a man who is
ignorant of letters should say, "Tell me what to write when
any name is proposed to me." For if I should tell him to
write Dion, and then another should come and propose to
him not the name of Dion but that of Theon, what will be
lOO EPICTETUS
done ? what will he write ? But if you have practised writ-
ing, you are also prepared to write (or to do) any thing that
is required. If* you are not, what can I now suggest ? For
if circumstances require something else, what will you say,
or what will you do ? Remember then this general precept
and you will need no suggestion. But if you gape after ex-
ternals, you must of necessity ramble up and down in obe-
dience to the will of your master. And who is the master ?
He who has the power over the things which you seek to
gain or try or avoid.
NOTES
* Epictetus refers to the rhetorical divisions of a speech.
* Xenophon has reported this saying of Socrates on the authority of
Hermogenes.
'"The meaning is, You must not ask for advice when you are come
into a difficulty, but every man ought to have such principles as to be
ready on all occasions to act as he ought; just as he who knows how
to write can write any name which is proposed to him." — Wolf.
* "The reader must know that these dissertations were spoken ex-
tempore, and that one thing after another would come into the thoughts
of the speaker. So the reader will not be surprised that when the dis-
course is on the maintenance of firmness or freedom from perturba-
tions, Epictetus should now speak of philosophical preparation, which
is most efficient for the maintenance of firmness." — Wolf.
CHAPTER III
TO THOSE WHO RECOMMEND PERSONS TO PHILOSOPHERS
DIOGENES said well to one who asked from him
letters of recommendation, "That you are a man,
he said, he will know as soon as he sees you; and
he will know whether you are good or bad, if he is
by experience skilful to distinguish the good and the bad;
but if he is without experience, he will never know, if I write
to him ten thousand times."^ For it is just the same as if
a drachma (a piece of silver money) asked to be recom-
mended to a person to be tested. If he is skilful in testing
silver, he will know what you are, for you (the drachma)
will recommend yourself. We ought then in life also to
have some skill as in the case of silver coin that a man may
be able to say like the judge of silver. Bring me any
drachma and I will test it. But in the case of syllogisms,
I would say, Bring any man that you please, and I will dis-
tinguish for you the man who knows how to resolve syllo-
gisms and the man who does not. Why ? Because I know
how to resolve syllogisms. I have the power, which a man
must have who is able to discover those who have the power
of resolving syllogisms. But in life how do I act ? At one
time I call a thing good, and at another time bad. What is
the reason? The contrary to that which is in the case of
syllogisms, ignorance and inexperience.
NOTE
* Mrs. Carter says "This is one of the many extravagant refinements
of the philosophers; and might lead persons into very dangerous mis-
takes, if it was laid down as a maxim in ordinary life." I think that
Mrs. Carter has not seen the meaning of Epictetus. The philosopher
will discover the man's character by trying him, as the assayer tries the
silver by a test.
Cicero (De legibus, i. 9) says that the face expresses the hidden char-
acter. Euripides (Medea, 518) says better, that no mark is impressed
on the body by which we can distinguish the good man from the bad.
Shakespere says
"There's no art
To find the mind's construction in the face.'*
Macbeth, act i. so. 4.
vn
CHAPTER IV
AGAINST A PERSON WHO HAD ONCE BEEN DETECTED IN
ADULTERY
AS Epictetus was saying that man is formed for fidelity,
and that he who subverts fidelity subverts the pecu-
liar characteristic of men, there entered one of those
who are considered to be men of letters, who had
once been detected in adultery in the city. Then Epictetus
continued, But if we lay aside this fidelity for which we are
formed and make designs against our neighbour's wife, what
are we doing? What else but destroying and overthrow-
ing? Whom, the man of fidelity, the man of modesty, the
man of sanctity. Is this all ? And are we not overthrow-
ing neighbourhood, and friendship, and the community ; and
in what place are we putting ourselves ? How shall I con-
sider you, man ? As a neighbour, as a friend ? What kind
of one ? As a citizen ? Wherein shall I trust you ? So if
you were an utensil so worthless that a man could not use
you, you would be pitched out on the dung heaps, and no
man would pick you up. But if being a man you are unable
to fill any place which befits a man, what shall we do with
you? For suppose that you can not hold the place of a
friend, can you hold the place of a slave? And who will
trust you? Are you not then content that you also should
be pitched somewhere on a dung heap, as a useless utensil,
and a bit of dung ? Then will you say, no man cares for me,
a man of letters? They do not, because you are bad and
useless. It is just as if the wasps complained because no
man cares for them, but all fly from them, and if a man can,
he strikes them and knocks them down. You have such a
sting that you throw into trouble and pain any man that you
wound with it. What would you have us do with you?
You have no place where you can be put.
"What then, are not women common by nature ?"^ So I
say also ; for a little pig is common to all the invited guests,
but when the portions have been distributed, go, if you think
DISCOURSES 103
it right, and snatch up the portion of him who reclines next
to you, or slily steal it, or place your hand down by it and
lay hold of it, and if you can tear away a bit of the meat,
grease your fingers and lick them. A fine companion over
cups, and Socratic guest indeed! Well, is not the theatre
common to the citizens? When then they have taken their
seats, come, if you think proper, and eject one of them. In
this way women also are common by nature. When then
the legislator, like the master of a feast, has disturbed them,
will you not also look for your own portion and not filch and
handle what belongs to another. " But I am a man of letters
and understand Archedemus." ^ Understand Archedemus
then, and be an adulterer, and faithless, and instead of a
man, be a wolf or an ape ; for what is the difference ? *
NOTES
* It is not clear what is meant by women being common by nature in
any rational sense. Zeno and his school said "it is their opinion also
that the women should be common among the wise, so that any man
should use any woman, as Zeno says in his Polity, and Chrysippus in
the book on Polity, and Diogenes the Cynic, and Plato; and we shall
love all the children equally like fathers, and the jealousy about adultery
will be removed." These wise men knew little about human nature, if
they taught such doctrines.
* Archedemus was a Stoic philosopher of Tarsus. We know little
about him.
* A man may be a philosopher or pretend to be ; and at the same time
he may be a beast.
CHAPTER V
HOW MAGNANIMITY IS CONSISTENT WITH CARE
THINGS themselves (material) are indifferent;^ but the
use of them is not indifferent. How then shall a
man preserve firmness and tranquillity, and at the
same time be careful and neither rash nor negligent ?
If he imitates those who play at dice. The counters are in-
different; the dice are indifferent. How do I know what
the cast will be? But to use carefully and dexterously the
cast of the dice, this is my business,^ Thus then in life also
the chief business is this: distinguish and separate things,
and say, Externals are not in my power : will is in my power.
Where shall I seek the good and the bad? Within, in the
things which are my own. But in what does not belong
to you call nothing either good or bad, or profit or damage
or any thing of the kind.
What then? Should we use such things carelessly? In
no way : for this on the other hand is bad for the faculty of
the will, and consequently against nature; but we should
act carefully because the use is not indifferent, and we should
also act with firmness and freedom from perturbations be-
cause the material is indifferent. For where the material is
not indifferent, there no man can hinder me nor compel me.
Where I can be hindered and compelled, the obtaining of
those things is not in my power, nor is it good or bad ; but
the use is either bad or good, and the use is in my power.
But it is difficult to mingle and to bring together these two
things, the carefulness of him who is affected by the mat-
ter (or things about him) and the firmness of him who has
no regard for it; but it is not impossible: and if it is, happi-
ness is impossible. But we should act as we do in the case
of a voyage. What can I do ? I can choose the master of
the ship, the sailors, the day, the opportunity. Then comes
a storm. What more have I to care for? for my part is
done. The business belongs to another, the master. — But
the ship is sinking — what then have I to do ? I do the only
104
DISCOURSES 105
thing that I can, not to be drowned full of fear, nor scream-
ing nor blaming God, but knowing that what has been pro-
duced must also perish : for I am not an immortal being, but
a man, a part of the whole, as an hour is a part of the day :
I must be present like the hour, and past like the hour.
What difference then does it make to me, how I pass away,
whether by being suffocated or by a fever, for I must pass
through some such means?
This is just what you will see those doing who play at
ball skilfully. No one cares about the balP as being good
or bad, but about throwing and catching it. In this there-
fore is the skill, in this the art, the quickness, the judgment,
so that even if I spread out my lap I may not be able to
catch it, and another, if I throw, may catch the ball. But if
with perturbation and fear we receive or throw the ball, what
kind of play is it then, and wherein shall a man be steady,
and how shall a man see the order in the game? But one
will say, "Throw ;" or "Do not throw ;" and another will say,
"You have thrown once." This is quarrelling, not play.
Socrates then knew how to play at ball. How? By
using pleasantry in the court where he was tried. "Tell me,"
he says, "Anytus, how do you say that I do not believe in
God. The Daemons (Saijuovei) , who are they, think you? Are
they not sons of Gods, or compounded of gods and men ?"
When Anytus admitted this, Socrates said, "Who then, think
you, can believe that there are mules (half asses), but not
asses." And this he said as if he were playing at ball.* And
what was the ball in this case? Life, chains, banishment, a
draught of poison, separation from wife and leaving chil-
dren orphans. These were the things which he was playing ;
but still he did play and threw the ball skilfully. So we
should do : we must employ all the care of the players, but
show the same indifference about the ball. For we ought
by all means to apply our art to some external material, not
as valuing the material, but, whatever it may be, showing our
art in it. Thus too the weaver does not make wool, but ex-
ercises his art upon such as he receives. Another gives you
food and property and is able to take them away and your
poor body also. When then you have received the material,
work on it. If then you come out (of the trial) without
l66 EPICTETUS
having suffered anything, all who meet you will congratulate
you on your escape ; but he who knows how to look at such
things, if he shall see that you have behaved properly in the
matter, will commend you and be pleased with you; and if
he shall find that you owe your escape to any want of proper
behaviour, he will do the contrary. For where rejoicing is
reasonable, there also is congratulation reasonable.
How then is it said that some external things are accord-
ing to nature and others contrary to nature? It is said as
it might be said if we were separated from union (or so-
ciety) : for to the foot I shall say that it is according to na-
ture for it to be clean ; but if you take it as a foot and as a
thing not detached (independent), it will befit it both to step
into the mud and tread on thorns, and sometimes to be cut
off for the good of the whole body ; otherwise it is no longer
a foot. We should think in some such way about ourselves
also. What are you? A man. If you consider yourself
as detached from other men, it is according to nature to live
to old age, to be rich, to be healthy. But if you consider
yourself as a man and a part of a certain whole, it is for the
sake of that whole that at one time you should be sick, at
another time take a voyage and run into danger, and at an-
other time be in want, and in some cases die prematurely.
Why then are you troubled ? Do you not know, that as a foot
is no longer a foot if it is detached from the body, so you are
no longer a man if you are separated from other men. For
what is a man ? A part of a state, of that first which con-
sists of Gods and of men ; then of that which is called next
to it, which is a small image of the universal state. What
then must I be brought to trial ; must another have a fever,
another sail on the sea, another die, and another be con-
demned ? Yes, for it is impossible in such a body, in such a
universe of things, among so many living together, that such
things should not happen, some to one and others to others.
It is your duty then since you are come here, to say what you
ought, to arrange these things as it is fit.* Then some one
says, "I shall charge you with doing me wrong." Much
good may it do you : I have done my part ; but whether you
also have done yours, you must look to that; for there is
some danger of this too, that it may escape your notice.
DISCOUSES 107
NOTES
'The materials (vXai) on which man works are neither good nor
bad, and so they are, as Epictetus names them, indifferent. But the
use of things, or of material, is not indifferent. They may be used well
or ill, conformably to nature or not.
' Terence says (Adelphi, iv. 7) —
Si illud, quod est maxime opus, jactu non cadit,
Illud quod cecidit forte, id arte ut corrigas.
'Dexterously' is 'arte,' tsxvikSx; in Epictetus. — ^Upton.
* The word is dpitaa-rov , which was also used by the Romans. One
threw the ball and the other caught it. Chrysippus used this simile of
a ball in speaking of giving and receiving (Seneca, "De Beneficiis,"
ii. 17). Martial has the word ("Epigrams" iv. 19) "Sive harpasta
manu pulverulenta rapis" ; and elsewhere.
* In Plato's "Apology," Socrates addresses Meletus ; and he says,
it would be equally absurd if a man should believe that there are foals
of horses and asses, and should not believe that there are horses and
asses. But Socrates says nothing of mules, for the word mules in some
texts of the "Apology" is manifestly wrong.
' He tells some imaginary person, who hears him, that since he is
come into the world, he must do his duty in it
CHATPER VI
OF INDIFFERENCE
THE hypothetical proposition is indifferent : the judg-
ment about it is not indifferent, but it is either
knowledge or opinion or error. Thus life is indif-
ferent : the use is not indifferent. When any man then
tells you that these things also are indifferent, do not become
negligent; and when a man invites you to be careful (about
such things), do not become abject and struck with admira-
tion of material things. And it is good for you to know
your own preparation and power, that in those matters where
you have not been prepared, you may keep quiet, and not be
vexed, if others have the advantage over you. For you too
in syllogisms will claim to have the advantage over them;
and if others should be vexed at this, you will console them
by saying, "I have learned them, and you have not." Thus
also where there is need of any practice, seek not that which
is acquired from the need (of such practice), but yield in
that matter to those who have had practice, and be yourself
content with firmness of mind.
Go and salute a certain person. How? Not meanly. —
But I have been shut out, for I have not learned to make
my way through the window; and when I have found the
door shut, I must either come back or enter through the
window. — But still speak to him. — In what way? Not
meanly. But suppose that you have not got what you
wanted. Was this your business, and not his ? Why then
do you claim that which belongs to another? Always re-
member what is your own, and what belongs to another ; and
you will not be disturbed. Chrysippus therefore said well.
So long as future things are uncertain, I always cling to
those which are more adapted to the conservation of that
which is according to nature ; for God himself has given me
the faculty of such choice. But if I knew that it was fated
(in the order of things) for me to be sick, I would even
move towards it; for the foot also, if it had intelligence,
xo8
DISCOURSES 109
would move to go into the mud. For why are ears of corn
produced? Is it not that they may become dry? And do
they not become dry that they may be reaped?^ for they are
not separated from communion with other things. If then
they had perception, ought they to wisli never to be reaped ?
But this is a curse upon ears of corn, to be never reaped. So
we must know that in the case of men too it is a curse not to
die, just the same as not to be ripened and not to be reaped.
But since we must be reaped, and we also know that we are
reaped, we are vexed at it ; for we neither know what we are
nor have we studied what belongs to man, as those who
have studied horses know what belongs to horses. But
Chry Santas^ when he was going to strike the enemy checked
himself when he heard the trumpet sounding a retreat: so
it seemed better to him to obey the general's command than
to follow his own inclination. But not one of us chooses,
even when necessity summons, readily to obey it, but weep-
ing and groaning we suffer what we do suffer, and we call
them circumstances. What kind of circumstances, man?
If you give the name of circumstances to the things which
are around you, all things are circumstances; but if you call
hardships by this name, what hardship is there in the dying
of that which has been produced ? But that which destroys
is either a sword, or a wheel, or a sea, or a tile, or a tyrant.
Why do you care about the way of going down to Hades?
All ways are equal.* But if you will listen to the truth, the
way which the tyrant sends you is shorter. A tyrant never
killed a man in six months : but a fever is often a year about
it. All these things are only sound and the noise of empty
names.
I am in danger of my life from Caesar. And am not I
in danger who dwell in Nicopolis, where there are so many
earthquakes : and when you are crossing the Hadriatic, what
hazard do you run ? Is it not the hazard of your life ? But
I am in danger also as to opinion. Do you mean your own ?
how ? For who can compel you to have any opinion which
you do not choose? But is it as to another man's opinion?
and what kind of danger is yours, if others have false opin-
ions? But I am in danger of being banished. What is it
to be banished? To be somewhere else than at Rome?
I lO EPICTETUS
Yes : what then if I should be sent to Gyara ? If that suits
you, you will go there; but if it does not, you can go to an-
other place instead of Gyara, whither he also will go, who
sends you to Gyara, whether he choose or not. Why then
do you go up to Rome as if it were something great ? It is
not worth all this preparation, that an ingenuous youth
should say, it was not worth while to have heard so much
and to have written so much and to have sat so long by the
side of an old man who is not worth much. Only remem-
ber that division by which your own and not your own are
distinguished: never claim any thing which belongs to
others, A tribunal and a prison are each a place, one high
and the other low; but the will can be maintained equal, if
you choose to maintain it equal in each. And we shall then
be imitators of Socrates, when we are able to write paeans
in prison.*^ But in our present disposition, consider if we
could endure in prison another person saying to us, "Would
you like me to read Paeans to you?" "Why do you trouble me?
do you not know the evils which hold me ? Can I in such cir-
cumstances (listen to paeans) ?" "What circumstances ?" "I
am going to die." "And will other men be immortal ?" ,
NOTES
* This discussion is with a young philosopher who, intending to return
from Nicopolis to Rome, feared the tyranny of Domitian, who was par-
ticularly severe towards philosophers.
The title "of indifference" means "of the indifference of things;" of
the things which are neither good nor bad.
' Epictetus alludes to the verses from the Hypsipyle of Euripides.
Compare Antoninus (vii. 40) : "Life must be reaped like the ripe ears
of corn : one man is born : another dies." Cicero (Tuscul. Disp. iii.
25) has translated six verses from Euripides, and among them are
these two:
tum vita omnibus
Metenda ut fruges : sic jubet necessitas.
•The story is in Xenophon's Cyropsedia (IV, near the beginning)
where Cyrus says that he called Chrysantas by name. Epictetus, as
Upton remarks, quotes from memory.
* So Anaxagoras said that the road to the other world (ad inferos) is
the same from all places. (Cicero, Tusc. Disp. i. 43.) What follows is
one of the examples of extravagant assertion in Epictetus. A tyrant
may kill by a slow death as a fever does. I suppose that Epictetus
DISCOURSES 1 1 1
would have some answer to that. Except to a Stoic the ways to death
are not indifferent: some ways of dying are painful, and even he who
can endure with fortitude, would prefer an easy death.
• Diogenes Laertius reports in his life of Socrates that he wrote in
prison a Paean, and he gives the first line which contains an address to
Apollo and Artemis.
CHAPTER VII
HOW WE OUGHT TO USE DIVINATION
THROUGH an unreasonable regard to divination many
of us omit many duties.^ For what more can the
diviner see than death or danger or disease, or gen-
erally things of that kind? If then I must expose
myself to danger for a friend, and if it is my duty even to die
for him, what need have I then for divination ? Have I not
within me a diviner who has told me the nature of good and
of evil, and has explained to me the signs (or marks) of
both? What need have I then to consult the viscera of vic-
tims or the flight of birds, and why do I submit when he
says, "It is for your interest?" For does he know what is
for my interest, does he know what is good ; and as he has
learned the signs of the viscera, has he also learned the signs
of good and evil? For if he knows the signs of these, he
knows the signs both of the beautiful and of the ugly, and of
the just and of the unjust. Do you tell me, man, what is
the thing which is signified for me ; is it life or death, pov-
erty or wealth ? But whether these things are for my inter-
est or whether they are not, I do not intend to ask you.
Why don't you give your opinion on matters of grammar,
and why do you give it here about things on which we are
all in error and disputing with one another?^ The woman
therefore, who intended to send by a vessel a month's pro-
visions to Gratilla^ in her banishment, made a good answer
to him who said that Domitian would seize what she sent, I
would rather, she replied, that Domitian should seize all than
that I should not send it.
What then leads us to frequent use of divination ? Cow-
ardice, the dread of what will happen. This is the reason
why we flatter the diviners. Pray, master, shall I succeed
to the property of my father ? Let us see : let us sacrifice on
the occasion — Yes, master, as fortune chooses. — When he
has said, You shall succeed to the inheritance, we thank him
112
DISCOURSES 1 1 3
as if we received the inheritance from him. The conse-
quence is that they play upon us,*
What then should we do? We ought to come (to divinia-
tion) without desire or aversion, as the wayfarer asks of the
man whom he meets which of two roads leads (to his jour-
ney's end), without any desire for that which leads to the
right rather than to the left, for he has no wish to go by any
road except the road which leads (to his end). In the same
way ought we to come to Grod also as a guide ; as we use our
eyes, not asking them to show us rather such things as we
wish, but receiving the appearances of things such as the
eyes present them to us. But now we trembling take the
augur (bird interpreter) by the hand, and while we invoke
God we intreat the augur, and say "Master have mercy on
me; suffer me to come safe out of this difficulty." Wretch,
would you have then any thing other than what is best ? Is
there then any thing better than what pleases God ? Why
do you, as far as in your power, corrupt your judge and lead
astray your adviser ?
NOTES
^Divination was a great part of ancient religion, and, as Epictetus
says, it led men "to omit many duties." In a certain sense there was
some meaning in it. If it is true that those who believe in God can
see certain signs in the administration of the world by which they can
judge what their behaviour ought to be, they can learn what their
duties are. If these signs are misunderstood, or if they are not seen
right, men may be governed by an abject superstition. So the external
forms of any religion may become the means of corruption and of human
debasement, and the true indications of God's will may be neglected.
Upton compares Lucan (ix. 572), who sometimes said a few good
things.
' A man who gives his opinion on grammar gives an opinion on a
thing of which many know something. A man who gives his opinion
on divination or on future events, gives an opinion on things of which
we all know nothing. When then a man affects to instruct on things
unknown, we may ask him to give his opinion on things which are
known, and so we may learn what kind of man he is.
' Gratilla was a lady of rank, who was banished from Rome and
Italy by Domitian.
* As knavish priests have often played on the fears and hopes of the
superstitious.
CHAPTER VIII
WHAT IS THE NATURE OF THE GOOD*
GOD is beneficial. But the Good also is beneficial.^
It is consistent then that where the nature of God
is, there also the nature of the good should be.
What then is the nature of God ?^ Flesh ? Cer-
tainly not. An estate in land? By no means. Fame?
No. Is it intelligence, knowledge, right reason? Yes.
Herein then simply seek the nature of the good; for I sup-
pose that you do not seek it in a plant. No. Do you seek
it in an irrational animal? No. If then you seek it in a
rational animal, why do you still seek it any where except in
the superiority of rational over irrational minds?* Now
plants have not even the power of using appearances, and
for this reason you do not apply the term good to them.
The good then requires the use of appearances. Does it re-
quire this use only ? For if you say that it requires this use
only, say that the good, and that happiness and unhappiness
are in irrational animals also. But you do not say this, and
you do right ; for if they possess even in the highest degree
the use of appearances, yet they have not the faculty of un-
derstanding the use of appearances ; and there is good reason
for this, for they exist for the purpose of serving others, and
they exercise no superiority. For the ass, I suppose, does
not exist for any superiority over others. No ; but because
we had need of a back which is able to bear something ; and
in truth we had need also of his being able to walk, and for
this reason he received also the faculty of making use of ap-
pearances, for otherwise he would not have been able to
walk. And here then the matter stopped. For if he had
also received the faculty of comprehending the use of appear-
ances, it is plain that consistently with reason he would not
then have been subjected to us, nor would he have done us
these services, but he would have been equal to us and like
to us.
Will you not then seek the nature of good in the ra-
114
DISCOURSES 115
tional animal? for if it is not there, you will not choose to
say that it exists in any other thing (plant or animal).
What then? are not plants and animals also the works of
God? They are; buttheyarenot superior things, nor yet parts
of the Gods ? But you are a superior thing ; you are a portion
separated from the deity ; you have in yourself a certain por-
tion of him. Why then are you ignorant of your own noble
descent ?** Why do you not know whence you came ? will you
not remember when you are eating, who you are who eat
and whom you feed? When you are in conjunction with a
woman, will you not remember who you are who do this
thing? When you are in social intercourse, when you are
exercising yourself, when you are engaged in discussion,
know you not that you are nourishing a god, that you are
exercising a god? Wretch, you are carrying about a god
with you, and you know it not.® Do you think that I mean
some God of silver or of gold, and external ? You carry him
within yourself, and you perceive not that you are polluting
him by impure thoughts and dirty deeds. And if an image
of God were present, you would not dare to do any of the
things which you are doing : but when God himself is present
within and sees all and hears all, you are not ashamed of
thinking and doing such things, ignorant as you are of your
own nature and subject to the anger of God. Then why
do we fear when we are sending a young man from the
school into active life, lest he should do anything improperly,
eat improperly, have improper intercourse with women ; and
lest the rags in which he is wrapped should debase him, lest
fine garments should make him proud? This youth (if he
acts thus) does not know his own God: he knows not with
whom he sets out (into the world). But can we endure
when he says " I wish I had you (God) with me." Have you
not God with you ? and do you seek for any other, when you
have him ? or will God tell you any thing else than this ? If
you were a statue of Phidias, either Athena or Zeus, you
would think both of yourself and of the artist, and if you
had any understanding (power of perception) you would
try to do nothing unworthy of him who made you or of
yourself, and try not to appear in an unbecoming dress (at-
titude) to those who look on you. But now because Zeus
Il6 EPICTETUS
has made you, for this reason do you care not how you
shall appear? And yet is the artist (in the one case) like the
artist in the other ? or the work in the one case like the other ?
And what work of an artist, for instance, has in itself the
faculties, which the artist shows in making it? Is it not
marble or bronze, or gold or ivory ? and the Athena of Phi-
dias when she has once extended the hand and received in it
the figure of Victory" stands in that attitude for ever. But
the works of God have power of motion, they breathe, they
have the faculty of using the appearances of things, and the
power of examining them. Being the work of such an artist
do you dishonour him ? And what shall I say, not only that
he made you, but also entrusted you to yourself and made
you a deposit to yourself ? Will you not think of this too,
but do you also dishonour your guardianship ? But if God
had entrusted an orphan to you, would you thus neglect him ?
He has delivered yourself to your own care, and says, "I
had no one fitter to intrust him to than yourself; keep him
for me such as he is by nature, modest, faithful, erect, un-
terrified, free from passion and perturbation." And then
you do not keep him such.
But some will say, "Whence has this fellow got the arro-
gance which he displays and these supercilious looks?" I
have not yet so much gravity as befits a philosopher; for I
do not yet feel confidence in what I have learned and in what
I have assented to : I still fear my own weakness. Let me
get confidence and then you shall see a countenance such as I
ought to have and an attitude such as I ought to have ; then
I will show to you the statue, when it is perfected, when it
is polished. What do you expect? a supercilious counte-
nance? Does the Zeus at Olympia* lift up his brow? No,
his look is fixed as becomes him who is ready to say
"Irrevocable is my word and shall not fail." — Iliad, i. 526.
Such will I show myself to you, faithful, modest, noble, free
from perturbation — What, and immortal too, exempt from
old age, and from sickness? No, but dying as becomes a
god, sickening as becomes a god. This power I possess ; this
I can do. But the rest I do not possess, nor can I do. I
DISCOURSES 1 1 7
will show the nerves (strength) of a philosopher. What
nerves® are these? A desire never disappointed, an aver-
sion which never falls on that which it would avoid, a proper
pursuit ( opu-qv ) , a diligent purpose, an assent which is not
rash. These you shall see.
NOTES
*Schwei§hauser observes that the title of this chapter would more cor-
rectly be o ©£05 kv vfiiv, God in man. There is no better chapter in
the book.
* Socrates (Xenophon, Mem. iv. 6, 8) concludes " that the useful is
good to him to whom it is useful."
* I do not remember that Epictetus has attempted any other descrip-
tion of the nature of God. He has done more wisely than some who
have attempted to answer a question which can not be answered. But
see ii. 14, n-13.
* Compare Cicero, de Offic. i. 27.
* Noble descent. See i. 9.
The doctrine that God is in man is an old doctrine. Euripides said
(Apud Theon. Soph. Progym.) : —
*0 vovi yap rffiXv itrrtv kv iKdaToo Geoi.
The doctrine became a commonplace of the poets (Ovid, Fast, vi.),
" Est deus in nobis, agitante calescimus illo ;" and Horace, Sat. ii. 6, 79,
"Atque affigit humo divinae particulam aurae." See i. 14, note 4.
* Mrs. Carter has a note here. "See i Cor. vi: 19; 2 Cor. vi: 16; 2
Tim. 1 : 14 ; i John iii : 24, iv : 12, 13. But though the simple expression
of carrying God about with us may seem to have some nearly parallel
to it in the New Testament, yet those represent the Almighty in a more
venerable manner, as taking the hearts of good men for a temple to
dwell in. But the other expressions here of feeding and exercising God,
and the whole of the paragraph, and indeed of the Stoic system, show
the real sense of even its more decent phrases to be vastly different from
that of Scripture."
The passage in i Cor. vi: 19, is ("What? know ye not that your
body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of
God, and ye are not your own" ? This follows v. 18, which is an ex-
hortation to "flee fornication." The passage in 2 Cor. vi: 16 is, "And
what agreement hath the temple of God with idols? for ye are the
temple of the living God ; as God hath said, I will dwell in them and
walk in them," etc. Mrs. Carter has not correctly stated the sense of
these two passages.
It is certain that Epictetus knew nothing of the writers of the Epistles
in the New Testament : but whence did these writers learn such forms
of expression as we find in the passages cited by Mrs. Carter? I believe
that they drew them from the Stoic philosophers who wrote before Epic-
tetus and that they applied them to the new religion which they were
teaching. The teaching of Paul and of Epictetus does not differ: the
spirit of God is in man.
Swedenborg says, "In these two faculties (rationality and liberty) the
Lord resides with every man, whether he be good or evil, they being
Il8 EPICTETUS
the Lord's mansions in the human race. But the mansion of the Lord is
nearer with a man, in proportion as the man opens the superior degrees
by these faculties ; for by the opening thereof he comes into superior de-
grees of love and wisdom, and consequently nearer to the Lord. Hence it
may appear that as these degrees are opened, so a man is in the Lord and
the Lord in him." Swedenborg, Angelic Wisdom, 240. Again, "the fac-
ulty of thinking rationally, viewed in itself, is not man's, but Go.d's in
man."
I am not quite sure in what sense the administration of the Eucharist
ought to be understood in the church of England service. Some English
divines formerly understood, and perhaps some now understand, the
ceremony as a commemoration of the blood of Christ shed for us and of
his body which was broken ; as we see in T. Burnet's posthumous work
(de Fide et Officiis Christianorum, p. 80). It was a commemoration of
the last supper of Jesus and the Apostles. But this does not appear to be
the sense in which the ceremony is now understood by some priests and
by some members of the church of England, whose notions approach
near to the doctrine of the Catholic mass. Nor does it appear to be the
sense of the prayer made before delivering the bread and wine to the
Communicants, for the prayer is "Grant us, gracious Lord, so to eat the
flesh of thy dear son Jesus Christ and to drink his blood that our sinful
bodies may be made clean by his body and our souls washed through
his most precious blood and that we may evermore dwell in him and he
in us." This is a different thing from Epictetus' notion of God being in
man, and also different, as I understand it, from the notion contained in
the two passages of Paul; for it is there said generally that the Holy
Ghost is in man or God in man, not that God is in man by virtue of a
particular ceremony. It should not be omitted that there is after the end
of the Communion service an admonition that the sacramental bread and
wine remain what they were, "and that the natural body and blood of
our Saviour Christ are in heaven and not here; it being against the
truth of Christ's natural body to be at one time in more places than one."
It was affirmed by the Reformers and the best writers of the English
church that the presence of Christ in the Eucharist is a spiritual pres-
ence, and in this opinion they followed Calvin and the Swiss divines :
and yet in the Prayer book we have the language that I have quoted;
and even Calvin, who only maintained a spiritual presence, said, "that
the verity is nevertheless joined to the signs, and that in the sacrament
we have 'true Communion in Christ's body and blood.'" (Contem-
porary Review, p. 464, August 1874). What would Epictetus have
thought of the subtleties of our days?
^ The Athena of Phidias was in the Parthenon on the Athenian
Acropolis, a colossal chryselephantine statue, that is, a frame work of
wood, covered with ivory and gold. The figure of Victory stood on the
hand of the goddess, as we frequently see in coins.
' The great statue at Olympia was the work of Phidias. It was a
seated colossal chryselephantine statue, and held a Victory in the right
hand.
' An allusion to the combatants in the public exercises, who used to
show their shoulders, muscles and sinews as a proof of their strength.
CHAPTER IX
THAT WHEN WE CAN NOT FULFIL THAT WHICH THE CHAR-
ACTER OF A MAN PROMISES, WE ASSUME THE CHARACTER
OF A PHILOSOPHER
IT is no common (easy) thing to do this only, to fulfil the
promise of a man's nature. For what is a man ? The
answer is, a rational and mortal being. Then by the
rational faculty from whom are we separated? From
wild beasts. And from what others? From sheep and
like animals. Take care then to do nothing like a wild
beast ; but if you do, you have lost the character of a man ;
you have not fulfilled your promise. See that you do noth-
ing like a sheep ; but if you do, in this case also the man is
lost. What then do we do as sheep ? When we act glutton-
ously, when we act lewdly, when we act rashly, filthily, in-
considerately, to what have we declined ? To sheep. What
have we lost ? The rational faculty. When we act conten-
tiously and harmfully and passionately, and violently, to
what have we declined? To wild beasts. Consequently
some of us are great wild beasts, and others little beasts, of
a bad disposition and small, whence we may say, Let me be
eaten by a lion.* But in all these ways the promise of a man
acting as a man is destroyed. For when is a conjunctive
(complex) proposition maintained?^ When it fulfils what
its nature promises; so that the preservation of a complex
proposition is when it is a conjunction of truths. When is
a disjunctive maintained? When it fulfils what it prom-
ises. When are flutes, a lyre, a horse, a dog, preserved?
(when they severally keep their promise). What is the
wonder then if man also in like manner is preserved, and in
like manner is lost? Each man is improved and preserved
by corresponding acts, the carpenter by acts of carpentry,
the grammarian by acts of grammar. But if a man accus-
toms himself to write ungrammatically, of necessity his art
will be corrupted and destroyed. Thus modest actions pre-
serve the modest man, and immodest actions destroy him:
119
1 20 EPICTETUS
and actions of fidelity preserve the faithful man, and the
contrary actions destroy him. And on the other hand con-
trary actions strengthen contrary characters : shamelessness
strengthens the shameless man, faithlessness the faithless
man, abusive words the abusive man, anger the man of an
angry temper, and unequal receiving and giving make the
avaricious man more avaricious.
For this reason philosophers admonish us not to be sat-
isfied with learning only, but also to add study, and then
practice.' For we have long been accustomed to do con-
trary things, and we put in practice opinions which are con-
trary to true opinions. If then we shall not also put in prac-
tice right opinions, we shall be nothing more than the ex-
positors of the opinions of others. For now who among
us is not able to discourse according to the rules of art about
good and evil things (in this fashion) ? That of things
some are good, and some are bad, and some are indifferent :
the good then are virtues, and the things which participate
in virtues ; and the bad are the contrary ; and the indifferent
are wealth, health, reputation. — Then, if in the midst of our
talk there should happen some greater noise than usual, or
some of those who are present should laugh at us, we are
disturbed. Philosopher, where are the things which you
were talking about? Whence did you produce and utter
them. From the lips, and thence only. Why then do you
corrupt the aids provided by others? Why do you treat
the weightiest matters as if you were playing a game of dice ?
For it is one thing to lay up bread and wine as in a store-
house, and another thing to eat. That which has been eaten,
is digested, distributed, and is become sinews, flesh, bones,
blood, healthy colour, healthy breath. Whatever is stored
up, when you choose you can readily take and show it ; but
you have no other advantage from it except so far as to ap-
pear to possess it. For what is the difference between ex-
plaining these doctrines and those of men who have different
opinions ? Sit down now and explain according to the rules
of art the opinions of Epicurus, and perhaps you will explain
his opinions in a more useful manner than Epicurus him-
self.* Why then do you call yourself a Stoic? Why do
you deceive the many ? Why do you act the part of a Jew,*^
DISCOURSES 121
when you are a Greek? Do you not see how (why) each is
called a Jew, or a Syrian or an Egyptian ? and when we see
a man inclining to two sides, we are accustomed to say, This
man is not a Jew, but he acts as one. But when he has as-
sumed the affects of one who has been imbued with Jewish
doctrine and has adopted that sect, then he is in fact and he
is named a Jew.° Thus we too being falsely imbued (bap-
tized), are in name Jews, but in fact we are something else.
Our affects (feelings) are inconsistent with our words; we
are far from practising what we say, and that of which we
are proud, as if we knew it. Thus being unable to fulfil
even what the character of a man promises, we even add to
it the profession of a philosopher, which is as heavy a bur-
den, as if a man who is unable to bear ten pounds should at-
tempt to raise the stone which Ajax'^ lifted.
NOTES
* This seems to be a proverb. If I am eaten, let me be eaten by the
nobler animal.
*A conjunctive or complex (arvjuTtsTtXeyjuevov) axiom or lemma.
Gellius (xvi. 8) gives an example: " P. Scipio, the son of Paulus, was
both twice consul and triumphed, and exercised the censorship and was
the colleague of L. Mummius in his censorship." Gellius adds, "in every
conjunctive if there is one falsehood, though the other parts are true,
the whole is said to be false," For the whole is proposed as true: there-
fore if one part is false, the whole is not true. The disjunctive
(Sts^evyjxEvov ) is of this kind : "pleasure is either bad or good, or
neither good nor bad."
'We often say a man learns a particular thing; and there are men
who profess to teach certain things, such as a language, or an art; and
they mean by teaching that the taught shall learn ; and learning means
that they shall be able to do what they learn. He who teaches an art
professes that the scholar shall be able to practice the art, the art of
making shoes for example, or other useful things. There are men who
profess to teach religion, and morality, and virtue generally. These men
may tell us what they conceive to be religion, and morality, and virtue ;
and those who are said to be taught may know what their teachers have
told them. But the learning of religion, and of morality and of virtue,
mean that the learner will do the acts of religion and of morality and of
virtue ; which is a very different thing from knowing what the acts of
religion, of morality, and of virtue are. The teacher's teaching is in fact
only made efficient by his example, by his doing that which he teaches.
* "He is not a Stoic philosopher, who can only explain in a subtle and
proper manner the Stoic principles : for the same person can explain the
principles of Epicurus, of course for the purpose of refuting them, and
perhaps he can explain them better than Epicurus himself. Consequently
he might be at the same time a Stoic and an Epicurean ; which is ab-
surd."— Schweig. He means that the mere knowledge of Stoic opinions
122 EPICTETUS
does not make a man a Stoic, or any other philosopher. A man must
according to Stoic principles practice them in order to be a Stoic philoso-
pher. So if we say that a man is a religious man, he must do the acts
which his religion teaches; for it is by his acts only that we can know
him to be a religious man. What he says and professes may be false :
and no man knows except himself whether his words and professions
are true. The uniformity, regularity, and consistency of his acts are evi-
dence which can not be mistaken.
* It has been suggested that Epictetus confounded under the name of
Jews those who were Jews and those who were Christians. We know
that some Jews became Christians.
* It is possible, as I have said, that by Jews Epictetus means Christians,
for Christians and Jews are evidently confounded by some writers, as
the first Christians were of the Jewish nation. In book iv. 7, Epictetus
gives the name of Galilaeans to the Jews. The term Galilaeans points to
the country of the great teacher. Paul says (Romans, ii: 28), "For he
is not a Jew, which is one outwardly — but he is a Jew which is one in-
wardly," etc. His remarks (ii: 17-29) on the man "who is called a Jew,
and rests in the law and makes his boast of God" may be compared with
what Epictetus says of a man who is called a philosopher, and does not
practice that which he professes.
' See ii. 24, 26 ; Iliad, vii. 264, etc. ; Juvenal, xv. 65.
"Nee hunc lapidem, quales et Turnus et Ajax
Vel quo Tydides percussit pondere coxam
JEnese." — ^Upton.
CHAPTER X
HOW WE MAY DISCOVER THE DUTIES OF LIFE FROM NAMES
CONSIDER who you are. In the first place, you are
a man; and this is one who has nothing superior
to the faculty of the will, but all other things sub-
jected to it; and the faculty itself he possesses un-
enslaved and free from subjection. Consider then from
what things you have been separated by reason. You have
been separated from wild beasts: you have been separated
from domestic animals ( itpo^droov ) . Further, you are a citi-
zen of the world, and a part of it, not one of the subservient
(serving), but one of the principal (ruling) parts, for you are
capable of comprehending the divine administration and of
considering the connexion of things. What then does the
character of a citizen promise (profess) ? To hold nothing
as profitable to himself; to deliberate about nothing as if he
were detached from the community, but to act as the hand
or foot would do, if they had reason and understood the con-
stitution of nature, for they would never put themselves in
motion nor desire any thing otherwise than with reference
to the whole. Therefore the philosophers say well, that if
the good man had foreknowledge of what would happen, he
would co-operate towards his own sickness and death and
mutilation, since he knows^ that these things are assigned
to him according to the universal arrangement, and that the
whole is superior to the part, and the state to the citizen.
But now because we do not know the future, it is our duty
to stick to the things which are in their nature more suitable
for our choice, for we were made among other things for
this.
After this remember that you are a son. What does this
character promise? To consider that every thing which is
the son's belongs to the father, to obey him in all things,
never to blame him to another, nor to say or do any thing
which does him injury, to yield to him in all things and
gfive way, co-operating with him as far as you can. After
123
124 EPICTETUS
this know that you are a brother also, and that to this charac-
ter it is due to make concessions ; to be easily persuaded, to
speak good of your brother, never to claim in opposition to
him any of the things which are independent of the will, but
readily to give them up, that you may have the larger share
in what is dependent on the will. For see what a thing it
is, in place of a lettuce, if it should so happen, or a seat, to
gain for yourself goodness of disposition. How great is
the advantage.^
Next to this, if you are a senator of any state, remember
that you are a senator : if a youth, that you are a youth : if
an old man, that you are an old man ; for each of such names,
if it comes to be examined, marks out the proper duties.
But if you go and blame your brother, I say to you, You
have forgotten who you are and what is your name. In the
next place, if you were a smith and made a wrong use of the
hammer, you would have forgotten the smith; and if you
have forgotten the brother and instead of a brother have be-
come an enemy, would you appear not to have changed one
thing for another in that case? And if instead of a man,
who is a tame animal and social, you are become a mischie-
vous wild beast, treacherous, and biting, have you lost noth-
ing? But, (I suppose) you must lose a bit of money that
you may suffer damage ? And does the loss of nothing else
do a man damage? If you had lost the art of grammar or
music, would you think the loss of it a damage? and if you
shall lose modesty, moderation ( KaTadroX^v) and gentleness,
do you think the loss nothing? And yet the things first
mentioned are lost by some cause external and independent
of the will, and the second by our own fault ; and as to the
first neither to have them nor to lose them is shameful ; but
as to the second, not to have them and to lose them is shame-
ful and matter of reproach and a misfortune. What does
the pathic lose? He loses the (character of) man. What
does he lose who makes the pathic what he is ? Many other
things; and he also loses the man no less than the other.
What does he lose who commits adultery? He loses the
(character of the) modest, the temperate, the decent, the
citizen, the neighbour. What does he lose who is angry?
Something else. What does the coward lose? Something
DISCOURSES
125
else. No man is bad without suffering some loss and damage.
If then you look for the damage in the loss of money only,
all these men receive no harm or damage; it may be, they
have even profit and gain, when they acquire a bit of money
by any of these deeds. But consider that if you refer every
thing to a small coin, not even he who loses his nose is in
your opinion damaged. Yes, you say, for he is mutilated
in his body. Well ; but does he who has lost his smell only
lose nothing? Is there then no energy of the soul which is
an advantage to him who possesses it, and a damage to him
who has lost it? — Tell me what sort (of energy) you mean.
— Have we not a natural modesty? — We have. — Does he
who loses this sustain no damage? is he deprived of nothing,
does he part with nothing of the things which belong to him ?
Have we not naturally fidelity? natural affection, a natural
disposition to help others, a natural disposition to forbear-
ance? The man then who allows himself to be damaged in
these matters, can he be free from harm and uninjured.
What then ? shall I not hurt him, who has hurt me ?^ In the
first place consider what hurt {fiXaftri) is, and remember what
you have heard from the philosophers. For if the good
consists in the will (purpose, intention, Ttpoaisaei) , and the
evil also in the will, see if what you say is not this : What
then, since that man has hurt himself by doing an unjust
act to me, shall I not hurt myself by doing some unjust act
to him? Why do we not imagine to ourselves (mentally
think of) something of this kind? But where there is
any detriment to the body or to our possession, there is harm
there; and where the same thing happens to the faculty of
the will, there is (you suppose) no harm; for he who has
been deceived or he who has done an unjust act neither
suffers in the head nor in the eye nor in the hip, nor does he
lose his estate; and we wish for nothing else than (security
to) these things. But whether we shall have the will modest
and faithful or shameless and faithless, we care not the
least, except only in the school so far as a few words are
concerned. Therefore our proficiency is limited to these
few words, but beyond them it does not exist even in the
slightest degree.*
1 26 EPICTETUS
NOTES
* This may appear extravagant ; but it is possible to explain it, and
even to assent to it. If a man believes that all is wisely arranged in the
course of human events, he would not even try to resist that which he
knows it is appointed for him to suffer : he would submit and be would
endure. If Epictetus means that the man would actively promote the end
or purpose which he foreknew, in order that his acts may be consistent
with what he foreknows and with his duty, perhaps the philosopher's
saying is too hard to deal with ; and as it rests on an impossible as-
sumption of foreknowledge, we may be here wiser than the philosophers,
if we say no more about it.
* A lettuce is an example of the most trifling thing. A seat probably
means a seat of superiority, a magistrate's seat, a Roman sella curulis.
^Socrates — We must by no means then do an act of injustice. Crito. —
Certainly not. Socrates. — Nor yet when you are wronged must you do
wrong in return, as most people think, since you must in no way do an
unjust act. Plato, Crito, c. 10.
*The same remark will apply to most dissertations spoken or written
on moral subjects : they are exercises of skill for him who delivers or
writes them, or matter for criticism and perhaps a way of spending an
idle hour for him who listens ; and that is all. Epictetus blames our in-
dolence and indifference as to acts, and the trifling of the schools of
philosophy in disputation.
CHAPTER XI
WHAT THE BEGINNING OF PHILOSOPHY IS
THE beginning of philosophy to him at least who enters
on it in the right way and by the door, is a con-
sciousness of his own weakness and inability about
necessary things. For we come into the world with
no natural notion of a right angled triangle, or of a diesis (a
quarter tone), or of a half tone; but we learn each of these
things by a certain transmission according to art; and for
this reason those who do not know them, do not think that
they know them. But as to good and evil, and beautiful and
ugly, and becoming and unbecoming, and happiness and mis-
fortune, and proper and improper, and what we ought to do
and what we ought not to do, who ever came into the world
without having an innate idea of them ? Wherefore we all
use these names, and we endeavour to fit the preconceptions
to the several cases (things) thus: he has done well, he has
not done well ; he has done as he ought, not as he ought ; he
has been unfortunate, he has been fortunate; he is unjust, he
is just : who does not use these names? who among us defers
the use of them till he has learned them, as he defers the use
of the words about lines (geometrical figures) or sounds?
And the cause of this is that we come into the world
already taught as it were by nature some things on this
matter (rojtov ) , and proceeding from these we have added to
them self-conceit ( oiTfmv ) . For why, a man says, do I not
know the beautiful and the ugly ? Have I not the notion of it ?
You have. Do I not adapt it to particulars ? You do. Do
I not then adapt it properly? In that lies the whole ques-
tion ; and conceit is added here. For beginning from these
things which are admitted men proceed to that which is mat-
ter of dispute by means of unsuitable adaptation ; for if they
possessed this power of adaptation in addition to those
things, what would hinder them from being perfect? But
now since you think that you properly adapt the preconcep-
tions to the particulars, tell me whence you derive this (as-
127
128 EPICTETUS
sume that you do so). Because I think so. But it does not
seem so to another, and he thinks that he also makes a proper
adaptation ; or does he not think so ? He does think so. Is
it possible then that both of you can properly apply the pre-
conceptions to things about which you have contrary opin-
ions? It is not possible. Can you then show us anything
better towards adapting the preconceptions beyond your
thinking that you do? Does the madman do any other
things than the things which seem to him right? Is then
this criterion sufficient for him also? It is not sufficient.
Come then to something which is superior to seeming
(rov doKsiv) . What is this ?
Observe, this is the beginning of philosophy, a percep-
tion of the disagreement of men with one another, and
an inquiry into the cause of the disagreement, and a con-
demnation and distrust of that which only seems, and a
certain investigation of that which seems whether it seems
rightly, and a discovery of some rule (Kavovog-) , as we have
discovered a balance in the determination of weights, and a
carpenter's rule (or square) in the case of straight and
crooked things. — This is the beginning of philosophy. Must
we say that all things are right which seem so to all ? And
how is it possible that contradictions can be right ? — Not all
then, but all which seem to us to be right. — How more to
you than those which seem right to the Syrians? why more
than what seem right to the Egyptians ? why more than what
seems right to me or to any other man? Not at all more.
What then seems to every man is not sufficient for deter-
mining what is ; for neither in the case of weights or mea-
sures are we satisfied with the bare appearance, but in each
case we have discovered a certain rule. In this matter then
is there no rule superior to what seems? And how is it
possible that the most necessary things among men should
have no sign (mark), and be incapable of being discovered?
There is then some rule. And why then do we not seek the
rule and discover it, and afterwards use it without varying
from it, not even stretching out the finger without it ?^ For
this, I think, is that which when it is discovered cures of their
madness those who use mere seeming as a measure, and
misuse it; so that for the future proceeding from certain
DISCOURSES 129
things (principles) known and made clear we may use in
the case of particular things the preconceptions which are
distinctly fixed.
What is the matter presented to us about which we are
inquiring? Pleasure (for example) . Subject it to the rule,
throw it into the balance. Ought the good to be such a
thing that it is fit that we have confidence in it ? Yes. And
in which we ought to confide? It ought to be. Is it fit to
trust to any thing which is insecure? No. Is then pleasure
any thing secure? No. Take it then and throw it out of
the scale, and drive it far away from the place of good things.
But if you are not sharp-sighted, and one balance is not
enough for you, bring another. Is it fit to be elated over
what is good? Yes. Is it proper then to be elated over
present pleasure ? See that you do not say that it is proper ;
but if you do, I shall then not think you worthy even of the
balance.^ Thus things are tested and weighed when the
rules are ready. And to philosophize is this, to examine and
confirm the rules ; and then to use them when they are known
is the act of a wise and good man.^
NOTES
* Doing nothing without the rule. This is a Greek proverb.
* That is, so far shall I consider you from being able to judge rightly
of things without a balance that I shall understand that not even with
the aid of a balance can you do it, that you can not even use a balance,
and consequently that you are not worth a single word from me.
— Schweig.
* This is a just conclusion. We must fix the canons or rules by which
things are tried ; and then the rules may be applied by the wise and good
to all cases.
CHAPTER XII
OF DISPUTATION OR DISCUSSION
WHAT things a man must learn in order to be able to
apply the art of disputation, has been accurately
shown by our philosophers (the Stoics) ; but
with respect to the proper use of the things, we
are entirely without practice. Only give to any of us, whom
you please, an illiterate man to discuss with, and he can not
discover how to deal with the man. But when he has moved
the man a little, if he answers beside the purpose, he does not
know how to treat him, but he then either abuses or ridicules
him, and says, "He is an illiterate man ; it is not possible to
do any thing with him." Now a guide, when he has found a
man out of the road leads him into the right way : he does not
ridicule or abuse him and then leave him. Do you also show
the illiterate man the truth, and you will see that he follows.
But so long as you do not show him the truth, do not ridicule
him, but rather feel your own incapacity.
How then did Socrates act? He used to compel his
adversary in disputation to bear testimony to him, and he
wanted no other witness.^ Therefore he could say, "I care
not for other witnesses, but I am always satisfied with the
evidence (testimony) of my adversary, and I do not ask the
opinion of others, but only the opinion of him who is disput-
ing with me." For he used to make the conclusion drawn
from natural notions so plain that every man saw the contra-
diction (if it existed) and withdrew from it (thus) : Does
the envious^ man rejoice? By no means, but he is rather
pained. Well, Do you think that envy is pain over evils?
and what envy is there of evils? Therefore he made his ad-
versary say that envy is pain over good things. Well then,
would any man envy those who are nothing to him ? By no
means. Thus having completed the notion and distinctly
fixed it he would go away without saying to his adversary,
Define to me envy ; and if the adversary had defined envy, he
did not say, You have defined it badly, for the terms of the
130
DISCOURSES 131
definition do not correspond to the thing defined — These are
technical terms, and for this reason disagreeable and hardly
intelligible to illiterate men, which terms we (philosophers)
can not lay aside. But that the illiterate man himself, who
follows the appearances presented to him, should be able to
concede any thing or reject it, we can never by the use of
these terms move him to do. Accordingly being conscious
of our own inability, we do not attempt the thing; at least
such of us as have any caution do not. But the greater part
and the rash, when they enter into such disputations, confuse
themselves and confuse others ; and finally abusing their ad-
versaries and abused by them, they walk away.
Now this was the first and chief peculiarity of Socrates,
never to be irritated in argument, never to utter any thing
abusive, any thing insulting, but to bear with abusive persons
and to put an end to the quarrel. If you would know what
great power he had in this way, read the Symposium of
Xenophon,^ and you will see how many quarrels he put an
end to. Hence with good reason in the poets also this power
is most highly praised,
"Quickly with skill he settles great disputes."*
Well then ; the matter is not now very safe, and particularly
at Rome ; for he who attempts to do it, must not do it in a
comer, you may be sure, but must go to a man of consular
rank, if it so happen, or to a rich man, and ask him. Can you
tell me, Sir, to whose care you have entrusted your horses?
I can tell you. Have you entrusted them to any person in-
differently and to one who has no experience of horses ? — By
no means. — Well then ; can you tell me to whom you entrust
your gold or silver things or your vestments? I don't en-
trust even these to any one indifferently. Well ; your own
body, have you already considered about entrusting the care
of it to any person? — Certainly. — To a man of experience,
I suppose, and one acquainted with the aliptic,* or with the
healing art? — Without doubt. — Are these the best things
that you have, or do you also possess something else which is
better than all these? — What kind of a thing do you mean?
— That I mean which makes use of these things, and tests
132 EPICTETUS
each of them, and deUberates. — It is the soul that you mean?
— You think right, for it is the soul that I mean. — In truth
I do think that the soul is a much better thing than all the
others which I possess. — Can you then show us in what way
you have taken care of the soul ? for it is not likely that you,
who are so wise a man and have a reputation in the city, in-
considerately and carelessly allow the most valuable thing
that you possess to be neglected and to perish. — Cer-
tainly not. — But have you taken care of the soul yourself;
and have you learned from another to do this, or have you
discovered the means yourself ? — Here comes the danger that
in the first place he may say, What is this to you, my good
man, who are you? Next, if you persist in troubling him,
there is danger that he may raise his hands and give you
blows. I was once myself also an admirer of this mode of
instruction until I fell into these dangers.*
NOTES
* This is what is said in the Gorgias of Plato.
' Socrates' notion of envy is stated by Xenophon to be this : "it is the
pain or vexation which men have at the prosperity of their friends, and
that such are the only envious persons." Bishop Butler gives a better
definition ; at least a more complete description of the thing. "Emulation
is merely the desire and hope of equality with or superiority over others,
with whom we may compare ourselves. There does not appear to be any
other grief in the natural passion, but only that want which is implied
in desire. However this may be so strong as to be the occasion of great
grief. To desire the attainment of this equality or superiority, by the par-
ticular means of others being brought down to our level, or below it, is,
I think, the distinct notion of envy. From whence it is easy to see, that
the real end which the natural passion, emulation, and which the unlaw-
ful one, envy, aims at is the same ; namely, that equality or superiority :
and consequently that to do mischief is not the end of envy, but merely
the means it makes use of to attain its end." — Sermons upon Human
Nature, I.
* The Symposium or Banquet of Xenophon is extant.
* Hesiod, Theogony, v. 87.
* The aliptic is the art of anointing and rubbing, one of the best
means of maintaining a body in health. The iatric or healing art is the
art of restoring to health a diseased body. The aliptic art is also equiva-
lent to the gymnastic art, or the art of preparing for gymnastic exercises,
which are also a means of preserving the body's health, when the exer-
cises are good and moderate.
* Epictetus is speaking of himself and of his experience at Rome.
CHAPTER XIII
ON ANXIETY (SOLICITUDE)
WHEN I see a man anxious, I say, What does this
man want? If he did not want some thing
which is not in his power, how could he be
anxious? For this reason a lute player when
he is singing by himself has no anxiety, but when he enters
the theatre, he is anxious even if he has a good voice and
plays well on the lute ; for he not only wishes to sing well, but
also to obtain applause: but this is not in his power. Ac-
cordingly, where he has skill, there he has confidence. Bring
any single person who knows nothing of music, and the
musician does not care for him. But in the matter where a
man knows nothing and has not been practised, there he is
anxious. What matter is this? He knows not what a
crowd is or what the praise of a crowd is. However he has
learned to strike the lowest chord and the highest ; but what
the praise of the many is, and what power it has in life he
neither knows nor has he thought about it. Hence he must
of necessity tremble and grow pale. I can not then say that
a man is not a lute player when I see him afraid, but I can
say something else, and not one thing, but many. And first
of all I call him a stranger and say. This man does not know
in what part of the world he is, but though he has been here
so long, he is ignorant of the laws of the State and the cus-
toms, and what is permitted and what is not; and he has
never employed any lawyer to tell him and to explain the
laws. But a man does not write a will, if he does not know
how it ought to be written, or he employs a person who does
know; nor does he rashly seal a bond or write a security.
But he uses his desire without a lawyer's advice, and aver-
sion, and pursuit (movement), and attempt and purpose.
How do you mean without a lawyer? He does not know
that he wills what is not allowed, and does not will that
which is of necessity ; and he does not know either what is his
own or what is another man's ; but if he did know, he would
133
134 EPICTETUS
never be impeded, he would never be hindered, he would not
be anxious. How so ? — Is any man then afraid about things
which are not evils ? — No. — Is he afraid about things which
are evils, but still so far within his power that they may not
happen? — Certainly he is not. — If then the things which are
independent of tlie will are neither good nor bad, and all
things which do depend on the will are within our power,
and no man can either take them from us or give them to us,
if we do not choose, where is room left for anxiety? But
we are anxious about our poor body, our little property,
about the will of Caesar ; but not anxious about things inter-
nal. Are we anxious about not forming a false opinion? —
No, for this is in my power. — About not exerting our move-
ments contrary to nature ? — No, not even about this. — When
then you see a man pale, as the physician says, judging from
the complexion, this man's spleen is disordered, that man's
liver; so also say, this man's desire and aversion are disor-
dered, he is not in the right way, he is in a fever. For noth-
ing else changes the colour, or causes trembling or chattering
of the teeth, or causes a man to
"Sink in his knees and shift from foot to foot"' —
For this reason when Zeno was going to meet Antigonus,*
he was not anxious, for Antigonus had no power over any
of the things which Zeno admired ; and Zeno did not care for
those things over which Antigonus had power. But Anti-
gonus was anxious when he was going to meet Zeno, for he
wished to please Zeno; but this was a thing external (out of
his power). But Zeno did not want to please Antigonus;
for no man who is skilled in any art wishes to please one who
has no such skill.
Should I try to please you? Why? I suppose, you
know the measure by which one man is estimated by another.
Have you taken pains to learn what is a good man and what
is a bad man, and how a man becomes one or the other?
Why then are you not good yourself ? — How, he replies, am
I not good? — Because no good man laments or groans or
weeps, no good man is pale and trembles, or says, How will
he receive me, how will he listen to me? — Slave, just as it
DISCOURSES 135
pleases him. Why do you care about what belongs to
others? Is it now his fault if he receives badly what pro-
ceeds from you ? — Certainly. — And is it possible that a fault
should be one man's, and the evil in another? — No. — Why
then are you anxious about that which belongs to others?
— Your question is reasonable ; but I am anxious how I shall
speak to him. Can not you then speak to him as you choose ?
— But I fear that I may be disconcerted ? — If you are going
to write the name of Dion, are you afraid that you would be
disconcerted? — By no means. — Why? is it not because you
have practised writing the name? — Certainly. — Well, if you
were going to read the name, would you not feel the same?
and why ? Because every art has a certain strength and con-
fidence in the things which belong to it. — Have you then not
practised speaking? and what else did you learn in the
school ? Syllogisms and sophistical propositions ? For what
purpose ? was it not for the purpose of discoursing skilfully ?
and is not discoursing skilfully the same as discoursing sea-
sonably and cautiously and with intelligence, and also with-
out making mistakes and without hindrance, and besides all
this with confidence? — Yes. — When then you are mounted on
a horse and go into a plain, are you anxious at being matched
against a man who is on foot, and anxious in a matter in
which you are practised, and he is not ? — Yes, but that person
(to whom I am going to speak) has power to kill me.^
Speak the truth then, unhappy man, and do not brag, nor
claim to be a philosopher, nor refuse to acknowledge your
masters, but so long as you present this handle in your body,
follow every man who is stronger than yourself. Socrates
used to practise speaking, he who talked as he did to the
tyrants,* to the dicasts (judges), he who talked in his prison.
Diogenes had practised speaking, he who spoke as he did to
Alexander, to the pirates, to the person who bought him.
These men were confident in the things which they practised.
But do you walk off to your own affairs and never leave
them : go and sit in a comer, and weave syllogisms, and pro-
pose them to another. There is not in you the man who can
rule a state.
136 EPICTETUS
NOTES
* Iliad, xiii. 281.
* In Diogenes Laertius (Zeno, vii.) there is a letter from Antigonus
to Zeno and Zeno's answer. Simplicius (note on the Encheiridion, c. 51)
supposes this Antigonus to be the King of Syria; but Upton remarks
that it is Antigonus Gonatas, king of Macedonia.
* The original is "but that person ( iKel'voi ) has power to kill me."
"That person" must be the person already mentioned, and Mrs. Carter
has done right in adding this explanation.
* The Thirty tyrants of Athens, as they were called. The talk of Soc-
rates with Critias and Charicles two of the Thirty is reported in Xeno-
phon's "Memorabilia" (i. 2, 33). The defence of Socrates before those
who tried him and his conversation in prison are reported in Plato's
"Apology," and in the "Phaedon" and "Crito," Diogenes was captured
by some pirates and sold (iv. i, 115).
CHAPTER XIV
TO NASO
WHEN a certain Roman entered with his son and
hstened to one reading, Epictetus said, This is
the method of instruction; and he stopped.
When the Roman asked him to go on, Epictetus
said, Every art when it is taught causes labour to him who
is unacquainted with it and is unskilled in it, and indeed the
things which proceed from the arts immediately show their
use in the purpose for which they were made; and most of
them contain something attractive and pleasing. For indeed
to be present and to observe how a shoemaker learns is not a
pleasant thing; but the shoe is useful and also not disagree-
able to look at. And the discipline of a smith when he is
learning is very disagreeable to one who chances to be
present and is a stranger to the art : but the work shows the
use of the art. But you will see this much more in music ;
for if you are present while a person is learning, the disci-
pline will appear most disagreeable; and yet the results of
music are pleasing and delightful to those who know noth-
ing of music. And here we conceive the work of a phi-
losopher to be something of this kind : he must adapt his wish
{povXtjcTtv) to what is going on, so that neither any of the
things which are taking place shall take place contrary to our
wish, nor any of the things which do not take place shall not
take place when we wish that they should. From this the
result is to those who have so arranged the work of phi-
losophy, not to fail in the desire, nor to fall in with that which
they should avoid ; without uneasiness, without fear, without
perturbation to pass through life themselves, together with
their associates maintaining the relations both natural and
acquired,^ as the relation of son, of father, of brother, of citi-
zen, of man, of wife, of neighbour, of fellow traveller, of
ruler, of ruled. The work of a philosopher we conceive to be
something like this. It remains next to inquire how this
must be accomplished.
138 EPICTETUS
We see then that the carpenter (rcVrcov) when he has
learned certain things becomes a carpenter; the pilot by
learning certain things becomes a pilot. May it not then in
philosophy also not be sufficient to wish to be wise and good,
and that there is also a necessity to learn certain things ? We
inquire then what these things are. The philosophers say
that we ought first to learn that there is a God and that he
provides for all things ; also that it is not possible to conceal
from him our acts, or even our intentions and thoughts.^
The next thing is to learn what is the nature of the Gods ; for
such as they are discovered to be, he, who would please and
obey them, must try with all his power to be like them. If
the divine is faithful, man also must be faithful ; if it is free,
man also must be free; if beneficent, man also must be bene-
ficent ; if magnanimous, man also must be magnanimous ; as
being then an imitator of God he must do and say every thing
consistently with this fact.
With what then must we begin? If you will enter on
the discussion, I will tell you that you must first understand
names (words). — So then you say that I do not now under-
stand names. — You do not understand them. — How then do
I use them? — ^Just as the illiterate use written language, as
cattle use appearances : for use is one thing, understanding is
another. But if you think that you understand them, pro-
duce whatever word you please, and let us try whether we
understand it. — But it is a disagreeable thing for a man to
be confuted who is now old, and, it may be, has now served
his three campaigns. — I too know this : for now you are
come to me as if you were in want of nothing: and what
could you even imagine to be wanting to you? You are
rich, you have children and a wife perhaps, and many slaves :
Caesar knows you, in Rome you have many friends, you
render their dues to all, you know how to requite him who
does you a favour, and to repay in the same kind him who
does you a wrong. What do you lack ? If then I shall shew
you that you lack the things most necessary and the chief
things for happiness, and that hitherto you have looked after
every thing rather than what you ought, and to crown all,"
that you neither know what God is nor what man is, nor
what is good nor what is bad; and as to what I have said
DISCOURSES 1 39
about your ignorance of other matters, that may perhaps be
endured, but if I say that you know nothing about yourself,
how is it possible that you should endure me and bear the
proof and stay here ? It is not possible ; but you immediately
go off in bad humour. And yet what harm have I done
you? unless the mirror also injures the ugly man because it
shows him to himself such as he is ; unless the physician also
is supposed to insult the sick man, when he says to him, Man,
do you think that you ail nothing ? But you have a fever :
go without food to-day; drink water. And no one says,
what an insult ! But if you say to a man. Your desires are
inflamed, your aversions are low, your intentions are incon-
sistent, your pursuits (movements) are not conformable to
nature, your opinions are rash and false, the man immedi-
ately goes away and says. He has insulted me.
Our way of dealing is like that of a crowded assembly.
Beasts are brought to be sold and oxen ; and the greater part
of the men come to buy and sell, and there are some few who
come to look at the market and to inquire how it is carried
on, and why, and who fixes the meeting and for what pur-
pose. So it is here also in this assembly (of life) : some
like cattle trouble themselves about nothing except their
fodder. For to all of you who are busy about possessions
and lands and slaves and magisterial offices, these are noth-
ing except fodder. But there are a few who attend the as-
sembly, men who love to look on and consider what is the
world, who governs it. Has it no governor ? And how is
it possible that a city or a family can not continue to exist,
not even the shortest time without an administrator and
guardian, and that so great and beautiful a system should be
administered with such order and yet without a purpose and
by chance?* There is then an administrator. What kind
of administrator and how does he govern? And who are
we, who were produced by him, and for what purpose?
Have we some connexion with him and some relation to-
wards him, or none? This is the way in which these few
are affected, and then they apply themselves only to this one
thing, to examine the meeting and then to go away. What
then ? They are ridiculed by the many, as the spectators at
the fair are by the traders ; and if the beasts had any under-
I40 EPICTETUS
Standing, they would ridicule those who admired anything
else than fodder.
NOTES
* Compare iii. 2, 4, iv. 8, 20. Antoninus (viii. 27) writes : "There are
three relations [between thee and other things] : the one to the body
which surrounds thee ; the second to the divine cause from which all
things come to all ; and the third to those who live with thee." This is
precise, true and practical. Those who object to "the divine cause," may
write in place of it "the nature and constitution of things ;" for there is
a constitution of things, which the philosopher attempts to discover ; and
for most practical purposes, it is immaterial whether we say that it is
of divine origin or has some other origin, or no origin can be discov-
ered. The fact remains that a constitution of things exists ; or, if that
expression be not accepted, we may say that we conceive that it exists
and we can not help thinking so.
' When God is said to provide for all things, this is what the Greeks
called TCpovota, providence. (Epictetus, i. 16, iii. 17.) In the second of
these passages there is a short answer to some objections made to Provi-
dence.
Epictetus could only know or believe what God is by the observation
of phenomena; and he could only know what he supposed to be God's
providence by observing his administration of the world and all that
happens in it. Among other works of God is man, who possesses certain
intellectual powers which enable him to form a judgment of God's
works, and a judgment of man himself. Man has or is supposed to have
certain moral sentiments, or a capacity of acquiring them in some way.
On the supposition that all man's powers are the gift of God, man's
power of judging what happens in the world under God's providence is
the gift of God; and if he should not be satisfied with God's administra-
tion, we have the conclusion that man, whose powers are from God, con-
demns that administration which is also from God. Thus God and man,
who is God's work, are in opposition to one another.
If a man rejects the belief in a deity and in a providence, because
of the contradictions and difficulties involved in this belief or supposed
to be involved in it, and if he finds the contradictions and difficulties such
as he can not reconcile with his moral sentiments and judgments, he will
be consistent in rejecting the notion of a deity and of providence. But
he must also consistently admit that his moral sentiments and judg-
ments are his own, and that he can not say how he acquired them, or
how he has any of the corporeal or intellectual powers which he is daily
using. By the hypothesis they are not from God. All then that a man
can say is that he has such powers.
* The original is "to add the colophon," which is a proverbial expres-
sion and signifies to give the last touch to a thing.
* From the fact that man has some intelligence Voltaire concludes that
we must admit that there is a greater intelligence. Letter to Mde.
Necker.
CHAPTER XV
TO OR AGAINST THOSE WHO OBSTINATELY PERSIST IN WHAT
THEY HAVE DETERMINED
WHEN some persons have heard these words, that a
man ought to be constant (firm), and that the
will is naturally free and not subject to compul-
sion, but that all other things are subject to
hindrance, to slavery, and are in the power of others, they
suppose that they ought without deviation to abide by every
thing which they have determined. But in the first place
that which has been determined ought to be sound (true).
I require tone (sinews) in the body, but such as exists in a
healthy body, in an athletic body ; but if it is plain to me that
you have the tone of a phrensied man and you boast of it, I
shall say to you, man, seek the physician : this is not tone, but
atony (deficiency in right tone). In a different way some-
thing of the same kind is felt by those who listen to these dis-
courses in a wrong manner ; which was the case with one of
my companions who for no reason resolved to starve himself
to death.^ I heard of it when it was the third day of his
abstinence from food and I went to inquire what had hap-
pened. I have resolved, he said. — But still tell me what it
was which induced you to resolve; for if you have resolved
rightly, we shall sit with you and assist you to depart ; but if
you have made an imreasonable resolution, change your
mind. — We ought to keep to our determinations. — What are
you doing, man ? We ought to keep not to all our determi-
nations, but to those which are right ; for if you are now per-
suaded that it is night, do not change your mind, if you
think fit, but persist and say, we ought to abide by our deter-
minations. Will you not make the beginning and lay the
foundation in an inquiry whether the determination is sound
or not sound, and so then build on it firmness and security?
But if you lay a rotten and ruinous foundation, will not your
miserable little building fall down the sooner, the more and
the stronger are the materials which you shall lay on it?
141
142 EPICTETUS
Without any reason would you withdraw from us out of life
a man who is a friend, and a companion, a citizen of the same
city, both the great and the small city ?^ Then while you are
committing murder and destroying a man who has done no
wrong, do you say that you ought to abide by your deter-
minations ? And if it ever in any way came into your head
to kill me, ought you to abide by your determinations ?
Now this man was with difficulty persuaded to change his
mind. But it is impossible to convince some persons at pres-
sent; so that I seem now to know, what I did not know be-
fore, the meaning of the common saying. That you can
neither persuade nor break a fool.' May it never be my lot
to have a wise fool for my friend : nothing is more untract-
able. "I am determined," the man says. Madmen are also ;
but the more firmly they form a judgment on things which
do not exist, the more ellebore^ they require. Will you not
act like a sick. man and call in the physician? — I am sick,
master, help me; consider what I must do; it is my duty to
obey you. So it is here also : I know not what I ought to do,
but I am come to learn. — Not so; but speak to me about
other things: upon this I have determined. — What other
things ? for what is greater and more useful than for you to
be persuaded that it is not sufficient to have made your deter-
mination and not to change it. This is the tone (energy)
of madness, not of health. — I will die, if you compel me to
this. — Why, man? What has happened? — I have deter-
mined— I have had a lucky escape that you have not deter-
mined to kill me — I take no money.'* Why ? — I have deter-
mined— Be assured that with the very tone (energy) which
you now use in refusing to take, there is nothing to hinder
you at some time from inclining without reason to take
money and then saying, I have determined. As in a distem-
pered body, subject to defluxions, the humour inclines some-
times to these parts, and then to those, so too a sickly soul
knows not which way to incline : but if to this inclination and
movement there is added a tone (obstinate resolution), then
the evil becomes past help and cure.
DISCOURSES 143
NOTES
*The wprd is aieoKaprepsrv, which Cicero (Tusc. i. 34) renders "per
inediam vita discedere." The words "I have resolved" are in Epictetus,
KSKptKa. Pliny (Epp. i. 12) says that Corellius Rufus, when he de-
termined to end his great sufferings by starvation made the same answer,
KEKpiKa, to the physician who offered him food.
' The great city is the world.
* The meaning is that you can not lead a fool from his purpose either
by words or force. "A wise fool" must mean a fool who thinks himself
wise ; and such we sometimes see. "Though thou shouldst bray a fool in
the mortar among wheat with a pestle, yet will not his foolishness de-
part from him." Proverbs, xxvii. 22.
* Ellebore was a medicine used in madness. Horace says, Sat. ii. 3.
82—
"Danda est ellebori multo pars maxima avaris."
* "Epictetus seems in this discussion to be referring to some pro-
fessor, who had declared that he would not take money from his hearers,
and then, indirectly at least, had blamed our philosopher for receiving
some fee from his hearers." Schweig.
CHAPTER XVI
THAT WE DO NOT STRIVE TO USE OUR OPINIONS ABOUT GOOD
AND EVIL
WHERE is the good? In the will.* Where is the
evil? In the will. Where is neither of them?
In those things which are independent of the will.
Well then? Does any one among us think of
these lessons out of the schools? Does any one meditate
(strive) by himself to give an answer to things^ as in the
case of questions? Is it day? — Yes. — Is it night? — No. —
Well, is the number of stars even ?^ — I can not say. — Wheft
money is shown (offered) to you, have you studied to make
the proper answer, that money is not a good thing? Have
you practised yourself in these answers, or only against
sophisms ? Why do you wonder then if in the cases which
you have studied, in those you have improved ; but in those
which you have not studied, in those you remain the same?
When the rhetorician knows that he has written well, that he
has committed to memory what he has written, and brings
an agreeable voice, why is he still anxious? Because he is
not satisfied with having studied. What then does he want?
To be praised by the audience? For the purpose then of
being able to practise declamation he has been disciplined;
but with respect to praise and blame he has not been disci-
plined. For when did he hear from any other what praise is,
what blame is, what the nature of each is, what kind of praise
should be sought, or what kind of blame should be shunned ?
And when did he practise this discipline which follows these
words (things) ?* Why then do you still wonder, if in the
matters which a man has learned, there he surpasses others,
and in those in which he has not been disciplined, there he is
the same with the many. So the lute player knows how to
play, sings well, and has a fine dress, and yet he trembles
when he enters on the stage; for these matters he under-
stands, but he does not know what a crowd is, nor the shouts
of a crowd, nor what ridicule is. Neither does he know what
X44
DISCOURSES 145
anxiety is, whether it is our work or the work of another,
whether it is possible to stop it or not. For this reason if
he has been praised, he leaves the theatre puffed up, but if he
has been ridiculed, the swollen bladder has been punctured
and subsides.
This is the case also with ourselves. What do we admire ?
Externals. About what things are we busy? Externals.
And have we any doubt then why we fear or why we are
anxious? What then happens when we think the things,
which are coming on us, to be evils ? It is not in our power
not to be afraid, it is not in our power not to be anxious.
Then we say, Lord God, how shall I not be anxious ? Fool,
have you not hands, did not God make them for you ? Sit
down now and pray that your nose may not run. Wipe
yourself rather and do not blame him. Well then, has he
given to you nothing in the present case ? Has he not given
to you endurance ? has he not given to you magnanimity ? has
he not given to you manliness ? When you have such hands,
do you still look for one who shall wipe your nose? But we
neither study these things nor care for them. Give me a
man who cares how he shall do any thing, not for the obtain-
ing of a thing, but who cares about his own energy. What
man, when he is walking about, cares for his own energy?
who, when he is deliberating, cares about his own delibera-
tion, and not about obtaining that about which he deliber-
ates? And if he succeeds, he is elated and says, How well
we have deliberated ; did I not tell you, brother, that it is im-
possible, when we have thought about any thing, that it
should not turn out thus ? But if the thing should turn out
otherwise, the wretched man is humbled ; he knows not even
what to say about what has taken place. Who among us for
the sake of this matter has consulted a seer? Who among
us as to his actions has not slept in indifference? Who?
Give (name) to me one that I may see the man whom I have
long been looking for, who is truly noble and ingenuous,
whether young or old ; name him.
Why then are we still surprised, if we are well practised
in thinking about matters (any given subject), but in our
acts are low, without decency, worthless, cowardly, impatient
of labour, altogether bad ? For we do not care about these
146 EPICTETUS
things nor do we study them. But if we had feared not
death or banishment, but fear itself, we should have studied
not to fall into those things which appear to us evils. Now
in the school we are irritable and wordy; and if any little
question arises about any of these things, we are able to
examine them fully. But drag us to practice, and you will
find us miserably shipwrecked. Let some disturbing appear-
ance come on us, and you will know what we have been
studying and in what we have been exercising ourselves.
Consequently through want of discipline we are always add-
ing something to the appearance and representing things to
be greater than what they are. For instance as to myself,
when I am on a voyage and look down on the deep sea, or
look round on it and see no land, I am out of my mind and
imagine that I must drink up all this water if I am wrecked,
and it does not occur to me that three pints are enough.
What then disturbs me? The sea? No, but my opinion.
Again, when an earthquake shall happen, I imagine that the
city is going to fall on me ; but is not one little stone enough
to knock my brains out ?
What then are the things which are heavy on us and dis-
turb us ? What else than opinions ? What else than opin-
ions lie heavy upon him who goes away and leaves his com-
panions and friends and places and habits of life? Now
little children, for instance, when they cry on the nurse leav-
ing them for a short time, forget their sorrow if they receive
a small cake. Do you choose then that we should compare
you to little children ? — No, by Zeus, for I do not wish to be
pacified by a small cake, but by right opinions. — And what
are these ? Such as a man ought to study all day, and not to
be affected by any thing that is not his own, neither by com-
panion nor place nor gymnasia, and not even by his own
body, but to remember the law and to have it before his eyes.
And what is the divine law? To keep a man's own, not to
claim that which belongs to others, but to use what is given,
and when it is not given, not to desire it ; and when a thing is
taken away, to give it up readily and immediately, and to be
thankful for the time that a man has had the use of it, if you
would not cry for your nurse and mamma. For what mat-
ter does it make by what thing a man is subdued, and on
DISCOURSES f47
what he depends? In what respect are you better than he
who cries for a girl, if you grieve for a little gymnasium, and
little porticoes and young men and such places of amuse-
ment ? Another comes and laments that he shall no longer
drink the water of Dirce. Is the Marcian water worse than
that of Dirce ? But I was used to the water of Dirce.*^ And
you in turn will be used to the other. Then if you become
attached to this also, cry for this too, and try to make a verse
like the verse of Euripides,
"The hot baths of Nero and the Marcian water."
See how tragedy is made when common things happen to
silly men.
When then shall I see Athens again and the Acropolis?
Wretch, are you not content with what you see daily? have
you any thing better or greater to see than the sun, the moon,
the stars, the whole earth, the sea ? But if indeed you com-
prehend him who administers the Whole, and carry him
about in yourself, do you still desire small stones, and a beau-
tiful rock?^ When then you are going to leave the sun itself
and the moon, what will you do ? will you sit and weep like
children? Well, what have you been doing in the school?
what did you hear, what did you learn? why did you write
yourself a philosopher, when you might have written the
truth ; as, "I made certain introductions,'^ and I read Chrysip-
pus, but I did not even approach the door of a philosopher."
For how should I possess any thing of the kind which Soc-
rates possessed, who died as he did, who lived as he did, or
any thing such as Diogenes possessed? Do you think that
any one of such men wept or grieved, because he was not
going to see a certain man, or a certain woman, nor to be
in Athens or in Corinth, but, if it should so happen, in Susa
or in Ecbatana ? For if a man can quit the banquet when he
chooses, and no longer amuse himself, does he still stay and
complain, and does he not stay, as at any amusement, only so
long as he is pleased ? Such a man, I suppose, would endure
perpetual exile or to be condemned to death. Will you not
be weaned now, like children, and take more solid food, and
not cry after mammas and nurses, which are the lamentations
148 EPICTETUS
of old women ? — But if I go away, I shall cause them sorrow.
— You cause them sorrow? By no means; but that will
cause them sorrow which also causes you sorrow, opinion.
What have you to do then ? Take away your own opinion,
and if these women are wise, they will take away their own :
if they do not, they will lamoit through their own fault
My man, as the proverb says, make a desperate effort on
behalf of tranquillity of mind, freedom and magnanimity.
Lift up your head at last as released from slavery. Dare
to look up to God and say. Deal with me for the future as
thou wilt ; I am of the same mind as thou art ; I am thine :
I refuse nothing that pleases thee : lead me where thou wilt :
clothe me in any dress thou choosest: is it thy will that I
should hold the office of a magistrate, that I should be in the
condition of a private man, stay here or be an exile, be poor,
be rich ? I will make thy defence to men in behalf of all these
conditions : I will shew the nature of each thing what it is. —
You will not do so ; but sit in an ox's belly and wait for your
mamma till she shall feed you. Who would Hercules have
been, if he had sat at home? He would have been Eurystheus
and not Hercules. Well, and in his travels through the world
how many intimates and how many friends had he? But
nothing more dear to him than God. For this reason it was
believed that he was the son of God, and he was. In obedi-
ence to God then he went about purging away injustice and
lawlessness. But you are not Hercules and you are not
able to purge away the wickedness of others ; nor yet are you
Theseus, able to purge away the evil things of Attica. Qear
away your own. From yourself, from your thoughts cast
away instead of Procrustes and Sdron,® sadness, fear, desire,
envy, malevolence, avarice, effeminacy, intemperance. But
it is not possible to eject these things otherwise than by look-
ing to God only, by fixing your affections on him only, by
being consecrated to his commands. But if you choose any
thing else, you will with sighs and gpx>ans be compelled to fol-
low* what is stronger than yourself, always seddng tran-
quillity and never able to find it; for you sedc tranquillity
there where it is not, and you n^ect to seek it where it is.
DISCOURSES 149
NOTKS
* See ii. 10, as
''"To answer to things" means to act in a way suitable to drcom-
stances, to be a matdi for tbem.
* Perhaps this was a common puzde. The man answers right ; he can
pot say.
* That is which follows praise or blame. He seems to mean making
the proper use of praise or of blame.
* Diree a pure stream in Bopotia, which flows into the Ismenns. The
Marcian water is the Marcian aqueduct at Rome, which was constructed
B.C 144, and was the best water that Rome had. Some of the arches of
this aqueduct exist The "bright stream of Dirce" is spoken of in the
"Hercules Furens" of Euripides (v. 573). The verse in the text which
we may suppose that Epictetus made, has a spondee in the fourth place,
which is contrary to the rule.
•The "small stones" are supposed to be the marbles which decorated
Athens, and the rock to be the Acropolis.
'In the original it is Eicrayoayai. It was a name used for short
commentaries on the principles of anv art; such as we now call Intro-
ductions. O^mpendiums. Ellements. Gellius, x\a. 8.
* Procru.stes and Sciron, two robbers who infested Attica and were
destroyed by Theseus, as Plutarch tells in his life of Theseus.
* Antoninus x. aS, "only to the rational animal is it given to follow
Toltmtarily what happens : but simply to follow is a necessity imposed 00
alL" Compare Scocca^ Quest. Nat. ii ^
CHAPTER XVII
HOW WE MUST ADAPT PRECONCEPTIONS TO PARTICULAR
CASES
WHAT is the first business of him who philoso-
phizes ? To throw away self conceit ( ozT^di? ) }
For it is impossible for a man to begin to
learn that which he thinks that he knows. As
to things then which ought to be done and ought not
to be done, and good and bad, and beautiful and ugly,
all of us talking of them at random go to the phi-
losophers; and on these matters we praise, we censure, we
accuse, we blame, we judge and determine about principles
honourable and dishonourable. But why do we go to the
philosophers? Because we wish to learn what we do not
think that we know. And what is this ? Theorems.^ For
we wish to learn what philosophers say as being something
elegant and acute ; and some wish to learn that they may get
profit from what they learn. It is ridiculous then to think
that a person wishes to learn one thing, and will learn an-
other; or further, that a man will make proficiency in that
which he does not learn. But the many are deceived by this
which deceived also the rhetorician Theopompus,* when he
blames even Plato for wishing everything to be defined.
For what does he say? Did none of us before you use the
words Good or Just, or do we utter the sounds in an unmean-
ing and empty way without understanding what they sever-
ally signify ? Now who tells you, Theopompus, that we had
not natural notions of each of these things and preconcep-
tions {itpoXrf^Bii) ? But it is not possible to adapt precon-
ceptions to their correspondent objects if we have not dis-
tinguished (analyzed) them, and inquired what object must
be subjected to each preconception. You may make the
same charge against physicians also. For who among us
did not use the words healthy and unhealthy before Hippo-
crates lived, or did we utter these words as empty sounds?
For we have also a certain preconception of health, but we
150
DISCOURSES 151
are not able to adapt it. For this reason one says, abstain
from food ; another says, give food ; another says, bleed ; and
another says, use cupping. What is the reason? is it any
other than that a man can not properly adapt the preconcep-
tion of health to particulars ?
So it is in this matter also, in the things which concern life.
Who among us does not speak of good and bad, of useful
and not useful ; for who among us has not a preconception of
each of these things? Is it then a distinct and perfect pre-
conception? Show this. How shall I show this? Adapt
the preconception properly to the particular things. Plato,
for instance, subjects definitions to the preconception of the
useful, but you to the preconception of the useless. Is it
possible then that both of you are right? How is it possi-
ble ? Does not one man adapt the preconception of good to
the matter of wealth, and another not to wealth, but to the
matter of pleasure and to that of health ? For, generally, if
all of us who use those words know sufficiently each of them,
and need no diligence in resolving (making distinct) the no-
tions of the preconceptions, why do we differ, why do we
quarrel, why do we blame one another ?
And why do I now allege this contention with one another
and speak of it? If you yourself properly adapt your pre-
conceptions, why are you unhappy, why are you hindered?
Let us omit at present the second topic about the pursuits
{ppfiai) and the study of the duties which relate to them.
Let us omit also the third topic, which; relates to the assents
{dvyKaToQeaeii) : I give up to you these two topics. Let us
insist upon the first, which presents an almost obvious de-
monstration that we do not properly adapt the preconcep-
tions. Do you now desire that which is possible and that
which is possible to you? Why then are you hindered?
why are you unhappy? Do you not now try to avoid the
unavoidable ? Why then do you fall in with any thing which
you would avoid ? Why are you unfortunate ? Why, when
you desire a thing, does it not happen, and, when you do not
desire it, does it happen? For this is the greatest proof of
unhappiness and misery ; I wish for something, and it does
not happen. And what is more wretched than I ?
It was because she could not endure this that Medea came
152 EPICTETUS
to murder her children : an act of a noble spirit in this view
at least, for she had a just opinion what it is for a thing not
to succeed which a person wishes. Then she says, "Thus I
shall be avenged on him (my husband) who has wronged
and insulted me ; and what shall I gain if he is punished thus ?
how then shall it be done? I shall kill my children, but I
shall punish myself also ; and what do I care?"* This is the
aberration of soul which possesses great energy. For she
did not know wherein lies the doing of that which we wish;
that you can not get this from without, nor yet by the altera-
tion and new adaptation of things. Do not desire the man
(Jason, Medea's husband), and nothing which you desire
will fail to happen: do not obstinately desire that he shall
live with you : do not desire to remain in Corinth ; and in a
word desire nothing than that which God wills. — And who
shall hinder you? who shall compel you? No man shall
compel you any more than he shall compel Zeus.
When you have such a guide and your wishes and desires
are the same as his, why do you still fear disappointment?
Give up your desire to wealth and your aversion to poverty,
and you will be disappointed in the one, you will fall into the
other. Well give them up to health, and you will be unfor-
tunate: give them up to magistracies, honours, country,
friends, children, in a word to any of the things which are
not in man's power (and you will be unfortunate). But
give them up to Zeus and to the rest of the gods ; surrender
them to the gods, let the gods govern, let your desire and
aversion be ranged on the side of the gods, and wherein will
you be any longer unhappy? But if, lazy wretch, you envy,
and complain, and are jealous and fear, and never cease for a
single day complaining both of yourself and of the gods, why
do you still speak of being educated? What kind of an
education, man ? Do you mean that you have been employed
about sophistical syllogisms {dvWoyid/iovg /leTaxiTtrovrai)?
Will you not, if it is possible, unlearn all these things and
begin from the beginning, and see at the same time that
hitherto you have not even touched the matter; and then
commencing from this foundation, will you not build up all
that comes after, so that nothing may happen which you do
DISCOURSES 153
not choose, and nothing shall fail to happen which you do
choose?
Give me one young man who has come to the school with
this intention, who is become a champion for this matter
and says, "I give up everything else, and it is enough for me
if it shall ever be in my power to pass my life free from
hindrance and free from trouble, and to stretch out (present)
my neck to all things like a free man, and to look up to
heaven as a friend of God and fear nothing that can happen."
Let any of you point out such a man that I may say, "Come,
young man, into the possession of that which is your own,
for it is your destiny to adorn philosophy: yours are these
possessions, yours these books, yours these discourses'/
Then when he shall have laboured sufficiently and exercised
himself in this part of the matter ( ronov ) , let him come to
me again and say, "I desire to be free from passion and free
from perturbation ; and I wish as a pious man and a philoso-
pher and a diligent person to know what is my duty to the
gods, what to my parents, what to my brothers, what to my
country, what to strangers." (I say) "Come also to the
second matter {roitov) : this also is yours." — "But I have
now sufficiently studied the second part {roitov') also, and
I would gladly be secure and unshaken, and not only when
I am awake, but also when I am asleep, and when I am filled
with wine, and when I am melancholy." Man, you are a
god, you have great designs.
No : but I wish to understand what Chrysippus says in his
treatise of the "Pseudomenos""^ (the Liar). — Will you not
hang yourself, wretch, with such your intention ? And what
good will it do you ? You will read the whole with sorrow,
and you will speak to others trembling. Thus you also do.
"Do you wish me,® brother, to read to you, and you to me" ?
— You write excellently, my man ; and you also excellently in
the style of Xenophon, and you in the style of Plato, and you
in the style of Antisthenes. Then having told your dreams
to one another you return to the same things : your desires
are the same, your aversions the same, your pursuits are the
same, and your designs and purposes, you wish for the same
things and work for the same. In the next place you do not
even seek for one to give you advice, but you are vexed if
154 EPICTETUS
you hear such things (as I say). Then you say, "An ill-na-
tured old fellow : when I was going away, he did not weep
nor did he say, Into what danger you are going : if you come
off safe, my child, I will burn lights. This is what a good
natured man would do." It will be a great thing for you if
you do return safe, and it will be worth while to burn lights
for such a person : for you ought to be immortal and exempt
from disease.
Casting away then, as I say, this conceit of thinking that
we know something useful, we must come to philosophy as
we apply to geometry, and to music : but if we do not, we
shall not even approach to proficiency though we read all the
collections and commentaries of Chrysippus and those of
Antipater and Archedemus.
NOTES
* See ii. ii, i, and iii. 14, 8.
'Theorems are defined by Cicero, "De Fato," c. 6, "Percepta appello
quae dicuntur Graece BEooprmara."
* This rhetorician or orator, as Epictetus names him, appears to be
the same person as Theopompus of Chios, the historian.
* This is the meaning of what Medea says in the "Medea" of Euripides.
Epictetus does not give the words of the poet.
* The "Pseudomenos" was a treatise by Chrysippus. "The Pseudo-
menos was a famous problem among the Stoics, and it is this. When a
person says, I lie; doth he lie, or doth he not? If he lies, he speaks
truth : if he speaks truth, he lies. The philosophers composed many
books on this difficulty. Chrysippus wrote six. Philetas wasted himself
in studying to answer it." — Mrs. Carter.
* Epictetus is ridiculing the men who compliment one another on their
writings. Upton compares Horace, Epp. ii. 2, 87.
"ut alter
Alterius sermone meros audiret honores —
Discedo Alcaeus puncto illius? ille meo quis?.
iQtiis nisi Callimachus ?"
CHAPTER XVIII
HOW WE SHOULD STRUGGLE AGAINST APPEARANCES
EVERY habit and faculty is maintained and increased
by the corresponding actions: the habit of walking
by walking, the habit of running by running. If
you would be a good reader, read ; if a writer, write.
But when you shall not have read for thirty days in succes-
sion, but have done something else, you will know the con-
sequence. In the same way, if you shall have lain down ten
days, get up and attempt to make a long walk, and you will
see how your legs are weakened. Generally then if you
would make any thing a habit, do it ; if you would not make
it a habit, do not do it, but accustom yourself to do something
else in place of it.
So it is with respect to the affections of the soul : when
you have been angry, you must know that not only has this
evil befallen you, but that you have also increased the habit,
and in a manner thrown fuel upon fire. When you have
been overcome in sexual intercourse with a person, do not
reckon this single defeat only, but reckon that you have also
nurtured, increased your incontinence. For it is impossible
for habits and faculties, some of them not to be produced,
when they did not exist before, and others not be increased
and strengthened by corresponding acts.
In this manner certainly, as philosophers say, also diseases
of the mind grow up. For when you have once desired
money, if reason be applied to lead to a perception of the evil,
the desire is stopped, and the ruling faculty of our mind is
restored to the original authority. But if you apply no
means of cure, it no longer returns to the same state, but
being again excited by the corresponding appearance, it is
inflamed to desire quicker than before : and when this takes
place continually, it is henceforth hardened (made callous),
and the disease of the mind confirms the love of money. For
he who has had a fever, and has been relieved from it, is not
in the same state that he was before, unless he has been com-
155
1 56 EPICTETUS
pletely cured. Something of the kind happens also in
diseases of the soul. Certain traces and blisters are left in
it, and unless a man shall completely efface them, when he is
again lashed on the same places, the lash will produce not
blisters (weals) but sores. If then you wish not to be of an
angry temper, do not feed the habit: throw nothing on it
which will increase it : at first keep quiet, and count the days
on which you have not been angry. I used to be in passion
every day; now every second day; then every third, then
every fourth. But if you have intermitted thirty days, make
a sacrifice to God. For the habit at first begins to be weak-
ened, and then is completely destroyed. "I have not been
vexed to-day, nor the day after, nor yet on any succeeding
day during two or three months ; but I took care when some
exciting things happened." Be assured that you are in a
good way. To-day when I saw a handsome person, I did
not say to myself, I wish I could lie with her, and Happy is
her husband; for he who says this says, Happy is her adul-
terer also. Nor do I picture the rest to my mind ; the woman
present, and stripping herself and lying down by my side.
I stroke my head and say. Well done, Epictetus, you have
solved a fine little sophism, much finer than that which is
called the master sophism. And if even the woman is will-
ing, and gives signs, and sends messages, and if she also
fondle me and come close to me, and I should abstain and be
victorious, that would be a sophism beyond that which is
named the Liar, and the Quiescent. Over such a victory as
this a man may justly be proud ; not for proposing the master
sophism.
How then shall this be done? Be willing at length to
be approved by yourself, be willing to appear beautiful to
God, desire to be in purity with your own pure self and with
God. Then when any such appearance visits you, Plato says,
"Have recourse to expiations, go a suppliant to the tem-
ples of the averting deities." It is even sufficient if you resort
to the society of noble and just men, and compare yourself
with them, whether you find one who is living or dead. Go
to Socrates and see him lying down with Alcibiades, and
mocking his beauty : consider what a victory he at last found
that he had gained over himself ; what an Olympian victory ;
DISCOURSES 157
in what number he stood from Hercules;* so that, by the
Gods, one may justly salute him. Hail, wondrous man, you
who have conquered not these sorry boxers and pancratiasts,
nor yet those who are like them, the gladiators. By placing
these objects on the other side you will conquer the appear-
ance : you will not be drawn away by it. But in the first
place be not hurried away by the rapidity of the appearance,
but say, Appearances, wait for me a little : let me see who you
are, and what you are about : let me put you to the test. And
then do not allow the appearance to lead you on and draw
lively pictures of the things which will follow; for if you
do, it will carry you off wherever it pleases. But rather
bring in to oppose it some other beautiful and noble appear-
ance and cast out this base appearance. And if you are ac-
customed to be exercised in this way, you will see what
shoulders, what sinews, what strength you have. But now
it is only trifling words, and nothing more.
This is the true athlete, the man who exercises himself
against such appearances. Stay, wretch, do not be carried
away. Great is the combat, divine is the work; it is for
kingship, for freedom, for happiness, for freedom from per-
turbation. Remember God : call on him as a helper and pro-
tector, as men at sea call on the Dioscuri^ in a storm. For
what is a greater storm than that which comes from appear-
ances which are violent and drive away the reason ? For the
storm itself, what else is it but an appearance? For take
away the fear of death, and suppose as many thunders and
lightnings as you please, and you will know what calm' and
serenity there is in the ruling faculty. But if you have once
been defeated and say that you will conquer hereafter, and
then say the same again, be assured that you will at last be in
so wretched a condition and so weak that you will not even
know afterwards that you are doing wrong, but you will
even begin to make apologies (defences) for your wrong
doing, and then you will confirm the saying of Hesiod* to be
true,
" With constant ills the dilatory strives."
NOTES
* Hercules is said to have established gymnastic contests and to have
been die first victor. Those who gained the victory both in wrestling
158
EPICTETUS
and in the pancratium were reckoned in the list of victors as coming in
the second or third place after him, and so on.
* Castor and Pollux. Horace, Carm. i. 12 : —
"Quorum simul alba nautis
Stella refulsit, etc."
* " Consider that every thing is opinion, and opinion is in thy power.
Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion, and like a mariner,
who has doubled the promontory, thou wilt find calm, every thing stable,
and a waveless bay." Antoninus, xiL
* Hesiod, Works and Days, v. 411.
CHAPTER XIX
AGAINST THOSE WHO EMBRACE PHILOSOPHICAL OPINIONS
ONLY IN WORDS
THE argument called the ruling argument (6 Kvptevoov
Xoyoi) appears to have been proposed from such
principles as these: there is in fact a common con-
tradiction between one another in these three propo-
sitions, each two being in contradiction to the third. The
propositions are, that every thing past must of necessity be
true ; that an impossibility does not follow a possibility ; and
that a thing is possible which neither is nor will be true.
Diodorus^ observing this contradiction employed the proba-
tive force of the first two for the demonstration of this pro-
position. That nothing is possible which is not true and
never will be. Now another will hold these two : That some-
thing is possible, which is neither true nor ever will be : and
That an impossibility does not follow a possibility. But
he will not allow that every thing which is past is necessarily
true, as the followers of Cleanthes seem to think, and Anti-
pater copiously defended them. But others maintain the
other two propositions, That a thing is possible which is
neither true nor will be true: and That everything which
is past is necessarily true ; but then they will maintain that an
impossibility can follow a possibility. But it is impossible
to maintain these three propositions, because of their com-
mon contradiction.^
If then any man should ask me, which of these propo-
sitions do you maintain? I will answer him, that I do not
know; but I have received this story, that Diodorus main-
tained one opinion, the followers of Panthoides, I think, and
Cleanthes maintained another opinion, and those of ChrysifH
pus a third. What then is your opinion? I was not made
for this purpose, to examine the appearances that occur to
me, and to compare what others say and to form an opinion
of my own on the thing. Therefore I differ not at all
from the grammarian. Who was Hector's father? Priam.
159
1 60 EPICTETUS
Who were his brothers ? Alexander and Deiphobus. Who
was their mother ? Hecuba — I have heard this story. From
whom? From Homer. And Hellanicus also, I think,
writes about the same things, and perhaps others like him.
And what further have I about the ruling argument ? Noth-
ing. But, if I am a vain man, especially at a banquet I
surprise the guests by enumerating those who have written
on these matters. Both Chrysippus has written wonder-
fully in his first book about Possibilities, and Cleanthes has
written specially on the subject, and Archedemus. Anti-
pater also has written not only in his work about Possibil-
ities, but also separately in his work on the ruling argument.
Have you not read the work? I have not read it. Read.
And what profit will a man have from it? he will be more
trifling and impertinent than he is now ; for what else have
you gained by reading it? What opinion have you formed
on this subject? none; but you will tell us of Helen and
Priam, and the island of Calypso which never was and never
will be. And in this matter indeed it is of no great impor-
tance if you retain the story, but have formed no opinion of
your own. But in matters of morality (Ethic) this happens
to us much more than in these things of which we are speak-
ing.
Speak to me about good and evil.^ Listen :
"The wind from Ilium to Ciconian shores
Brought me."*
Of things some are good, some are bad, and others are
indifferent. The good then are the virtues and the things
which partake of the virtues : the bad are the vices, and the
things which partake of them; and the indifferent are the
things which lie between the virtues and the vices, wealth,
health, life, death, pleasure, pain. Whence do you know
this? Hellanicus says it in his Egyptian history; for what
difference does it make to say this, or to say that Diogenes
has it in his Ethic, or Chrysippus or Cleanthes ? Have you
then examined any of these things and formed an opinion of
your own? Show how you are used to behave in a storm
on shipboard? Do you remember this division (distinction
of things), when the sail rattles and a man, who knows noth-
DISCOURSES l6l
ing of times and seasons, stands by you when you are
screaming and says, "Tell me, I ask you by the gods, what
you were saying just now. Is it a vice to suffer shipwreck :
does it participate in vice?" Will you not take up a stick and
lay it on his head ? What have we to do with you, man ? we
are perishing and you come to mock us ? But if Caesar send
for you to answer a charge, do you remember the distinc-
tion ? If when you are going in pale and trembling, a per-
son should come up to you and say, "Why do you tremble,
man? what is the matter about which you are engaged?
Does Caesar who sits within give virtue and vice to those
who go in to him ?" You reply. Why do you also mock me
and add to my present sorrows? — "Still tell me, philosopher,
tell me why you tremble ? Is it not death of which you run
the risk, or a prison, or pain of the body, or banishment, or
disgrace? What else is there? Is there any vice or any-
thing which partakes of vice?" What then did you use to
say of these things? — "What have you to do with me, man?
my own evils are enough for me." And you say right.
Your own evils are enough for you, your baseness, your
cowardice, your boasting which you showed when you sat
in the school. Why did you decorate yourself with what
belonged to others ? Why did you call yourself a Stoic ?
Observe yourselves thus in your actions, and you will find
to what sect you belong. You will find that most of you are
Epicureans, a few Peripatetics,'^ and those feeble. For
wherein will you show that you really consider virtue equal
to everything else or even superior ? But show me a Stoic,
if you can. Where or how? But you can show me an
endless number who utter small arguments of the Stoics.
For do the same persons repeat the Epicurean opinions any
worse? And the Peripatetic, do they not handle them also
with equal accuracy? who then is a Stoic? As we call a
statue Phidiac, which is fashioned according to the art of
Phidias ; so show me a man who is fashioned according to
the doctrines which he utters. Show me a man who is sick
and happy, in danger and happy, dying and happy, in exile
and happy, in disgrace and happy. Show him : I desire, by
the gods, to see a Stoic. You can not show me one fashioned
so ; but show me at least one who is forming, who has shown
1 62 EPICTETUS
a tendency to be a Stoic. Do me this favour : do not grudge
an old man seeing a sight which I have not seen yet. Do
you think that you must show me the Zeus of Phidias or the
Athena, a work of ivory and gold? Let any of you show
me a human soul ready to think as God does, and not to
blame^ either God or man, ready not to be disappointed about
any thing, not to consider himself damaged by any thing, not
to be angry, not to be envious, not to be jealous ; and why
should I not say it direct? desirous from a man to become
a god, and in this poor mortal body thinking of his fellow-
ship with Zeus.''^ Show me the man. But you can not.
Why then do you delude yourselves and cheat others? and
why do you put on a g^ise which does not belong to you, and
walk about being thieves and pilferers of these names and
things which do not belong to you?
And now I am your teacher, and you are instructed in my
school. And I have this purpose, to make you free from
restraint, compulsion, hindrance, to make you free, prosper-
ous, happy, looking to God in everything small and great.
And you are here to learn and practise these things. Why
then do you not finish the work, if you also have such a pur-
pose as you ought to have, and if I in addition to the purpose
also have such qualification as I ought to have? What is
that which is wanting ? When I see an artificer and material
lying by him, I expect the work. Here then is the artificer,
here the material ; what is it that we want ? Is not the thing
one that can be taught ? It is. Is it not then in our power ?
The only thing of all that is in our power. Neither wealth
is in our power, nor health, nor reputation, nor in a word
any thing else except the right use of appearances. This
(right use) is by nature free from restraint, this alone is
free from impediment. Why then do you not finish the
work? Tell me the reason. For it is either through my
fault that you do not finish it, or through your own fault, or
through the nature of the thing. The thing itself is possible,
and the only thing in our power. It remains then that the
fault is either in me or in you, or, what is nearer the truth,
in both. Well then, are you willing that we begin at last to
bring such a purpose into this school, and to take no notice of
DISCOURSES 163
the past? Let us only make a beginning. Trust to me,
and you will see.
NOTES
* Diodoru's, sumamed Cronus, lived at Alexandria in the time of
Ptolemoeus Soter. He was of the school named the Megaric, and dis-
tinguished in dialectic.
* If you assume any two of these three, they must be in contradiction
to the third and destroy it.
* "Speak to me," etc., may be supposed to be said to Epictetus, who
has been ridiculing logical subtleties and the grammarians' learning.
When he is told to speak of good and evil, he takes a verse of the
Odyssey, the first which occurs to him, and says, Listen. There is noth-
ing to listen to, but it is as good for the hearer as anything else. Then
he utters some philosophical principles, and being asked where he
learned them, he says, from Hellanicus, who was an historian, not a
philosopher. He is bantering the hearer : it makes no matter from what
author I learned them ; it is all the same. The real question is, have
you examined what Good and Evil are, and have you formed an opinion
yourself?
* Odyssey, ix. 39.
* The Peripatetics allowed many things to be good which contributed
to a happy life; but still they contended that the smallest mental excel-
lence was superior to all other things. Cicero, De Fin. v. 5, 31.
' "To blame God" means to blame the constitution and order of
things, for to do this appeared to Epictetus to be absurd and wicked;
as absurd as for the potter's vessel to blame the potter, if that can be
imagined, for making it liable to wear out and to break.
^ " 'Our fellowship is with the Father and with his son Jesus Christ,*
I John i. 3. The attentive reader will observe several passages besides
those which have been noticed, in which there is a striking conformity
between Epictetus and the Scriptures : and will perceive from them,
either that the Stoics had learned a good deal of the Christian language
or that treating a subject practically and in earnest leads men to such
strong expressions as we often find in Scripture and sometimes in the
philosophers, especially Epictetus." — Mrs. Carter.
CHAPTER XX
AGAINST THE EPICUREANS AND ACADEMICS
THE propositions which are true and evident are of
necessity used even by those who contradict them :
and a man might perhaps consider it to be the great-
est proof of a thing being evident that it is found
to be necessary even for him who denies it to make use of it
at the same time. For instance, if a man should deny that
there is anything universally true, it is plain that he must
make the contradictory negation, that nothing is univer-
sally true. What, wretch, do you not admit even this ? For
what else is this than to affirm thatwhatever is universally af-
firmed is false? Again if a man should come forward and
say : Know that there is nothing that can be known, but all
things are incapable of sure evidence; or if another say.
Believe me and you will be the better for it, that a man ought
not to believe any thing; or again, if another should say,
Learn from me, man, that it is not possible to learn any
thing ; I tell you this and will teach you, if you choose. Now
in what respect do these differ from those? Whom shall I
name? Those who call themselves Academics? "Men,
agree [with us] that no man agrees [with another] : believe
us that no man believes anybody."
Thus Epicurus^ also, when he designs to destroy the nat-
ural fellowship of mankind, at the same time makes use of
that which he destroys. For what does he say? "Be not
deceived, men, nor be led astray, nor be mistaken : there is no
natural fellowship among rational animals ; believe me. But
those who say otherwise, deceive you and seduce you by false
reasons." — What is this to you? Permit us to be deceived.
Will you fare worse, if all the rest of us are persuaded that
there is a natural fellowship among us, and that it ought by
all means to be preserved ? Nay, it will be much better and
safer for you. Man, why do you trouble yourself about us?
Why do you keep awake for us? Why do you light your
lamp? Why do you rise early? Why do you write so
164
DISCOURSES 165
many books, that no one of us may be deceived about the
gods and beheve that they take care of men; or that no one
may suppose the nature of good to be other than pleasure?
For if this is so, He down and sleep, and lead the life of a
worm, of which you judged yourself worthy : eat and drink,
and enjoy women, and ease yourself, and snore.^ And what is
it to you, how the rest shall think about these things, whether
right or wrong ? For what have we to do with you ? You
take care of sheep because they supply us with wool and milk,
and last of all with their flesh. Would it not be a desirable
thing if men could be lulled and enchanted by the Stoics,
and sleep and present themselves to you and to those like
you to be shorn and milked ? For this you ought to say to
your brother Epicureans: but ought you not to conceal it
from others, and particularly before every thing to persuade
them, that we are by nature adapted for fellowship, that tem-
perance is a good thing; in order that all things may be
secure for you?' Or ought we to maintain this fellowship
with some and not with others ? With whom then ought we
to maintain it ? With such as on their part also maintain it,
or with such as violate this fellowship ? And who violate it
more than you who establish such doctrines ?
What then was it that waked Epicurus from his sleepiness,
and compelled him to write what he did write? What else
was it than that which is the strongest thing in men. Nature,
which draws a man to her own will though he be unwilling
and complaining ? For since, she says, you think that there is
no community among mankind, write this opinion and leave
it for others, and break your sleep to do this, and by your
own practice condemn your own opinions. Shall we then
say that Orestes was agitated by the Erinyes (Furies) and
roused from his deep sleep, and did not more savage Erinyes
and Pains rouse Epicurus from his sleep and not allow him
to rest, but compelled him to make known his own evils, as
madness and wine did the Galli (the priests of Cybele) ? So
strong and invincible is man's nature. For how can a vine
be moved not in the manner of a vine, but in the manner of
an olive tree ? or on the other hand how can an olive tree be
moved not in the manner of an olive tree, but in the manner
of a vine? It is impossible : it can not be conceived. Neither
1 66 ' EPICTETUS
then is it possible for a man completely to lose the movements
(affects) of a man; and even those who are deprived of their
genital members are not able to deprive themselves of man's
desires. Thus Epicurus also mutilated all the offices of a
man, and of a father of a family, and of a citizen and of a
friend, but he did not mutilate human desires, for he could
not; not more than the lazy Academics can cast away or
blind their own senses, though they have tried with all their
might to do it. What a shame is this ? when a man has re-
ceived from nature measures and rules for the knowing of
truth, and does not strive to add to these measures and rules
and to improve them, but just the contrary, endeavours to
take away and destroy whatever enables us to discern the
truth?
What say you philosopher? piety and sanctity, what do
you think that they are? If you like, I will demonstrate
that they are good things. Well, demonstrate it, that our
citizens may be turned and honour the deity and may no
longer be negligent about things of the highest value. Have
you then the demonstrations? — I have, and I am thankful.
— Since then you are well pleased with them, hear the con-
trary : That there are no Grods, and, if there are, they take
no care of men, nor is there any fellowship between us and
them; and that this piety and sanctity which is talked of
among most men is the lying of boasters and sophists, or
certainly of legislators for the purpose of terrifying and
checking wrong doers.* — Well done, philosopher, you have
done something for our citizens, you have brought back all
the young men to contempt of things divine. — What then,
does not this satisfy you? Learn now, that justice is noth-
ing, that modesty is folly, that a father is nothing, a son
nothing. — Well done, philosopher, persist, persuade the
young men, that we may have more with the same opinions
as you and who say the same as you. From such principles
as these have gjown our well constituted states ; by these was
Sparta founded : Lycurgus fixed these opinions in the Spar-
tans by his laws and education, that neither is the servile con-
dition more base than honourable, nor the condition of free
men more honourable than base, and that those who died at
Thermopylae* died from these opinions; and through what
DISCOURSES 167
Other opinions did the Athenians leave their city?® Then
those who talk thus, marry and beget children, and employ
themselves in public affairs and make themselves priests and
interpreters. Of whom ? of gods who do not exist : and they
consult the Pythian priestess that they may hear lies, and
they report the oracles to others. Monstrous impudence and
imposture.
Man what are you doing ?^ are you refuting yourself every
day ; and will you not give up these frigid attempts ? When
you eat, where do you carry your hand to ? to your mouth or
to your eye ? When you wash yourself, what do you go into ?
Do you ever call a pot a dish, or a ladle a spit ? If I were a
slave of any of these men, even if I must be flayed by him
daily, I would rack him. If he said, "Boy, throw some olive
oil into the bath," I would take pickle sauce and pour it down
on his head. What is this ? he would say — An appearance
was presented to me, I swear by your genius, which could not
be distinguished from oil and was exactly like it — Here give
me the barley-drink (tisane), he says — I would fill and carry
him a dish of sharp sauce — Did I not ask for the barley
drink ? Yes, master : this is the barley drink ? Take it and
smell; take it and taste. How do you know then if our
senses deceive us? — If I had three or four fellow-slaves of
the same opinion, I should force him to hang himself through
passion or to change his mind. But now they mock us by
using all the things which nature gives, and in words des-
troying them.
Grateful indeed are men and modest, who, if they do noth-
ing else, are daily eating bread and yet are shameless enough
to say, we do not know if there is a Demeter or her daughter
Persephone or a Pluto :* not to mention that they are enjoy-
ing the night and the day, the seasons of the year, and the
stars, and the sea and the land and the co-operation of man-
kind, and yet they are not moved in any degree by these
things to turn their attention to them ; but they only seek to
belch out their little problem (matter for discussion), and
when they have exercised their stomach to go off to the bath.
But what they shall say, and about what things or to what
persons, and what their hearers shall learn from this talk,
they care not even in the least degree, nor do they care if any
1 68 EPICTETUS
generous youth after hearing such talk should suffer any
harm from it, nor after he has suffered harm should lose all
the seeds of his generous nature; nor if we should give an
adulterer help towards being shameless in his acts ; nor if a
public peculator should lay hold of some cunning excuse
from these doctrines ; nor if another who neglects his parents
should be confirmed in his audacity by this teaching. — What
then in your opinion is good or bad ? This or that ? — Why
then should a man say any more in reply to such persons as
these, or give them any reason or listen to any reason from
them, or try to convince them? By Zeus one might much
sooner expect to make catamites change their mind than
those who are become so deaf and blind to their own evils.^
NOTES
* Cicero, de Fin. ii. 30. 31, speaking of the letter, which Epicurus wrote
to Hermarchus when he was dying, says "that the actions of Epicurus
were inconsistent with his sayings," and "his writings were confuted
by his probity and morality."
* Paul says, i Cor. 15 -.32 : "If after the manner of men I have fought
with beasts at Ephesus, what advantageth it me, if the dead rise not?
let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." The words "let us eat and
drink," etc. are said to be a quotation from the Thais of Menander. The
meaning seems to be, that if I do not believe in the resurrection of the
dead, why should I not enjoy the sensual pleasures of life only? This
is not the doctrine of Epictetus, as we see in the text.
* It would give security to the Epicureans, that they would enjoy all
that they value, if other men should be persuaded that we are all made
for fellowship, and that temperance is a good thing.
* Polybius when he is speaking of the Roman state, commends the men
of old time, who established in the minds of the multitude the opinions
about the ^ods and Hades, wherein, he says, they acted more wisely than
those in his time who would destroy such opinions.
* Epictetus alludes to the Spartans who fought at Thermopylae B. C.
480 against Xerxes and his army. Herodotus has recorded the inscrip-
tion placed over the Spartans : —
"Stranger go tell the Spartans, Here we lie
Obedient to those who bade us die."
*When Xerxes was advancing on Athens, the Athenians left the city
and embarked on their vessels before the battle of Salamis, B.C. 480.
' He is now attacking the Academics, who asserted that we can know
nothing.
* Epictetus is speaking according to the popular notions. To deny
Demeter and to eat the bread which she gives is the same thing in the
common notions of the Greeks, as it would be for Epictetus to deny the
existence of God and to eat the bread which he gives.
*"This resembles what our Saviour said to the Jewish rulers: Verily
DISCOURSES 169
I say unto you, that the publicans and the harlots go into the kingdom of
God before you." Matthew, xxi. 31. — Mrs. Carter.
To an Academic who said he comprehended nothing, the Stoic Ariston
replied, "Do you not see even the person who is sitting near you?" When
the Academic denied it, Ariston said, "Who made you blind? who stole
your power of sight?" (Diogenes Laertius, vii. 163.)
la
CHAPTER XXI
t
OF INCONSISTENCY
SOME things men readily confess, and other things they
do not. No one then will confess that he is a fool or
without understanding; but quite the contrary you
will hear all men saying, I wish that I had fortune
equal to my understanding. But men readily confess that
they are timid, and they say: I am rather timid, I confess;
but as to other respects you will not find me to be foolish.
A man will not readily confess that he is intemperate; and
that he is unjust, he will not confess at all. He will by no
means confess that he is envious or a busy body. Most men
will confess that they are compassionate. What then is the
reason? — The chief thing (the ruling thing) is inconsistency
and confusion in the things which relate to good and evil.
But different men have different reasons ; and generally what
they imagine to be base, they do not confess at all. But they
suppose timidity to be a characteristic of a good disposition,
and compassion also; but silliness to be the absolute charac-
teristic of a slave. And they do not at all admit (confess)
the things which are offences against society. But in the
case of most errors for this reason chiefly they are induced
to confess them, because they imagine that there is some-
thing involuntary in them as in timidity and compassion;
and if a man confess that he is in any respect intemperate,
he alleges love (or passion) as an excuse for what is involun-
tary. But men do not imagine injustice to be at all involun-
tary. There is also in jealousy, as they suppose, something
involuntary; and for this reason they confess to jealousy
also.
Living then among such men, who are so confused, so ig-
norant of what they say, and of the evils which they have or
have not, and why they have them, or how they shall be re-
lieved of them, I think it is worth the trouble for a man to
watch constantly (and to ask) whether I am also one of
them, what imagination I have about myself, how I conduct
170
DISCOURSES 171
myself, whether I conduct myself as a prudent man, whether
I conduct myself as a temperate man, whether I ever say
this, that I have been taught to be prepared for everything
that may happen. Have I the consciousness, which a man
who knows nothing ought to have, that I know nothing?
Do I go to my teacher as men go to oracles, prepared to
obey ? or do I like a snivelling boy go to my school to learn
history and understand the books which I did not under-
stand before, and, if it should happen so, to explain them
also to others ? — Man, you have had a fight in the house with
a poor slave, you have turned the family upside down, you
have frightened the neighbours, and you come to me as if
you were a wise man, and you take your seat and judge how
I have explained some word, and how I have babbled what-
ever came into my head. You come full of envy, and hum-
bled, because you bring nothing from home; and you sit
during the discussion thinking of nothing else than how
your father is disposed towards you and your brother,
"What are they saying about me there? now they think that
I am improving, and are saying. He will return with all
knowledge. I wish I could learn every thing before I re-
turn : but much labour is necessary, and no one sends me
any thing, and the baths at Nicopolis are dirty ; every thing
is bad at home, and bad here."
Then they say, no one gains any profit from the school.
— Why, who comes to the school? who comes for the pur-
pose of being improved ? who comes to present his opinions
to be purified? who comes to learn what he is in want of?
Why do you wonder then if you carry back from the school
the very things which you bring into it ? For you come not
to lay aside (your principles) or to correct them or to re-
ceive other principles in place of them. By no means, nor
any thing like it. You rather look to this, whether you pos-
sess already that for which you come. You wish to prattle
about theorems ? What then ? Do you not become greater
triflers? Do not your little theorems give you some oppor-
tunity of display? You solve sophistical syllogisms. Do
you not examine the assumptions of the syllogism named the
Liar ? Do you not examine h5rpothetical syllogisms ? Why
then are you still vexed if you receive the things for which
172 EPICTETUS
you come to the school? Yes; but if my child die or my
brother, or if I must die or be racked, what good will these
things do me? — Well, did you come for this? for this do
you sit by my side? did you ever for this light your lamp or
keep awake? or, when you went out to the walking place,
did you ever propose any appearance that had been presented
to you instead of a syllogism, and did you and your friends
discuss it together? Where and when? Then you say,
Theorems are useless. To whom ? To such as make a bad
use of them. For eye-salves are not useless to those who
use them as they ought and when they ought. Fomenta-
tions are not useless. Dumb-bells are not useless; but they
are useless to some, useful to others. If you ask me now if
syllogisms are useful, I will tell you that they are useful, and
if you choose, I will prove it. — How then will they in any
way be useful to me ? Man, did you ask if they are useful
to you, or did you ask generally? Let him who is suffer-
ing from dysentery, ask me if vinegar is useful ; I will say
that it is useful. — Will it then be useful to me? — I will say,
no. Seek first for the discharge to be stopped and the ulcers
to be closed. And do you, O men, first cure the ulcers and
stop the discharge; be tranquil in your mind, bring it free
from distraction into the school, and you will know what
power reason has.
CHAPTER XXII
ON FRIENDSHIP*
WHAT a man applies himself to earnestly, that he
naturally loves. Do men then apply themselves
earnestly to the things which are bad? By no
means. Well, do they apply themselves to things
which in no way concern themselves ? not to these either. It
remains then that they employ themselves earnestly only
about things which are good ; and if they are earnestly em-
ployed about things, they love such things also. Whoever
then understands what is good, can also know how to love:
but he who can not distinguish good from bad, and things
which are neither good nor bad from both, how can he pos-
sess the power of loving ? To love then is only in the power
of the wise.
How is this? a man may say; I am foolish, and yet I
love my child. — I am surprised indeed that you have begun
by making the admission that you are foolish. For what
are you deficient in ? Can you not make use of your senses ?
do you not distinguish appearances? do you not use food
which is suitable for your body, and clothing and habitation ?
Why then do you admit that you are foolish ? It is in truth
because you are often disturbed by appearances and per-
plexed, and their power of persuasion often conquers you;
and sometimes you think these things to be good, and then
the same things to be bad, and lastly neither good nor bad ;
and in short you grieve, fear, envy, are disturbed, you are
changed. This is the reason why you confess that you are
foolish. And are you not changeable in love? But wealth,
and pleasure and in a word things themselves, do you some-
times think them to be good, and sometimes bad? and do
you not think the same men at one time to be good, at an-
other time bad? and have you not at one time a friendly
feeling towards them, and at another time the feeling of an
enemy ? and do you not at one time praise them, and at an-
other time blame them? Yes; I have these feelings also.
173
174 EPICTETUS
,Well then, do you think that he who has been deceived about
a man is his friend? Certainly not. And he who has se-
lected a man as his friend and is of a changeable dispostion,
has he good-will towards him? He has not. And he who
now abuses a man, and afterwards admires him? This
man also has no good-will to the other. Well then, did you
never see little dogs caressing and playing with one another,
so that you might say, there is nothing more friendly? but
that you may know what friendship is, throw a bit of flesh
among them, and you will learn. Throw between yourself
and your son a little estate, and you will know how soon he
will wish to bury you and how soon you wish your son to
die. Then you will change your tone and say, what a son I
have brought up ! He has long been wishing to bury me.
Throw a pretty girl between you ; and do you the old man
love her, and the young one will love her too. If a little
fame intervene or dangers, it will be just the same. You
will utter the words of the father of Admetus !
" Life gives you pleasure: and why not your father?" *
Do you think that Admetus did not love his own child when
he was little ? that he was not in agony when the child had a
fever? that he did not often say, I wish I had the fever in-
stead of the child? then when the test (the thing) came and
was near, see what words they utter. Were not Eteocles
and Polynices from the same mother and from the same
father? Were they not brought up together, had they not
lived together, drunk together, slept together, and often
kissed one another ? So that, if any man, I think, had seen
them, he would have ridiculed the philosophers for the para-
doxes which they utter about friendship. But when a quar-
rel rose between them about the royal power, as between
dogs about a bit of meat, see what they say
Polynices. Where will you take your station before the towers?
Eteocles. Why do you ask me this?
Pol. I will place myself opposite and try to kill you.
Et. I also wish to do the same. *
Such are the wishes that they utter.
DISCOURSES 175
For universally, be not deceived, every animal is attached
to nothing so much as to its own interest.* Whatever then
appears to it an impediment to this interest, whether this
be a brother, or a father, or a child, or beloved, or lover, it
hates, spurns, curses: for its nature is to love nothing so
much as its own interest; this is father, and brother, and
kinsman, and country, and God. When then the gods ap-
pear to us to be an impediment to this, we abuse them and
throw down their statues and burn their temples, as Alex-
ander ordered the temples of ^sculapius to be burned when
his dear friend died.^
For this reason if a man put in the same place his in-
terest, sanctity, goodness, and country, and parents, and
friends, all these are secured : but if he puts in one place his
interest, in another his friends, and his country and his kins-
men and justice itself, all these give way being borne down
by the weight of interest. For where the I and the Mine
are placed, to that place of necessity the animal inclines : if
in the flesh, there is the ruling power : if in the will, it is there:
and if it is in externals, it is there.® If then I am there
where my will is, then only shall I be a friend such as I
ought to be, and son, and father ; for this will be my interest,
to maintain the character of fidelity, of modesty, of patience,
of abstinence, of active co-operation, of observing my rela-
tions (towards all). But if I put myself in one place, and
honesty in another, then the doctrine of Epicurus becomes
strong, which asserts either that there is no honesty or it is
that which opinion holds to be honest (virtuous).
It was through this ignorance that the Athenians and
the Lacedaemonians quarrelled, and the Thebans with both;
and the great king quarrelled with Hellas, and the Mace-
donians with both ; and the Romans with the Getae.'^ And
still earlier the Trojan war happened for these reasons. Al-
exander was the giiest of Menelaus; and if any man had
seen their friendly disposition, he would not have believed
any one who said that they were not friends. But there was
cast between them (as between dogs) a bit of meat, a hand-
some woman, and about her war arose. And now when you
see brothers to be friends appearing to have one mind, do
not conclude from this any thing about their friendship, not
1^6 EPICTETUS
even if they swear it and say that it is impossible for them to
be separated from one another. For the ruhng principle
of a bad man can not be trusted, it is insecure, has no certain
rule by which it is directed, and is overpowered at different
times by different appearances. But examine, not what
other men examine, if they are born of the same parents and
brought up together, and under the same pedagogue; but
examine this only, wherein they place their interest, whether
in externals or in the will. If in externals, do not name
them friends, no more than name them trustworthy or con-
stant, or brave or free : do not name them even men, if you
have any judgment. For that is not a principle of human
nature which makes them bite one another, and abuse one
another, and occupy deserted places or public places, as if
they were mountains,* and in the courts of justice display
the acts of robbers; nor yet that which makes them intem-
perate and adulterers and corrupters, nor that which makes
them do whatever else men do against one another through
this one opinion only, that of placing themselves and their
interests in the things which are not within the power of
their will. But if you hear that in truth these men think
the good to be only there, where will is, and where there is
a right use of appearances, no longer trouble yourself
whether they are father or son, or brothers, or have associ-
ated a long time and are companions, but when you have
ascertained this only, confidently declare that they are
friends, as you declare that they are faithful, that they are
just. For where else is friendship than where there is fidel-
ity, and modesty, where there is a communion of honest
things and of nothing else?
But you may say, such a one treated me with regard so
long; and did he not love me? How do you know, slave,
if he did not regard you in the same way as he wipes his
shoes with a sponge, or as he takes care of his beast ? How
do you know, when you have ceased to be useful as a vessel,
he will not throw you away like a broken platter ? But this
woman is my wife, and we have lived together so long.
And how long did Eriphyle live with Amphiaraus, and was
the mother of children and of many? But a necklace® came
between them: and what is a nedclace? It is the opinion
DISCOURSES 177
about such things. That was the bestial principle, that was
the thing which broke asunder the friendship between hus-
band and wife, that which did not allow the woman to be a
wife, nor the mother to be a mother. And let every man
among you who has seriously resolved either to be a friend
himself or have another for his friend, cut out these opinions,
hate them, drive them from his soul. And thus first of all
he will not reproach himself, he will not be at variance with
himself, he will not change his mind, he will not torture
himself. In the next place, to another also, who is like him-
self, he will be altogether and completely a friend. But he
will bear with the man who is unlike himself, he will be kind
to him, gentle, ready to pardon on account of his ignorance,
on account of his being mistaken in things of the greatest
importance ; but he will be harsh to no man, being well con-
vinced of Plato's doctrine that every mind is deprived of
truth unwillingly. If you can not do this, yet you can do in
all other respects as friends do, drink together, and lodge
together, and sail together, and you may be bom of the same
parents ; for snakes also are : but neither will they be friends
nor you, so long as you retain these bestial and cursed opin-
ions.
NOTES
*■ " In this dissertation is expounded the Stoic principle that friendship
is only possible between the good." Schweig. He also says that there
was another discourse by Epictetus on this subject, in which he ex-
pressed some of the opinions of Musonius Rufus (i. i, note 12).
Schweig. draws this conclusion from certain words of Stobaeus ; and he
supposes that this dissertation of Epictetus was in one of the last four
books of Epictetus' discourses by Arrian, which have been lost.
Cicero (de Amicit. c. 5) says "nisi in bonis amicitiam esse non posse,"
and c. i8.
' The first verse is from the "Alcestis" of Euripides, v. 691. The
second in Epictetus is not in Euripides.
•From the "Phcenissae" of Euripides, v. 723, etc.
•Compare Euripides, "Hecuba," v. 846, etc:
Setvov ys BvTfroii dbg ditavra dv^nirvet:
Kal Tcci a.vdyKa<; 005 vofiot dtcbptdavy
(piXovi TiOevTSi Tovi ys TCoXs/ntoordrovi
Ijfipovi re Tovi icpiv evfieveii itoioviitvoi.
* Alexander did this when Hephaestion died. Arrian, Expedition of
Alexander, vii. 14.
' Matthew vi. 21, "for where your treasure is, there will your heart be
also."
178
EPICTETUS
* The quarrels of the Athenians with the Lacedaemonians appear chiefly
in the history of the Peloponnesian war. (Thucydides, i. i.) The quar-
rel of the great king, the king of Persia, is the subject of the history of
Herodotus (i. i). The great quarrel of the Macedonians with the Per-
sians is the subject of Arrian's expedition of Alexander. The Romans
were at war with the Getae or Daci in the time of Trajan, and we may
assume that Epictetus was still living then.
* Schweig. thinks that this is the plain meaning : "as wild beasts in the
mountains lie in wait for men, so men lie in wait for men, not only in
deserted places, but even in the forum."
* The old story about Eriphyle who betrayed her husband for a neck-
lace.
CHAPTER XXIII
ON THE POWER OF SPEAKING
EVERY man will read a book with more pleasure or
even with more ease, if it is written in fairer char-
acters. Therefore, every man will also listen more
readily to what is spoken, if it is signified by appro-
priate and becoming words. We must not say then that
there is no faculty of expression : for this affirmation is the
characteristic of an impious and also of a timid man. Of
an impious man, because he undervalues the gifts which
come from God, just as if he would take away the commod-
ity of the power of vision, or of hearing, or of seeing.
Has then God given you eyes to no purpose ? and to no pur-
pose has he infused into them a spirit^ so strong and of such
skilful contrivance as to reach a long way and to fashion the
forms of things which are seen? What messenger is so
swift and vigilant? And to no purpose has he made the
interjacent atmosphere so efficacious and elastic that the
vision penetrates through the atmosphere which is in a man-
ner moved? And to no purpose has he made light, without
the presence of which there would be no use in any other
thing ?
Man, be neither ungrateful for these gifts nor yet forget
the things which are superior to them. But indeed for the
power of seeing and hearing, and indeed for life itself, and
for the things which contribute to support it, for the fruits
which are dry, and for wine and oil give thanks to God : but
remember that he has given you something else better than
all these, I mean the power of using them, proving them and
estimating the value of each. For what is that which gives
information about each of these powers, what each of them
is worth ? Is it each faculty itself ? Did you ever hear the
faculty of vision saying any thing about itself ? or the faculty
of hearing ? or wheat, or barley, or a horse, or a dog ? No ;
but they are appointed as ministers and slaves to serve the
faculty which has the power of making use of the appear-
179
l8o EPICTETUS
ances of things. And if you inquire what is the value of
each thing, of whom do you inquire? who answers you?
How then can any other faculty be more powerful than this,
which uses the rest as ministers and itself proves each and
pronounces about them ? for which of them knows what itself
is, and what is its own value? which of them knows when
it ought to employ itself and when not? what faculty is it
which opens and closes the eyes, and turns them away from
objects to which it ought not to apply them and does apply
them to other objects? Is it the faculty of vision? No;
but it is the faculty of the will. What is that faculty
which closes and opens the ears? what is that by which
they are curious and inquisitive, or on the contrary unmoved
by what is said ? is it the faculty of hearing ? It is no other
than the faculty of the will. Will this faculty then, seeing
that it is amidst all the other faculties which are blind and
dumb and unable to see any thing else except the very acts
for which they are appointed in order to minister to this
(faculty) and serve it, but this faculty alone sees sharp and
sees what is the value of each of the rest; will this faculty
declare to us that any thing else is the best,- or that itself is?
And what else does the eye do when it is opened than see?
But whether we ought to look on the wife of a certain per-
son, and in what manner, who tells us ? The faculty of the
will. And whether we ought to believe what is said or not
to believe it, and if we do believe, whether we ought to be
moved by it or not, who tells us? Is it not the faculty of
the will ? But this faculty of speaking and of ornamenting
words, if there is indeed any such peculiar faculty, what else
does it do, when there happens to be discourse about a thing,
than to ornament the words and arrange them as hair-dress-
ers do the hair ? But whether it is better to speak or to be
silent, and better to speak in this way or that way, and
whether this is becoming or not becoming, and the season
for each and the use, what else tells us than the faculty of
the will? Would you have it then to come forward and
condemn itself?
What then? it (the will) says,^ if the fact is so, can that
which ministers be superior to that to which it ministers, can
the horse be superior to the rider, or the dog to the hunts-
DISCOURSES l8l
man, or the instrument to the musician, or the servants to
the king ? What is that which makes use of the rest ? The
will. What takes care of all? The will. What destroys
the whole man, at one time by hunger, at another time by
hanging, and at another time by a precipice? The will.
Then is any thing stronger in men than this? and how is it
possible that the things which are subject to restraint are
stronger than that which is not ? What things are naturally
formed to hinder the faculty of vision? Both will and
things which do not depend on the faculty of the will. It
is the same with the faculty of hearing, with the faculty of
speaking in like manner. But what has a natural power of
hindering the will? Nothing which is independent of the
will; but only the will itself, when it is perverted. There-
fore this (the will) is alone vice or alone virtue.
Then being so great a faculty and set over all the rest, let
it (the will) come forward and tell us that the most excel-
lent of all things is the flesh. Not even if the flesh itself de-
clared that it is the most excellent, would any person bear
that it should say this. But what is it, Epicurus, which pro-
nounces this, which wrote about the End (purpose) of our
Being,' which wrote on the Nature of Things, which wrote
about the Canon (rule of truth), which led you to wear a
beard, which wrote when it was dying that it was spending
the last and a happy day ?* Was this the flesh or the will ?
Then do you admit that you possess any thing superior to
this (the will) ? and are you not mad? are you in fact so
blind and deaf ?
What then ? does any man despise the other faculties ? I
hope not. Does any man say that there is no use or excel-
lence in the speaking faculty ? I hope not. That would be
foolish, impious, ungrateful towards God. But a man ren-
ders to each thing its due value. For there is some use even
in an ass, but not so much as in an ox : there is also use in
a dog, but not so much as in a slave : there is also some use
in a slave, but not so much as in citizens : there is also some
use in citizens, but not so much as in magistrates. Not in-
deed because some things are superior, must we undervalue
the use which other things have. There is a certain value in
the power of speaking, but it is not so great as the power
1 82 EPICTETUS
of the will. When then I speak thus, let no man think that
I ask you to neglect the power of speaking, for neither do
I ask you to neglect the eyes, nor the ears nor the hands nor
the feet, nor clothing nor shoes. But if you ask me what
then is the most excellent of all things, what must I say? I
can not say the power of speaking, but the power of the will,
when it is right (o/ofl?)). For it is this which uses the other
(the power of speaking), and all the other faculties both
small and great. For when this faculty of the will is set
right, a man who is not good becomes good: but when it
fails, a man becomes bad. It is through this that we are
unfortunate, that we are fortunate, that we blame one an-
other, are pleased with one another. In a word, it is this
which if we neglect it makes unhappiness, and if we care-
fully look after it, makes happiness.
But to take away the faculty of speaking and to say that
there is no such faculty in reality, is the act not only of an
ungrateful man towards those who gave it, but also of a
cowardly man: for such a person seems to me to fear, if
there is any faculty of this kind, that we shall not be able
to Hespise it. Such also are those who say that there is no
difference between beauty and ugliness. Then it would hap-
pen that a man would be afifected in the same way if he saw
Thersites and if he saw Achilles : in the same way, if he saw
Helen and any other woman. But these are foolish and
clownish notions, and the notions of men who know not the
nature of each thing, but are afraid, if a man shall see the
difference, that he shall immediately be seized and carried
off vanquished. But this is the great matter; to leave to
each thing the power (faculty) which it has, and leaving to
it this power to see what is the worth of the power, and to
learn what is the most excellent of all things, and to pursue
this always, to be diligent about this, considering all other
things of secondary value compared with this, but yet, as
far as we can, not neglecting all those other things. For we
must take care of the eyes also, not as if they were the most
excellent thing, but we must take care of them on account of
the most excellent thing, because it will not be in its true
natural condition, if it does not rightly use the other facul-
ties, and prefer some things to others.
DISCOURSES 183
What then is usually done ? Men generally act as a trav-
eller would do on his way to his own country, when he enters
a good inn, and being pleased with it should remain there.
Man, you have forgotten your purpose : you were not travel-
ling to this inn, but you were passing through it. — But this
is a pleasant inn. — And how many other inns are pleasant ?
and how many meadows are pleasant? yet only for passing
through. But your purpose is this, to return to your coun-
try, to relieve your kinsmen of anxiety, to discharge the
duties of a citizen, to marry, to beget children, to fill the
usual magistracies.^ For you are not come to select more
pleasant places, but to live in these where you were born and
of which you were made a citizen. Something of the kind
takes place in the matter which we are considering. Since
by the aid of speech and such communication as you receive
here you must advance to perfection, and purge your will and
correct the faculty which makes use of the appearances of
things; and since it is necessary also for the teaching (de-
livery) of theorems to be effected by a certain mode of ex-
pression and with a certain variety and sharpness, some per-
sons captivated by these very things abide in them, one cap-
tivated by the expression, another by syllogisms, another
again by sophisms, and still another by some other inn
{itavSoKEiov) of this kind; and there they stay and waste
away as if they were among Sirens.
Man, your purpose (business) was to make yourself ca-
pable of using conformably to nature the appearances pre-
sented to you, in your desires not to be frustrated, in your
aversion from things not to fall into that which you would
avoid, never to have no luck (as one may say), nor ever to
have bad luck, to be free, not hindered, not compelled, con-
forming yourself to the administration of Zeus, obeying it,
well satisfied with this, blaming no one, charging no one
with fault, able from your whole soul to utter these verses
"Lead me, O Zeus, and thou too Destiny."
Then having this purpose before you, if some little form of
expression pleases you, if some theorems please you, do you
abide among them and choose to dwell there, forgetting the
184 EPICTETUS
things at home, and do you say, These things are fine?
Who says that they are not fine? but only as being a way
home, as inns are. For what hinders you from being an
unfortunate man, even if you speak Hke Demosthenes ? and
what prevents you, if you can resolve syllogisms like Chry-
sippus,^ from being wretched, from sorrowing, from envy-
ing, in a word, from being disturbed, from being unhappy?
Nothing. You see then that these were inns, worth noth-
ing; and that the purpose before you was something else.
When I speak thus to some persons, they think that I am re-
jecting care about speaking or care about theorems. But
I am not rejecting this care, but I am rejecting the abiding
about these things incessantly and putting our hopes in them.
If a man by this teaching does harm to those who listen to
him, reckon me too among those who do this harm : for I
am not able, when I see one thing which is most excellent
and supreme, to say that another is so, in order to please you.
MOTES
* The word for "spirit" is TtvEvjua, a vital spirit, an animal spirit,
a nervous fluid, as Schweighauser explains it, or as Plutarch says
(De Placit. Philosoph. iv. 15), "the spirit which has the power of vision,
which permeates from the chief faculty of the mind to the pupil of the
eye;" and in another passage of the same treatise (iv. 8), "the instru-
ments of perception said to be intelligent spirits (Ttvevjuara voepd)
have a motion from the chief faculty of the mind to the organs."
' On the Greek text Upton remarks that, "there are many passages in
these dissertations which are ambiguous or rather confused on account
of the small questions, and because the matter is not expanded by
oratorical copiousness, not to mention other causes."
* This appears to be the book which Cicero (Tuscul. iii. 18) entitles
on the "supreme good" (de summo bono), which, as Cicero says, con-
tains all the doctrine of Epicurus. The book on the Canon or Rule is
mentioned by Velleius in Cicero de Nat. Decorum i. c. 16, as "that celes-
tial volume of Epicurus on the Rule and Judgment." See also De Fin.
i. 19.
* This is said in a letter written by Epicurus, when he was dying in
great pain (Diog. Laert. x. 22) ; Cicero (De Fin. ii. c. 30) quotes this
letter.
" The Stoics taught that a man should lead an active life. Horace
(Ep. i. I, 16) represents himself as sometimes following the Stoic prin-
ciples :
"Nunc agilis fio et mersor civilibus undis."
but this was only talk. The Stoic should discharge all the duties of
a citizen, says Epictetus ; he should even marry and beget children.
But the marrying may be done without any sense of duty ; and the con-
tinuance of the human race is secured by the natural love of the male
DISCOURSES 185
and of the female for conjunction. Still it is good advice, which the
Roman censor Metellus gave to his fellow citizens, that, as they could
not live without women, they should make the best of this business of
marriage. (Gellius, i. 6.)
• Chrysippus wrote a book on the resolution of Syllogisms. Diogenes
Laertius (vii.) says of Chrysippus that he was so famous among Dialec-
ticians that most persons thought, if there was Dialectic among the
Gods, it would not be any other than that of Chrysippus.
i">Si
CHAPTER XXIV
TO (or against) a person who was one of those who
WERE not valued ( ESTEEMED) BY HIM
A CERTAIN person said to him (Epictetus) : Fre-
quently I desired to hear you and came to you, and
you never gave me any answer: and now, if it is
possible, I intreat you to say something to me. Do
you think, said Epictetus, that as there is an art in any thing
else, so there is also an art in speaking, and that he who has
the art, will speak skilfully, and he who has not, will speak
unskilfully? — I do think so. — He then who by speaking
receives benefit himself, and is able to benefit others, will
speak skilfully: but he who is rather damaged by speaking
and does damage to others, will he be unskilled in this art of
speaking? And you may find that some are damaged and
others benefited by speaking. And are all who hear bene-
fited by what they hear ? Or will you find that among them
also some are benefited and some damaged ? — There are both
among these also, he said. — In this case also then those who
hear skilfully are benefited, and those who hear unskilfully
are damaged? He admitted this. Is there then a skill in
hearing also, as there is in speaking? — It seems so. — If you
choose, consider the matter in this way also. The practice
of music, to whom does it belong? To a musician. And
the proper making of a statue, to whom do you think that it
belongs ? To a statuary. And the looking at a statue skil-
fully, does this appear to you to require the aid of no art ? —
This also requires the aid of art. — Then if speaking properly
is the business of the skilful man, do you see that to hear
also with benefit is the business of the skilful man ? Now as
to speaking and hearing perfectly, and usefully,^ let us for
the present, if you please, say no more, for both of us are a
long way from every thing of the kind. But I think that
every man will allow this, that he who is going to hear phi-
losophers requires some amount of practice in hearing. Is
it not so ?
i86
DISCOURSES 187
Tell me then about what I should talk to you : about what
matter are you able to listen ? — About good and evil. — Good
and evil in what ? In a horse ? No. Well, in an ox ? No.
What then ? In a man ? Yes. Do we know then what a
man is, what the notion is which we have of him, or have
we our ears in any degree practised about this matter ? But
do you understand what nature is? or can you even in any
degree understand me when I say, I shall use demonstra-
tion to you? How? Do you understand this very thing,
what demonstration is, or how any thing is demonstrated,
or by what means; or what things are like demonstration,
but are not demonstration ? Do you know what is true or
what is false? What is consequent on a thing, what is re-
pugnant to a thing, or not consistent, or inconsistent ? But
must I excite you to philosophy, and how ? Shall I show to
you the repugnance in the opinions of most men, through
which they differ about things good and evil, and about
things which are profitable and unprofitable, when you know
not this very thing, what repugnance (contradiction) is?
Show me then what I shall accomplish by discoursing with
you : excite my inclination to do this. As the grass which
is suitable, when it is presented to a sheep, moves its inclina-
tion to eat, but if you present to it a stone or bread, it will
not be moved to eat ; so there are in us certain natural incli-
nations also to speak, when the hearer shall appear to be
somebody, when he himself shall excite us : but when he
shall sit by us like a stone or like grass, how can he excite
a man's desire (to speak) ? Does the vine say to the hus-
bandman, "Take care of me?" No, but the vine by showing
in itself that it will be profitable to the husbandman, if he
does take care of it, invites him to exercise care. When
children are attractive and lively, whom do they not invite
to play with them, and crawl with them, and lisp with them?
But who is eager to play with an ass or to bray with it? for
though it is small, it is still a little ass.
Why then do you say nothing to me ? I can only say this
to you, that he who knows not who he is, and for what pur-
pose he exists, and what is this world, and with whom he is
associated, and what things are the good and the bad, and
the beautiful and the ugly, and who neither understands dis-
1 88 EPICTETUS
course nor demonstration, nor what is true nor what is false,
and who is not able to distinguish them, will neither desire
according to nature nor turn away nor move towards, nor in-
tend (to act), nor assent, nor dissent nor suspend his judg-
ment : to say all in a few words, he will go about dumb and
blind, thinking that he is somebody, but being nobody. Is
this so now for the first time? Is it not the fact that ever
since the human race existed, all errors and misfortunes have
arisen through this ignorance? Why did Agamemnon and
Achilles quarrel with one another ? Was it not through not
knowing what things are profitable and not profitable ? Does
not the one say it is profitable to restore Chryseis to her
father, and does not the other say that it is not profitable?
does not the one say that he ought to take the prize of an-
other, and does not the other say that he ought not? Did
they not for these reasons forget, both who they were and
for what purpose they had come there ? Oh, man, for what
purpose did you come? to gain mistresses or to fight? To
fight. With whom? the Trojans or the Hellenes? With the
Trojans. Do you then leave Hector alone and draw your
sword against your own king? And do you, most excel-
lent Sir, neglect the duties of the king, you who are the
people's guardian and have such cares; and are you quar-
relling about a little girl with the most warlike of your allies,
whom you ought by every means to take care of and pro-
tect? and do you become worse than (inferior to) a well be-
haved priest who treats you these fine gladiators with all
respect ? Do you see what kind of things ignorance of what
is profitable does?
But I also am rich. Are you then richer than Agamem-
non ? But I am also handsome. Are you then more hand-
some than Achilles? But I have also beautiful hair. But
had not Achilles more beautiful hair and gold coloured ? and
he did not comb it elegantly nor dress it. But I am also
strong. Can you then lift so great a stone as Hector or
Ajax? But I am also of noble birth. Are you the son of
a goddess mother? are you the son of a father sprung from
Zeus? What good then do these things do to him, when
he sits and weeps for a girl? But I am an orator. And
was he not ? Do you not see how he handled the most skil-
DISCOURSES 189
f ul of the Hellenes in oratory, Odysseus and Phoenix ? how
he stopped their mouths ?^
This is all that I have to say to you ; and I say even this
not willingly. Why? Because you have not roused me.
For what must I look to in order to be roused, as men who
are expert in riding are roused by generous horses? Must
I look to your body? You treat it disgracefully. To your
dress? That is luxurious. To your behaviour, to your
look? That is the same as nothing. When you would
listen to a philosopher, do not say to him, "You tell me noth-
ing;" but only show yourself worthy of hearing or fit for
hearing; and you will see how you will move the speaker.
' "That is, let us not now consider whether I am perfect in the art
of speaking, and you have a mind well prepared to derive real advantage
from philosophical talk. Let us consider this only, whether your ears
are sufficiently prepared for listening, whether you can understand a
philosophical discussion." Schweig.
* In the ninth book of the Iliad, where Achilles answers the messen-
gers sent to him by Agamemnon. The reply of Achilles is a wonderful
example of eloquence.
CHAPTER XXV
THAT LOGIC IS NECESSARY
WHEN one of those who were present said, "Per-
suade me that logic is necessary," he repHed, Do
you wish me to prove this to you ? — The answer
was "Yes" — Then I must use a demonstrative
form of speech. — This was granted. — How then will you
know if I am cheating you by my argument ? The man was
silent. Do you see, said Epictetus, that you yourself are ad-
mitting that logic is necessary, if without it you can not
know so much as this, whether logic is necessary or not nec-
essary ?
190
CHAPTER XXVI
WHAT IS THE PROPERTY OF ERROR
EVERY error comprehends contradiction : for since he
who errs does not wish to err, but to be right, it is
plain that he does not do what he wishes. For what
does the thief wish to do? That which is for his
own interest. If then the theft is not for his own interest,
he does not do that which he wishes. But every rational
soul is by nature offended at contradiction, and so long as it
does not understand this contradiction, it is not hindered
from doing contradictory things: but when it does under-
stand the contradiction, it must of necessity avoid the con-
tradiction and avoid it as much as a man must dissent from
the false when he sees that a thing is false; but so long as
this falsehood does not appear to him, he assents to it as to
truth.
He then is strong in argument and has the faculty of
exhorting and confuting, who is able to show to each man
the contradiction through which he errs and clearly to prove
how he does not do that which he wishes and does that which
he does not wish. For if any one shall show this, a man
will himself withdraw from that which he does; but so long
as you do not show this, do not be surprised if a man per-
sists in his practice; for having the appearance of doing
right, he does what he does. For this reason Socrates also
trusting to this power used to say, "I am used to call no other
witness of what I say, but I am always satisfied with him
with whom I am discussing and I ask him to give his opinion
and call him as a witness, and though he is only one, he is
sufficient in the place of all." For Socrates knew by what the
rational soul is moved, just like a pair of scales, and then it
must incline, whether it chooses or not. Show the rational
governing faculty a contradiction, and it will withdraw from
it ; but if you do not show it, rather blame yourself than him
who is not persuaded.
19X
BOOK III
CHAPTER I
OF FINERY IN DRESS
A CERTAIN young man, a rhetorician, came to see
Epictetus, with his hair dressed more carefully than
was usual and his attire in an ornamental style;
whereiipon Epictetus said, Tell me if you do not
think that some dogs are beautiful and some horses, and so of
all other animals. "I do think so," the youth replied. Are
not then some men also beautiful and others ugly? "Cer-
tainly." Do we then for the same reason call each of them in
the same kind beautiful, or each beautiful for something pe-
culiar? And you will judge of this matter thus. Since we
see a dog naturally formed for one thing, and a horse for an-
other, and for another still, as an example, a nightingale,
we may generally and not improperly declare each of them to
be beautiful then when it is most excellent according to its
nature ; but since the nature of each is different, each of them
seems to me to be beautiful in a different way. Is it not so ?
He admitted that it was. That then which makes a dog
beautiful, makes a horse ugly; and that which makes a
horse beautiful, makes a dog ugly, if it is true that their na-
tures are different. "It seems to be so." For I think that
what makes a Pancratiast beautiful, makes a wrestler to be
not good, and a runner to be most ridiculous; and he who
is beautiful for the Pentathlon, is very ugly for wrestling.*
It is so said he. What then makes a man beautiful ? Is it
that which in its kind makes both a dog and a horse beauti-
ful? "It is," he said. What then makes a dog beautiful?
The possession of the excellence of a dog. And what makes
a horse beautiful? The possession of the excellence of a
192
DISCOURSES 193
horse. What then makes a man beautiful? Is it not the
possession of the excellence of a man ? And do you then, if
you wish to be beautiful, young man, labour at this, the ac-
quisition of human excellence. But what is this? Observe
whom you yourself praise, when you praise many persons
without partiality: do you praise the just or the unjust?
"The just." Whether do you praise the moderate or the
immoderate? "The moderate." And the temperate or the
intemperate? "The temperate." If then you make your-
self such a person, you will know that you make your-
self beautiful : but so long as you neglect these things, you
must be ugly ( aidxpov ) , even though you contrive all you
can to appear beautiful.
Further I do not know what to say to you: for if I say
to you what I think, I shall offend you, and you will perhaps
leave the school and not return to it : and if I do not say
what I think, see how I shall be acting, if you come to me to
be improved, and I shall not improve you at all, and if you
come to me as to a philosopher, and I shall say nothing to
you as a philosopher. And how cruel it is to you to leave
you uncorrected. If at any time afterwards you shall ac-
quire sense, you will with good reason blame me and say,
What did Epictetus observe in me that when he saw me in
such a plight coming to him in such a scandalous condition,
he neglected me and never said a word ? did he so much de-
spair of me? was I not young? was I not able to listen to
reason ? and how many other young men at this age commit
many like errors? I hear that a certain Polemon from be-
ing a most dissolute youth underwent such a great change.
Well, suppose that he did not think that I should be a Pole-
mon;^ yet he might have set my hair right, he might have
stripped off my decorations, he might have stopped me from
plucking the hair out of my body; but when he saw me
dressed like — what shall I say? — he kept silent. I do not
say like what; but you will say when you come to your
senses, and shall know what it is, and what persons use such
a dress.
If you bring this charge against me hereafter, what de-
fence shall I make ? Why, shall I say that the man will
not be persuaded by me ? Was Laius persuaded by Apollo ?
13
194 EPICTETUS
Did he not go away and get drunk and show no care for
the oracle ?^ Well then for this reason did Apollo refuse to
tell him the truth ? I indeed do not know, whether you will
be persuaded by me or not : but Apollo knew most certainly
that Laius would not be persuaded and yet he spoke. But
why did he speak? I say in reply, But why is he Apollo,
and why does he deliver oracles, and why has he fixed him-
self in this place as a prophet and source of truth and for the
inhabitants of the world to resort to him? and why are the
words "Know yourself" written in front of the temple,
though no person takes any notice of them ?
Did Socrates persuade all his hearers to take care of them-
selves? Not the thousandth part. But however, after he
had been placed in this position by the deity, as he himself
says, he never left it. But what does he say even to his
judges? ''If you acquit me on these conditions that I no
longer do that which I do now, I will not consent and I
will not desist ; but I will go up both to young and old, and,
to speak plainly, to every man whom I meet, and I will ask
the questions which I ask now ; and most particularly will I
do this to you my fellow citizens, because you are more
nearly related to me."* — Are you so curious, Socrates, and
such a busy-body? and how does it concern you how we
act? and what is it that you say? Being of the same com-
munity and of the same kin, you neglect yourself, and show
yourself a bad citizen to the state, and a bad kinsman to
your kinsmen, and a bad neighbour to your neighbours.
Who then are you ? — Here it is a great thing to say, "I am
he whose duty it is to take care of men ; for it is not every
little heifer which dares to resist a lion ; but if the bull comes
up and resists him, say to the bull, if you choose, 'and who
are you, and what business have you here?' " Man, in
every kind there is produced something which excels; in
oxen, in dogs, in bees, in horses. Do not then say to that
which excels, "Who then are you ?" If you do, it will find a
voice in some way and say, "I am such a thing as the purple
in a garment: do not expect me to be like the others, or
blame my nature that it has made me different from the rest
of men."
What then ? am I such a man ? Certainly not. And are
DISCOURSES 195
you such a man as can listen to the truth ? I wish you were.
But however since in a manner I have been condemned to
wear a white beard and a cloak, and you come to me as to a
philosopher, I will not treat you in a cruel way nor yet as if
I despaired of you, but I will say, Young man, whom do
you wish to make beautiful? In the first place, know who
you are and then adorn yourself appropriately. You are a
human being; and this is a mortal animal which has the
power of using appearances rationally. But what is meant
by "rationally"? Conformably to nature^ and completely.
What then do you possess which is peculiar? Is it the ani-
mal part ? No. Is it the condition of mortality ? No. Is
it the power of using appearances ?^ No. You possess the
rational faculty as a peculiar thing : adorn and beautify this ;
but leave your hair to him who made it as he chose. Come,
what other appellations have you ? Are you man or woman ?
Man. Adorn yourself then as man, not as woman.
Woman is naturally smooth and delicate; and if she has
much hair (on her body), she is a monster and is exhibited
at Rome among monsters. And in a man it is monstrous
not to have hair ; and if he has no hair, he is a monster ; but
if he cuts off his hairs and plucks them out, what shall we
do with him? where shall we exhibit him? and under what
name shall we show him ? I will exhibit to you a man who
chooses to be a woman rather than a man. What a terrible
sight! There is no man who will not wonder at such a
notice. Indeed I think that the men who pluck out their
hairs do what they do without knowing what they do. Man
what fault have you to find with your nature? That it made
you a man ? What then ? was it fit that nature should make
all human creatures women? and what advantage in that
case would you have had in being adorned ? for whom would
you have adorned yourself, if all human creatures were
women? But you are not pleased with the matter: set to
work then upon the whole business. Take away — what is
its name? — that which is the cause of the hairs : make your-
self a woman in all respects, that we may not be mistaken :
do not make one half man, and the other half woman.
Whom do you wish to please? The women? Please them
as a man. Well ; but they like smooth men. Will you not
196 EPICTETUS
hang yourself? and if women took delight in catamites,
would you become one? Is this your business? were you
born for this purpose, that dissolute women should delight
in you? Shall we make such a one as you a citizen of Cor-
inth and perchance a prefect of the city, or chief of the
youth, or general or superintendent of the games? Well,
and when you have taken a wife, do you intend to have your
hairs plucked out ? To please whom and for what purpose ?
And when you have begotten children, will you introduce
them also into the state with the habit of plucking their
hairs? A beautiful citizen, and senator and rhetorician.
We ought to pray that such young men be bom among us
and brought up.
Do not so, I intreat you by the Gods, young man: but
when you have once heard these words, go away and say to
yourself, "Epictetus has not said this to me : for how could
he? but some propitious God through him: for it would
never have come into his thoughts to say this, since he is
not accustomed to talk thus with any person. Come then let
us obey God, that we may not be subject to his anger." You
say, No. But (I say), if a crow by his croaking signifies
any thing to you, it is not the crow which signifies, but God
through the crow; and if he signifies any thing through a
human voice, will he not cause the man to say this to you,
that you may know the power of the divinity, that he signi-
fies to some in this way, and to others in that way, and con-
cerning the greatest things and the chief he signifies through
the noblest messenger ? What else is it which the poet says :
"For we ourselves have warned him, and have sent
Hermes the careful watcher, Argus' slayer,
The husband not to kill nor wed the wife."^
Was Hermes going to descend from heaven to say this to
him (^gisthus) ? And now the gods say this to you and
send the messenger, the slayer of Argus, to warn you not
to pervert that which is well arranged, nor to busy your-
self about it, but to allow a man to be a man, and a woman
to be a woman, a beautiful man to be as a beautiful man,
and an ugly man as an ugly man, for you are not flesh
and hair, but you are will {lepoaipedti)] and if your will is
DISCOURSES 197
beautiful, then you will be beautiful. But up to the present
time I dare not tell you that you are ugly, for I think that
you are readier to hear anything than this. But see what
Socrates says to the most beautiful and blooming of men
Alcibiades : "Try then to be beautiful." What does he say to
him? Dress your hair and pluck the hairs from your legs?
Nothing of that kind. But adorn your will, take away bad
opinions. How with the body ? Leave it as it is by nature.
Another has looked after these things : intrust them to him.
What then, must a man be uncleaned? Certainly not; but
what you are and are made by nature, cleanse this. A man
should be cleanly as a man, a woman as a woman, a child as
a child. You say no : but let us also pluck out the lion's
mane, that he may not be uncleaned, and the cock's comb for
he also ought to be cleaned. Granted, but as a cock, and the
lion as a lion, and the hunting dog as a hunting dog.
NOTES
* A Pancratiast is a man who is trained for the Pancratium, that is,
both for boxing and wrestling. The Pentathlon comprised five exercises,
which are expressed by one Greek line,
Leaping, running, the quoit, throwing the javelin, wrestling.
* Comp. Horace, Sat. ii. 3, v. 253.
Quaero, faciasne quod olim
Mutatus Polemon? etc.
The story of Polemon is told by Diogenes Laertius. He was a dissolute
youth. As he was passing one day the place where Xenocrates was lec-
turing, he and his drunken companions burst into the school, but Pole-
mon was so affected by the words of the excellent teacher that he came
out quite a different man, and ultimately succeeded Xenocrates in the
school of the Academy. See Epictetus, iv. 11, 30.
* Laius consulted the oracle at Delphi how he should have children.
The oracle told him not to beget children, and even to expose them if
he did. Laius was so foolish as to disobey the god in both respects, for
he begot children and brought them up. He did indeed order his child
(Edipus to be exposed, but the boy was saved and became the murderer
of Laius.
* Plato, Apolc^, i. 9, and 17.
* Cicero, de Fin. ii. Ji ; Horace, Epp. i. 10.12. This was the great prin-
ciple of Zeno, to live according to nature. Bishop Butler in the Preface
to his Sermons says of this philosophical principle, that virtue consisted
in following nature, that it is "a manner of speaking not loose and un-
determinate, but clear and distinct, strictly just and true."
* The bare use of objects (appearances) belongs to all animals; a
rational use of them is peculiar to man. Mrs. Carter, Introd. sec 7.
^ From the Odyssey, i, 37, where Zeus is speaking of iEgisthus.
CHAPTER II
IN WHAT A MAN OUGHT TO BE EXERCISED WHO HAS MADE
PROFICIENCY ; AND THAT WE NEGLECT THE CHIEF THINGS
THERE are three things (topics, roirot) in which a man
ought to exercise himself who would be wise and
good.^ The first concerns the desires and the aver-
sions, that a man may not fail to get what he de-
sires, and that he may not fall into that which he does not
desire. The second concerns the movements (towards an
object) and the movements from an object, and generally
in doing what a man ought to do, that he may act according
to order, to reason, and not carelessly. The third thing con-
cerns freedom from deception and rashness in judgment, and
generally it concerns the assents (dvyKaraSedEti). Of these
topics the chief and the most urgent is that which relates to
the affects (ra TtdBrf, perturbations); for an affect is pro-
duced in no other way than by a failing to obtain that which
a man desires or falling into that which a man would wish
to avoid. This is that which brings in perturbations, dis-
orders, bad fortune, misfortunes, sorrows, lamentations, and
envy; that which makes men envious and jealous; and by
these causes we are even unable to listen to the precepts of
reason. The second topic concerns the duties of a man ; for
I ought not to be free from affects {dTtaBrf) like a statue, but
I ought to maintain the relations (dxedsig) natural and ac-
quired, as a pious man, as a son, as a father, as a citizen.
The third topic is that which immediately concerns those
who are making proficiency, that which concerns the security
of the other two, so that not even in sleep any appearance
unexamined may surprise us, nor in intoxication, nor in
melancholy. This, it may be said, is above our power. But
the present philosophers neglecting the first topic and the
second (the affects and duties), employ themselves on
the third, using sophistical arguments {ueraTtiitTovTai;), mak-
ing conclusions from questioning, employing hypotheses,
lying. For a man must, as it is said, when employed on
198
DISCOURSES 199
these matters, take care that he is not deceived. Who must ?
The wise and good man. This then is all that is wanting
to you. Have you successfully worked out the rest? Are
you free from deception in the matter of money ? If you see
a beautiful girl, do you resist the appearance? If your
neighbour obtains an estate by will, are you not vexed?
Now there is nothing else wanting to you except unchange-
able firmness of mind (djusTaTtToodia)? Wretch, you hear
these very things with fear and anxiety that some person
may despise you, and with inquiries about what any person
may say about you. And if a man come and tell you that in
a certain conversation in which the question was. Who is
the best philosopher, a man who was present said that a cer-
tain person was the chief philosopher, your little soul which
was only a finger's length stretches out to two cubits. But if
another who is present says, You are mistaken; it is not
worth while to listen to a certain person, for what does he
know ? he has only the first principles, and no more ? then you
are confounded, you grow pale, you cry out immediately, I
will show him who I am, that I am a great philosopher. — It
is seen by these very things : why do you wish to show it by
others ? Do you not know that Diogenes pointed out one of
the sophists in this way by stretching out his middle finger ?^
And then when the man was wild with rage, "This," he said,
"is the certain person ; I have pointed him out to you." For a
man is not shown by the finger, as a stone or a piece of wood ;
but when any person shows the man's principles, then he
shows him as a man.
Let us look at your principles also. For is it not plain
that you vaHie not at all your own will {itpoaipedi^), but
you look externally to things which are independent of your
will ? For instance, what will a certain person say ? and what
will people think of you? will you be considered a man of
learning; have you read Chrysippus or Antipater? for if you.
have read Archedemus' also, you have every thing [that you
can desire]. Why are you still uneasy lest you should not
show us who you are ? Would you let me tell you what man-
ner of man you have shown us that you are ? You have ex-
hibited yourself to us as a mean fellow, querulous, passion-
ate, cowardly, finding fault with every thing, blaming every
200 EPICTETUS
body, never quiet, vain : this is what you have exhibited to
us. Go away now and read Archedemus; then if a mouse
should leap down and make a noise, you are a dead man.
For such a death awaits you as it did* — what was the man's
name? — Crinis; and he too was proud, because he under-
stood Archedemus.
Wretch, will you not dismiss these things that do not
concern you at all ? These things are suitable to those who
are able to learn them without perturbation, to those who
can say: "I am not subject to anger, to grief, to envy: I
am not hindered, I am not restrained. What remains for
me ? I have leisure, I am tranquil : let us see how we must
deal with sophistical arguments ; let us see how when a man
has accepted an hypothesis he shall not be led away to any
thing absurd." To them such things belong. To those
who are happy it is appropriate to light a fire, to dine ; if they
choose, both to sing and to dance. But when the vessel is
sinking, you come to me and hoist the sails.^
NOTES
^KaXbiKai ay (xBoi is the usual Greek expression to signify a perfect
man. The Stoics, according to Stobaeus, absurdedly called "virtue,"
KaXov (beautiful), because it naturally "calls" ( KaXsl) to itself those
who desire it. The Stoics also said that every thing good was beautiful
(KaXoi), and that the good and the beautiful were equivalent. The
Roman expression is "Vir bonus et sapiens." Perhaps the phrase
KaXoi Kai dyoBoi arose from the notion of beauty and goodness being
the combination of a perfect human being.
* To point out a man with the middle finger was a way of showing the
greatest contempt for him.
* As to Archedemus, see ii. 4, 11. aitex^i?^ ditavra: this expression
is compared by Upton with Matthew vi. 2, aitixov6t jxtdBov.
* Crinis was a Stoic philosopher mentioned by Diogenes Laertius.
We may suppose that he was no real philosopher, and that he died of
fright.
■* The philosopher is represented as being full of anxiety about things
which do not concern him, and which are proper subjects for those
only who are free from disturbing passions and are quite happy, which
is not the philosopher's condition. He is compared to a sinking ship,
and at this very time he is supposed to be employed in the useless labour
of hoisting the sails.
CHAPTER III
WHAT IS THE MATTER ON WHICH A GOOD MAN SHOULD BE
EMPLOYED^ AND IN WHAT WE OUGHT CHIEFLY TO PRAC-
TISE OURSELVES
THE material for the wise and good man is his own
ruling faculty : and the body is the material for the
physician and the aliptes (the man who oils per-
sons) ; the land is the matter for the husbandman.
The business of the wise and good man is to use appearances
conformably to nature : and as it is the nature of ^ery soul
to assent to the truth, to dissent from the false, and to remain
in suspense as to that which is uncertain-, so it is its nature to
be moved towards the desire of the good, and to aversion
from the evil ; and with respect to that which is neither good
nor bad it feels indifferent. For as the money-changer
(banker) is not allowed to reject Caesar's coin, nor the seller
of herbs, but if you show the coin, whether he chooses or not,
he must give up what is sold for the coin ; so it is also in the
matter of the soul. When the good appears, it immediately
attracts to itself ; the evil repels from itself. But the soul will
never reject the manifest appearance of the good, any more
than persons will reject Caesar's coin. On this principle de-
pends every movement both of man and God.
For this reason the good is preferred to every intimate
relationship (obligation). There is no intimate relation-
ship between me and my father, but there is between
me and the good. Are you so hard-hearted ? Yes, for such
is my nature ; and this is the coin which God has given me.
For this reason if the good is something different from the
beautiful and the just, both father is gone (neglected), and
brother and country, and every thing. But shall I overlook
my own good, in order that you may have it, and shall I give
it up to you ? Why ? I am your father. But you are not my
good. I am your brother. But you are not my good.
But if we place the good in a right determination of
the will, the very observance of the relations of life is
M aoi
202 EPICTETUS
good, and accordingly he who gives up any external things,
obtains that which is good. Your father takes away your
property. But he does not injure you. Your brother will
have the greater part of the estate in land. Let him have
as much as he chooses. Will he then have a greater share
of modesty, of fidelity, of brotherly affection ? For who will
eject you from this possession? Not even Zeus, for neither
has he chosen to do so; but he has made this in my owh
power, and he has given it to me just as he possessed it him-
self, free from hindrance, compulsion, and impediment.
When then the coin which another uses is a different coin, if
a man presents this coin, he receives that which is sold for it.
Suppose. that there comes into the province a thievish procon-
sul, what coin does he use? Silver coin. Show it to him,
and carry off what you please. Suppose one comes who is
an adulterer: what coin does he use? Little girls. Take, a
man says, the coin, and sell me the small thing. Give, says the
seller, and buy [what you want]. Another is eager to possess
boys. Give him the coin, and receive what you wish. An-
other is fond of hunting: give him a fine nag or a dog.
Though he groans and laments, he will sell for it that which
you want. For another compels him from within, he who
has fixed (determined) this coin.^
Against (or with respect to) this kind of thing chiefly a
man should exercise himself. As soon as you go out in the
morning, examine every man whom you see, every man
whom you hear; answer as to a question, What have you
seen? A handsome man or woman? Apply the rule. Is
this independent of the will, or dependent? Independent.
Take it away. What have you seen? A man lamenting
over the death of a child. Apply the rule. Death is a thing
independent of the will. Take it away. Has the proconsul
met you? Apply the rule. What kind of thing is a pro-
consul's office ? Independent of the will, or dependent on it ?
Independent. Take this away also: it does not stand ex-
amination : cast it away : it is nothing to you.
If we practised this and exercised ourselves in it daily
from morning to night, something indeed would be done.
But now we are forthwith caught half asleep by every ap-
pearance, and it is only, if ever, that in the school we are
THE AUGURS
From a painting by Jean IA)n Gerome
DISCOURSES 203
roused a little. Then when we go out, if we see a man
lamenting, we say, "He is undone." If we see a consul, we
say, "He is happy." If we see an exiled man, we say, "He
is miserable." If we see a poor man, we say, "He is
wretched : he has nothing to eat."
We ought then to eradicate these bad opinions, and to
this end we should direct all our efforts. For what is weep-
ing and lamenting ? Opinion. What is bad fortune? Opin-
ion. What is civil sedition, what is divided opinion, what is
blame, what is accusation, what is impiety, what is trifling?
All these things are opinions, and nothing more, and opinions
about things independent of the will, as if they were good
and bad. Let a man transfer these opinions to things de-
pendent on the will, and I engage for him that he will be
firm and constant, whatever may be the state of things
■around him. Such as is a dish of water, such is the soul.
Such as is the ray of light which falls on the water, such are
the appearances. \Vhen the water is moved, the ray also
seems to be moved, yet it is not moved. And when then a
man is seized with giddiness, it is not the arts and the virtues
which are confounded, but the spirit (the nervous power)
on which they are impressed ; but if the spirit be restored to
its settled state, those things also are restored.
NOTE
* Mrs. Carter compares the Epistle to the Romans, vii. 21-23. Schweig-
hauser says, the man either sees that the thing which he is doing
is bad or unjust, or for any other reason he does not do the thing
willingly; but he is compelled, and allows himself to be carried away
by the passion which rules him. The "another" who compels is God,
Schweig. says, who has made the nature of man such, that he must
postpone everything else to that thing in which he places his Good:
and he adds, that it is man's fault if he places his good in that thing, in
which God has not placed it.
Some persons will not consider this to be satisfactory. The man is
"compelled and allows himself to be carried away," etc. The notion of
"compulsion" is inconsistent with the exercise of the will. The man is
unlucky. He is like him "who sees," as the Latin poet says, "the better
things and approves of them, but follows the worse."
CHAPTER IV
AGAINST A PERSON WHO SHOWED HIS PARTISANSHIP IN AN
UNSEEMLY WAY IN A THEATRE
THE governor of Epirus having shown his favour to an
actor in an unseemly way and being pubUcly blamed
on this account, and afterwards having reported to
Epictetus that he was blamed and that he was vexed
at those who blamed him, Epictetus said, What harm have
they been doing ? These men also were acting as partizans,
as you were doing. The governor replied, Does then any
person show his partizanship in this way? When they see
you, said Epictetus, who are their governor, a friend of
Caesar and his deputy, showing partizanship in this way,
was it not to be expected that they also should show their
partizanship in the same way? for if it is not right to show
partizanship in this way, do not do so yourself ; and if it is
right, why are you angry if they followed your example?
For whom have the many to imitate except you, who are
their superiors? to whose example should they look when
they go to the theatre except yours? See how the deputy
of Caesar looks on : he has cried out, and I too then will cry
out. He springs up from his seat, and I will spring up.
His slaves sit in various parts of the theatre and call out. I
have no slaves, but I will myself cry out as much as I can
and as loud as all of them together. You ought then to
know when you enter the theatre that you enter as a rule and
example to the rest how they ought to look at the acting.
Why then did they blame you? Because every man hates
that which is a hindrance to him. They wished one person
to be crowned ; you wished another. They were a hindrance
to you, and you were a hindrance to them. You were found
to be the stronger; and they did what they could; they
blamed that which hindered them. What then would you
have ? That you should do what you please, and they should
not even say what they please? And what is the wonder?
Do not the husbandmen abuse Zeus when they are hindered
204
DISCOURSES 205
by him? do not the sailors abuse him? do they ever cease
abusing Caesar? What then? does not Zeus know? is not
what is said reported to Caesar ? What then does he do ? he
knows that, if he punished all who abuse him, he would have
nobody to rule over. What then ? when you enter the thea-
tre, you ought to say not, "Let Sophron (some actor) be
crowned," but you ought to say this, "Come let me maintain
my will in this matter so that it shall be conformable to
nature: no man is dearer to me than myself. It would be
ridiculous then for me to be hurt (injured) in order that
another who is an actor may be crowned. Whom then do
I wish to gain the prize ? Why the actor who does gain the
prize ; and so he will always gain the prize whom I wish to
gain it." — But I wish Sophron to be crowned. — Celebrate as
many games as you choose in your own house, Nemean,
Pythian, Isthmian, Olympian, and proclaim him victor. But
in public do not claim more than your due, nor attempt to
appropriate to yourself what belongs to all. If you do not
consent to this, bear being abused : for when you do the
same as the many, you put yourself on the same level with
them.
CHAPTER V
AGAINST THOSE WHO ON ACCOUNT OF SICKNESS GO AWAY
HOME
I AM sick here, said one of the pupils, and I wish to return
home. — At home, I suppose, you were free from sick-
ness. Do you not consider whether you are doing any
thing here which may be useful to the exercise of your
will, that it may be corrected ? For if you are doing nothing,
towards this end, it was to no purpose that you came. Go
away. Look after your affairs at home. For if your ruling
power can not be maintained in a state conformable to na-
ture, it is possible that your land can, that you will be able to
increase your money, you will take care of your father in his
old age, frequent the public place, hold magisterial office:
being bad you will do badly any thing else that you have
to do. But if you understand yourself, and know that you
are casting away certain bad opinions and adopting others in
their place, and if you have changed your state of life from
things which are not within your will to things which are
within your will, and if you ever say, Alas ! you are not say-
ing what you say on account of your father, or your brother,
but on account of yourself, do you still allege your sickness ?
Do you not know that both disease and death must surprise
us while we are doing something ? the husbandman while he
is tilling the ground, the sailor while he is on his voyage?
what would you be doing when death surprises you, for you
must be surprised when you are doing something? If you
can be doing anything better than this when you are sur-
prised, do it. For I wish to be surprised by disease or death
when I am looking after nothing else than my own will, that
I may be free from perturbation, that I may be free from
hindrance, free from compulsion, and in a state of liberty. I
wish to be found practising these things that I may be able
to say to God, "Have I in any respect transgressed thy com-
mands ? have I in any respect wrongly used the powers which
thou gavest me? have I misused my perceptions or my pre-
206
DISCOURSES 207
conceptions ( xpoX-^edt) ? have I ever blamed thee ? have
I ever found fault with thy administration? I have been
sick, because it was thy will, and so have others, but I was
content to be sick. I have been poor because it was thy will,
but I was content also. I have not filled a magisterial office,
because it was not thy pleasure that I should : I have never
desired it. Hast thou ever seen me for this reason discon-
tented? have I not always approached thee with a cheerful
countenance, ready to do thy commands and to obey thy
signals? Is it now thy will that I should depart from the
assemblage of men? I depart. I give thee all thanks that
thou hast allowed me to join in this thy assemblage of men
and to see thy works, and to comprehend this thy administra-
tion." May death surprise me while I am thinking of these
things, while I am thus writing and reading.
But my mother will not hold my head when I am sick.
Go to your mother then; for you are a fit person to have
your head held when you are sick. — But at home I used to lie
down on a delicious bed. — Go away to your bed : indeed you
are fit to lie on such a bed even when you are in health : do not
then lose what you can do there (at home).
But what does Socrates say?* As one man, he says, is
pleased with improving his land, another with improving his
horse, so I am daily pleased in observing that I am growing
better. Better in what? in using nice little words? Man,
do not say that. In little matters of speculation (Qeoop-^jnaTo) ?
what are you saying? — And indeed I do not see what
else there is on which philosophers employ their time. — Does
it seem nothing to you to have never found fault with any
person, neither with God nor man ? to have blamed nobody ?
to carry the same face always in going out and coming in?
This is what Socrates knew, and yet he never said that he
knew any thing or taught any thing.^ But if any man asked
for nice little words or little speculations, he would carry him
to Protagoras or to Hippias; and if any man came to ask
for potherbs, he would carry him to the gardener. Who
then among you has this purpose (motive to action) ? for if
indeed you had it, you would both be content in sickness, and
in hunger, and in death. If any among you has been in love
with a charming girl, he knows that I say what is true.*
«08 EPICTETUS
NOTES
*Xenophon (Memorab. i. 6, 14) ; but Epictetus does not quote the
words, he only gives the meaning. Antoninus (viii. 43) says, "Differ-
ent things delight different people. But it is my delight to keep the
ruling faculty sound without turning away either from any man or from
any of the things which happen to men, but looking at and receiving all
with welcome eyes, and using every thing according to its value."
' Socrates never professed to teach virtue, but by showing himself
to be a virtuous man he expected to make his companions virtuous by
imitating his example. Xenophon, Memorab. i. 2, 3.
* Upton explains this passage thus : "He who loves knows what it is
to endure all things for love. If any man then being captivated with
love for a girl would for her sake endure dangers and even death, what
would he not endure if he possessed the love of God, the Universal,
the chief of beautiful things ?"
CHAPTER VI
MISCELLANEOUS
WHEN some person asked him how it happened that
since reason has been more cultivated by the men
of the present age the progress made in former
times was greater. In what respect, he answered,
has it been more cultivated now, and in what respect was the
progress greater then ? For in that in which it has now been
more cultivated, in that also the progress will now be found.
At present it has been cultivated for the purpose of resolving
syllogisms, and progress is made. But in former times it
was cultivated for the purpose of maintaining the governing
faculty in a condition conformable to nature, and progress
was made. Do not then mix things which are different, and
do not expect, when you are labouring at one thing to make
progress in another. But see if any man among us when
he is intent upon this, the keeping himself in a state conform-
able to nature and living so always, does not make progress.
For you will not find such a man.
The good man is invincible, for he does not enter the
contest where he is not stronger. If you (his adversary)
want to have his land and all that is on it, take the land;
take his slaves, take his magisterial office, take his poor body.
But you will not make his desire fail in that which it seeks,
nor his aversion fall into that which he would avoid. The
only contest into which he enters is that about things which
are within the power of his will ; how then will he not be in-
vincible ?
Some person having asked him what is Common sense,
Epictetus replied. As that may be called a certain Common
hearing which only distinguishes vocal sounds, and that
which distinguishes musical sounds is not Common, but
artificial; so there are certain things which men, who are
not altogether perverted, see by the common notions which
all possess. Such a constitution of the mind is named Com-
mon sense.^
ao9
2IO EPICTETUS
It is not easy to exhort weak young men ; for neither is it
easy to hold (soft) cheese with a hook.^ But those who
have a good natural disposition, even if you try to turn them
aside, cling still more to reason. Wherefore Rufus gener-
ally attempted to discourage (his pupils), and he used this
method as a test of those who had a good natural disposition
and those who had not. For it was his habit to say, as a
stone, if you cast it upwards, will be brought down to the
earth by its own nature, so the man whose mind is naturally
good, the more you repel him, the more he turns towards
that to which he is naturally inclined.
NOTES
^ The Greek is Koivoi vovi, the Communis sensus of the Romans, and
our Common sense. Horace (Sat. i. 3, 65) speaks of a man who "com-
muni sensu plane caret," one who has not the sense or understanding
which is the common property of men.
* This is a proverb used by Bion, as Digenes Laertius says. The
cheese was new and soft, as tiie ancients used it
CHAPTER VII
TO THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FREE CITIES WHO WAS AN
EPICUREAN
WHEN the administrator^ came to visit him, and the
man was an Epicurean, Epictetus said, It is prop-
er for us who are not philosophers to inquire of
you who are philosophers,^ as those who come to
a strange city inquire of the citizens and those who are ac-
quainted with it, what is the best thing in the world, in order
that we also after inquiry may go in quest of that which is
best and look at it, as strangers do with the things in cities.
For that there are three things which relate to man, soul,
body, and things external, scarcely any man denies. It re-
mains for you philosophers to answer what is the best.
What shall we say to men? Is the flesh the best? and was
it for this that Maximus^ sailed as far as Cassiope in winter
(or bad weather) with his son, and accompanied him that
he might be gratified in the flesh ? When the man said that
it was not, and added, "Far be that from him." Is it not fit
then, Epictetus said, to be actively employed about the best ?
It is certainly of all things the most fit. What then do we
possess which is better than the flesh ? The soul, he replied.
And the good things of the best, are they better, or the good
things of the worse? The good things of the best. And
are the good things of the best within the power of the will
or not within the power of the will? They are within
the power of the will. Is then the pleasure of the soul a
thing within the power of the will ? It is, he replied. And
on what shall this pleasure depend? On itself? But that
can not be conceived : for there must first exist a certain sub-
stance or nature {ov6ta) of good, by obtaining which we
shall have pleasure in the soul. He assented to this also.
On what then shall we depend for this pleasure of the soul ?
for if it shall depend on things of the soul, the substance (na-
ture) of the good is discovered; for good can not be one
thing, and that at which we are rationally delighted another
SIX
212 EPICTETUS
thing; nor if that which precedes is not good, can that which
comes after be good, for in order that the thing which comes
after may be good, that which precedes must be good. But
you would not affirm this, if you are in your right mind, for
you would then say what is inconsistent both with Epicurus
and the rest of your doctrines. It remains then that the
pleasure of the soul is in the pleasure from things of the
body : and again that those bodily things must be the things
which precede and the substance (nature) of the good.
For this reason Maximus acted foolishly if he made the
voyage for any other reason than for the sake of the flesh,
that is, for the sake of the best. And also a man acts fool-
ishly if he abstains from that which belongs to others, when
he is a judge {dtKadrtfi) and able to take it. But, if you
please, let us consider this only, how this thing may be done
secretly, and safely, and so that no man will know it. For
not even does Epicurus himself declare stealing to be bad,*
but he admits that detection is ; and because it is impossible
to have security against detection, for this reason he says,
Do not steal. But I say to you that if stealing is done clev-
erly and cautiously, we shall not be detected : further also we
have powerful friends in Rome both men and women, and
the Hellenes ( Greeks ) are weak, and no man will venture to
go up to Rome for the purpose (of complaining). Why do
you refrain from your own good ? This is senseless, foolish.
But even if you tell me that you do refrain, I will not believe
you. For as it is impossible to assent to that which appears
false, and to turn away from that which is true, so it is im-
possible to abstain from that which appears good. But
wealth is a good thing, and certainly most efficient in pro-
ducing pleasure. Why will you not acquire wealth ? And
why should we not corrupt our neighbour's w^ife, if we can
do it without detection ? and if the husband foolishly prates
about the matter, why not pitch him out of the house? If
you would be a philosopher such as you ought to be, if a per-
fect philosopher, if consistent with your own doctrines, [you
must act thus] . If you would not, you will not differ at all
from us who are called Stoics ; for we also say one thing, but
we do another: we talk of the things which are beautiful
(good), but we do what is base. But you will be perverse
DISCOURSES 213
in the contrary way, teaching what is bad, practising what is
good.
In the name of God,* are you thinking of a city of Epicu-
reans? [One man says], "I do not marry." — "Nor I, for a
man ought not to marry ; nor ought we to beget children, nor
engage in pubUc matters." What then will happen ? whence
will the citizens come ? who will bring them up ? who will be
governor of the youth, who preside over gymnastic exer-
cises ? and in what also will the teacher instruct them ? will he
teach them what the Lacedaemonians were taught, or what
the Athenians were taught ? Come take a young man, bring
him up according to your doctrines. The doctrines are bad,
subversive of a state, pernicious to families, and not becom-
ing to women. Dismiss them, man. You live in a chief
city: it is your duty to be a magistrate, to judge justly, to
abstain from that which belongs to others ; no woman ought
to seem beautiful to you except your own wife, and no youth,
no vessel of silver, no vessel of gold (except your own).
Seek for doctrines which are consistent with what I say, and
by making them your guide you will with pleasure abstain
from things which have such persuasive power to lead us
and overpower us. But if to the persuasive power of these
things, we also devise such a philosophy as this which helps
to push us on towards them and strengthens us to this end,
what will be the consequence? In a piece of toreutic® art
which is the best part ? the silver or the workmanship ? The
substance of the hand is the flesh ; but the work of the hand is
the principal part (that which precedes and leads the rest).
The duties then are also three : those which are directed to-
wards the existence of a thing ; those which are directed to-
wards its existence in a particular kind ; and third, the chief
or leading things themselves. So also in man we ought not
to value the material, the poor flesh, but the principal {lead-
ing things, to. itporfyovMsva). What are these? Engaging
in public business, marrying, begetting children, venerating
God, taking care of parents, and generally, having desires,
aversions ( ktcKXtveiv ) , pursuits of things and avoidances, in
the way in which we ought to do these things, and according
to our nature. And how are we constituted by nature?
Free, noble, modest: for what other animal blushes? what
2I4 EPICTETUS
Other is capable of receiving the appearance (the impression)
of shame? and we are so constituted by nature as to subject
pleasure to these things, as a minister, a servant, in order
that it may call forth our activity, in order that it may keep
us constant in acts which are conformable to nature,
"But I am rich and I want nothing." — Why then do you
pretend to be a philosopher? Your golden and your silver
vessels are enough for you. What need have you of princi-
ples (opinions) ? "But I am also a judge {Kpirrti) of the
Greeks." — Do you know how to judge? Who taught you to
know ? "Caesar wrote to me a codicil."^ Let him write and
give you a commission to judge of music; and what will be
the use of it to you? Still how did you become a judge?
whose hand did you kiss ? the hand of Symphorus or Nume-
nius? Before whose bedchamber have you slept?® To
whom have you sent gifts ? Then do you not see that to be
a judge is just of the same value as Numenius is? "But I"
can throw into prison any man whom I please." — So you can
do with a stone. — "But I can beat with sticks whom I please."
— So you may an ass. This is not a governing of men.
Govern us as rational animals: show us what is profitable
to us, and we will follow it : show us what is unprofitable, and
we will turn away from it. Make us imitators of yourself, as
Socrates made men imitators of himself. For he was like
a governor of men, who made them subject to him their de-
sires, their aversion, their movements towards an object and
their turning away from it. — Do this : do not do this : if you
do not obey, I will throw you into prison. — This is not gov-
erning men like rational animals. But I (say) : As Zeus has
ordained, so act: if you do not act so, you will feel the
penalty, you will be punished. — What will be the punish-
ment ? Nothing else than not having done your duty : you
will lose the character of fidelity, modesty, propriety. Do
not look for greater penalties than these.
NOTES
*The Greek is StopBoori^i. The Latin word is Corrector, which occurs
in inscriptions, and elsewhere.
• The Epicureans are ironically named Philosophers, for most of them
were arrogant men.
• Maximus was appointed by Trajan to conduct a campaign against
the Parthians, in which he lost his life.
DISCOURSES 215
Cassiope or Cassope is a city in Epirus, near the sea, and between
Pandosia and Nicopolis, where Epictetus lived.
* Diogenes Laertius, quoted by Upton. "Injustice," says Epicurus
"is not an evil in itself, but the evil is in the fear which there is on
account of suspicion."
' Upton compares the passage (v. 333) in the "Cyclops" of Euripides,
who speaks like an Epicurean. Not to marry and not to engage in
public affairs were Epicurean doctrines.
• The toreutic art is the art of working in metal, stone, or wood, and
of making figures on them in relief or by cutting into the material.
' A codicillus is a small codex and the original sense of codex is a
strong stem or stump. Lastly it was used for a book, and even for a
will. Codicilli were small writing-tablets, covered with wax, on which
men wrote with a stylus or pointed metal. Lastly, codicillus is a book
or writing generally; and a writing or letter by which the emperor
conferred any office. Our word codicil has only one sense, which is a
small writing added or subjoined to a will or testament, but this sense
is also derived from the Roman use of the word. (Dig. 29, tit. 7, de
jure codicillorum.)
' Upton supposes this to mean, whose bedchamber man are you ? and
he compares i. 19. Schweig. says that this is not the meaning here,
and that the meaning is this : He who before daybreak is waiting at the
door of a rich man, whose favour he seeks, is said in a derisive way to
be passing the night before a man's chamber.
CHAPTER VIII
HOW WE MUST EXERCISE OURSELVES AGAINST APPEARANCES
AS we exercise ourselves against sophistical questions,
so we ought to exercise ourselves daily against ap-
pearances ; for these appearances also propose ques-
tions to us. A certain person's son is dead. An-
swer; the thing is not within the power of the will : it is not
an evil. A father has disinherited a certain son. What do
you think of it ? It is a thing beyond the power of the will,
not an evil. Caesar has condemned a person. It is a thing
beyond the power of the will, not an evil. The man is af-
flicted at this. Affliction is a thing which depends on the
will : it is an evil. He has borne the condemnation bravely.
That is a thing within the power of the will : it is a good. If
we train ourselves in this manner, we shall make progress;
for we shall never assent to any thing of which there is not
an appearance capable of being comprehended. Your son is
dead. What has happened? Your son is dead. Nothing
more ? Nothing. Your ship is lost. What has happened ?
Your ship is lost. A man has been led to prison. What has
happened ? He has been led to prison. But that herein he
has fared badly, every man adds from his own opinion. But
Zeus, you say, does not do right in these matters. Why?
because he has made you capable of endurance? because he
has made you magnanimous ? because he has taken from that
which befalls you the power of being evils ? because it is in
your power to be happy while you are suffering what you
suffer ; because he has opened the door to you, when things
do not please you ? Man, go out and do not complain.
Hear how the Romans feel towards philosophers, if you
would like to know. Italicus, who was the most in repute
of the philosophers, once when I was present being vexed
with his own friends and as if he was suffering something
intolerable said, "I can not bear it, you are killing me : you
will make me such as that man is ;" pointing to me.
216
CHAPTER IX
TO A CERTAIN RHETORICIAN WHO WAS GOING UP TO ROME ON
A SUIT
WHEN a certain person came to him, who was going
up to Rome on account of a suit which had re-
gard to his rank, Epictetus enquired the reason
of his going to Rome, and the man then asked
what he thought about the matter. Epictetus repHed, If
you ask me what you will do in Rome, whether you will suc-
ceed or fail, I have no rule {BedopTj/xa) about this. But if
you ask me how you will fare, I can tell you: if you have
right opinions {Soyfiara), you will fare well; if they are
false, you will fare ill. For to every man the cause of his
acting is opinion. For what is the reason why you desired
to be elected governor of the Cnossians? Your opinion.
What is the reason that you are now going up to Rome?
Your opinion. And going in winter, and with danger and
expense. — I must go. — What tells you this ? Your opinion.
Then if opinions are the causes of all actions, and a man has
bad opinions, such as the cause may be, such also is the effect.
Have we then all sound opinions, both you and your adver-
sary? And how do you differ? But have you sounder
opinions than your adversary? Why? You think so.
And so does he think that his opinions are better ; and so do
madmen. This is a bad criterion. But show to me that you
have made some inquiry into your opinions and have taken
some pains about them. And as now you are sailing to
Rome in order to become governor of the Cnossians, and
you are not content to stay at home with the honours which
you had, but you desire something greater and more con-
spicuous, so when did you ever make a voyage for the pur-
pose of examining your own opinions, and casting them out,
if you have any that are bad ? Whom have you approached
for this purpose? What time have you fixed for it ? What
age? Go over the times of your life by yourself, if you are
ashamed of me (knowing the fact), when you were a boy,
217
2l8 EPICTETUS
did you examine your own opinions ? and did you not then,
as you do all things now, do as you did do? and when you
were become a youth and attended the rhetoricians, and
yourself practised rhetoric, what did you imagine that you
were deficient in? And when you were a young man and
engaged in public matters, and pleaded causes yourself, and
were gaining reputation, who then seemed your equal ? And
when would you have submitted to any man examining and
showing that your opinions are bad? What then do you
wish me to say to you? — Help me in this matter. — I have
no theorem (rule) for this. Nor have you, if you came
to me for this purpose, come to me as a philosopher, but as
to a seller of vegetables or a shoemaker. For what purpose
then have philosophers theorems? For this purpose, that
whatever may happen, our ruling faculty may be and con-
tinue to be conformable to nature. Does this seem to you a
small thing? — No; but the greatest. — What then? does it
need only a short time? and is it possible to seize it as you
pass by ? If you can, seize it.
Then you will say, I met with Epictetus as I should meet
with a stone or a statue : for you saw me, and nothing more.
But he meets with a man as a man, who learns his opinions,
and in his turn shows his own. Learn my opinions : show
me yours; and then say that you have visited me. Let us
examine one another: if I have any bad opinion, take it
away: if you have any, show it. This is the meaning of
meeting with a philosopher. — Not so, (you say) : but this
is only a passing visit, and while we are hiring the vessel, we
can also see Epictetus. Let us see what he says. Then you
go away and say : Epictetus was nothing ; he used solecisms
and spoke in a barbarous way. For of what else do you
come as judges ? — Well, but a man may say to me, if I attend
to such matters (as you do), I shall have no land, as you
have none ; I shall have no silver cups as you have none, nor
fine beasts as you have none. — In answer to this it is perhaps
sufficient to say : I have no need of such things : but if you
possess many things, you have need of others : whether you
choose or not, you are poorer than I am. What then have
I need of? Of that which you have not: of firmness, of a
mind which is conformable to nature, of being free from
DISCOURSES 219
perturbation. Whether I have a patron* or not, what is
that to me? but it is something to you. I am richer than
you : I am not anxious what Caesar will think of me : for this
reason, I flatter no man. This is what I possess instead of
vessels of silver and gold. You have utensils of gold; but
your discourse, your opinions, your assents, your move-
ments (pursuits), your desires are of earthenware. But
when I have these things conformable to nature, why should
I not employ my studies also upon reason ? for I have leisure :
my mind is not distracted. What shall I do, since I have no
distraction ? What more suitable to a man have I than this ?
When you have nothing to do, you are disturbed, you go to
the theatre or you wander about without a purpose. Why
should not the philosopher labour to improve his reason?
You employ yourself about crystal vessels : I employ myself
about the syllogism named the lying •? you about myrrhine^
vessels; I employ myself about the syllogism named the
denying {^rov djto<pdcrtcovroi). To you every thing appears
small that you possess : to me all that I have appears great.
Your desire is insatiable: mine is satisfied. To (children)
who put their hand into a narrow-necked earthen vessel and
bring out figs and nuts, this happens; if they fill the hand,
they can not take it out, and then they cry. Drop a few of
them and you will draw things out. And do you part with
your desires : do not desire many things and you will have
what you want.
NOTES
* The Roman word "patronus," which at that time had the sense of a
protector.
* On the syllogism named lying ( <pev86juEvoz) see Epict. ii. 17, 34.
* "Murrhina vasa" were reckoned very precious by the Romans, and
they gave great prices for them. It is not certain of what material they
were made.
CHAPTER X
IN WHAT MANNER WE OUGHT TO BEAR SICKNESS
WHEN the need of each opinion comes, we ought to
have it in readiness ■} on the occasion of break-
fast, such opinions as relate to breakfast; in the
bath, those that concern the bath; in bed, those
that concern bed.
" Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes,
Before each daily action thou hast scann'd:
What's done amiss, what done, what left undone;
From first to last examine all, and then
Blame what is wrong, in what is right rejoice.'"
And we ought to retain these verses in such way that we
may use them, not that we may utter them aloud, as when
we exclaim "Psean Apollo."^ Again in fever we should have
ready such opinions as concern a fever; and we ought not,
as soon as the fever begins, to lose and forget all. (A man
who has a fever) may say: If I philosophize any longer,
may I be hanged : wherever I go, I must take care of the poor
body, that a fever may not come. But what is philosophi-
zing ? Is it not a preparation against events which may hap-
pen ? Do you not understand that you are saying something
of this kind? "If I shall still prepare myself to bear with
patience what happens, may I be hanged." But this is just
as if a man after receiving blows should give up the Pan-
cratium. In the Pancratium it is in our power to desist and
not to receive blows. But in the other matter if we give up
philosophy, what shall we gain? What then should a man
say on the occasion of each painful thing? It was for this
that I exercised myself, for this I disciplined myself. God
says to you, "Give me a proof that you have duly practised
athletics,* that you have eaten what you ought, that you have
been exercised, that you have obeyed the aliptes (the oiler
and rubber)." Then do you show yourself weak when the
time for action comes ? Now is the time for the fever. Let
220
DISCOURSES 221
it be borne well. Now is the time for thirst, bear it well ;
now is the time for hunger, bear it well. Is it not in your
power? who shall hinder you? The physician will hinder
you from drinking ; but he can not prevent you from bearing
thirst well : and he will hinder you from eating ; but he can
not prevent you from bearing hunger well.
But I can not attend to my philosophical studies. And
for what purpose do you follow them? Slave, is it not
that you may be happy, that you may be constant, is it not
that you be in a state conformable to nature and live
so ? What hinders you when you have a fever from having
your ruling faculty conformable to nature? Here is the
proof of the thing, here is the test of the philosopher. For
this also is a part of life, like walking, like sailing, like
journeying by land, so alsois fever. Do you read when you
are walking? No. Nor do you when you have a fever.
But if you walk about well, you have all that belongs to a
man who walks. If you bear a fever well, you have all
that belongs to a man in a fever. What is it to bear a fever
well ? Not to blame God or man ; not to be afflicted at that
which happens, to expect death well and nobly, to do what
must be done : when the physician comes in, not to be fright-
ened at what he says; nor if he says, "You are doing well,"
to be overjoyed. For what good has he told you ? and when
you were in health, what good was that to you ? And even
if he says, "You are in a bad way," do not despond. For what
is it to be ill ? is it that you are near the severance of the soul
and the body? what harm is there in this? If you are not
near now, will you not afterwards be near? Is the world
going to be turned upside down when you are dead ? Why
then do you flatter the physician ?'^ Why do you say if you
please, master, I shall be well?*^ Why do you give him an
opportunity of raising his eyebrows (being proud ; or show-
ing his importance) ? Do you not value a physician, as you
do a shoemaker when he is measuring your foot, or a car-
penter when he is building your house, and so treat the phy-
sician as to the body which is not yours, but by nature dead ?
He who has a fever has an opportunity of doing this : if he
does these things, he has what belongs to him. For it is not
the business of a philosopher to look after these externals.
222 EPICTETUS
neither his wine nor his oil nor his poor body, but his own
ruling power. But as to externals how must he act ? so far as
not to be careless about them. Where then is there reason for
fear? where is there then still reason for anger, and of fear
about what belongs to others, about things which are of no
value ? For we ought to have these two principles in readi-
ness, that except the will nothing is good nor bad ; and that
we ought not to lead events, but to follow them. — My brother
ought not to have behaved thus to me. — No ; but he will see
to that : and, however he may behave, I will conduct myself
towards him as I ought. For this is my own business : that
belongs to another ; no man can prevent this, the other thing
can be hindered.
' NOTES .
* "As physicians have always their instruments and knives ready for
cases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou have principles
{Sdyjuara), ready for the understanding of things divine and human,
and for doing every thing, even the smallest, with a recollection of the
bond which unites the divine and human to one another. For neither
wilt thou do anything well which pertains to man without at the same
time having a reference to things divine; nor the contrary." — Marcus
Aurelius.
* These verses are from the Golden verses attributed to Pythagoras.
See iv. 6, 32.
•The beginning of a form of prayer, as in Macrobius, Sat. i. 17:
"namque Vestales Virgines ita indigitant: Apollo Maedice, Apollo
Paean."
*eivo/i{^GOifjB\tf<Tai. "St. Paul hath made use of this very expres-
sion iav MV yojui/iooi dBX^d^, 2 Tim. ii. 3." — Mrs. Carter.
* "Et quid opus Cratero magnos promittere montes ?" Persius, iii. 65.
Craterus was a physician.
* Upton compares Matthew, viii. 2. "Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst
make me clean."
CHAPTER XI
CERTAIN MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
THERE are certain penalties fixed as by law for those
who disobey the divine administration. Whoever
thinks any other thing to be good except those things
which depend on the will, let him envy, let him de-
sire, let him flatter, let him be perturbed : whoever considers
any thing else to be evil, let him grieve, let him lament, let
him weep, let him be unhappy. And yet, though so severely
punished, we can not desist.
Remember what the poet^ says about the stranger:
"Stranger, I must not, e'en if a worse man come."
This then may be applied even to a father : I must not, even
if a worse man than you should come, treat a father un-
worthily; for all are from paternal Zeus. And (let the same
be said) of a brother, for all are from the Zeus who presides
over kindred. And so in the other relations of life we shall
find Zeus to be an inspector.
^ The poet is Homer. The complete passage is in the Odyssey, xiv.
55, et seq.
"Stranger, I must not, e'en if a worse man come,
111 treat a stranger, for all come from Zeus,
Strangers and poor."
2«3
CHAPTER XH
ABOUT EXERCISE
WE ought not to make our exercises consist in means
contrary to nature and adapted to cause admira-
tion, for if we do so, we who call ourselves phi-
losophers, shall not differ at all from jugglers.
For it is difficult even to walk on a rope ; and not only diffi-
cult, but it is also dangerous. Ought we for this reason to
practise walking on a rope, or setting up a palm tree,^ or em-
bracing statues ? By no means. Every thing which is dif-
ficult and dangerous is not suitable for practice ; but that is
suitable which conduces to the working out of that which is
proposed to us. And what is that which is proposed to us
as a thing to be worked out ? To live with desire and aver-
sion (avoidance of certain things) free from restraint. And
what is this? Neither to be disappointed in that which you
desire, nor to fall into any thing which you would avoid.
Towards this object then exercise (practice) ought to tend.
For since it is not possible to have your desire not disap-
pointed and your aversion free from falling into that which
you would avoid, without great and constant practice, you
must know that if you allow your desire and aversion to
turn to things which are not within the power of the will,
you will neither have your desire capable of attaining your
object, nor your aversion free from the power of avoiding
that which you would avoid. And since strong habit leads
(prevails), and we are accustomed to employ desire and
aversion only to things which are not within the power of
our will, we ought to oppose to this habit a contrary habit,
and where there is great slipperiness in the appearances,
there to oppose the habit of exercise.
I am rather inclined to pleasure: I will incline to the
contrary side above measure for the sake of exercise. I
am averse to pain : I will rub and exercise against this the
appearances which are presented to me for the purpose of
withdrawing my aversion from every such thing. For who
224
DISCOURSES 225
is a practitioner in exercise? He who practises not using
his desire, and applies his aversion only to tljings which are
within the power of his will, and practises most in the things
which are difficult to conquer. For this reason one man
must practise himself more against one thing and another
against another thing. What then is it to the purpose to set
up a palm tree, or to carry about a tent of skins, or a mortar
and pestle?^ Practise, man, if you are irritable, to endure if
you are abused, not to be vexed if you are treated with dis-
honour. Then you will make so much progress that, even
if a man strikes you you will say to yourself. Imagine that
you have embraced a statue: then also exercise yourself to
use wine properly so as not to drink much, for in this also
there are men who foolishly practise themselves ; but first of
all you should abstain from it, and abstain from a young girl
and dainty cakes. Then at last, if occasion presents itself,
for the purpose of trying yourself at a proper time you will
descend into the arena to know if appearances overpower you
as they did formerly. But at first fly far from that which
is stronger than yourself : the contest is unequal between a
charming young girl and a beginner in philosophy. The
earthen pitcher, as the saying is, and the rock do not agree.*
After the desire and the aversion comes the second topic
(matter) of the movements towards action and the with-
drawals from it; that you may be obedient to reason, that
you do nothing out of season or place, or contrary to any
propriety of the kind. The third topic concerns the assents,
which is related to the things which are persuasive and at-
tractive. For as Socrates said, we ought not to live a life
without examination, so we ought not to accept an appear-
ance without examination, but we should say, Wait, let me
see what you are and whence you come; like the watch at
night (who says) "Show me the pass (the Roman tessera)."
Have you the signal from nature which the appearance that
may be accepted ought to have? And finally whatever
means are applied to the body by those who exercise it, if
they tend in any way towards desire and aversion, they also
may be fit means of exercise ; but if they are for display, they
are the indications of one who has turned himself towards
something external and who is hunting for something else
15
226 EPICTETUS
and who looks for spectators who will say, "Oh the great
man." For this reason Apollonius said well, "When you
intend to exercise yourself for your own advantage, and you
are thirsty from heat, take in a mouthful of cold water, and
spit it out and tell nobody."*
MOTES
^ " To set up a palm tree." He does not mean a real palm tree, but
something high and upright. The climbers of palm trees are mentioned
by Lucian, de Dea Syria (c 29). Schweighauser has given the true in-
terpretation when he says that on certain feast days in the country a
high piece of wood is fixed in the earth and climbed by the most active
youths by using only their hands and feet. In England we know what
this is.
It is said that Diogenes used to embrace statues when they were cov-
ered with snow for tiie purpose of exercising himself. I suppose bronze
statues, not marble which might be easily broken. The man would not
remain long in the embrace of a metal statue in winter. But perhaps
the story is not true. I have heard of a general, not an English general,
setting a soldier on a cold cannon; but it was as a punishment.
"This was done for the sake of exercise says Upton; but I don't
understand the passage.
' There is a like fable in .^sop of the earthen pitcher and the brazen. —
Upton.
* Schweighauser refers to Arrian's "Expedition of Alexander" (vi:
26) for such an instance of Alexander's abstinence. There was an
Apollonius of Tyana, whose life was written bv Philostratus : but it
may be that this is not the man who is mentioned here.
CHAPTER XIII
WHAT SOLITUDE IS^ AND WHAT KIND OF PERSON A SOLI-
TARY MAN IS
SOLITUDE is a certain condition of a helpless man,
For because a man is alone, he is not for that reason
also solitary; just as though a man is among num-
bers, he is not therefore not solitary. When then
we have lost either a brother, or a son, or a friend on whom
we were accustomed to repose, we say that we are left soli-
tary, though we are often in Rome, though such a crowd
meet us, though so many live in the same place, and some-
times we have a great number of slaves. For the man who is
solitary, as it is conceived, is considered to be a helpless per-
son and exposed to those who wish to harm him. For this
reason when we travel, then especially do we say that we are
lonely when we fall among robbers, for it is not the sight of a
human creature which removes us from solitude, but the
sight of one who is faithful and modest and helpful to us.
For if being alone is enough to make solitude, you may say
that even Zeus is solitary in the conflagration^ and bewails
himself saying, "Unhappy that I am who have neither Hera,
nor Athena, nor Apollo, nor brother, nor son, nor descend-
ant, nor kinsman." This is what some say that he does when
he is alone at the conflagration.^ For they do not under-
stand how a man passes his life when he is alone, because
they set out from a certain natural principle, from the nat-
ural desire of community and mutual love and from the
pleasure of conversation among men. But none the less a
man ought to be prepared in a manner for this also (being
alone), to be able to be sufficient for himself and to be his
own companion. For as Zeus dwells with himself, and is
tranquil by himself, and thinks of his own administration
and of its nature, and is employed in thoughts suitable to
himself ; so ought we also to be able to talk with ourselves,
not to feel the want of others also, not to be unprovided with
the means of passing our time; to observe the divine admin-
227
228 EPICTETUS
istration, and the relation of ourselves to every thing else ; to
consider how we formerly were affected towards things that
happen and how at present ; what are still the things which
give us pain ; how these also can be cured and how removed ;
if any things require improvement, to improve them accord-
ing to reason.
For you see that Caesar appears to furnish us with great
peace, that there are no longer enemies nor battles nor great
associations of robbers nor of pirates, but we can travel at
every hour and sail from east to west. But can Caesar give
us security from fever also, can he from shipwreck, from
fire, from earthquake or from lightning ? well, I will say, can
he give us security against love ? He can not. From sorrow ?
He can not. From envy? He can not. In a word then he
can not protect us from any of these things. But the doctrine
of philosophers promises to give us security (peace) even
against these things. And what does it say? Men, if you
will attend to me, wherever you are, whatever you are doing,
you will not feel sorrow, nor anger, nor compulsion, nor
hindrance, but you will pass your time without perturbations
and free from every thing. When a man has this peace, not
proclaimed by Caesar, ( for how should he be able to proclaim
it?), but by God through reason, is he not content when he is
alone? when he sees and reflects. Now no evil can happen to
me ; for me there is no robber, no earthquake, every thing is
full of peace, full of tranquillity : every way, every city, every
meeting, neighbour, companion is harmless. One person
whose business it is, supplies me with food; another with
raiment; another with perceptions, and preconceptions
{itpoXT^rffeti). And if he does not supply what is necessary,
he (God) gives the signal for retreat, opens the door, and
says to you, "Go." Go whither? To nothing terrible, but to
the place from which you came, to your friends and kins-
men, to the elements: what there was in you of fire goes
to fire; of earth, to earth; of air (spirit), to air; of water to
water : no Hades, nor Acheron, nor Cocytus, nor Pyriphlege-
thon, but all is full of Gods and Daemons. When a man
has such things to think on, and sees the sun, the moon and
stars, and enjoys earth and sea, he is not solitary nor even
helpless. Well then, if some man should come upon me
DISCOURSES 229
when I am alone and murder me? Fool, not murder You,
but your poor body.
What kind of solitude then remains ? what want ? why do
we make ourselves worse than children? and what do chil-
dren do when they are left alone? They take up shells and
ashes, and they build something, then pull it down, and build
something else, and so they never want the means of pass-
ing the time. Shall I then, if you sail away, sit down and
weep, because I have been left alone and solitary? Shall I
then have no shells, no ashes? But children do what they
do through want of thought (or deficiency in knowledge),
and we through knowledge are unhappy.
Every great power (faculty) is dangerous to beginners.
You must then bear such things as you are able, but con-
formably to nature : but not .... Practise sometimes a way of
living like a person out of health that you may at some time
live like a man in health. Abstain from food, drink water,
abstain sometimes altogether from desire, in order that you
may some time desire consistently with reason; and if con-
sistently with reason, when you have anything good in you,
you will desire well. — Not so; but we wish to live like wise
men immediately and to be useful to men — Useful how?
what are you doing ? have you been useful to yourself ? But,
I suppose, you wish to exhort them? You exhort them!
You wish to be useful to them. Show to them in your own
example what kind of men philosophy makes, and don't trifle.
When you are eating, do good to those who eat with you;
when you are drinking, to those who are drinking with you ;
by yielding to all, giving way, bearing with them, thus do
them good, and do not spit on them your phlegm (bad
humours).
NOTES
' This was the doctrine of Heraclitus "that all things were composed
from (had their origin in) fire, and were resolved into it," an opinion
afterwards adopted by the Stoics. It is not so extravagant, as it may
appear to some persons, to suppose that the earth had a beginning, is
in a state of continual change, and will finally be destroyed in some way,
and have a new beginning.
' The Latin translation is : "hoc etiam nonnulli facturum cum in
conflagratione mundi .... aiunt." But the word is icotei : and this
may mean that the conflagration has happened, and will happen again.
The Greek philosophers in their speculations were not troubled with
230 EPICTETUS
the consideration of time. Even Herodotus (ii: 11), in his speculations
on the gulf, which he supposes that the Nile valley was once, speaks of
the possibility of it being tilled up in 20,000 years, or less. Modern specu-
lators have only recently become bold enough to throw aside the notion
of the earth and the other bodies in space being limited by time, as the
ignorant have conceived it
CHAPTER XIV
CERTAIN MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS
AS bad* tragic actors can not sing alone, but in company
with many: so some persons can not walk about
alone. Man, if you are anything, both walk alone
and talk to yourself, and do not hide yourself in the
chorus. Examine a little at last, look around, stir yourself
up, that you may know who you are.
When a man drinks water, or does anything for the sake
of practice (discipline), whenever there is an opportunity he
tells it to all : "I drink water." Is it for this that you drink
water, for the purpose of drinking water? Man, if it is
good for you to drink, drink; but if not, you are acting ri-
diculously. But if it is good for you and you do drink, say
nothing about it to those who are displeased with water-
drinkers. What then, do you wish to please these very men ?
Of things that are done some are done with a final pur-
pose {itpornyovfievooi)^ some according to occasion, others with
a certain reference to circumstances, others for the purpose
of complying with others, and some according to a fixed
scheme of life.*
You must root out of men these two things, arrogance
(pride) and distrust. Arrogance then is the opinion that
you want nothing (are deficient in nothing) : but distrust is
the opinion that you can not be happy when so many circum-
stances surround you. Arrogance is removed by confuta-
tion; and Socrates was the first who practised this. And (to
know) that the thing is not impossible inquire and seek.
This search will do you no harm; and in a manner this is
philosophizing, to see how it is possible to employ desire and
aversion {ktctcXiatt) without impediment.
I am superior to you, for my father is a man of consular
rank. Another says, I have been a tribune, but you have
not. If we were horses, would you say. My father was
swifter? I have much barley and fodder, or elegant neck
ornaments. If then while you were saying this, I said,
«3i
232 EPICTETUS
Be it SO : let us run then. Well, is there nothing in a man
such as running in a horse, by which it will be known which
is superior and inferior? Is there not modesty {aiSooi),
fidelity, justice? Show yourself superior in these, that you
may be superior as a man. If you tell me that you can kick
violently, I also will say to you, that you are proud of that
which is the act of an ass.
'All the manuscripts have "good" (KaXo{), which the critics have
properly corrected.
* This section is not easy to translate.
CHAPTER XV
THAT WE OUGHT TO PROCEED WITH CIRCUMSPECTION IN"
EVERY THING ^
IN every act consider what precedes and what follows, and
then proceed to the act. If you do not consider, you
will at first begin with spirit, since you have not thought
at all of the things which follow ; but afterwards when
some consequences have shown themselves, you will basely
desist (from that which you have begun). — I wish to con-
quer at the Olympic games. — [And I too, by the gods : for it
is a fine thing] . But consider here what precedes and what
follows ; and then, if it is for your good, undertake the thing.
You must act according to rules, follow strict diet, abstain
from delicacies, exercise yourself by compulsion at fixed
times, in heat, in cold ; drink no cold water, nor wine, when
there is opportunity of drinking it.^ In a word you must
surrender yourself to the trainer, as you do to a physician.
Next, in the contest, you must be covered with sand,^ some-
times dislocate a hand, sprain an ankle, swallow a quantity
of dust, be scourged with the whip; and after undergoing
all this, you must sometimes be conquered. After reck-
oning all these things, if you have still an inclination, go to
the athletic practice. If you do not reckon them, observe
you will behave like children who at one time play as
wrestlers, then as gladiators, then blow a trumpet, then act a
tragedy, when they have seen and admired such things. So
you also do : you are at one time a wrestler (athlete), then a
gladiator, then a philosopher, then a rhetorician; but with
your whole soul you are nothing; like the ape you imitate
all that you see; and always one thing after another pleases
you, but that which becomes familiar displeases you. For
you have never undertaken any thing after consideration,
nor after having explored the whole matter and put it to a
strict examination; but you have undertaken it at hazard
and with a cold desire. Thus some persons having seen a
philosopher and having heard one speak like Euphrates* —
'6 233
234 EPICTETUS
and yet who can speak like him? — wish to be philosophers
themselves.
Man, consider first what the matter is (which you propose
to do) , then your own nature also, what it is able to bear. If
you are a wrestler, look at your shoulders, your thighs, your
loins: for different men are naturally formed for different
things. Do you think that, if you do (what you are doing
daily), you can be a philosopher? Do you think that you
can eat as you do now, drink as you do now, and in the same
way be angry and out of humour ? You must watch, labour,
conquer certain desires, you must depart from your kinsmen,
be despised by your slave, laughed at by those who meet you,
in every thing you must be in an inferior condition, as to
magisterial office, in honours, in courts of justice. When
you have considered all these things completely, then, if you
think proper, approach to philosophy, if you would gain in
exchange for these things freedom from perturbations, lib-
erty, tranquillity. If you have not considered these things,
do not approach philosophy : do not act like children, at one
time a philosopher, then a tax collector, then a rhetorician,
then a procurator (officer) of Caesar. These things are not
consistent. You must be one man either good or bad : you
must either labour at your own ruling faculty or at external
things : you must either labour at things within or at external
things : that is, you must either occupy the place of a philoso-
pher or that of one of the vulgar.
A person said to Rufus^ when Galba was murdered, "Is
the world now governed by Providence?" But Rufus re-
plied, "Did I ever incidentally form an argument from Galba
that the world is governed by Providence?"
NOTES
* " This chapter has a gfreat conformity to Luke xiv : 28, etc. But it
is to be observed that Epictetus, both here and elsewhere, supposes some
persons incapable of being philosophers; that is, virtuous and pious
men: but Christianity requires and enables all to be such." — Mrs. Car-
ter.
The passage in Luke contains a practical lesson, and so far is the same
as the teaching of Epictetus : but the conclusion in v : 33 does not ap-
pear to be helped by what immediately precedes v. 28-32. The remark
that Christianity "enables all to be such" is not true, unless Mrs. Carter
gives to the word "enables" a meaning which I do not see.
DISCOURSES 235
' The commentators refer us to Paul, i Cor. c 9, 25. Compare Horace,
"Ars Poetica," 39:
"Versate diu quid ferre recusent,
Quid valeant humeri."
■ Wolf thought that the word itapopv(r<rea^at might mean the loss
of an eye ; but other commentators give the word a different meaning.
* In place of Euphrates the "Encheiridion" 29 had in the text "Socra-
tes," which name the recent editors of the "Encheiridion altered to "Eu-
phrates," and correctly. The younger Pliny (i. Ep. 10) speaks in high
terms of the merits and attractive eloquence of this Syrian philosopher
Euphrates, who is mentioned by M. Antoninus (x. 31) and by others.
*Rufus was a philosopher. See i: i, i: 9. Galba is the emperor Galba,
who was murdered. The meaning of the passage is rather obscure, and
it is evident that it does not belong to this chapter. Lord Shaftesbury
remarks that this passage perhaps belongs to chapter 11 or 14, or per-
haps to the end of chapter 17.
CHAPTER XVI
THAT WE OUGHT WITH CAUTION TO ENTER INTO FAMILIAR
INTERCOURSE WITH MEN
IF a man has frequent intercourse with others either for
talk, or drinking together, or generally for social pur-
poses, he must either become like them, or change them
to his own fashion. For if a man places a piece of
quenched charcoal close to a piece that is burning, either the
quenched charcoal will quench the other, or the burning char-
coal will light that which is quenched. Since then the dan-
ger is so great, we must cautiously enter into such intimacies
with those of the common sort, and remember that it is im-
possible that a man can keep company with one who is cov-
ered with soot without being partaker of the soot himself.
For what will you do if a man speaks about gladiators, about
horses, about athletes, or what is worse about men ? Such a
person is bad, such a person is good : this was well done, this
was done badly. Further, if he scofif, or ridicule, or show an
ill-natured disposition ? Is any man among us prepared like
a lute-player when he takes a lute, so that as soon as he has
touched the strings, he discovers which are discordant, and
tunes the instrument? such a power as Socrates had who
in all his social intercourse could lead his companions to his
own purpose ? How should you have this power ? It is there-
fore a necessary consequence that you are carried about by
the common kind of people.
Why then are they more powerful than you? Because
they utter these useless words from their real opinions:
but you utter your elegant words only from your, lips ; for
this reason they are without strength and dead, and it is
nauseous to listen to your exhortations and your miserable
virtue, which is talked of every where (up and down). In
this way the vulgar have the advantage over you : for every
opinion {S6y/xa) is strong and invincible. Until then the
good (Ko/iipai) sentiments (vTtoXT^eti) are fixed in you, and
you shall have acquired a certain power for your security, I
236
DISCOURSES 237
advise you to be careful in your association with common
persons : if you are not, every day like wax in the sun there
will be melted away whatever you inscribe on your minds in
the school. Withdraw then yourselves far from the sun so
long as you have these waxen sentiments. For this reason
also philosophers advise men to leave their native country,
because ancient habits distract them and do not allow a be-
ginning to be made of a different habit ; nor can we tolerate
those who meet us and say : "See such a one is now a philoso-
pher, who was once so and so." Thus also physicians send
those who have lingering diseases to a different country and
a different air; and they do right. Do you also introduce
other habits than those which you have: fix your opinions
and exercise yourselves in them. But you do not so : you go
hence to a spectacle, to a show of gladiators, to a place of
exercise (^vo-tov), to a circus; then you come back later,
and again from this place you go to those places, and still the
same persons. And there is no pleasing (good) habit, nor
attention, nor care about self and observation of this kind.
How shall I use the appearances presented to me ? according
to nature, or contrary to nature ? how do I answer to them ?
as I ought, or as I ought not? Do I say to those things
which are independent of the will, that they do not concern
me? For if you are not yet in this state, fly from your
former habits, fly from the common sort, if you intend ever
to begin to be something.
CHAPTER XVII
OF PROVIDENCE
WHEN you make any charge against Providence,
consider, and you will learn that the thing has
happened according to reason, — Yes, but the un-
just man has the advantage. — In what? — In
money. — Yes, for he is superior to you in this, that he flat-
ters, is free from shame, and is watchful. What is the won-
der? But see if he has the advantage over you in being
faithful, in being modest : for you will not find it to be so ;
but wherein you are superior, there you will find that you
have the advantage. And I once said to a man who was
vexed because Philostorgus was fortunate: Would you
choose to lie with Sura ?^ "May it never happen," he replied,
"that this day should come?" Why then are you vexed, if he
receives something in return for that which he sells; or how
can you consider him happy who acquires those things by
such means as you abominate; or what wrong does Provi-
dence, if he gives the better things to the better men ? Is it
not better to be modest than to be rich ? — He admitted this —
Why are you vexed then, man, when you possess the better
thing? Remember then always and have in readiness the
truth, that this is a law of nature, that the superior has an
advantage over the inferior in that in which he is superior;
and you will never be vexed.
But my wife treats me badly. — Well, if any man asks you
what this is, say, my wife treats me badly — Is there then
nothing more? Nothing. — My father gives me nothing —
[What is this? my father gives me nothing — Is there noth-
ing else then ? — Nothing] : but to say that this is an evil is
something which must be added to it externally, and falsely
added. For this reason we must not get rid of poverty, but
of the opinion about poverty, and then we shall be happy.
NOTE
^ Upton suggests that Sura may be Palfurius (Juvenal, iv. 53), or
Palfurius Sura (Suetonius, Domitian, c 13).
238
CHAPTER XVIII
• THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE DISTURBED BY ANY NEWS j
WHEN any thing shall be reported to you which is of
a nature to disturb, have this principle in read-
iness, that the news is about nothing which is
within the power of your will. Can any man re-
port to you that you have formed a bad opinion, or had a bad
desire? By no means. But perhaps he will report that
some person is dead. What then is that to you ? He may
report that some person speaks ill of you. What then is that
to you ? Or that your father is planning something or other.
Against whom? Against your will (itpoatpsa-t?) ? How
can he ? But is it against your poor body, against your lit-
tle property ? You are quite safe : it is not against you. But
the judge declares that you have committed an act of im-
piety. And did not the judges (Sitcaarat) make the same
declaration against Socrates ? Does it concern you that the
judge has made this declaration? No. Why then do you
trouble yourself any longer about it? Your father has a
certain duty, and if he shall not fulfill it, he loses the char-
acter of a father, of a man of natural affection, of gentleness.
Do not wish him to lose any thing else on this account. For
never does a man do wrong in one thing, and suffer in an-
other. On the other side it is your duty to make your de-
fence firmly, modestly, without anger: but if you do not,
you also lose the character of a son, of a man of modest be-
haviour, of generous character. Well then, is the judge free
from danger? No; but he also is in equal danger. Why
then are you still afraid of his decision ? What have you to
do with that which is another man's evil? It is your own
evil to make a bad defence: be on your guard against this
only. But to be condemned or not to be condemned, as that
is the act of another person, so it is the evil of another per-
son, A certain person threatens you. Me? No. He
blames you. Let him see how he manages his own affairs.
He is going to condemn you unjustly. He is a wretched
man.
239
CHAPTER XIX
WHAT IS THE CONDITION OF A COMMON KIND OF MAN AND
OF A PHILOSOPHER
THE first difference between a common person (iSKhriji )
and a philosopher is this : the common person says,
"Woe to me for my little child, for my brother, for
my father."^ The philosopher, if he shall ever be
compelled to say. Woe to me, stops and says, "but
for myself." For nothing which is independent of
the will can hinder or damage the will, and the
will can only hinder or damage itself. If then we
ourselves incline in this direction, so as, when we
are unlucky, to blame ourselves and to remember
that nothing else is the cause of perturbation or loss of tran-
quillity except our own opinion, I swear to you by all the
gods that we have made progress. But in the present state
of affairs we have gone another way from the beginning.
For example, while we were still children, the nurse, if we
ever stumbled through want of care, did not chide us, but
would beat the stone. But what did the stone do ? Ought
the stone to have moved on account of your child's folly?
Again, if we find nothing to eat on coming out of the bath,
the pedagogue never checks our appetite, but he flogs the
cook, Man, did we make you the pedagogue of the cook
and not of the child ? Correct the child, improve him. In
this way even when we are grown up we are like children.
For he who is unmusical is a child in music ; he who is with-
out letters is a child in learning: he who is untaught, is a
child in life.
NOTE
*■ Compare iii : 5, 4.
240
CHAPTER XX
THAT WE CAN DERIVE ADVANTAGE FROM ALL EXTERNAL
THINGS
IN the case of appearances which are objects of the vision,*
nearly all have allowed the good and the evil to be in
ourselves, and not in externals. No one gives the name
of good to the fact that it is day, nor bad to the fact
that it is night, nor the name of the greatest evil to the opin-
ion that three are four. But what do men say? They say
that knowledge is good, and that error is bad ; so that even
in respect to falsehood itself there is a good result, the
knowledge that it is falsehood. So it ought to be in life
also. Is health a good thing, and is sickness a bad thing?
No, man. But what is it ? To be healthy, and healthy in a
right way, is good : to be healthy in a bad way is bad ; so that
it is possible to gain advantage even from sickness, I declare.
For is it not possible to gain advantage even from death,
and is it not possible to gain advantage from mutilation ?
Do you think that Menceceus gained little by death ?^ Could
a man who says so, gain so much as Menceceus gained?
Come, man, did he not maintain the character of being a
lover of his country, a man of great mind, faithful, gener-
ous? And if he had continued to live, would he not have
lost all these things ? would he not have gained the opposite ?
would he not have gained the name of coward, ignoble, a
hater of his country, a man who feared death? Well, do
you think that he gained little by dying? I suppose not.
But did the father of Admetus' gain much by prolonging his
life so ignobly and miserably? Did he not die afterwards?
Cease, I adjure you by the gods, to admire material things.
Cease to make yourselves, slaves, first of things, then on ac-
count of things slaves of those who are able to give them or
take them away.
Can advantage then be derived from these things ? From
all ; and from him who abuses you. Wherein does the man
who exercises before the combat profit the athlete? Very
241
242 EPICTETUS
greatly. This man becomes my exerciser before the com-
bat : he exercises me in endurance, in keeping my temper, in
mildness. You say no: but he, who lays hold of my neck
and disciplines my loins and shoulders, does me good; and
the exercise master (the aliptes, or oiler) does right when he
says, "Raise him up with both hands;" and the heavier he
(iKeivoi) is, so much the more is my advantage. But if a
man exercises me in keeping my temper, does he not do me
good ? — This is not knowing how to gain an advantage from
men. Is my neighbour bad ? Bad to himself, but good to
me: he exercises my good disposition, my moderation. Is
my father bad ? Bad to himself, but to me good. This is
the rod of Hermes: touch with it what you please, as the
saying is, and it will be of gold. I say not so: but bring
what you please, and I will make it good.* Bring disease,
bring death, bring poverty, bring abuse, bring trial on cap-
ital charges: all these things through the rod of Hermes
shall be made profitable. What will you do with death?
Why, what else than that it shall do you honour, or that it
shall show you by act through it, what a man is who follows
the will of nature ? What will you do with disease ? I will
show its nature, I will be conspicuous in it, I will be firm,
I will be happy, I will not flatter the physician, I will not
wish to die. What else do you seek ? Whatever you shall
give me, I will make it happy, fortunate, honoured, a thing
which a man shall seek.
You say "No : but take care that you do not fall sick : it is
a bad thing." This is the same as if you should say, "Take
care that you never receive the impression (appearance) that
three are four : that is bad." Man, how is it bad ? If I think
about it as I ought, how shall it then do me any damage?
and shall it not even do me good? If then I think about
poverty as I ought to do, about disease, about not having
office, is not that enough for me? will it not be an advan-
iage? How then ought I any longer to look to seek evil and
good in externals? What happens? these doctrines are
maintained here, but no man carries them away home; but
immediately every one is at war with his slave, with his
neighbours, with those who have sneered at him, with those
DISCOURSES 243
who have ridiculed him. Good luck to Lesbius,* who daily-
proves that I know nothing.
*The original is ^BooprjrtKobv (pavradtSbv which is translated in
the Latin version visa theoretica, but this does not help us. Perhaps
the author means any appearances which are presented to us either by
the eyes or by the understanding ; but I am not sure what he means.
* Menoeceus, the son of Creon, gave up his life by which he would
save his country, as it was declared by an oracle. (Cicero, Tuscul. i. c
48.) Juvenal (Sat. xiv. 238) says
"Quarum Amor in te
Quantus erat patriae Deciorum in pectore ; quantum
Dilexit Thebas, si Graecia vera, Menceceus."
Euripides, Phcenissae, v. 913.
*The father of Admetus was Pheres ( Euripides, Alcestis).
* Mrs. Carter quotes the epistle to the Romans (viii. 28) : "and we
know that all things work together for good to them that love God" ;
but she quotes only the first part of the verse and omits the conclusion,
"to them who are the called according to his purpose."
' Some abusive fellow, known to some of the hearers of Epictetus.
We ought perhaps to understand the words as if it were said, " each of
you ought to say to himself, Good luck to Lesbius, etc." Schweig's note.
CHAPTER XXI
AGAINST THOSE WHO READILY COME TO THE PROFESSION OF
SOPHISTS
THEY who have taken up bare theorems {Beoop^/iara)
immediately wish to vomit them forth, as persons
whose stomachs are diseased do with food. First di-
gest the thing, then do not vomit it up thus : if you
do not digest it, the thing becomes truly an emetic, a crude
food and unfit to eat. But after digestion show us some
change in your ruling faculty, as athletes show in their shoul-
ders by what they have been exercised and what they have
eaten ; as those who have taken up certain arts show by what
they have learned. The carpenter does not come and say,
Hear me talk about the carpenter's art; but having under-
taken to build a house, he makes it, and proves that he knows
the art. You also ought to do something of the kind ; eat
like a man, drink like a man, dress, marry, beget children,
do the office of a citizen, endure abuse, bear with an unrea-
sonable brother, bear with your father, bear with your son,
neighbour, companion.^ Show us these things that we may
see that you have in truth learned something from the phi-
losophers. You say. No; but come and hear me read (phil-
osophical) commentaries. Go away, and seek somebody
to vomit them on. (He replies) And indeed I will expound
to you the writings of Chrysippus as no other man can : I
will explain his text most clearly: I will add also, if I can,
the vehemence of Antipater and Archedemus.^
Is it then for this that young men shall leave their coun-
try and their parents, that they may come to this place, and
hear you explain words? Ought they not to return with a
capacity to endure, to be active in association with others,
free from passions, free from perturbation, with such a pro-
vision for the journey of life with which they shall be able
to bear well the things that happen and derive honour from
them?^ And how can you give them any of these things
which you do not possess ? Have you done from the begin-
244
DISCOURSES 245
ning any thing else than employ yourself about the resolu-
tion of syllogisms, of sophistical arguments (ozyweraTr/Trrovrc?),
and in those which work by questions ? But such a man has
a school; why should not I also have a school? These
things are not done, man, in a careless way, nor just as it
may happen; but there must be a (fit) age and life, and God
as a guide. You say, No. But no man sails from a port
without having sacrificed to the gods and invoked their help ;
nor do men sow without having called on Demeter ; and shall
a man who has undertaken so great a work undertake it
safely without the gods ? and shall they who undertake this
work come to it with success? What else are you doing,
man, than divulging the mysteries? You say, there is a
temple at Eleusis, and one here also. There is an Hiero-
phant at Eleusis,* and I also will make an Hierophant : there
is a herald, and I will establish a herald : there is a torch-
bearer at Eleusis, and I also will establish a torchbearer ;
there are torches at Eleusis, and I will have torches here.
The words are the same : how do the things done here differ
from those done there ? — Most impious man, is there no dif-
ference? these things are done both in due place and in due
time; and when accompanied with sacrifice and prayers,
when a man is first purified, and when he is disposed in his
mind to the thought that he is going to approach sacred rites
and ancient rites. In this way the mysteries are useful, in
this way we come to the notion that all these things were
established by the ancients for the instruction and correction
of life. But you publish and divulge them out of time, out
of place, without sacrifices, without purity; you have not
the garments which the hierophant ought to have, nor the
hair, nor the headdress, nor the voice, nor the age ; nor have
you purified yourself as he has : but you have committed to
memory the words only, and you say, Sacred are the words
by themselves.''
You ought to approach these matters in another way : the
thing is great, it is mystical, not a common thing, nor is it
given to every man. But not even wisdom* perhaps is
enough to enable a man to take the care of youths : a man
must have also a certain readiness and fitness for this pur-
pose, and a certain quality of body, and above all things he
246 [ EPICTETUS
must have God to advise him to occupy this office, as God
advised Socrates to occupy the place of one who confutes
error, Diogenes the office of royalty and reproof, and the
office of teaching precepts. But you open a doctor's shop,
though you have nothing except physic : but where and how
they should be applied, you know not nor have you taken
any trouble about it. "See," that man says, "I too have
salves for the eyes." Have you also the power of using
them ? Do you know both when and how they will do good,
and to whom they will do good? Why then do you act at
hazard in things of the greatest importance? why are you
careless ? why do you undertake a thing that is in no way fit
for you ? Leave it to those who are able to do it, and to do it
well. Do not yourself bring disgrace on philosophy through
your own acts, and be not one of those who load it with a bad
reputation. But if theorems please you, sit still, and turn
them over by yourself ; but never say that you are a philoso-
pher, nor allow another to say it : but say : '*He is mistaken,
for neither are my desires different from what they were
before, nor is my activity directed to other objects, nor do I
assent to other things, nor in the use of appearances have I
altered at all from my former condition." This you must
think and say about yourself, if you would think as you
ought : if not act at hazard, and do what you are doing ; for
it becomes you.
NOTES
* The practical teaching of the Stoics is contained in iii. c. 7, and it
is good and wise. A modern writer says of modern practice : "If we
open our eyes and if we will honestly acknowledge to ourselves what
we discover, we shall be compelled to confess that all the life and ef-
forts of the civilized people of our times is founded on a view of the
world, which is directly opposed to the view of the world which Jesus
had" (Strauss, " Der alte und der neue Glaube." p. 74).
* Cicero ( Academ. Prior, ii. 47) names Antipater and Archidemus
(Archedemus) the chief of dialecticians, and also opiniosissimi homi-
nes.
*This passage is one of those which show the great good sense of
Epictetus in the matter of education; and some other remarks to the
same effect follow in this chapter. A man might justly say that we
have no clear notion of the purpose of education. A modern writer,
who seems to belong to the school of Epictetus says : " it can not be de-
nied that in all schools of all kinds it ought to be the first and the chief
object to make children healthy, good, honest, and, if possible, sensible
men and women ; and if this is not done in a reasonable degree, I main-
tain that the education of these schools is good for nothing — I do not
DISCOURSES 247
propose to make children good and honest and wise by precepts and
dogmas and preaching, as you will see. They must be made good and
wise by a cultivation of the understanding, by the practice of the disci-
pline necessary for that purpose, and by the example of him who gov-
erns, directs and instructs." Further, "my men and women teachers
have something which the others have not : they have a purpose, an end
in their system of education ; and what is education ? What is human
life without some purpose or end which may be attained by industry,
order and the exercise of moderate abilities? Great abilities are rare,
and they are often accompanied by qualities which make the abilities
useless to him who has them, and even injurious to society."
* There was a great temple of Demeter (Ceres) at Eleusis in Attica,
and solemn mysteries, and an Hierophant or conductor of the cere-
monies.
* The reader, who has an inclination to compare religious forms an-
cient and modern, may find something in modem practice to which the
words of Epictetus are applicable.
* This is a view of the fitness of a teacher which, as far as I know, is
quite new ; and it is also true. Perhaps there was some vague notion of
this kind in modern Europe at the time when teachers of youths were
only priests, and when it was supposed that their fitness for the office
of teacher was secured by their fitness for the office of priest. In the
present "ordering of Deacons" in the Church of England, the person,
who is proposed as a fit person to be a deacon, is asked the following
question by the bishop : "Do you trust that you are inwardly moved by
the Holy Ghost to take upon you this office and ministration to serve
God for the promotion of his glory and the edifying of his people?" "In
the ordering of priests" this question is omitted, and another question
only is put, which is used only in the ordering of Deacons: "Do you
think in your heart that you be truly called, according to the will of
our Lord Jesus Christ," etc. The teacher ought to have God to advise
him to occupy the office of teacher, as Epictetus says. He does not say
how God will advise ; perhaps he supposed that this advice might be
given in the way in which Socrates said that he received it.
"Wisdom perhaps is not enough" to enable a man to take care of
youths. Whatever wisdom may mean, it is true that a teacher should
have a fitness and liking for the business. If he has not, he will find it
disagreeable, and he will not do it well. He may and ought to gain a
reasonable living by his labour: if he seeks only money and wealth, he
is on the wrong track, and he is only like a common dealer in buying
and selling, a butcher or a shoemaker, or a tailor, all useful members of
society and all of them necessary in their several kinds. But the teacher
has a priestly office, the making, as far as it is possible, children into
good men and women. Should he be ordered like a Deacon or a Priest,
for his office is even more useful than that of a Priest or Deacon? Some
will say that this is ridiculous. Perhaps the wise will not think so.
CHAPTER XXII
ABOUT CYNICISM
WHEN one of his pupils inquired of Epictetus, and
he was a person who appeared to be inclined to
C)micism, what kind of a person a Cynic ought to
be and what was the notion {icpo^rjxlm) of the
thing, we will inquire, said Epictetus, at leisure : but I have
so much to say to you that he who without God attempts
so great a matter, is hateful to God, and has other purpose
than to act indecently in public. For in any well-managed
house no man comes forward, and says to himself, I ought
to be manager of the house. If he does so, the master turns
round, and seeing him insolently giving orders, drags him
forth and flogs him. So it is also in this great city (the
world) ; for here also there is a master of the house who
orders every thing. (He says) You are the sun ; you can by
going round make the year and seasons, and make the fruits
grow and nourish them, and stir the winds and make them
remit, and warm the bodies of men properly: go, travel
round, and so administer things from the greatest to the
least. You are a calf; when a lion shall appear, do your
proper business {i. e. run away) : if you do not, you will suf-
fer. You are a bull : advance and fight, for this is your
business, and becomes you, and you can do it. You can lead
the army against Ilium : be Agamemnon. You can fight in
single combat against Hector : be Achilles. But if Thersites^
came forward and claimed the command, he would either not
have obtained it; or if he did obtain it, he would have dis-
graced himself before many witnesses.
Do you also think about the matter carefully: it is not
what it seems to you. (You say) I wear a cloak now and
I shall wear it then: I sleep hard now, and I shall sleep
hard then : I will take in addition a little bag now and a staff,
and I will go about and begin to beg and to abuse those
whom I meet ; and if I see any man plucking the hair out of
his body, I will rebuke him, or if he has dressed his hair, or
248
DISCOURSES 249
if he walks about in purple — If you imagine the thing to be
such as this, keep far away from it : do not approach it : it is
not at all for you. But if you imagine it to be what it is,
and do not think yourself to be unfit for it, consider what a
great thing you undertake.
In the first place in the things which relate to yourself, you
must not be in any respect like what you are now : you must
not blame God or man : you must take away desire alto-
gether, you must transfer avoidance {eKKXt6ii) only to the
things which are within the power of the will : you must not
feel anger nor resentment nor envy nor pity ; a girl must not
appear handsome to you, nor must you love a little reputa-
tion, nor be pleased with a boy or a cake. For you ought
to know that the rest of men throw walls around them and
houses and darkness when they do any such things, and they
have many means of concealment. A man shuts the door,
he sets somebody before the chamber : if a person comes, say
that he is out, he is not at leisure. But the Cynic instead of
all these things must use modesty as his protection: if he
does not, he will be indecent in his nakedness and under the
open sky. This is his house, his door : this is the slave be-
fore his bedchamber: this is his darkness. For he ought
not to wish to hide any thing that he does : and if he does,
he is gone, he has lost the character of a Cynic, of a man
who lives under the open sky, of a free man : he has begun
to fear some external thing, he has begun to have need of
concealment, nor can he get concealment when he chooses.
For where shall he hide himself and how? And if by
chance this public instructor shall be detected, this peda-
gogue, what kind of things will he be compelled to suffer?
When then a man fears these things, is it possible for him
to be bold with his whole soul to superintend men ? It can
not be: it is impossible.
In the first place then you must make your ruling faculty
pure, and this mode of life also. Now (you should say),
to me the matter to work on is my understanding, as wood
is to the carpenter, as hides to the shoemaker ; and my busi-
ness is the right use of appearances. But the body is noth-
ing to me : the parts of it are nothing to me. Death ? Let
it come when it chooses, either death of the whole or of a
250
EPICTETUS
part. Fly, you say. And whither; can any man eject me
out of the world ? He can not. But wherever I go, there is
the sun, there is the moon, there are the stars, dreams, omens,
and the conversation {omsUo) with gods.
Then, if he is thus prepared, the true Cynic can not be sat-
isfied with this ; but he must know that he is sent a messen-
ger from Zeus to men about good and bad things,^ to show
them that they have wandered and are seeking the substance
of good and evil where it is not, but where it is, they never
think; and that he is a spy, as Diogenes was carried off to
Philip after the battle of Chaeroneia as a spy. For in fact a
Cynic is a spy of the things which are good for men and
which are evil, and it is his duty to examine carefully and
to come and report truly, and not to be struck with terror so
as to point out as enemies those who are not enemies, nor
in any other way to be perturbed by appearances nor con-
founded.
It is his duty then to be able with a loud voice, if the occa-
sion should arise, and appearing on the tragic stage to say
like Socrates : Men, whither are you hurrying ; what are you
doing, wretches ? like blind people you are wandering up and
down : you are going by another road, and have left the true
road : you seek for prosperity and happiness where they are
not, and if another shows you where they are, you do not
believe him. Why do you seek it without ?^ In the body ?
It is not there. If you doubt, look at Myro, look at Ophel-
lius.* In possessions ? It is not there. But if you do not
believe me, look at Croesus : look at those who are now rich,
with what lamentations their life is filled. In power? It
is not there. If it is, those must be happy who have been
twice and thrice consuls ; but they are not. Whom shall we
believe in these matters? You who from without see their
affairs and are dazzled by an appearance, or the men them-
selves? What do they say? Hear them when they groan,
when they grieve, when on account of these very consul-
ships and glory and splendour they think that they are more
wretched and in greater danger. Is it in royal power? It
is not : if it were, Nero would have been happy, and Sarda-
napalus. But neither was Agamemnon happy, though he
DISCOURSES 251
was a better man than Sardanapalus and Nero; but while
others are snoring, what is he doing?
" Much from his head he tore his rooted hair :"
Iliad, x: 15.
and what does he say himself?
' I am perple:
Disturb'd I a
Is leaping.' "
" ' I am perplexed,' he says, 'and
Disturb'd I am,' and 'my heart out of my bosom
Iliad, x: 91.
Wretch, which of your affairs goes badly? Your posses-
sions ? No. Your body ? No. But you are rich in gold
and copper. What then is the matter with you ? That part
of you, whatever it is, has been neglected by you and is cor-
rupted, the part with which we desire, with which we avoid,
with which we move towards and move from things. How
neglected ? He knows not the nature of good for which he
is made by nature and the nature of evil; and what is his
own, and what belongs to another ; and when any thing that
belongs to others goes badly, he says, "Woe to me, for the
Hellenes are in danger." Wretched is his ruling faculty,
and alone neglected and uncared for. The Hellenes are going
to die destroyed by the Trojans. And if the Trojans do
not kill them, will they not die? Yes; but not all at once.
What difference then does it make? For if death is an
evil, whether men die altogether, or if they die singly, it is
equally an evil. Is any thing else then going to happen than
the separation of the soul and the body ?* Nothing. And if
the Hellenes perish, is the door closed, and is it not in your
power to die? It is. Why then do you lament and say,
"Oh, you who are a king and have the sceptre of Zeus !"
An unhappy king does not exist more than an unhappy god.
What then art thou ? In truth a shepherd : for you weep as
shepherds do, when a wolf has carried off one of their sheep :
and these who are governed by you are sheep. And why
did you come hither ? Was your desire in any danger ? was
your aversion (eKKXidti) ? was your movement (pursuits) ?
was your avoidance of things? He replies, "No; but the
wife of my brother was carried off." Was it not then a great
252 EPICTETUS
gain to be deprived of an adulterous wife? "Shall we be de-
spised then by the Trojans?" What kind of people are the
Trojans, wise or foolish? If they are wise, why do you fight
with them ? If they are fools, why do you care about them ?
In what then is the good, since it is not in these things?
Tell us, you who are lord, messenger and spy. Where you
do not think that it is, nor choose to seek it : for if you chose
to seek it, you would have found it to be in yourselves ; nor
would you be wandering out of the way, nor seeking what
belongs to others as if it were your own. Turn your
thoughts into yourselves : observe the preconceptions which
you have. What kind of a thing do you imagine the good
to be? That which flows easily, that which is happy, that
which is not impeded. Come, and do you not naturally
imagine it to be great, do you not imagine it to be valuable?
do you not imagine it to be free from harm ? In what ma-
terial then ought you to seek for that which flows easily, for
that which is not impeded? in that which serves or in that
which is free? In that which is free. Do you possess the
body then free or is it in servile condition? We do not
know. Do you not know that it is the slave of fever, of
gout, ophthalmia, dysentery, of a tyrant, of fire, of iron, of
every thing which is stronger? Yes, it is a slave. How
then is it possible that any thing which belongs to the body
can be free from hindrance ? and how is a thing great or val-
uable which is naturally dead, or earth, or mud ? Well then,
do you possess nothing which is free? Perhaps nothing.
And who is able to compel you to assent to that which ap-
pears false? No man. And who can compel you not to
assent to that which appears true? No man. By this then
you see that there is something in you naturally free. But
to desire or to be averse from, or to move towards an object
or to move from it, or to prepare yourself, or to propose
to do anything, which of you can do this, unless he has re-
ceived an impression of the appearance of that which is pro-
fitable or a duty ? No man. You have then in these things
also something which is not hindered and is free. Wretched
men, work out this, take care of this, seek for good here.
And how is it possible that a man who has nothing, who
is naked, houseless, without a hearth, squalid, without a
DISCOURSES 253
slave, without a city, can pass a life that flows easily ? See,
God has sent you a man to show you that it is possible.®
Look at me, who am without a city, without a house, with-
out possessions, without a slave; I sleep on the ground; I
have no wife, no children, no praetorium, but only the earth
and heavens, and one poor cloak. And what do I want?
Am I not without sorrow? am I not without fear? Am I
not free? When did any of you see me failing in the object
of my desire ? or ever falling into that which I would avoid ?
did I ever blame God or man?'^ did I ever accuse any man?
did any of you ever see me with sorrowful countenance?
And how do I meet with those you are afraid of and admire ?
Do not I treat them like slaves? Who, when he sees me,
does not think that he sees his king and master ?
This is the language of the Cynics, this their character,
this is their purpose. You say No : but their characteristic
is the little wallet, and staff, and great jaws : the devouring
of all that you give them, or storing it up, or the abusing un-
reasonably all whom they meet, or displaying their shoulder
as a fine thing. — Do you see how you are going to undertake
so great a business? First take a mirror: look at your
shoulders : observe your loins, your thighs. You are going,
my man, to be enrolled as a combatant in the Olympic games,
no frigid and miserable contest. In the Olympic games a
man is not permitted to be conquered only and to take his de-
parture ; but first he must be disgraced in the sight of all the
world, not in the sight of Athenians only, or of Lacedae-
monians or of Nicopolitans ; next he must be whipped also
if he has entered into the contests rashly; and before being
whipped, he must suffer thirst and heat, and swallow much
dust.
Reflect more carefully, know thyself,® consult the divinity,
without God attempt nothing; for if he shall advise you (to
do this or anything), be assured that he intends you to be-
come great or to receive many blows. For this very amusing
quality is conjoined to a C)niic : he must be flogged like an
ass, and when he is flogged, he must love those who flog him,
as if he were the father of all, and the brother of all.® —
You say No ; but if a man flogs you, stand in the public place
and call out, "Caesar, what do I suffer in this state of peace
254
EPICTETUS
under thy protection?" Let us bring the offender before
the proconsul. — But what is Caesar to a Cynic, or what is a
proconsul or what is any other except him who sent the
Cynic down hither, and whom he serves, namely Zeus?
Does he call upon any other than Zeus ? Is he not convinced
that whatever he suffers, it is Zeus who is exercising him?
Hercules when he was exercised by Eurystheus did not think
that he was wretched, but without hesitation he attempted
to execute all that he had in hand. And is he who is
trained to the contest and exercised by Zeus going to call out
and to be vexed, he who is worthy to bear the sceptre of
Diogenes ? Hear what Diogenes says to the passers by when
he is in a fever. "Miserable wretches, will you not stay ? but
are you going so long a journey to Olympia to see the des-
truction or the fight of athletes ; and will you not choose
to see the combat between a fever and a man?" Would
such a man accuse God who sent him down as if God were
treating him unworthily, a man who gloried in his circum-
stances, and claimed to be an example to those who were
passing by? For what shall he accuse him of? because he
maintains a decency of behaviour, because he displays his
virtue more conspicuously? Well, and what does he say
of poverty, about death, about pain ? How did he compare
his own happiness with that of the great king (the king of
Persia) ? or rather he thought that there was no comparison
between them. For where there are perturbations, and
griefs, and fears, and desires not satisfied, and aversions of
things which you can not avoid, and envies and jealousies,
how is there a road to happiness there? But where there
are corrupt principles, there these things must of necessity
be.
When the young man asked, if when a Cynic has fallen
sick, and a friend asks him to come to his house and to be
taken care of in his sickness, shall the Cynic accept the invi-
tation, he replied, And where shall you find, I ask, a Cynic's
friend ? For the man who invites ought to be such another
as the Cynic that he may be worthy of being reckoned the
Cynic's friend. He ought to be a partner in the Cynic's
sceptre and his royalty, and a worthy minister, if he intends
DISCOURSES 255
to be considered worthy of a Cynic's friendship, as Diogenes
was a friend of Antisthenes, as Crates was a friend of Diog^
enes. Do you think that if a man comes to a Cynic and
salutes him, that he is the Cynic's friend, and that the Cynic
will think him worthy of receiving a Cynic into his house?
So that if you please, reflect on this also : rather look round
for some convenient dunghill on which you shall bear your
fever and which will shelter you from the north wind that
you may not be chilled. But you seem to me to wish to go
into some man's house and to be well fed there for a time.
Why then do you think of attempting so great a thing (as
the life of a Cynic) ?
But, said the young man, shall marriage and the procrea-
tion of children as a chief duty be undertaken by the Cynic ?^^
If you grant me a community of wise men, Epictetus replies
perhaps no man will readily apply himself to the Cynic prac-
tice. For on whose account should he undertake this man-
ner of life? However if we suppose that he does, nothing
will prevent him from marrying and begetting children ; for
his wife will be another like himself, and his father-in-law
another like himself, and his children will be brought up
like himself. But in the present state of things which is like
that of an army placed in battle order, is it not fit that the
Cynic should without any distraction be employed only on
the ministration of God,^^ able to go about among men, not
tied down to the common duties of mankind, nor entangled
in the ordinary relations of life, which if he neglects, he will
not maintain the character of an honourable and good man ?
and if he observes them he will lose the character of the
messenger, and spy and herald of God. For consider that
it is his duty to do something towards his father-in-law,*
something to the other kinsfolks of his wife, something to
his wife also (if he has one). He is also excluded by being
a Cynic from looking after the sickness of his own family,
and from providing for their support. And to say nothing
of the rest, he must have a vessel for heating water for the
child that he may wash it in the bath ; wool for his wife when
she is delivered of a child, oil, a bed, a cup : so the furniture
of the house is increased. I say nothing of his other occupa-
256 EPICTETUS
tions, and of his distraction. Where then now is that king,
he who devotes himself to the pubHc interests,
" The people's guardian and so full of cares."
Homer, Iliad ii : 25
whose duty it is to look after others, the married and those
who have children ; to see who uses his wife well, who uses
her badly; who quarrels; what family is well administered,
what is not; going about as a physician does and feels
pulses? He says to one, you have a fever, to another you
have a head-ache, or the gout : he says to one, abstain from
food ; to another he says, eat ; or do not use the bath ; to an-
other, you require the knife, or the cautery. How can he
have time for this who is tied to the duties of common life?
is it not his duty to supply clothing to his children, and to
send them to the schoolmaster with writing tablets, and
styles (for writing). Besides must he not supply them with
beds ? for they can not be genuine Cynics as soon as they are
born. If he does not do this, it would be better to expose
the children as soon as they are born than to kill them in
this way. Consider what we are bringing the Cynic down
to, how we are taking his royalty from him. — Yes, but
Crates took a wife. — You are speaking of a circumstance
which arose from love and of a woman who was another
Crates. ^^ But we are inquiring about ordinary marriages
and those which are free from distractions, and making this
inquiry we do not find the affair of marriage in this state
of the world a thing which is especially suited to the Cynic.
How then shall a man maintain the existence of society?
In the name of God, are those men greater benefactors to
society who introduce into the world to occupy their own
places two or three grunting children, or those who superin-
tend as far as they can all mankind, and see what they do,
how they live, what they attend to, what they neglect con-
trary to their duty ? Did they who left little children to the
Thebans do them more good than Epaminondas who died
childless ? And did Priamus who begat fifty worthless sons
or Danaus or vEolus contribute more to the community than
Homer ? Then shall the duty of a general or the business of
a writer exclude a man from marriage or the begetting of
DISCOURSES 257
children, and such a man shall not be judged to have accepted
the condition of childlessness for nothing; and shall not the
royalty of a Cynic be considered an equivalent for the want
of children ? Do we not perceive his grandeur and do we
not justly contemplate the character of Diogenes; and do
we instead of this turn our eyes to the present Cynics who
are dogs that wait at tables, and in no respect imitate the
Cynics of old except perchance in breaking wind, but in noth-
ing else? For such matters would not have moved us at all
nor should we have wondered if a Cynic should not marry or
beget children. Man, the Cynic is the father of all men; the
men are his sons, the women are his daughters : he so care-
fully visits all, so well does he care for all. Do you think
that it is from idle impertinence that he rebukes those whom
he meets? He does it as a father, as a brother, and as the
minister of the father of all, the minister of Zeus.
If you please, ask me also if a Cynic shall engage in the
administration of the state. Fool, do you seek a greater
form of administration than that in which he is engaged?
Do you ask if he shall appear among the Athenians and
say something about the revenues and the supplies, he who
must talk with all men, alike with Athenians, alike with
Corinthians, alike with Romans, not about supplies, nor yet
about revenues, nor about peace or war, but about happiness
and unhappiness, about good fortune and bad fortune, about
slavery and freedom? When a man has undertaken the
administration of such a state, do you ask me if he shall en-
gage in the administration of a state ? ask me also if he shall
govern (hold a magisterial ofifice) : again I will say to you,
Fool, what greater government shall he exercise than that
which he exercises now?
It is necessary also for such a man (the Cynic) to have a
certain habit of body : for if he appears to be consumptive,
thin and pale, his testimony has not then the same weight.
For he must not only by showing the qualities of the soul
prove to the vulgar that it is in his power independent of the
things which they admire to be a good man, but he must
also show by his body that his simple and frugal way of
living in the open air does not injure even the body. See,
he says, I am proof of this, and my own body also is. So
17
258 EPICTETUS
Diogenes used to do, for he used to go about fresh looking,
and he attracted the notice of the many by his personal ap-
pearance. But if a Cynic is an object of compassion, he
seems to be a beggar: all persons turn away from him, all
are offended with him; for neither ought he to appear
dirty so that he shall not also in this respect drive away men ;
but his very roughness ought to be glean and attractive.
There ought also to belong to the Cynic much natural
grace and sharpness ; and if this is not so, he is a stupid fel-
low, and nothing else : and he must have these qualities that
he may be able readily and fitly to be a match for all circum-
stances that may happen. So Diogenes replied to one who
said, "Are you the Diogenes who does not believe that there
are gods?"^^ "And how," repHed Diogenes, "can this be
when I think that you are odious to the gods ?" On another
occasion in reply to Alexander, who stood by him when he
was sleeping, and quoted Homer's line (Iliad, ii. 24)
" A man a councillor should not sleep all night,"
he answered, when he was half asleep,
" The people's guardian and so full of cares."
But before all the Cynic's ruling faculty must be purer
than the sun ; and if it is not, he must necessarily be a cun-
ning knave and a fellow of no principle, since while he him-
self is entangled in some vice he will reprove others.^* For
see how the matter stands : to these kings and tyrants their
guards and arms give the power of reproving some persons,
and of being able even to punish those who do wrong though
they are themselves bad ; but to a Cynic instead of arms and
guards it is conscience (rd dwetSoi) which gives this power.
When he knows that he has watched and laboured for man-
kind, and has slept pure, and sleep has left him still purer,
and that he thought whatever he has thought as a friend of
the gods, as a minister, as a participator of the power of
Zeus, and that on all occasions he is ready to say
" Lead me, O Zeus, and thou, O Destiny ; "
and also, If so it pleases the gods, so let it be ; why should
DISCOURSES 259
he not have confidence to speak freely to his own brothers,
to his children, in a word to his kinsmen? For this reason
he is neither over curious nor a busybody when he is in this
state of mind; for he is not a meddler with the affairs of
others when he is superintending human affairs, but he is
looking after his own aflfairs. If tliat is not so, you may also
say that the general is a busybody, when he inspects his sol-
diers, and examines them and watches them and punishes
the disorderly. But if while you have a cake under your
arm, you rebuke others, I will say to you, "Will you not
rather go away into a corner and eat that which you have
stolen ; what have you to do with the affairs of others ? For
who are you ? are you the bull of the herd, or the queen of
the bees? Show me the tokens of your supremacy, such as
they have from nature. But if you are a drone claiming the
sovereignty over the bees, do you not suppose that your fel-
low citizens will put you down as the bees do the drones?"
The Cynic also ought to have such power of endurance as
to seem insensible to the common sort, and a stone : no man
reviles him, no man strikes him, no man insults him, but he
gives his body that any man who chooses may do with it
what he likes. For he bears in mind that the inferior must
be overpowered by the superior in that in which it is inferior ;
and the body is inferior to the many, the weaker to the
stronger. He never then descends into such a contest in
which he can be overpowered ; but he immediately withdraws
from things which belong to others, he claims not the things
which are servile. But where there is will and the use of
appearances, there you will see how many eyes he has so that
you may say, " Argus was blind compared with him." Is his
assent ever hasty, his movement (towards an object) rash,
does his desire ever fail in its object, does that which he
would avoid befall him, is his purpose unaccomplished, does
he ever find fault, is he ever humiliated, is he ever envious?
To these he directs all his attention and energy; but as to
every thing else he snores supine. All is peace; there is no
robber who takes away his will, ^* no tyrant. But what say
you as to his body ? I say there is. And his possessions ? I
say there is. And as to magistracies and honours? — What
does he care for them? — When then any person would
26o EPICTETUS
frighten him through them, he says to him, "Begone, look
for children; masks are formidable to them; but I know
that they are made of shell, and have nothing inside."
About such a matter as this you are deliberating. There-
fore, if you please, I urge you in God's name, defer the mat-
ter, and first consider your preparation for it. For see what
Hector says to Andromache, "Retire rather," he says, "into
the house and weave : "
" 'War is the work of men
Of all indeed, but specially 'tis mine.' "
Iliad, vi. 490.
So he was conscious of his own qualification, and knew her
weakness.
NOTES
^ See the description of Thersites in the Iliad, ii. 212.
' The office which in our times corresponds to this description of the
Cynic, is the office of a teacher of religion.
" _ _ "Quod petis hie est.
Est Ulubris, animus si te non deficit sequus."
Horace, Ep. i. 11, 30.
" Willst du immer weiter schweif en ?
Sieh, das Gute liegt so nah.
Lerne nur das Gliick ergreifen,
Denn das Cluck ist immer da."
Goethe.
* These men are supposed to have been strong gladiators. Croesus
the rich king of Lydia, who was taken prisoner by Cyrus the Persian.
' Man then is supposed to consist of a soul and of a body. It may be
useful to remember this when we are examining other passages in
Epictetus.
'"It is observable that Epictetus seems to think it a necessary qualifi-
cation in a teacher sent from God for the instruction of mankind to be
destitute of all external advantages and a suffering character. Thus
doth this excellent man, who had carried human reason to so great a
height, bear testimony to the propriety of that method which the divine
wisdom hath thought fit to follow in the scheme of the Gospel ; whose
great author had not where to lay his head; and which some in later
ages have inconsiderately urged as an argument against the Christian
religion. The infinite disparity between the proposal of the example of
Diogenes in Epictetus and of our Redeemer in the New Testament is
too obvious to need any enlargement." Mrs. Carter.
' Some of the ancients, who called themselves philosophers, did
blame God and his administration of the world ; and there^ are men
who do the same now. If a man is dissatisfied with the condition of the
world, he has the power of going out of it, as Epictetus often says;
DISCOURSES 261
and if he knows, as he must know, that he can not alter the nature of
man and the conditions of human Hfe, he may think it wise to withdraw
from a state of things with which he is not satisfied. If he believes that
there is no God, he is at liberty to do what he thinks best for himself;
and if he does believe that there is a God he may still think that his
power of quitting the world is a power which he may exercise when he
chooses. Many persons commit suicide, not because they are dissatisfied
with the state of the world, but for other reasons. I have not yet heard
of a modern philosopher who found fault with the condition of human
things, and voluntarily retired from life. Our philosophers live as long
as they can, and some of them take care of themselves and of all that
they possess ; they even provide well for the comfort of those whom
they leave behind them. The conclusion seems to be that they prefer
living in this world to leaving it, that their complaints are idle talk ;
and that being men of weak minds, and great vanity they assume the
philosopher's name, and while they try to make others as dissatisfied as
they profess themselves to be, they are really enjoying themselves after
their fashion as much as they can. These men, though they may have
the means of living with as much comfort as the conditions of human
life permit, are dissatisfied, and they would, if they could, make as
dissatisfied as themselves those who have less means of making life
tolerable. These grumblers are not the men who give their money or
their labour or their lives for increasing the happiness of mankind and
diminishing the unavoidable sufferings of human life ; but they find it
easier to blame God, when they believe in him ; or to find fault with
things as they are, which is more absurd, when they do not believe in
God, and when they ought to make the best that they can of the con-
ditions under which we live.
' "E caelo descendit yv&Qt deavrov" Juvenal xi. 27. The express-
sion, " Know thyself" is attributed to several persons, and to Socrates
among them. Self-knowledge is one of the most difficult kinds of
knowledge ; and no man has it completely. Men either estimate their
powers too highly, and this is named vanity, self conceit or arrogance ;
or they think too meanly of their powers and do not accomplish what
they might accomplish, if they had reasonable self confidence.
* Compare this with the Christian precepts of forbearance and love
to enemies, Matthew v. 39-44. The reader will observe that Christ
specifies higher injuries and provocations than Epictetus doth; and
requires of all his followers, what Epictetus describes only as the duty
of one or two extraordinary persons, as such." — Mrs. Carter.
* The Stoics recommended marriage, the procreation of children, the
discharge of magisterial offices, and the duties of social life generally.
^'''It is remarkable that Epictetus here uses the same word (axept-
ditddrooi ) with St. Paul, i Cor. vii. 35, and urges the same considera-
tion, of applying wholly to the service of God, to dissuade from mar-
riage. His observation too that the state of things was then {^dj? iv ica'
parapet) like that of an army prepared for battle, nearly resembles the
Apostle's (ivsdT&da ovdyKrj) present necessity. St. Paul says 2 Tim.
ii. 4 {ovdEl^ drpavEvofiBvoi; kfiitXEKErai. etc.) "no man that warreth
entangleth himself with the affairs of life." So Epictetus says here that
a Cynic must not be ( kfiitsfiXeyfievov) in relations, etc. From these
and many other passages of Epictetus one would be inclined to think
that he was not unacquainted with St. Paul's Epistles or that he had
heard something of the Christian doctrine." Mrs. Carter.
I do not find any evidence of Epictetus being acquainted with the
262 EPICTETUS
Epistles of Paul. It is possible that he had heard something of the
Christian doctrine, but I have not observed any evidence of the fact.
Epictetus and Paul have not the same opinion about marriage, for Paul
says that " if they can not contain let them marry : for it is better to
marry than to burn." Accordingly his doctrine is "to avoid fornication
let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own
husband." He does not directly say what a man should do when he is
not able to maintain a wife; but the inference is plain what he will do
(l Cor. vii. 2). Paul's view of marriage differs from that of Epictetus,
who recommends marriage. Paul does not : he writes, " I say therefore
to the unmarried and widows, it is good for them if they abide even
as I." He does not acknowledge marriage and the begetting of children
as a duty ; which Epicetus did.
In the present condition of the world Epictetus says that the minister
of God should not marry, because the cares of a family would distract
him and make him unable to discharge his duties There is sound sense
in this. A minister of God should not be distracted by the cares of a
family, especially if he is poor.
" The wife of Crates was Hipparchia, who persisted against all ad-
vice in marrying Crates and lived with him exactly as he lived. Dioge-
nes Laertius, vi. 96. Upton.
"Diogenes Laertius, vi : 42.
" The Cynic is in Epictetus the minister of religion. He must be pure,
for otherwise how can he reprove vice? This is a useful lesson to those
whose business it is to correct the vices of mankind.
"This is quoted by M. Antoninus, xi. 36.
CHAPTER XXIII
TO THOSE WHO READ AND DISCUSS FOR THE SAKE OF
OSTENTATION^
FIRST say to yourself who you wish to be: then do
accordingly what you are doing; for in nearly all
other things we see this to be so. Those who fol-
low athletic exercises first determine what they wish
to be, then they do accordingly what follows. If a man is
a runner in the long course, there is a certain kind of diet, of
walking, rubbing, and exercise: if a man is a runner in the
stadium, all these things are different ; if he is a Pentathlete,
they are still more different. So you will find it also in the
arts. If you are a carpenter, you will have such, and such
things ; if a worker in metal, such things. For everything that
we do, if we refer it to no end, we shall do it to no purpose ;
and if we refer it to the wrong end, we shall miss the mark.
Further, there is a general end or purpose, and a particular
purpose. First of all, we must act as a man. What is com-
prehended in this? We must not be like a sheep, though
gentle; nor mischievous, like a wild beast. But the par-
ticular end has reference to each person's mode of life and
his will. The lute-player acts as a lute-player, the carpenter
as a carpenter, the philosopher as a philosopher, the rheto-
rician as a rhetorician. When then you say, Come and hear
me read to you : take care first of all that you are not doing
this without a purpose; then if you have discovered that you
are doing this with reference to a purpose, consider if it is
the right purpose. Do you wish to do good or to be praised ?
Immediately you hear him saying. To me what is the value of
praise from the many ? and he says well, for it is of no value
to a musician, so far as he is a musician, nor to a geome-
trician. Do you then wish to be useful? in what? tell us
that we may run to your audience room. Now can a man
do anything useful to others, who has not received some-
thing useful himself? No, for neither can a man do any
263
264 EPICTETUS
thing useful in the carpenter's art, unless he is a carpenter;
nor in the shoemaker's art, unless he is a shoemaker.
Do you wish to know then if you have received any advan-
tage? Produce your opinions, philosopher. What is the
thing which desire promises? Not to fail in the object.
What does aversion promise? Not to fall into that which
you would avoid. Well ; do we fulfill their promise ? Tell
me the truth; but if you lie, I will tell you. Lately when
your hearers came together rather coldly, and did not give
you applause, you went away humbled. Lately again when
you had been praised, you went about and said to all, What
did you think of me? Wonderful, master, I swear by all
that is dear to me. But how did I treat of that particular
matter? Which? The passage in which I described Pan
and the nymphs?^ Excellently. Then do you tell me that
in desire and in aversion you are acting according to nature ?
Be gone; try to persuade somebody else. Did you not
praise a certain person contrary to your opinion ? and did you
not flatter a certain person who was the son of a senator?
Would you wish your own children to be such persons? — I
hope not — Why then did you praise and flatter him? He
is an ingenuous youth and listens well to discourses — How
is this? — He admires me. You have stated your proof.
Then what do you think? do not these very people secretly
despise you? When then a man who is conscious that he
has neither done any good nor ever thinks of it, finds a phi-
losopher who says, You have a great natural talent, and you
have a candid and good disposition, what else do you think
that he says except this. This man has some need of me ? Or
tell me what act that indicates a great mind has he shown ?
Observe; he has been in your company a long time; he has
listened to your discourses, he has heard you reading ; has he
become more modest ? has he been turned to reflect on him-
self ? has he perceived in what a bad state he is ? has he cast
away self-conceit? does he look for a person to teach him?
He does. A man who will teach him to live? No, fool, but
how to talk ; for it is for this that he admires you also. Lis-
ten and hear what he says: This man writes with perfect
art, much better than Dion.^ This is altogether another
thing. Does he say, This man is modest, faithful, free from
DISCOURSES 265
perturbations ? and even if he did say it, I should say to him,
Since this man is faithful, tell me what this faithful man is.
And if he could not tell me, I should add this. First under-
stand what you say, and then speak.
You then, who are in a wretched plight and gaping after
applause and counting your auditors, do you intend to be
useful to others? — To-day many more attended my dis-
course. Yes, many; we suppose five hundred. That is
nothing; suppose that there were a thousand — Dion never
had so many hearers — How could he? — And they under-
stand what is said beautifully. What is fine, master, can
move even a stone — See, these are the words of a philoso-
pher. This is the disposition of a man who will do good to
others; here is a man who has listened to discourses, who
has read what is written about Socrates as Socratic, not as
the compositions of Lysias and Isocrates. "I have often
wondered by what arguments."* Not so, but "by what argu-
ment" : this is more exact than that — What, have you read
the words at all in a different way from that in which you
read little odes? For if you read them as you ought, you
would not have been attending to such matters, but you
would rather have been looking to these words: "An)^us
and Melitus are able to kill me, but they cannot harm me:"
"and I am always of such a disposition as to pay regard to
nothing of my own except to the reason which on inquiry
seems to me the best."^ Hence who ever heard Socrates
say, 'T know something and I teach :" but he used to send
different people to different teachers. Therefore they used
to come to him and ask to be introduced to philosophers by
him ; and he would take them and recommend them. — Not
so ; but as he accompanied them he would say. Hear me to-
day discoursing in the house of Quadratus.® Why should
I hear you? Do you wish to show me that you put words
together cleverly? You put them together, man; and what
good will it do you? — But only praise me. — What do you
mean by praising? — Say to me, admirable, wonderful. —
Well, I say so. But if that is praise whatever it is which
philosophers mean by the name {Karr^yopiaY of good, what
have I to praise in you? If it is good to speak well, teach
men, and I will praise you. — What then ? ought a man to lis-
ts
266 EPICTETUS
ten to such things without pleasure? — I hope not. For my
part I do not listen even to a lute-player without pleasure.
Must I then for this reason stand and play the lute? Hear
what Socrates says, "Nor would it be seemly for a man of my
age, like a young man composing addresses, to appear before
you."^ Like a young man, he says. For in truth this small
art is an elegant thing, to select words, and to put them to-
gether, and to come forward and gracefully to read them or
to speak, and while he is reading to say, "There are not many
who can do these things, I swear by all that you value."
Does a philosopher invite people to hear him? As the
sun himself draws men to him, or as food does, does not
the philosopher also draw to him those who will receive ben-
efit ? What physician invites a man to be treated by him ?
Indeed I now hear that even the physicians in Rome do in-
vite patients, but when I lived there, the physicians were in-
vited. "I invite you to come and hear that things are in a
bad way for you, and that you are taking care of every thing
except that of which you ought to take care, and that you are
ignorant of the good and the bad and are unfortunate and
unhappy." A fine kind of invitation : and yet if the words
of the philosopher do not produce this effect on you, he is
dead, and so is the speaker. Rufus was used to say : "If you
have leisure to praise me, I am speaking to no purpose."^
Accordingly he used to speak in such a way that every one of
us who were sitting there supposed that some one had ac-
cused him before Rufus : he so touched on what was doing,
he so placed before the eyes every man's faults.
The philosopher's school, ye men, is a surgery : you ought
not to go out of it with pleasure, but with pain. For you
are not in sound health when you enter : one has dislocated
his shoulder, another has an abscess, a third a fistula, and a
fourth a headache. Then do I sit and utter to you little
thoughts and exclamations that you may praise me and go
away, one with his shoulder in the same condition in which
he entered, another with his head still aching, and a third
with his fistula or his abscess just as they were? Is it for
this then that young men shall quit home, and leave their
parents and their friends and kinsmen and property, that
they may say to you, Wonderful! when you are uttering
DISCOURSES 267
your exclamations. Did Socrates do this, or Zeno, or
Cleanthes ?
What then? is there not the hortatory style? Who de-
nies it? as there is the style of refutation, and the didactic
style. Who then ever reckoned a fourth style with these,
the style of display? What is the hortatory style? To be
able to show both to one person and to many the struggle
in which they are engaged, and that they think more about
any thing than about what they really wish. For they wish
the things which lead to happiness, but they look for them
in the wrong place. In order that this may be done, a thou-
sand seats must be placed and men must be invited to listen,
and you must ascend the pulpit in a fine robe or cloak and
describe the death of Achilles. Cease, I intreat you by the
gods, to spoil good words and good acts as much as you can.
Nothing can have more power in exhortation than when the
speaker shows to the hearers that he has need of them. But
tell me who when he hears you reading or discoursing is
anxious about himself or turns to reflect on himself ? or when
he has gone out says. The philosopher hit me well : I must
no longer do these things. But does he not, even if you
have a great reputation, say to some person? He spoke
finely about Xerxes ;*° and another says, No, but about the
battle of Thermopylae. Is this listening to a philosopher?
NOTES
* Epictetus in an amusing manner touches on the practice of Sophists,
Rhetoricians, and others, who made addresses only to get praise. This
practice of reciting prose or verse compositions was common in the
time of Epictetus, as we may learn from the letters of the younger
Pliny, Juvenal, Martial, and the author of the treatise de Causis cor-
ruptae eloquentiae. Upton.
Such were the subjects which the literary men of the day delighted in.
' Dion of Prusa in Bithynia was named Chrysostomus (golden-
mouthed) because of his eloquence. He was a rhetorician and sophist,
as the term was then understood, and was living at the same time as
Epictetus. Eighty of his orations written in Greek are still extant, and
some fragments of fifteen.
* These words are the beginning of Xenophon's Memorabilia, i. i.
The small critics disputed whether the text should read ridt Xoyoti, or
Ttvt Xoyoo.
' From the Crito of Plato, c. 6.
* The rich, says Upton, used to lend their houses for recitations, as we
learn from Pliny, Ep. viii. 12 and Juvenal, vii. 40.
" Si dulcedine famae
Succensus recites, maculosas commodat aedes."
268 EPICTETUS
Quadratus is a Roman name. There appears to be a confusion between
Socrates and Quadratus. The man says, No. Socrates would not do
so; but he would do, as a man might do now. He would say on the
road; I hope you will come to hear me. I don't find anything in the
notes on this passage; but it requires explanation.
^ KaTTjyopia is one of Aristotle's common terms.
' From Plato's Apology of Socrates.
• Aulus Gellius, v. i. Seneca, Ep. 52. Upton.
" Cicero, de Officiis i. 18 : "Quae magno animo et fortiter excellen-
terque gesta sunt, ea pescio quomodo pleniore ore laudamus. Hinc
Rhetorum campus de Marathone, Salamine, Plataeis, Thermopylis,
Leuctris,"
CHAPTER XXIV
THAT WE OUGHT NOT TO BE MOVED BY A DESIRE FOR THOSE
THINGS WHICH ARE NOT IN OUR POWER
LET not that which in another is contrary to nature be
an evil to you : for you are not formed by nature to
be depressed with others nor to be unhappy with
others, but to be happy with them. If a man is un-
happy, remember that his unhappiness is his own fault : for
God has made all men to be happy, to be free from perturba-
tions. For this purpose he has given means to them, some
things to each person as his own, and other things not as
his own : some things subject to hindrance and compulsion
and deprivation ; and these things are not a man's own : but
the things which are not subject to hindrances, are his own;
and the nature of good and evil, as it was fit to be done by
him who takes care of us and protects us like a father, he
has made our own. — But you say, I have parted from a
certain person, and he is grieved. — Why did he consider as
his own that which belongs to another ? why, when he looked
on you and was rejoiced, did he not also reckon that you
are mortal, that it is natural for you to part from him for
a foreign country? Therefore he suffers the consequences
of his own folly. But why do you or for what purpose be-
wail yourself ? Is it that you also have not thought of these
things ? but like poor women who are good for nothing, you
have enjoyed all things in which you took pleasure, as if
you would always enjoy them, both places and men and con-
versation; and now you sit and weep because you do not
see the same persons and do not live in the same places. —
Indeed you deserve this, to be more wretched than crows and
ravens who have the power of flying where they please and
changing their nests for others, and crossing the seas with-
out lamenting or regretting their former condition. — Yes,
but this happens to them because they are irrational crea-
tures.— Was reason then given to us by the gods for the
purpose of unhappiness and misery, that we may pass our
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270 EPICTETUS
lives in wretchedness and lamentation? Must all persons
be immortal and must no man go abroad, and must we our-
selves not go abroad, but remain rooted like plants; and if
any of our familiar friends goes abroad, must we sit and
weep ; and on the contrary, when he returns, must we dance
and clap our hands like children?
Shall we not now wean ourselves and remember what we
have heard from the philosophers? if we did not listen to
them as if they were jugglers : they tell us that this world is
one city,^ and the substance out of which it has been formed
is one, and that there must be a certain period, and that
some things must give way to others, that some must be dis-
solved, and others come in their place; some to remain in
the same place, and others to be moved : and that all things
are full of friendship, first of the gods,^ and then of men
who by nature are made to be of one family ; and some must
be with one another, and others must be separated, rejoicing
in those who are with them, and not grieving for those who
are removed from them; and man in addition to being by
nature of a noble temper and having a contempt of all things
which are not in the power of his will, also possesses this
property not to be rooted nor to be naturally fixed to . the
earth, but to go at different times to different places, some-
times from the urgency of certain occasions, and at others
merely for the sake of seeing. So it was with Ulysses, who
saw
"Of many men the states, and learned their ways."*
And still earlier it was the fortune of Hercules to visit all
the inhabited world
"Seeing men's lawless deeds and their good rules of law :"*
casting out and clearing away their lawlessness and intro-
ducing in their place good rules of law. And yet how many
friends do you think that he had in Thebes, how many in
Argos, how many in Athens? and how many do you think
that he gained by going about? And he married also, when
it seemed to him a proper occasion, and begot children, and
left them without lamenting or regretting or leaving them
as orphans ; for he knew that no man is an orphan ; but it is
DISCOURSES 271
the father who takes care of all men always and continu-
ously. For it was not as mere report that he had heard that
Zeus is the father of men, for he thought that Zeus was his
own father, and he called him so, and to him he looked when
he was doing what he did. Therefore he was enabled to
live happily in all places. And it is never possible for happi-
ness and desire of what is not present to come together.
For that which is happy must have alP that it desires, must
resemble a person who is filled with food, and must have
neither thirst nor hunger. — But Ulysses felt a desire for
his wife and wept as he sat on a rock. — Do you attend to
Homer and his stories in every thing ? Or if Ulysses really
wept, what was he else than an unhappy man? and what
good man is unhappy? In truth the whole is badly admin-
istered, if Zeus does not take care of his own citizens that
they may be happy like himself. But these things are not
lawful or right to think of : and if Ulysses did weep and la-
ment, he was not a good man. For who is good if he knows
not who he is? and who knows what he is, if he forgets
that things which have been made are perishable, and that
it is not possible for one human being to be with another
always? To desire then things which are impossible is to
have a slavish character, and is foolish : it is the part of
a stranger, of a man who fights against God in the only way
that he can, by his opinions.
But my mother laments when she does not see me. — Why
has she not learned these principles? and I do not say this,
that we should not take care that she may not lament, but
I say that we ought not to desire in every way what is not
our own. And the sorrow of another is another's sorrow :
but my sorrow is my own. I then will stop my own sorrow
by every means, for it is in my power: and the sorrow of
another I will endeavour to stop as far as I can ; but I will
not attempt to do it by every means ; for if I do, I shall be
fighting against God, I shall be opposing Zeus and shall be
placing myself against him in the administration of the uni-
verse; and the reward (the punishment) of this fighting
against God and of this disobedience not only will the chil-
dren of my children pay, but I also shall myself, both by day
and by night, startled by dreams, perturbed, trembling at
272 EPICTETUS
every piece of news, and having my tranquillity depending
on the letters of others. — Some person has arrived from
Rome. I only hope that there is no harm. But what harm can
happen to you, where you are not? — From Hellas (Greece)
some one is come: I hope that there is no harm. — In this
way every place may be the cause of misfortune to you. Is
it not enough for you to be unfortunate there where you are,
and must you be so even beyond sea, and by the report of
letters ? Is this the way in which your affairs are in a state
of security? — Well then suppose that my friends have died
in the places which are far from me. — What else have they
suffered than that which is the condition of mortals? Or
how are you desirous at the same time to live to old age, and
at the same time not to see the death of any person whom you
love ? Know you not that in the course of a long time many
and various kinds of things must happen ; that a fever shall
overpower one, a robber another, and a third a tyrant ? Such
is the condition around us, such are those who live with us in
the world : cold and heat, and unsuitable ways of living, and
journeys by land, and voyages by sea, and winds, and various
circumstances which surround us, destroy one man, and ban-
ish another, and throw one upon an embassy and another into
an army. Sit down then in a flutter at all these things, la-
menting, unhappy, unfortunate, dependent on another, and
dependent not on one or two, but on ten thousands upon ten
thousands.
Did you hear this when you were with the philosophers ?
did you learn this? do you not know that human life is a
warfare? that one man must keep watch, another must go
out as a spy, and a third must fight ? and it is not possible
that all should be in one place, nor is it better that it should
be so. But you neglecting to do the commands of the gen-
eral complain when any thing more hard than usual is im-
posed on you, and you do not observe what you make the
army become as far as it is in your power; that if all imitate
you, no man will dig a trench, no man will put a rampart
round, nor keep watch, nor expose himself to danger, but
will appear to be useless for the purposes of an army. Again,
in a vessel if you go as a sailor, keep to one place and stick
to it. And if you are ordered to climb the mast, refuse; if
DISCOURSES 273
to run to the head of the ship, refuse ; and what master of a
ship will endure you? and will he not pitch you overboard
as a useless thing, an impediment only and bad example to
the other sailors? And so it is here also: every man's life
is a kind of warfare, and it is long and diversified. You
must observe the duty of a soldier and do everything at the
nod of the general ; if it is possible, divining what his wishes
are: for there is no resemblance between that general and
this, neither in strength nor in superiority of character. You
are placed in a great office of command and not in any mean
place ; but you are always a senator. Do you not know that
such a man must give little time to the affairs of his house-
hold, but be often away from home, either as a governor
or one who is governed or discharging some office, or serv-
ing in war or acting as a judge? Then do you tell me that
you wish, as a plant, to be fixed to the same places and to
be rooted? — Yes, for it is pleasant. — Who says that it is
not ? but a soup is pleasant, and a handsome woman is pleas-
ant. What else do those say who make pleasure their end ?
Do you not see of what men you have uttered the language ?
that it is the language of Epicureans and catamites? Next
while you are doing what they do and holding their opinions,
do you speak to us the words of Zeno and of Socrates?
Will you not throw away as far as you can the things be-
longing to others with which you decorate yourself, though
they do not fit you at all ? For what else do they desire than
to sleep without hindrance and free from compulsion, and
when they have risen to yawn at their leisure, and to wash
the face, then write and read what they choose, and then
talk about some trifling matter being praised by their friends
whatever they may say, then to go forth for a walk, and
having walked about a little to bathe, and then eat and sleep
such sleep as is the fashion of such men? why need we say
how? for one can easily conjecture. Come, do you also tell
your own way of passing the time which you desire, you
who are an admirer of truth and of Socrates and Diog-
enes. What do you wish to do in Athens? the same (that
others do), or something else? Why then do you call your-
self a Stoic? Well, but they who falsely call themselves
Roman citizens,® are severely punished; and should those,
274
EPICTETUS
who falsely claim so great and reverend a thing and name,
get off unpunished? or is this not possible, but the law di-
vine and strong and inevitable is this, which exacts the se-
verest punishments from those who commit the greatest
crimes? For what does this law say? Let him who pre-
tends to things which do not belong to him be a boaster, a
vainglorious man;'^ let him who disobeys the divine ad-
ministration be base, and a slave; let him suffer grief, let
him be envious, let him pity;* and in a word let him be un-
happy and lament.
Well then ; do you wish me to pay court to a certain per- .
son? to go to his doors ?^ — If reason requires this to be done
for the sake of country, for the sake of kinsmen, for the
sake of mankind, why should you not go? You are not
ashamed to go to the doors of a shoemaker, when you are
in want of shoes, nor to the door of a gardener, when you
want lettuces ; and are you ashamed to go to the doors of the
rich when you want any thing? — Yes, for I have no awe of
a shoemaker — Don't feel any awe of the rich — Nor will I
flatter the gardener — And do not flatter the rich — How then
shall I get what I want ? — Do I say to you, go as if you were
certain to get what you want ? And do not I only tell you,
that you may do what is becoming to yourself ? Why then
should I still go? That you may have gone, that you may
have discharged the duty of a citizen, of a brother, of a
friend. And further remember that you have gone to the
shoemaker, to the seller of vegetables, who have no power
in any thing great or noble, though he may sell dear. You
go to buy lettuces: they cost an obolus (penny), but not a
talent. So it is here also. The matter is worth going for
to the rich man's door — Well, I will go — It is worth talk-
ing about — Let it be so ; I will talk with him — But you must
also kiss his hand and flatter him with praise — Away with
that, it is a talent's worth : it is not profitable to me, nor to
the state nor to my friends, to have done that which spoils
a good citizen and a friend. — But you will seem not to have
been eager about the matter, if you do not succeed. Have you
again forgotten why you went ? Know you not that a good
man does nothing for the sake of appearance, but for the sake
of doing right? — What advantage is it then to him to have
DISCOURSES 275
done right ? — And what advantage is it to a man who writes
the name of Dion to write it as he ought ? — The advantage
is to have written it. — Is there no reward then^^ ? — Do you
seek a reward for a good man greater than doing what is
good and just? At Olympia you wish for nothing more,
but it seems to you enough to be crowned at the games.
Does it seem to you so small and worthless a thing to be
good and happy? For these purposes being introduced by
the gods into this city (the world), and it being now your
duty to undertake the work of a man, do you still want
nurses also and a mamma, and do foolish women by their
weeping move you and make you effeminate? Will you
thus never cease to be a foolish child ? know you not that he
who does the acts of a child, the older he is, the more ridic-
ulous he is ?
In Athens did you see no one by going to his house? —
I visited any man that I pleased — Here also be ready to
see, and you will see whom you please: only let it be with-
out meanness, neither with desire nor with aversion, and
your affairs will be well managed. But this result does not
depend on going nor on standing at the doors, but it de-
pends on what is within, on your opinions. When you
have learned not to value things which are external and
not dependent on the will, and to consider that not one of
them is your own, but that these things only are your own,
to exercise the judgment well, to form opinions, to move
towards an object, to desire, to turn from a thing, where
is there any longer room for flattery, where for meanness?
why do you still long for the quiet there (at Athens), and
for the places to which you are accustomed? Wait a little
and you will again find these places familiar: then, if you
are of so ignoble a nature, again if you leave these also,
weep and lament.
How then shall I become of an affectionate temper? By
being of a noble disposition, and happy. For it is not rea-
sonable to be mean-spirited nor to lament yourself, nor to
depend on another, nor even to blame God or man. I en-
treat you, become an affectionate person in this way, by
observing these rules. But if through this affection, as you
name it, you are going to be a slave and wretched, there is no
276 EPICTETUS
profit in being affectionate. And what prevents you from
loving another as a person subject to mortahty, as one who
may go away from you. Did not Socrates love his own
children ? He did ; but it was as a free man, as one who re-
membered that he must first be a friend to the gods. For
this reason he violated nothing which was becoming to a
good man, neither in making his defence nor by fixing a
penalty on himself,^ ^ nor even in the former part of his
life when he was a senator or when he was a soldier. But we
are fully supplied with every pretext for being of ignoble
temper, some for the sake of a child, some for a mother, and
others for brethren's sake. But it is not fit for us to be un-
happy on account of any person, but to be happy on ac-
count of all, but chiefly on account of God who has made
us for this end. Well, did Diogenes^ ^ love nobody, who was
so kind and so much a lover of all that for mankind in
general he willingly undertook so much labour and bodily
sufferings? He did love mankind, but how? As became
a minister of God, at the same time caring for men, and
being also subject to God. For this reason all the earth
was his country, and no particular place; and when he was
taken prisoner he did not regret Athens nor his associates
and friends there, but even he became familiar with the
pirates and tried to improve them; and being sold after-
wards he lived in Corinth as before at Athens ; and he would
have behaved the same, if he had gone to the country of
the Perrhaebi.^^ Thus is freedom acquired. For this rea-
son he used to say, "Ever since Antisthenes made me free,
I have not been a slave." How did Antisthenes make him
free? Hear what he says: Antisthenes taught me what is
my own, and what is not my own; possessions are not my
own, nor kinsmen, domestics, friends, nor reputation, nor
places familiar, nor mode of life; all these belong to others.
What then is your own? The use of appearances. This
he showed to me, that I possess it free from hindrance, and
from compulsion, no person can put an obstacle in my way,
no person can force me to use appearances otherwise than
I wish. Who then has any power over me? Philip or
Alexander, or Perdiccas or the great king? How have
they this power? For if a man is going to be overpowered
DISCOURSES ■ 277
by a man, he must long before be overpowered by things. If
then pleasure is not able to subdue a man, nor pain, nor
fame, nor wealth, but he is able, when he chooses, to spit
out all his poor body in a man's face and depart from life,
whose slave can he still be? But if he dwelt with pleasure
in Athens, and was overpowered by this manner of life, his
affairs would have been at every man's command ; the stron-
ger would have the power of grieving him. How do you
think that Diogenes would have flattered the pirates that
they might sell him to some Athenian, that sometime he
might see that beautiful Piraeus, and the Long Walls and
the Acropolis? In what condition would you see them?
As a captive, a slave and mean : and what would be the use of
it for you ? — Not so : but I should see them as a free man —
Show me, how you would be free. Observe, some person
has caught you, who leads you away from your accustomed
place of abode and says, "You are my slave, for it is in my
power to hinder you from living as you please, it is in my
power to treat you gently, and to humble you: when I
choose, on the contrary you are cheerful and go elated to
Athens." What do you say to him who treats you as a
slave? What means have you of finding one who will
rescue you from slavery ? Or can not you even look him in
the face, but without saying more do you intreat to be set
free? Man, you ought to go gladly to prison, hastening,
going before those who lead you there. Then, I ask you,
are you unwilling to live in Rome and desire to live in
Hellas (Greece) ? And when you must die, will you then
also fill us with your lamentations, because you will not see
Athens nor walk about in the Lyceion? Have you gone
abroad for this? was it for this reason you have sought to
find some person from whom you might receive benefit?
What benefit ? That you may solve syllogisms more readily,
or handle hypothetical arguments? and for this reason did
you leave brother, country, friends, your family, that you
might return when you had learned these things? So you
did not go abroad to obtain constancy of mind, nor free-
dom from perturbation, nor in order that being secure from
harm you may never complain of any person, accuse no
person, and no man may wrong you, and thus you may
278 EPICTETUS
maintain your relative position without impediment? This
is a fine traffic that you have gone abroad for in syllogisms
and sophistical arguments and hypothetical : if you like,
take your place in the agora (market or public place) and
proclaim them for sale like dealers in physic.^* Will you
not deny even all that you have learned that you may not
bring a bad name on your theorems as useless ? What harm
has philosophy done you? Wherein has Chrysippus injured
you that you should prove by your acts that his labours
are useless? Were the evils that you had there (at home)
not enough, those which were the cause of your pain and
lamentation, even if you had not gone abroad? Have you
added more to the list? And if you again have other ac-
quaintances and friends, you will have more causes for
lamentation; and the same also if you take an affection
for another country. Why then do you live to surround
yourself with other sorrows upon sorrows through which
you are unhappy ? Then, I ask you, do you call this affec-
tion? What affection, man! If it is a good thing, it is the
cause of no evil : if it is bad, I have nothing to do with it.
I am formed by nature for my own good : I am not formed
for my own evil.
What then is the discipline for this purpose ? First of all
the highest and the principal, and that which stands as it
were at the entrance, is this : when you are delighted with
anything, be delighted as with a thing which is not one of
those which can not be taken away, but as with something of
such a kind, as an earthen pot is, or a glass cup, that when it
has been broken, you may remember what it was, and may
not be troubled. So in this matter also: if you kiss your
own child, or your brother or friend, never give full license
to the appearance {(pavradiav) , and allow not your pleasure
to go as far as it chooses ; but check it, and curb it as those
who stand behind men in their triumphs and remind them
that they are mortal.^*^ Do you also remind yourself in like
manner, that he whom you love is mortal, and that what you
love is nothing of your own : it has been given to you for the
present, not that it should not be taken from you, nor has it
been given to you for all time, but as a fig is given to you or
a bunch of grapes at the appointed season of the year. But if
DISCOURSES 279
you wish for these things in winter, you are a fool. So if you
wish for your son or friend when it is not allowed to you, you
must know that you are wishing for a fig in winter. For such
as winter is to a fig, such is every event which happens from
the universe to the things which are taken away according to
its nature. And further, at the times when you are delighted
with a thing, place before yourself the contrary appearances.
What harm is it while you are kissing your child to say with
a lisping voice, "To-morrow you will die;" and to a friend
also, "To-morrow you will go away or I shall, and never
shall we see one another again?" — But these are words of
bad omen. — And some incantations also are of bad omen;
but because they are useful, I don't care for this; only let
them be useful. But do you call things to be of bad omen ex-
cept those which are significant of some evil ? Cowardice is
a word of bad omen, and meanness of spirit, and sorrow, and
grief and shamelessness. These words are of bad omen : and
yet we ought not to hesitate to utter them in order to protect
ourselves against the things. Do you tell me that a name
which is significant of any natural thing is of bad omen ? say
that even for the ears of corn to be reaped is of bad omen, for
it signifies the destruction of the ears, but not of the world.
Say that the falling of the leaves also is of bad omen, and for
the dried fig to take the place of the green fig, and for raisins
to be made from the grapes. For all these things are changes
from a former state into other states ; not a destruction, but
a certain fixed economy and administration. Such is going
away from home and a small change : such is death, a greater
change, not from the state which now is to that which is not,
but to that which is not now. — Shall I then no longer exist?
— You will not exist, but you will be something else, of which
the world now has need : for you also came into existence
not when you chose, but when the world had need of you.^®
Wherefore the wise and good man, remembering who he
is and whence he came, and by whom he was produced, is
attentive only to this, how he may fill his place with due regu-
larity, and obediently to God. Dost thou still wish me to
exist (live) ? I will continue to exist as free, as noble in
nature, as thou hast wished me to exist : for thou hast made
me free from hindrance in that which is my own. But hast
28o EPICTETUS
thou no further need of me? I thank thee; and so far I
have remained for thy sake, and for the sake of no other
person, and now in obedience to thee I depart. How dost
thou depart? Again, I say, as thou hast pleased, as free,
as thy servant, as one who hast known thy commands and
thy prohibitions. And so long as I shall stay in thy service,
whom dost thou will me to be ? A prince or a private man,
a senator or a common person, a soldier or a general, a
teacher or a master of a family ? whatever place and position
thou mayest assign to me, as Socrates says, I will die ten
thousand times rather than desert them. And where dost
thou will me to be ? in Rome or Athens, or Thebes or Gyara.
Only remember me there where I am. If thou sendest me
to a place where there are no means for men living according
to nature, I shall not depart (from life) in disobedience to
thee, but as if thou wast giving me the signal to retreat : I
do not leave thee, let this be far from my intention, but I per-
ceive that thou hast no need of me. If means of living ac-
cording to nature be allowed to me, I will seek no other
place than that in which I am, or other men than those
among whom I am.
Let these thoughts be ready to hand by night and by day :
these you should write, these you should read : about these
you should talk to yourself, and to others. Ask a man, Can
you help me at all for this purpose? and further, go to an-
other and to another. Then if any thing that is said be con-
trary to your wish, this reflection first will immediately re-
lieve you, that it is not unexpected. For it is a great thing
in all cases to say, I knew that I begot a son who is mortal.^^
For so you also will say, I knew that I am mortal, I knew
that I may leave my home, I knew that I may be ejected from
it, I knew that I may be led to prison. Then if you turn
round and look to yourself, and seek the place from which
comes that which has happened, you will forthwith recollect
that it comes from the place of things which are out of the
power of the will, and of things which are not my own.
What then is it to me? Then, you will ask, and this is the
chief thing : And who is it that sent it ? The leader, or the
general, the state, the law of the state. Give it me then, for
I must always obey the law in every thing. Then, when the
DISCOURSES 281
appearance (of things) pains you, for it is not in your power
to prevent this, contend against it by the aid of reason, con-
quer it : do not allow it to gain strength nor to lead you to
the consequences by raising images such as it pleases and as
it pleases. If you be in Gyara, do not imagine the mode of
living at Rome, and how many pleasures there were for him
who lived there and how many there would be for him who
returned to Rome : but fix your mind on this matter, how a
man who lives in Gyara ought to live in Gyara like a man of
courage. And if you be in Rome, do not imagine what the
life in Athens is, but think only of the life in Rome.
Then in the place of all other delights substitute this, that
of being conscious that you are obeying God, than not in
word, but in deed you are performing the acts of a wise and
good man. For what a thing it is for a man to be able to say
to himself. Now whatever the rest may say in solemn man-
ner in the schools and may be judged to be saying in a way
contrary to common opinion (or in a strange way) this I am
doing; and they are sitting and discoursing of my vir-
tues and inquiring about me and praising me; and of this
Zeus has willed that I shall receive from myself a demonstra-
tion, and shall myself know if he has a soldier such as he
ought to have, a citizen such as he ought to have, and if he
has chosen to produce me to the rest of mankind as a witness
of the things which are independent of the will: See that
you fear without reason, that you foolishly desire what you
do desire : seek not the good in things external ; seek it in
yourselves : if you do not, you will not find it. For this pur-
pose he leads me at one time hither, at another time sends
me thither, shows me to men as poor, without authority, and
sick; sends me to Gyara, leads me into prison, not because
he hates me, far from him be such a meaning, for who hates
the best of his servants? nor yet because he cares not for me.
for he does not neglect any even of the smallest things;^®
but he does this for the purpose of exercising me and making
use of me as a witness to others. Being appointed to such a
service, do I still care about the place in which I am. or with
whom I am, or what men say about me? and do I not en-
tirely direct my thoughts to God and to his instructions and
commands ?
282 EPICTETUS
Having these things (or thoughts) always in hand, and
exercising them by yourself, and keeping them in readiness,
you will never be in want of one to comfort you and
strengthen you. For it is not shameful to be without some-
thing to eat, but not to have reason sufficient for keeping
away fear and sorrow. But if once you have gained ex-
emption from sorrow and fear, will there any longer be a
tyrant for you, or a tyrant's guard, or attendants on
Caesar? Or shall any appointment to offices at court cause
you pain, or shall those who sacrifice in the Capitol on the
occasion of being named to certain functions, cause pain to
you who have received so great authority from Zeus ? Only
do not make a proud display of it, nor boast of it ; but shew
it by your acts ; and if no man perceives it, be satisfied that
you are yourself in a healthy state and happy.
NOTES
* See ii. 5, 26.
' See iii. 13, 15.
* Homer, Odyssey i. 3.
* Odyssey, xvii. 487.
■> dicexetv. See iii. 2, 13. Paul to the Philippians, iv. 18.
'Suetonius (Claudius, 25) says: "Peregrinae conditionis homines
vetuit usurpare Romana nomina, duntaxat gentilia. Civitatem Ro-
manam usurpantes in campo, Esquilino securi percussit."
^ This is a denunciation of the hypocrite.
' "Pity" perhaps means that he will suffer the perturbation of pity,
when he ought not to feel it. I am not sure about the exact meaning.
* "What follows hath no connection with what immediately preceded ;
but belongs to the general subject of the chapter." Mrs. Carter.
"The person with whom Epictetus chiefly held this discourse, seems
to have been instructed by his friends to pay his respects to some great
man at Nicopolis (perhaps the procurator, iii. 4. i) and to visit his
house." Schweighauser.
" The reward of virtue is in the acts of virtue. The Stoics taught
that virtue is its own reward. When I was a boy I have written this
in copies, but I did not know what it meant. I know now that few
people believe it; and like the man here, they inquire what reward
they shall have for doing as they ought to do. A man of common
sense would give no other answer than what Epictetus gives. But that
will not satisfy all. The heathens must give the answer : " For what
more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service? Art thou
not content that thou hast done something conformable to thy nature,
and dost thou seek to be paid for it? just as if the eye demanded a
recompense for seeing or the feet for walking." M. Antoninus, ix. 42.
Compare Seneca, de Vita Beata, c. 9.
" It was the custom at Athens when the court (the dicasts) had de-
termined to convict an accused person, in some cases at least, to ask
DISCOURSES 283
him what penalty he proposed to be inflicted on himself; but Socrates
refused to do this or to allow his friends to do it, for he said that to
name the penalty was the same as admitting his guilt (Xenophon,
Apologia, 23). Socrates said that if he did name a proper penalty for
himself, it would be that he should daily be allowed to dine in the
Prytaneium (Plato, Apology, c. 26; Cicero, De Oratore, i. 54).
" The character of Diogenes is described very diflFerently by Epic-
tetus from that which we read in common books.
"A people in Thessaly between the river Peneius and Mount Olym-
pus. It is the same as if Epictetus had said to any remote country.
" This is an old practice, to go about and sell physic to people.
Cicero (Pro Cluentio, c. 14) speaks of such a quack (pharmacopola),
who would do a poisoning job for a proper sum of money. I have seen
a travelling doctor in France who went about in a cart, and rang a
bell, at the sound of which people came round him. Some who were
deaf had stuff poured into their ears, paid their money, and made way
for others who had other complaints.
" It was the custom in Roman triumphs for a slave to stand behind
the triumphant general in his chariot and to remind him that he was
still mortal. Juvenal, x. 41.
" I am not sure if Epictetus ever uses Kodjuoi in the sense of Uni-
verse, the " universum " of philosophers. I think he sometimes uses it
in the common sense of the world, the earth and all that is on it. Epic-
tetus appears to teach that when a man dies, his existence is terminated.
The body is resolved into the elements of which it is formed, and these
elements are employed for other purposes. Consistently with this doc-
trine he may have supposed that the powers, which we call rational
and intellectual, exist in man by virtue only of the organisation of his
brain which is superior to that of all other animals ; and that what we
name the soul has no existence independent of the body. It was an old
Greek hypothesis that at death the body returned to earth from which it
came, and the soul {itvevfio) returned to the regions above, from which
it came. I can not discover any passage in Epictetus in which the doc-
trine is taught that the soul has an existence independent of the body.
The opinions of Marcus Antoninus on this matter are contained in his
book, iv. 14, 21, and perhaps elsewhere: but they are rather obscure.
A recent writer has attempted to settle the question of the existence of
departed souls by affirming that we can find no place for them either
in heaven or in hell ; for the modern scientific notion, as I suppose that
it must be named, does not admit the conception of a place heaven or a
place hell (Strauss, Der Alte und der Neue Glaube, p. 129).
We may name Paul a contemporary of Epictetus, for though Epic-
tetus may have been the younger, he was living at Rome during Nero's
reign (A. D. 54-68) ; and it is affirmed, whether correctly or not, I do
not undertake to say, that Paul wrote from Ephesus his first epistle to
the Corinthians (Cor. i. 16. 8) in the beginning of A. D. 56. Epictetus
it is said, lived in Rome, till the time of the expulsion of the philoso-
phers by Domitian, when he retired to Nicopolis an old man, and taught
there. Paul's first epistle to the Corinthians (c. 15) contains his doctrine
of the resurrection, which is accepted, I believe, by all, or nearly all, if
there are any exceptions, who profess the Christian faith : but it is not
understood by all in the same way.
Paul teaches that Christ died for our sins, that he was buried and
rose again on the third day: and that after his resurrection he was
seen by many persons. Then he a^k?, if Christ rose from the dead, how
284
EPICTETUS
can some say that there is no resurrection of the dead? "But if there
be no resurrection of the dead, then is Christ not risen" (v. 13) ; and
(v. 19), " if in this life only we have hope in Christ, we are of all men
most miserable." But he affirms again (v. 20) that "Christ is risen and
become the first fruits of them that slept." In v. 32, he asks what ad-
vantages he has from his struggles in Ephesus, " if the dead rise not :
let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die." He seems not to admit the
value of life, if there is no resurrection of the dead; and he seems to
say that we shall seek or ought to seek only the pleasures of sense, be-
cause life is short, if we do not believe in a resurrection of the dead.
It may be added that there is not any direct assertion in this chapter
that Christ ascended to heaven in a bodily form, or that he ascended to
heaven in any way. He then says (v. 35), " But some man will say,
How are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come?" He
answers his question (v. 36), "Thou fool, that which thou sowest is
not quickened except it die ;" and he adds that " God giveth it (the seed)
a body as it hath pleased him, and to every seed his own body." We all
know that the body which is produced from the seed, is not the body
" that shall be ; " and we also know that the seed which is sown does not
die, and that if the seed died, no body would be produced from such
seed. His conclusion is that the dead "is^sown a natural body; it is
raised a spiritual body" {d&jna ifvsvjiartKov). I believe that the com-
mentators do not agree about this "spiritual body," but it seems plain
that Paul did not teach that the body which will rise will be the same
as the body which is buried. He says (v. 50) that "flesh and blood can
not inherit the kingdom of God." Yet in the Apostles' Creed we pro-
nounce our belief in the "resurrection of the body" ; but in the Nicene
Creed it is said we look " for the resurrection of the dead," which is a
different thing or may have a different meaning from " the resurrection
of the body." In the ministration of baptism to such as are of riper
years, the person to be baptized is asked " Dost thou believe in God the
Father Almighty," etc. in the terms of the Church Creeds, but in place
of the resurrection of the body or of the dead, he is asked if he believes
" in the resurrection of the flesh."
The various opinions of divines of the English church on the resur-
rection of the body are stated by A. Clissold in the Practical Na-
ture of the Theological Writings of E. Swedenborg in a letter to
Whately, Archbishop of Dublin, 1859, 2nd ed.
"Seneca de Consol. ad Pol. c. 30; Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. iii. 13.
"Compare i., 12. 2, ii. 14. 11, iii. 26. 28. "Compare this with the de-
scription of the universal care of Providence, Matthew, x. 29, 30, and
the occasion on which it was produced." Mrs. Carter.
CHAPTER XXV
TO THOSE WHO FALL OFF ( DESIST ) FROM THEIR
PURPOSE
CONSIDER as to the things which you proposed to
yourself at first, which you have secured, and
which you have not; and how you are pleased
when you recall to memory the one, and are pained
about the other; and if it is possible, recover the things
wherein you failed. For we must not shrink when we are
engaged in the greatest combat, but we must even take blows.
For the combat before us is not in wrestling and the Pancra-
tion, in which both the successful and the unsuccessful may
have the greatest merit, or may have little, and in truth may
be very fortunate or very unfortunate ; but the combat is for
good fortune and happiness themselves. Well then, even if
we have renounced the contest in this matter (for good for-
tune and happiness), no man hinders us from renewing the
combat again, and we are not compelled to wait for another
four years that the games at Olympia may come again ;^ but
as soon as you have recovered and restored yourself, and
employ the same zeal, you may renew the combat again ; and
if again you renounce it, you may again renew it ; and if you
once gain the victory, you are like him who has never re-
nounced the combat. Only do not through a habit of doing
the same thing (renouncing the combat) begin to do it with
pleasure, and then like a bad athlete go about after being
conquered in all the circuit of the games like quails who have
run away.^
The sight of a beautiful young girl overpowers me. Well,
have I not been overpowered before ? An inclination arises
in me to find fault with a person ; for have I not found fault
with him before? You speak to us as if you had come off
(from these things) free from harm, just as if a man should
say to his physician who forbids him to bathe, "Have I not
bathed before ?" If then the physician can say to him, "Well,
and what then happened to you after the bath? Had you
28s
286 EPICTETUS
not a fever, had you not a headache ?" And when you found
fault with a person lately, did you not do the act of a malig-
nant person, of a trifling babbler; did you not cherish this
habit in you by adding to it the corresponding acts ? And
when you were overpowered by the young girl, did you
come off unharmed? Why then do you talk of what you
did before? You ought, I think, remembering what you
did, as slaves remember the blows which they have received,
to abstain from the same faults. But the one case is not like
the other; for in the case of slaves the pain causes the re-
membrance : but in the case of your faults, what is the pain,
what is the punishment ; for when have you been accustomed
to fly from evil acts?^ Sufferings then of the trying char-
acter are useful to us, whether we choose or not.
NOTES
* These games were celebrated once in four years.
* "All the circuit of the games " means the circuit of the Pythian,
Isthmian, Nemean, and Olympic games. A man who had contended
in these four games victoriously was named Periodonices, or Perio-
deutes. Upton.
The Greeks used to put quails in a cockpit, as those who are old
enough may remember that we used to put game cocks to fight with one
another. Schweighauser describes a way of trying the courage of
these quails from Pollux (ix. 109) ; but I suppose that the birds fought
also with one another.
Upton supposed that the words' AXX' ovx o/iotov .... to Kaic&5
ivEpyijdat, in the translation, ''But the one case is not" ... to "fly
from evil acts," are said by the adversary of Epictetus, and Mrs. Carter
has followed Upton in the translation. But then there is no sense in
the last sentence Oi icovot dpa^ etc., in the translation, "Sufferings
then," etc. The reader may consult Schweighauser' s note. I suppose
that Epictetus is speaking the words " But the one case," etc. to the
end of the chapter. The adversary, who is not punished like a slave,
and has no pains to remind him of his faults, is supposed so far not
to have felt the consequences of his bad acts ; but Epictetus concludes
that sufferings of a painful character would be useful to him, as they
are to all persons who do what they ought not to do. There is perhaps
some difficulty in the word itetpavrjpioav. But I think that Schweig.
has correctly explained the passage.
CHAPTER XXVI
TO THOSE WHO FEAR WANT*
ARE you not ashamed at being more cowardly and more
mean than fugitive slaves ? How do they when they
run away leave their masters? on what estates do
they depend, and what domestics do they rely on?
Do they not after stealing a little which is enough for the first
days, then afterwards move on through land or through sea,
contriving one method after another for maintaining their
lives ? And what fugitive slave ever died of hunger ?^ But
you are afraid lest necessary things should fail you, and are
sleepless by night. Wretch, are you so blind, and don't you
see the road to which the want of necessaries leads ? — Well,
where does it lead? — To the same place to which a fever
leads, or a stone that falls on you, to death. Have you not
often said this yourself to your companions? have you not
read much of this kind, and written much ? and how often
have you boasted that you were easy as to death ?
Yes : but my wife and children also suffer hunger.^ — Well
then, does their hunger lead to any other place? Is there
not the same descent to some place for them also? Is not
there the same state below for them? Do you not choose
then to look to that place full of boldness ag'ainst every want
and deficiency, to that place to which both the richest and
those who have held the highest offices, and kings themselves
and tyrants must descend? or to which you will descend
hungry, if it should so happen, but they burst by indigestion
and drunkenness. What beggar did you hardly ever see
who was not an old man, and even of extreme old age? But
chilled with cold day and night, and lying on the ground, and
eating only what is absolutely necessary they approach near
to the impossibility of dying.* Can not you write? Can not
you teach (take care of) children? Can not you be a watch-
man at another person's door ? — But it is shameful to come
to such a necessity. — Learn then first what are the things
which are shameful, and then tell us that you are a philoso-
287
288 EPICTETUS
pher : but at present do not, even if any other man call you
so, allow it.
Is that shameful to you which is not your own act, that
of which you are not the cause, that which has come to you
by accident, as a headache, as a fever ? If your parents were
poor, and left their property to others, and if while they live,
they do not help you at all, is this shameful to you? Is this
what you learned with the philosophers? Did you never
hear that the thing which is shameful ought to be blamed,
and that which is blameable is worthy of blame ? Whom do
you blame for an act which is not his own, which he did not
do himself? Did you then make your father such as he is,
or is it in your power to improve him ? Is this power given
to you ? Well then, ought you to wish the things which are
not given to you, or to be ashamed if you do not obtain them ?
And have you also been accustomed while you were stud^-ing
philosophy to look to others and to hope for nothing from
yourself? Lament then and groan and eat with fear that
you may not have food to-morrow. Tremble about your
poor slaves lest they steal, lest they run away, lest they die.
So live, and continue to live, you who in name only have ap-
proached philosophy, and have disgraced its theorems as far
as you can by showing them to be useless and unprofitable
to those who take them up ; you who have never sought con-
stancy, freedom from perturbation, and from passions : you
who have not sought any person for the sake of this object,
but many for the sake of syllogisms; you who have never
thoroughly examined any of these appearances by yourself,
Am I able to bear, or am I not able to bear ? What remains
for me to do? But as if all your affairs were well and se-
cure, you have been resting on the third topic,*^ that of things
being unchanged, in order that you may possess unchanged
— what ? cowardice, mean spirit, the admiration of the rich,
desire without attaining any end, and avoidance {k'KKXidtv)
which fails in the attempt? About security in these things
you have been anxious.
Ought you not to have gained something in addition from
reason, and then to have protected this with security? And
whom did you ever see building a battlement all round and
not encircling it with a wall?® And what door-keeper is
DISCOURSES 289
placed with no door to watch? But you practise in order
to be able to prove — what ? You practise that you may not
be tossed as on the sea through sophisms, and tossed about
from what ? Shew me first what you hold, what you meas-
ure, or what you weigh ; and shew me the scales or the me-
dimnus (the measure) ; or how long will you go on measur-
ing the dust ?'^ Ought you not to demonstrate those things
which make men happy, which make things go on for them
in the way as they wish, and why we ought to blame no man,
accuse no man, and acquiesce in the administration of the
universe? Shew me these. "See, I shew them: I will re-
solve syllogisms for you," — This is the measure, slave ; but
it is not the thing measured. Therefore you are now paying
the penalty for what you neglected, philosophy : you tremble,
you lie awake, you advise with all persons; and if your
deliberations are not likely to please all, you think that you
have deliberated ill. Then you fear hunger, as you suppose :
but it is not hunger that you fear, but you are afraid that you
will not have a cook, that you will not have another to pur-
chase provisions for the table, a third to take off your shoes,
a fourth to dress you, others to rub you, and to follow you,
in order that in the bath, when you have taken off your
clothes and stretched yourself out like those who are crucified
you may be rubbed on this side and on that, and then the
aliptes( rubber) may say (to the slave), "Change his position,
present the side, take hold of his head, shew the shoulder ;"
And then when you have left the bath and gone home, you
may call out, "Does no one bring me something to eat ?" And
then, "Take away the tables, sponge them :" You are afraid
of this, that you may not be able to lead the life of a sick man.
But learn the life of those who are in health, how slaves live,
how labourers, how those live who are genuine philosophers ;
how Socrates lived, who had a wife and children ; how Diog-
enes lived, and how Cleanthes® who attended to the school
and drew water. If you choose to have these things, you
will have them every where, and you will live in full confi-
dence. Confiding in what? In that alone in which a man
can confide, in that which is secure, in that which is not sub-
ject to hindrance, in that which can not be taken away, that
is in your own will. And why have you made yourself so use-
19
290 EPICTETUS
less and good for nothing that no man will choose to receive
you into his house, no man to take careof you ? but if a utensil
entire and useful were cast abroad, every man who found it,
would take it up and think it a gain ; but no man will take
you up, and every man will consider you a loss. So can not
you discharge the office even of a dog, or of a cock ? Why
then do you choose to live any longer, when you are what
you are ?
Does any good man fear that he shall fail to have food ?
To the blind it does not fail, to the lame it does not : shall
it fail to a good man ? And to a good soldier there does not
fail to be one who gives him pay, nor to a labourer, nor to
a shoemaker : and to the good man shall there be wanting
such a person?® Does God thus neglect the things that he
has established, his ministers, his witnesses, whom alone he
employs as examples to the uninstructed, both that he exists,
and administers well the whole, and does not neglect human
affairs, and that to a good man there is no evil either when he
is living or when he is dead ? What then when he does not
supply him with food? What else does he do than like a
good general he has given me the signal to retreat ? I obey,
I follow, assenting to the words of the commander, praising
his acts : for I came when it pleased him, and I will also go
away when it pleases him; and while I lived, it was my
duty to praise God both by myself, and to each person sever-
ally and to many. He does not supply me with many things,
nor with abundance, he does not will me to live luxuriously ;
for neither did he supply Hercules who was his own son ; but
another (Eurystheus) was king of Argos and Mycenae, and
Hercules obeyed orders, and laboured, and was exercised.
And Eurystheus was what he was, neither king of Argos nor
of Mycenae, for he was not even king of himself ; but Her-
cules was ruler and leader of the whole earth and sea, who
purged away lawlessness, and introduced justice and holi-
ness;^'* and he did these things both naked and alone. And
when Ulysses was cast out shipwrecked, did want humiliate
him, did it break his spirit? but how did he go off to the vir-
gins to ask for necessaries, to beg which is considered most
shameful?**
"As a lion bred in the mountains trusting in his strength.""
DISCOURSES 291
Relying on what? Not on reputation nor on wealth nor
on the power of a magistrate, but on his own strength, that
is, on his opinions about the things which are in our power
and those which are not. For these are the only things
which make men free, which make them escape from hin-
drance, which raise the head (neck) of those who are de-
pressed, which make them look with steady eyes on the rich
and on tyrants. And this was (is) the gift given to the phi-
losopher. But you will not come forth bold, but trembling
about your trifling garments and silver vessels. Unhappy
man, have you thus wasted your time till now ?
What then, if I shall be sick? You will be sick in such
a way as you ought to be. — Who will take care of me? —
God; your friends. — I shall lie down on a hard bed. — But
you will lie down like a man. — I shall not have a convenient
chamber. — You will be sick in an inconvenient chamber. —
Who will provide for me the necessary food? — Those who
provide for others also. You will be sick like Manes.*^ —
And what also will be the end of the sickness? Any other
than death ? — Do you then consider that this the chief of all
evils to man and the chief mark of mean spirit and of cow-
ardice is not death, but rather the fear of death? Against
this fear then I advise you to exercise yourself : to this let all
your reasoning tend, your exercises, and reading; and you
will know that thus only are men made free.
NOTES
' " Compare this chapter with the beautiful and affecting discourses of
our Saviour on the same subject, Matthew vi. 25-34; Luke xii. 22-30."
Mrs. Carter. The first verse of Matthew begins, "Take no thought for
your life, what ye shall eat or what ye shall drink," etc. No Christian
literally follows the advice of this and the following verses, and he would
be condemned by the judgment of all men if he did.
' It is very absurd to suppose that no fugitive slave ever died of hunger.
How could Epictetus know that?
* He supposes that the man who is dying of hunger has also wife and
children, who will suffer the same dreadful end. The consolation, if it
is any, is that the rich and luxurious and kings will also die. The fact is
true. Death is the lot of all. But a painful death by hunger can not be
alleviated by a man knowing that all must die in some way. It seems as
if the philosopher expected that even women and children should be phi-
losophers, and that the husband in his philosophy should calmly contem-
plate the death of wife and children by starvation. This is an example of
the absurdity to which even a wise man carried his philosophy ; and it is
unworthy of the teacher's general good sense.
292 EPICTETUS
* We see many old beggars who endure what others could not endure ;
but they all die at last, and would have died earlier if their beggar life
had begun sooner. The living in the open air and wandering about
help them to last longer; but the exposure to cold and wet and to the
want of food hastens their end. The life of a poor old beggar is neither
so long nor so comfortable as that of a man, who has a good home and
sufficient food, and lives with moderation.
* See iii. c. 2.
* "Plato using the same simile teaches that last of all disciplines dia-
lectic ought to be learned." Schweighauser.
' This is good advice. When you propose to measure, to estimate
things, you should first tell us what the things are before you attempt to
fix their value; and what is the measure or scales that you use.
* Cleanthes, the successor of Zeno in his school, was a great example
of the pursuit of knowledge under difficulties : during the night he used
to draw water from the wells for the use of the gardens : during the day
he employed himself in his studies. He was the author of a noble hymn
to Zeus, which is extant.
* It seems strange that Epictetus should make such assertions when we
know that they are not true. Shortly afterward he himself speaks even
of the good man not being supplied with food by God.
" Compare Hebrews xi. and xii., in which the Apostle and Philoso-
pher reason in nearly the same manner and even use the same terms;
but how superior is the example urged by the Apostle to Hercules and
Ulysses !" Mrs. Carter.
" The story of Ulysses asking Nausicaa and her maids for help when
he was cast naked on the land is in the Odyssey vi. 127.
" Odyssey, vi. 130.
" Manes is a slave's name. Diogenes had a slave named Manes, his
only slave, who ran away, and though Diogenes was informed where the
slave was, he did not think it worth while to have him brought back.
He said, it would be a shame if Manes could live without Diogenes, and
Diogenes could not live without Manes.
BOOK IV
CHAPTER I
ABOUT FREEDOM
HE is free who lives as he wishes to live ;* who is neither
subject to compulsion nor to hindrance, nor to force;
whose movements to action {opfiai) are not impeded,
whose desires attain their purpose, and who does not
fall into that which he would 2iwo\d{iKK\t6£ti dTCEpiitrooToi)-
Who then chooses to live in error ? No man. Who chooses to
live deceived, liable to mistake, unjust, unrestrained, discon-
tented, mean ? No man. Not one then of the bad lives as
he wishes ; nor is he then free. And who chooses to live in
sorrow, fear, envy, pity, desiring and failing in his desires,
attempting to avoid something and falling into it ? Not one.
Do we then find any of the bad free from sorrow, free from
fear, who does not fall into that which he would avoid, and
does not obtain that which he wishes ? Not one ; nor 'then
do we find any bad man f ree.^
If then a man who has been twice consul should hear this,
if you add, "But you are a wise man; this is nothing to
you ;" he will pardon you. But if you tell him the truth, and
say, "You differ not at all from those who have been thrice
sold as to being yourself not a slave," what else ought you to
expect than blows ? For he says, "What, I a slave, I whose
father was free, whose mother was free, I whom no man can
purchase: I am also of senatorial rank, and a friend of
Caesar, and I have been a consul, and I own many slaves."
In the first place, most excellent senatorial man, perhaps your
father also was a slave in the same kind of servitude, and
your mother, and your grandfather and all your ancestors in
an ascending series. But even if they were as free as it is
293
294 EPICTETUS
possible, what is this to you ? What if they were of a noble
nature, and you of a mean nature ; if they were fearless, and
you a coward ; if they had the power of self-restraint, and
you are not able to exercise it.
And what, you may say, has this to do with being a slave ?
Does it seem to you to be nothing to do a thing unwillingly,
with compulsion, with groans, has this nothing to do with
being a slave ? It is something, you say : but who is able to
compel me, except the lord of all, Caesar? Then even you
yourself have admitted that you have one master. But that
he is the common master of all, as you say, let not this con-
sole you at all : but know that you are a slave in a great fam-
ily. So also the people of Nicopolis are used to exclaim,
"By the fortune of Caesar,^ we are free."
However, if you please, let us not speak of Caesar at pres-
ent. But tell me this: did you never love any person, a
young girl, or slave, or free? What then is this with respect
to being a slave or free? Were you never commanded by
the person beloved to do something which you did not wish
to do? have you never flattered your little slave? have you
never kissed her feet ? And yet if any man compelled you to
kiss Caesar's feet, you would think it an insult and excessive
tyranny. What else then is slavery ? Did you never go out
by night to some place whither you did not wish to go, did
you not expend what you did not wish to expend, did you not
utter words with sighs and groans, did you not submit to
abuse and to be excluded?* But if you are ashamed to con-
fess your own acts, see what Thrasonides' says and does, who
having seen so much military service as perhaps not even you
have, first of all went out by night, when Geta (a slave) does
not venture out, but if he were compelled by his master, would
have cried out much and would have gone out lamenting his
bitter slavery. Next, what does Thrasonides say? "A
worthless girl has enslaved me, me whom no enemy ever did.
Unhappy man, who are the slave even of a girl, and a worth-
less girl. Why then do you still call yourself free? and why
do you talk of your service in the army ?" Then he calls for
a sword and is angry with him who out of kindness refuses
it ; and he sends presents to her who hates him, and intreats
and weeps, and on the other hand having had a little success
DISCOURSES 295
he is elated. But even then how? was he free enough
neither to desire nor to fear ?
Now consider in the case of animals, how we employ the
notion of liberty. Men keep tame lions shut up, and feed
them, and some take them about ; and who will say that this
lion is free ?® Is it not the fact that the more he lives at his
ease, so much the more he is in a slavish condition ? and who
if he had perception and reason would wish to be one of these
lions ? Well, these birds when they are caught and are kept
shut up, how much do they suffer in their attempts to es-
cape ?^ and some of them die of hunger rather than submit to
such a kind of life. And as many of them as live, hardly
live and with suffering pine away ; and if they ever find any
opening, they make their escape. So much do they desire
their natural liberty, and to be independent and free from
hindrance. And what harm is there to you in this ? What
do you say? I am formed by nature to fly where I choose,
to live in the open air, to sing when I choose : you deprive me
of all this, and say, what harm is it to you ? For this reason
we shall say that those animals only are free, which can not
endure capture, but as soon as they are caught, escape from
captivity by death. So Diogenes also somewhere says that
there is only one way to freedom, and that is to die content :
and he writes to the Persian king, "You can not enslave
the Athenian state any more than you can enslave fishes."
How is that? can not I catch them? If you catch them, says
Diogenes, they will immediately leave you, as fishes do ; for
if you catch a fish, it dies ; and if these men that are caught
shall die, of what use to you is the preparation for war?
These are the words of a free man who had carefully ex-
amined the thing, and, as was natural, had discovered it.
But if you look for it in a different place from where it is,
what wonder if you never find it?
The slave wishes to be set free immediately. Why ? Do
you think that he wishes to pay money to the collectors of
twentieths?* No; but because he imagines that hitherto
through not having obtained this, he is hindered and unfor-
tunate. If I shall be set free, immediately it is all happiness,
I care for no man, I speak to all as an equal and like to them,
I go where I choose, I come from any place I choose, and go
296 EPICTETUS
where I choose. Then he is set free ; and forthwith having
no place where he can eat, he looks for some man to flatter,
some one with whom he shall sup : then he either works with
his body or endures the most dreadful things;^ and if he
can obtain a manger, he falls into a slavery much worse than
his former slavery ; or even if he is become rich, being a man
without any knowledge of what is good, he loves some little
girl, and in his unhappiness laments and desires to be a slave
again. He says, what evil did I suffer in my state of slavery ?
Another clothed me, another supplied me with shoes, an-
other fed me, another looked after me in sickness; and I
did only a few services for him. But now a wretched man,
what things I suffer, being a slave to many instead of to one.
But however, he says, if I shall acquire rings,^*^ then I shall
live most prosperously and happily. First, in order to ac-
quire these rings, he submits to that which he is worthy of ;
then when he has acquired them, it is again all the same.
Then he says, If I shall be engaged in military service, I am
free from all evils. He obtains military service. He suffers
as much as a flogged slave, and nevertheless he asks for a
second service and a third. After this, when he has put the
finishing stroke (the colophon) ^^ to his career, and is become
a senator, then he becomes a slave by entering into the as-
sembly, then he serves the finer and most splendid slavery —
not to be a fool, but to learn what Socrates taught, what is
the nature of each thing that exists, and that a man should
not rashly adapt preconceptions {TtpoXr/ipeii ) to the several
things which are. For this is the cause to men of all their
evils, they not being able to adapt the general preconceptions
to the several things. But we have different opinions (about
the cause of our evils) . One man thinks that he is sick : not
so however, but the fact is that he does not adapt his precon-
ceptions right. Another thinks that he is poor ; another that
he has a severe father or mother; and another again that
Caesar is not favourable to him. But all this is one and only
one thing, the not knowing how to adapt the preconceptions.
For who has not a preconception of that which is bad, that it
is hurtful, that it ought to be avoided, that it ought in every
way to be guarded against? One preconception is not re-
pugnant to another, only where it comes to the matter of ad-
DISCOURSES 297
aptation. What then is this evil, which is both hurtful, and
a thing to be avoided ? He answers not to be Caesar's friend,
— He is gone far from the mark, he has missed the adapta-
tion, he is embarrassed, he seeks the things which are not at
all pertinent to the matter; for when he has succeeded in
being Caesar's friend, nevertheless he has failed in finding
what he sought. For what is that which every man seeks?
To live secure, to be happy, to do every thing as he wishes,
not to be hindered, nor compelled. When then he is become
the friend of Caesar, is he free from hindrance? free from
compulsion, is he tranquil, is he happy ? Of whom shall we
inquire ? What more trustworthy witness have we than this
very man who is become Caesar's friend? Come forward
and tell us when did you sleep more quietly, now or before
you became Caesar's friend ? Immediately you hear the an-
swer, "Stop, I entreat you, and do not mock me : you know
not what miseries I suffer, and sleep does not come to me;
but one comes and says, 'Caesar is already awake, he is now
going forth;' then come troubles and cares." — Well, when
did you sup with more pleasure, now or before ? Hear what
he says about this also. He says that if he is not invited, he is
pained : and if he is invited, he sups like a slave with his mas-
ter, all the while being anxious that he does not say or do any
thing foolish. And what do you suppose that he is afraid
of ; lest he should be lashed like a slave ? How can he expect
any thing so good? No, but as befits so great a man,
Caesar's friend, he is afraid that he may lose his head. And
when did you bathe more free from trouble, and take your
gymnastic exercise more quietly? In fine, which kind of
life did you prefer? your present or your former life? I
can swear that no man is so stupid or so ignorant of truth as
not to bewail his own misfortunes the nearer he is in friend-
ship to Caesar.
Since then neither those who are called kings live as they
choose, nor the friends of kings, who finally are those who
are free ? Seek, and you will find ; for you have aids from
nature for the discovery of truth. But if you are not able
yourself by going along these ways only to discover that
which follows, listen to those who have made the inquiry.
What do they say ? Does freedom seem to you a good thing?
20
298 EPICTETUS
The greatest good. Is it possible then that he who obtains
the greatest good can be unhappy or fare badly? No.
Whomsoever then you shall see unhappy, unfortunate, la-
menting, confidently declare that they are not free. I do
declare it. We have now then got away from buying and
selling and from such arrangements about matters of prop-
erty : for if you have rightly assented to these matters, if the
great king (the Persian king) is unhappy, he can not be free,
nor can a little king, nor a man of consular rank, nor one who
has been twice consul. — Be it so.
Further then answer me this question also, does freedom
seem to you to be something great and noble and valuable?
— How should it not seem so? Is it possible then when a
man obtains anything so great and valuable and noble to be
mean ? — It is not possible. — When then you see any man sub-
ject to another or flattering him contrary to his own opinion,
confidently affirm that this man also is not free ; and not only
if he do this for a bit of supper, but also if he does it for a
government (province) or a consulship : and call these men
little slaves who for the sake of little matters do these things,
and those who do so for the sake of great things call great
slaves, as they deserve to be. — This is admitted also. — Do you
think that freedom is a thing independent and self govern-
ing?— Certainly. — Whomsoever then it is in the power of
another to hinder and compel, declare that he is not free.
And do not look, I entreat you, after his grandfathers and
great grandfathers, or inquire about his being bought or
sold ; but if you hear him saying from his heart and with feel-
ing, "Master," even if the twelve fasces precede him (as con-
sul), call him a slave. And if you hear him say, "Wretch
that I am, how much I sufifer," call him a slave. If finally
you see him lamenting, complaining, unhappy, call him a
slave though he wears a prsetexta. If then he is doing
nothing of this kind, do not yet say that he is free, but learn
his opinions, whether they are subject to compulsion, or may
produce hindrance, or to bad fortune; and if you find him
such, call him a slave who has a holiday in the Saturnalia :^^
say that his master is from home : he will return soon, and
you will know what he suffers. Who will return ? Whoever
has in himself the power over anything which is desired by
DISCOURSES i299
the man, either to give it to him or to take it away ? Thus
then have we many masters? We have: for we have cir-
cumstances as masters prior to our present masters ; and these
circumstances are many. Therefore it must of necessity be
that those who have the power over any of these circum-
. stances must be our masters. For no man fears Caesar him-
self, but he fears death, banishment, deprivation of his prop-
erty, prison, and disgrace. Nor does any man love Caesar,
unless Caesar is a person of great merit, but he loves wealth,
the office of tribune, praetor or consul. When we love,
and hate and fear these things, it must be that those who
have the power over them must be our masters. Therefore
we adore them even as gods; for we think that what pos-
sesses the power of conferring the greatest advantage on us
is divine. Then we wrongly assume {vTcordddojusv) that a cer-
tain person has the power of conferring the greatest advan-
tages ; therefore he is something divine. For if we wrongly
assume that a certain person has the power of conferring the
greatest advantages, it is a necessary consequence that the
conclusion from these premises must be false.
What then is that which makes a man free from hindrance
and makes him his own master? For wealth does not do
it, nor consulship, nor provincial government, nor royal
power ; but something else must be discovered. What then
is that which when we write makes us free from hindrance
and unimpeded? The knowledge of the art of writing.
What then is it in playing the lute ? The science of playing
the lute. Therefore in life also it is the science of life. You
have then heard in a general way : but examine the thing also
in the several parts. Is it possible that he who desires any of
the things which depend on others can be free from hin-
drance ? No — Is it possible for him to be unimpeded ? No
— Therefore he can not be free. Consider then ; whether we
have nothing which is in our own power only, or whether
we have all things, or whether some things are in our own
power, and others in the power of others. — What do you
mean? — When you wish the body to be entire (sound), is it
in your power or not? — It is not in my power — When you
wish it to be healthy ? — Neither is this in my power. — When
you wish it to be handsome? — Nor is this — Life or death? —
300
EPICTETUS
Neither is this in my power.^^ — Your body then is another's,
subject to every man who is stronger than yourself? — It is.
— But your estate, is it in your power to have it when you
please, and as long as you please, and such as you please? —
No. — And your slaves? — No. — And your clothes? — No. —
And your house? — No. — And your horses? — Not one of
these things. — And if you wish by all means your children to
live, or your wife, or your brother, or your friends, is it in
your power ? — This also is not in my power.
Whether then have you nothing which is in your own
power, which depends on yourself only and can not be taken
from you, or have you any thing of the kind ? — I know not.
— Look at the thing then thus, and examine it. Is any man
able to make you assent to that which is false ?^^ — No man. —
In the matter of assent then you are free from hindrance and
obstruction ? — Granted. — Well ; and can a man force you to
desire to move towards that to which you do not choose ? —
He can, for when he threatens me with death or bonds, he
compels me to desire to move towards it. If then, you de-
spise death and bonds, do you still pay any regard to him ? —
No. — Is then the despising of death an act of your own or is
it not yours ? — It is my act. — Is it your own act then also to
desire to move towards a thing : or is it not so ? — It is my
own act. — But to desire to move away from a thing, whose
act is that ? This also is your act. — What then if I have at-
tempted to walk, suppose another should hinder me ? — What
part of you does he hinder? does he hinder the faculty of
assent ? — No : but my poor body. — Yes, as he would do with
a stone. — Granted; but I no longer walk. — And who told
you that walking is your own act free from hindrance ? for I
said that this only was free from hindrance, to desire to
move : but where there is need of body and its co-operation,
you have heard long ago that nothing is your own. — Granted
this also. — And who can compel you to desire what you do
not wish ? — No man. — And to propose or intend, or in short
to make use of the appearances which present themselves,
can any man compel you ? — He can not do this : but he will
hinder me when I desire from obtaining what I desire. — If
you desire any thing which is your own, and one of these
things which can not be hindered, how will he hinder you ? —
DISCOURSES 301
He can not in any way. — Who then tells you that he who
desires the things that belong to another is free from hin-
drance ?
Must I then not desire health? By no means, nor any
thing else that belongs to another : for what is not in your
power to acquire or to keep when you please, this belongs to
another. Keep then far from it not only your hands, but
more than that, even your desires. If you do not, you have
surrendered yourself as a slave; you have subjected your
neck, if you admire^*^ any thing not your own, to every thing
that is dependent on the power of others and perishable, to
which you have conceived a liking. — Is not my hand myown?
— It is a part of your own body ; but it is by nature earth,
subject to hindrance, compulsion, and the slave of every thing
which is stronger. And why do I say your hand? You
ought to possess your whole body as a poor ass loaded, as
long as it is possible, as long as you are allowed. But if there
be a press,^^ and a soldier should lay hold of it, let it go, do
not resist, nor murmur ; if you do, you will receive blows, and
never the less you will lose the ass. But when you ought to
feel thus with respect to the body, consider what remains to
be done about all the rest, which is provided for the sake of
the body. When the body is an ass, all the other things are
bits belonging to the ass, pack-saddles, shoes,^"^ barley, fod-
der. Let these also go : get rid of them quicker and more
readily than of the ass.
When you have made this preparation, and have practised
this discipline, to distinguish that which belongs to another
from that which is your own, the things which are subject to
hindrance from those which are not, to consider the things
free from hindrance to concern yourself, and those which are
not free not to concern yourself, to keep your desire steadily
fixed to the things which do concern yourself, and turned
from the things which do not concern yourself ; do you still
fear any man ? No one. For about what will you be afraid ?
about the things which are your own, in which consists the
nature of good and evil? and who has power over these
things? who can take them away? who can impede them?
No man can, no more that he can impede God. But will you
be afraid about your body and your possessions, about things
302 EPICTETUS
which are not yours, about things which in no way concern
you ? and what else have you been studying from the begin-
ning than to distinguish between your own and not your
own, the things which are in your power and not in your
power, the things subject to hindrance and not subject? and
why have you come to the philosophers ? was it that you may
never the less be unfortunate and unhappy ? You will then in
this way, as I have supposed you to have done, be without
fear and disturbance. And what is grief to you? for fear
comes from what you expect, but grief from that which is
present. But what further will you desire ? For of the things
which are within the power of the will, as being good and
present, you have a proper and regulated desire : but of the
things which are not in the power of the will you do not
desire any one, and so you do not allow any place to that
which is irrational, and impatient, and above measure hasty.
When then you are thus affected towards things, what man
can any longer be formidable to you ? For what has a man
which is formidable to another, either when you see
him or speak to him or finally are conversant with him ? Not
more than one horse has with respect to another, or one dog
to another, or one bee to another bee. Things indeed are
formidable to every man ; and when any man is able to con-
fer these things on another or to take them away, then he too
becomes formidable. How then is an acropolis (a stronghold
or fortress, the seat of tyranny) demolished? Not by the
sword, not by fire, but by opinion. For if we abolish the
acropolis which is in the city, can we abolish also that of fe-
ver, and that of beautiful women ? Can we in a word abolish
the acropolis which is in us and cast out the tyrants within
us, whom we have daily over us, sometimes the same tyrants,
at other times different tyrants ? But with this we must be-
gin, and with this we must demolish the acropolis and eject
the tyrants, by giving up the body, the parts of it, the facul-
ties of it, the possessions, the reputation, magisterial offices,
honours, children, brothers, friends, by considering all these
things as belonging to others. And if tyrants have been
ejected from us, why do I still shut in the acropolis by a wall
of circumvallation,^® at least on my account; for if it still
stands, what does it do to me? why do I still eject (the ty-
DISCOURSES 303
rant's) guards? For where do I perceive them? against oth-
ers they have their fasces, and their spears and their swords.
But I have never been hindered in my will, nor compelled
when I did not will. And how is this possible? I have placed
my movements towards action {opixrfv) in obedience to
God.^® Is it his will that I shall have fever? It is my will
also. Is it his will that I should move towards any thing?
It is my will also. Is it his will that I should obtain any
thing? It is my wish also.^® Does he not will? I do not
wish. Is it his will that I die, is it his will that I be put to the
rack ? It is my will then to die : it is my will then to be put to
the rack. Who then is still able to hinder me contrary to my
own judgment, or to compel me? No more than he can hin-
der or compel Zeus.
Thus the more cautious of travellers also act. A traveller
has heard that the road is infested by robbers; he does not
venture to enter on it alone, but he waits for the companion-
ship on the road either of an ambassador, or of a quaestor,
or of a proconsul, and when he has attached himself to such
persons he goes along the road safely. So in the world^^ the
wise man acts. There are many companies of robbers, ty-
rants, storms, difficulties, losses of that which is dearest.
Where is there any place of refuge ? how shall he pass along
without being attacked by robbers? what company shall he
wait for that he may pass along in safety ? to whom shall he
attach himself ? To what person generally ? to the rich man,
to the man of consular rank? and what is the use of that to
me? Such a man is stripped himself, groans and laments.
But what if the fellow companion himself turns against me
and becomes my robber, what shall I do ? I will be a friend of
Caesar: when I am Caesar's companion no man will wrong
me. In the first place, that 1 may become illustrious, what
things must I endure and suffer? how often and by how
many must I be robbed ? Then, if I become Caesar's friend,
he also is mortal. And if Caesar from any circumstance be-
comes my enemy, where is it best for me to retire? Into a
desert? Well, does fever not come there? What shall be done
then ? Is it not possible to find a safe fellow traveller, a faith-
ful one, strong, secure against all surprises ? Thus he consid-
304 EPICTETUS
ers and perceives that if he attaches himself to Ciod, he will
make his journey in safety.
How do you understand, "attaching yourself to God?" In
this sense, that whatever God wills, a man also shall will ; and
what God does not will, a man also shall not will. How then
shall this be done ? In what other way than by examining the
movements ( 6pjj.di, the acts) of God^^ and his administra-
tion ? What has he given to me as my own and in my own
power ? what has he reserved to himself ? He has given to me
the things which are in the power of the will (rd npoaipsviKa :)
he has put them in my power free from impediment and
hindrance. How was he able to make the earthly body free
from hindrance? [He could not], and accordingly he has
subjected to the revolution of the whole ( rff r&v oXoov icep-
toioSY^ possessions, household things, house, children,
wife. Why then do I fight against God? why do I will what
does not depend on the will ? why do I will to have absolutely
what is not granted to me ? But how ought I to will to have
things ? In the way in which they are given and as long as
they are given. But he who has given takes away.^* Why
then do I resist? I do not say that I shall be a fool if I use
force to one who is stronger, but I shall first be unjust. For
whence had I things when I came into the world? — My
father gave them to me. — And who gave them to him ? and
who made the sun? and who made the fruits of the earth?
and who the seasons? and who made the connection of men
with one another and their fellowship ?
Then after receiving everything from another and even
yourself, are you angry and do you blame the giver if he
takes any thing from you? Who are you, and for what pur-
pose did you come into the world? Did not he (God) intro-
duce you here, did he not show you the light, did he not give
you fellow workers, and perceptions and reason? and as
whom did he introduce you here? did he not introduce
you as subject to death, and as one to live on earth
with a little flesh, and to observe his administra-
tion, and to join with him in the spectacle and the
festival for a short time? Will you not then, as long
as you have been permitted, after seeing the spectacle
and the solemnity, when he leads you out, go with adoration
DISCOURSES 305
of him and thanks for what you have heard and seen ? — No ;
but I would still enjoy the feast. — The initiated too would
wish to be longer in the initiation : ^^ and perhaps also those
at Olympia to see other athletes ; but the solemnity is ended :
go away like a grateful and modest man ; make room for oth-
ers : others also must be born, as you were, and being born
they must have a place, and houses and necessary things. And
if the first do not retire, what remains ? Why are you insatia-
ble? Why are you not content? why do you contract the
world? — Yes, but I would have my little children with me
and my wife. — What, are they yours ? do they not belong to
the giver, and to him who made you? then will you not
give up what belongs to others? will you not give way to
him who is superior? — Why then did he introduce me into
the world on these conditions? — And if the conditions do not
suit you, depart.^® He has no need of a spectator who is not
satisfied. He wants those who join in the festival, those who
take part in the chorus, that they may rather applaud, adr
mire, and celebrate with hymns the solemnity. But those who
can bear no trouble, and the cowardly he will not unwillingly
see absent from the great assembly (Ttavrfyvpti) ; for they
did not when thev were present behave as they ought to do
at a festival nor fill up their place properly, but they lamented,
found fault with the deity, fortune, their companions; not
seeing both what they had, and their own powers, which they
received for contrary purposes, the powers of magnanimity,
of a generous mind, manly spirit, and what we are now in-
quiring about, freedom. — For what purpose then have I re-
ceived these things? — To use them. — How long? — So long
as he who has lent them chooses. — What if they are neces-
sary to me? — Do not attach yourself to them and they will
not be necessary : do not say to yourself that they are neces-
sary, and then they are not necessary.
This study you ought to practise from morning to even-
ing, beginning with the smallest things and those most liable
to damage, with an earthen pot, with a cup. Then proceed in
this way to a tunic, to a little dog, to a horse, to a small es-
tate in land : then to yourself, to your body, to the parts of
your body, to your children, to your wife, to your brothers.
Look all round and throw these things from you (which are
306 EPICTETUS
not yours). Purge your opinions, so that nothing cleave to
you of the things which are not your own, that nothing grow
to you, that nothing give you pain when it is torn from you ;
and say, while you are daily exercising yourself as you do
there (in the school), not that you are philosophizing, for
this is an arrogant (offensive) expression, but that you are
presenting an asserter of freedom : for this is really freedom.
To this freedom Diogenes was called by Antisthenes, and he
said that he could no longer be enslaved by any man. For
this reason when he was taken prisoner, how did he behave
to the pirates ? Did he call any of them master ? and I do not
speak of the name, for I am not afraid of the word, but of
the state of mind, by which the word is produced. How did
he reprove them for feeding badly their captives ? How was
he sold? Did he seek a master? no; but a slave. And when
he was sold how did he behave to his master T^'' Immediately
he disputed with him and said to his master that he ought
jiot to be dressed as he was, nor shaved in such a manner ; and
about the children he told them how he ought to bring them
up. And what was strange in this? for if his master had
boug'ht an exercise master, would he have employed him in
the exercises of the palaestra as a servant or as a master ? and
so if he had bought a physician or an architect. And so in ev-
ery matter, it is absolutely necessary that he who has skill
must be the superior of him who has not. Whoever then gen-
erally possesses the science of life, what else must he be than
master ? For who is master in a ship ? The man who governs
the helm ? Why ? Because he who will not obey him suffers
for it. But a master can give me stripes. Can he do it then
without suffering for it ? So I also used to think. But because
he can not do it without suffering for it, for this reason it is
not in his power: and no man can do what is unjust without
suffering for it. And what is the penalty for him who puts his
own slave in chains? what do you think that is? The fact
of putting the slave in chains : — and you also will admit this,
if you choose to maintain the truth, that man is not a wild
beast, but a tame animal. For when is a vine doing badly?
When it is in a condition contrary to its nature. When is a
cock ? Just the same. Therefore a man also is so. What then
is a man's nature ? To bite, to kick, and to throw into prison
DISCOURSES 307
and to behead ? No ; but to do good, to co-operate with oth-
ers, to wish them well. At that time then he is in a bad condi-
tion, whether you choose to admit it or not, when he is acting
foolishly.
Socrates then did not fare badly? — No ; but his judges and
his accusers did. — Nor did Helvidius at Rome fare badly ? —
No; but his murderer did. How do you mean? — The same
as you do when you say that a cock has not fared badly when
he has gained the victory and been severely wounded; but
that the cock has fared badly when he has been defeated and
is unhurt : nor do you call a dog fortunate, who neither pur-
sues game nor labours, but when you see him sweating,**
when you see him in pain and panting violently after run-
ning. What paradox (unusual thing) do we utter if we say
that the evil in every thing is that which is contrary to the na-
ture of the thing? Is this a paradox? for do you not say
this in the case of all other things ? Why then in the case of
man only do you think differently ? But because we say that
the nature of man is tame (gentle) and social and faithful,
you will not say that this is a paradox? It is not. — What
then, is it a paradox to say that a man is not hurt when he is
whipped, or put in chains, or beheaded ? does he not, if he suf-
fers nobly, come off even with increased advantage and
profit ? But is he not hurt who suffers in a most pitiful and
disgraceful way, who in place of a man becomes a wolf, or
viper, or wasp ?
Well then, let us recapitulate the things which have been
agreed on. The man who is not under restraint is free, to
whom things are exactly in that state in which he wishes
them to be; but he who can be restrained or compelled or
hindered, or thrown into any circumstances against his will,
is a slave. But who is free from restraint ? He who desires
nothing that belongs to (is in the power of) others. And
what are the things which belong to others ? Those which
are not in our power either to have or not to have, or to have
of a certain kind or in a certain manner.*® Therefore the
body belongs to another, the parts of the body belong to an-
other, possession (property) belongs to another. If then
you are attached to any of these things as your own, you will
pay the penalty which it is proper for him to pay who desires
3o8 EPICTETUS
what belongs to another. This road leads to freedom, this is
the only way of escaping from slavery, to be able to say at
last with all your soul
"Lead me, O Zeus, and thou O destiny.
The way that I am bid by you to go."
But what do you say, philosopher ? The tyrant summons you
to say something which does not become you. Do you say it
or do you not? Answer me. — Let me consider. — Will you
consider now ? But when you were in the school, what was it
which you used to consider ? Did you not study what are the
things that are good and what are bad, and what things are
neither one nor the other? — I did. — What then was our opin-
ion ? — That just and honourable acts were good ; and that un-
just and disgraceful (foul) acts were bad. — Is life a good
thing? — No. — Is death a bad thing? — No. — Is prison? —
No. — But what did we think about mean and faith-
less words and betrayal of a friend and flattery of a tyrant?
— That they are bad. — Well then, you are not considering,
nor have you considered nor deliberated. For what is the
matter for consideration ; is it whether it is becoming for me,
when I have it in my power, to secure for myself the greatest
of good things, and not to secure for myself (that is, not to
avoid) the greatest evils? A fine inquiry indeed, and nec-
essary, and one that demands much deliberation. Man, why
do you mock us? Such an inquiry is never made. If you
really imagined that base things were bad and honourable
things were good, and that all other things were nehher good
nor bad, you would not even have approached this inquiry
nor have come near it ; but immediately you would have been
able to distinguish them by the understanding as you would
do (in other cases) by the vision. For when do you inquire
if black things are white, if heavy things are light, and do not
comprehend the manifest evidence of the senses ? How then
do you now say that you are considering whether things
which are neither good nor bad ought to be avoided more
than things which are bad? But you do not possess these
opinions; and neither do these things seem to you to be
neither good nor bad, but you think that they are the great-
est evils; nor do you think those other things (mean and
DISCOURSES 309
faithless words, etc.) to be evils, but matters which do not
concern us at all. For thus from the beginning you have
accustomed yourself. Where am 1 ? In the schools : and are
any listening to me ? I am discoursing among philosophers.
But I have gone out of the school. Away with this talk of
scholars and fools. Thus a friend is overpowered by the
testimony of a philosopher :^® thus a philosopher becomes a
parasite; thus he lets himself for hire for money: thus in the
senate a man does not say what he thinks: in private (in the
school) he proclaims his opinions.^* You are a cold and mis-
erable little opinion, suspended from idle words as from a
hair. But keep yourself strong and fit for the uses of life and
initiated by being exercised in action. How do you hear (the
report) ? — I do not say, that your child is dead — for how
could you bear that ? — but that your oil is spilled, your wine
drunk up. Do you act in such a way that one standing by
you while you are making a great noise, may say this only,
"Philosopher, yoii say something different in the school.
Why do you deceive us ? Why, when you are only a worm,
do you say that you are a man ? I should like to be present
when one of the philosophers is with a woman, that I might
see how he is exerting himself, and what words he is utter-
ing, and whether he remembers his title of philosopher, and
the words which he hears or says or reads."
And what is this to liberty? Nothing else than this,
whether you who are rich choose or not. — And who is your
evidence for this? — who else than yourselves? who have a
powerful master (Cassar), and who live in obedience to his
nod and motion, and who faint if he only looks at you with a
scowling countenance; you who court old women^^ and old
men, and say, "I can not do this : it is not in my power."
Why is it not in your power? Did you not lately contend
with me and say that you are free? But Aprulla'' has hin-
dered me ? Tell the truth then, slave, and do not run away
from your masters, nor deny, nor venture to produce any one
to assert your freedom ( Kapntarriv ) , when you have so many
evidences of your slavery. And indeed when a man is com-
pelled by love to do something contrary to his opinion (judg-
ment), and at the same time sees the better, but has not the
strength to follow it, one might consider him still more
3IO EPICTETUS
worthy of excuse as being held by a certain violent and in a
manner a divine power.^^ But who could endure you who
are in love with old women and old men, and wipe the old
women's noses, and wash them and give them presents, and
also wait on them like a slave when they are sick, and at the
same time wish them dead, and question the physicians
whether they are sick unto death ? And again, when in order
to obtain these great and much-admired magistracies and
honours, you kiss the hands of these slaves of others, and so
you are not the slave even of free men. Then you walk about
before me in stately fashion a praetor or a consul. Do I not
know how you became a praetor, by what means you got your
consulship, who gave it to you? I would not even choose to
live, if I must live by help of Felicion,^'^ and endure his arro-
gance and servile insolence : for I know what a slave is, who
is fortunate, as he thinks, and puffed up by pride.
You then, a man may say, are you free? I wish, by the
Gods, and pray to be free ; but I am not yet able to face my
masters, I still value my poor body, I value greatly the preser-
vation of it entire, though I do not possess it entire.^^ But I
can point out to you a free man, that you may no longer seek
an example, Diogenes was free. How was he free ? — not be-
cause he was born of free parents, but because he was himself
free, because he had cast off all the handles of slavery, and it
was not possible for any man to approach him, nor had any
man the means of laying hold of him to enslave him. He had
everything easily loosed, everything only hanging to him.
If you laid hold of his property, he would have rather let it
go and be yours, than he would have followed you for it: if
you had laid hold of his leg, he would have let go his leg; if
of all his body, all his poor body; his intimates, friends,
country, just the same. For he knew from whence he had
them, and from whom, and on what conditions. His true
parents indeed, the Gods, and his real country he would never
have deserted, nor would he have yielded to any man in obe-
dience to them and to their orders, nor would any man have
died for his country more readily. For he was not used to in-
quire when he should be considered to have done anything
on behalf of the whole of things (the universe, or all the
world), but he remembered that every thing which is done
DISCOURSES 311
comes from thence and is done on behalf of that country and
is commanded by him who administers it. Therefore see
what Diogenes himself says and writes : — "For this reason,"
he says, "Diogenes, it is in your power to speak both with the
King of the Persians and with Archidamus the king of the
Lacedaemonians, as you please." Was it because he was
born of free parents ? I suppose all the Athenians and all the
Lacedaemonians because they were born of slaves, could not
talk with them (these kings) as they wished, but feared and
paid court to them. Why then does he say that it is in his
power? Because I do not consider the poor body to be my
own, because I want nothing, because law^^ is every thing to
me, and nothing else is. These were the things which per-
mitted him to be free.
And that you may not think that I show you the example
of a man who is a solitary person, who has neither wife nor
children, nor country, nor friends, nor kinsmen, by whom he
could be bent and drawn in various directions, take Socrates
and observe that he had a wife and children, but he did not
consider them as his own ; that he had a country, so long as it
was fit to have one, and in such a manner as was fit ; friends
and kinsmen also, but he held all in subjection to law and to
the obedience due to it. For this reason he was the first to go
out as a soldier, when it was necessary, and in war he ex-
posed himself to danger most unsparingly;^® and when he
was sent by the tyrants to seize Leon, he did not even deliber-
ate about the matter, because he thought that it was a base
action, and he knew that he must die (for his refusal) , if it so
happened.^® And what difference did that make to him? for
he intended to preserve something else, not his poor flesh,
but his fidelity, his honourable character. These are things
which could not be assailed nor brought into subjection. Then
when he was obliged to speak in defence of his life, did he
behave like a man who had children, who had a wife ? No, but
he behaved like a man who has neither. And what did he do
when he was (ordered) to drink the poison,*^ and when he
had the power of escaping from prison, and when Crito said
to him, Escape for the sake of your children, what did Socra-
tes say?*^ did he consider the power of escape as an unex-
pected gain ? By no means : he considered what was fit and
3 1 2 EPICTETUS
proper ; but the rest he did not even look at or take into the
reckoning. For he did not choose, he said, to save his poor
body, but to save that which is increased and saved by doing
what is just, and is impaired and destroyed by doing what
is unjust. Socrates will not save his life by a base act ; he who
would not put the Athenians to the vote when they clam-
oured that he should do so,^^ he who refused to obey the ty-
rants, he who discoursed in such a manner about virtue and
right behaviour. It is not possible to save such a man's life
by base acts, but he is saved by dying, not by running away.
For the good actor also preserves his character by stopping
when he ought to stop, better than when he goes on acting be-
yond the proper time. What then shall the children of Soc-
rates do? "If," said Socrates, "I had gone ofif to Thessaly,
would you have taken care of them; and if I depart to the
world below, will there be no man to take care of them?" See
how he gives to death a gentle name and mocks it. But if you
and I had been in his place, we should have immediately an-
swered as philosophers that those who act unjustly must be
repaid in the same way, and we should have added, "I shall
be useful to many, if my life is saved, and if I die, I shall be
useful to no man." For, if it had been necessary, we should
have made our escape by slipping through a small hole. And
how in that case should we have been useful to any man ? for
where would they have been then staying ?^^ or if we were
useful to men while we were alive, should we not have been
much more useful to them by dying when we ought to die,
and as we ought? And now Socrates being dead, no less
useful to men, and even more useful, is the remembrance of
that which he did or said when he was alive.^'*
Think of these things, these opinions, these words : look to
these examples, if you would be free, if you desire the thing
according to its worth. And what is the wonder if you buy
so great a thing at the price of things so many and so great?
For the sake of this which is called liberty, some hang them-
selves, others throw themselves down precipices, and some-
times even whole cities have perished : and will you not for
the sake of the true and unassailable and secure liberty give
back to God when he demands them the things which he has
given ? Will you not, as Plato says, study not to die only, but
DISCOURSES 313
also to endure torture, and exile, and scourging and in a word
to give up all which is not your own ? If you will not, you will
be a slave among slaves, even if you be ten thousand times a
consul ; and if you make your way up to the Palace (Caesar's
residence), you will no less be a slave; and you will feel, that
perhaps philosophers utter words which are contrary to com-
mon opinion (paradoxes), as Cleanthes also said, but not
words contrary to reason. For you will know by experience
that the words are true, and that there is no profit from the
things which are valued and eagerly sought to those who
have obtained them ; and to those who have not yet obtained
them there is an imagination ((pavTadia) , that when these
things are come, all that is good will come with them ; then,
when they are come, the feverish feeling is the same, the
tossing to and fro is the same, the satiety, the desire of things
which are not present ; for freedom is acquired not by the full
possession of the things which are desired, but by removing
the desire. And that you may know that this is true, as you
have laboured for those things, so transfer your labour to
these; be vigilant for the purpose of acquiring an opinion
which will make you free ; pay court to a philosopher instead
of to a rich old man : be seen about a philosopher's doors :
you will not disgrace yourself by being seen ; you will not go
away empty nor without profit, if you go to the philosopher
as you ought, and if not (if you do not succeed), try at least :
the trial (attempt) is not disgraceful.
NOTES
^ Cicero, Paradox, v. "Quid enim libertas ? Potestas vivendi ut velis.
Quis igitur vivit ut vult, nisi qui recta sequitur," etc
' "Whoever committeth sin, is the servant of sin," John viii. 34. Mrs.
Carter.
'A usual form of oath. See ii. 20, 29. Upton compares the Roman ex-
pression "Per Genium," as in Horace, Epp. i. 7, 94 —
"Quod te per Genium, dextramque, Deosque Penates
Obsecro et obtestor."
• A lover's exclusion by his mistress was a common topic, and a serious
cause of complaint (Lucretius, iv. 1172) :
"At lacrimans exclusus amator limina saepe
Floribus et sertis operit."
See also Horace, Odes, i. 25.
314
EPICTETUS
• Thrasonides was a character in one of Menander's plays, entitled
Mtaov/ievos or the Hated.
• It must have been rather difficult to manage a tame lion ; but we read
of such things among the Romans. Seneca, Epp. 41.
' The keeping of birds in cages, parrots and others, was also common
among the Romans. Ovid (Amor. ii. 6) has written a beautiful elegy on
the death of a favourite parrot.
"See ii. i, 26. The eiKo6T(bvat^Nere the Publicani, men who farmed
this and other taxes. A tax of a twentieth of the value of a slave when
manumitted was established at an early time (Livy vii. 16). It appears
from this passage that the manumitted slave paid the tax out of his sav-
ings (peculium). See ii. i, note 7.
' The reader may guess the meaning.
'" A gold ring was worn by the Equites ; and accordingly to desire the
gold ring is the same as to desire to be raised to the Equestrian class.
" The colophon. See ii. 14, note 5. After the words "most splendid
slavery" it is probable that some words have accidentally been omitted in
the manuscript
" Saturnalia. See i. 25, note 3.
At this season the slaves had liberty to enjoy themselves and to talk
freely with their masters. Hence Horace says Sat. ii. 74 —
"Age, libertate Decembri,
Quando ita majores voluerunt utere."
" Schweighauser observes that death is in our power, as the Stoics
taught ; and Epictetus often tells us ,that the door is open. He suggests
that the true reading may be icai ovk ditoQaveiv. I think that the text
is right. Epictetus asks is "Life or Death" in our power. He means no
more than if he had said Life only.
" He means that which seems to you to be false. See iii. 22, 42.
"In the matter of assent then" : this is the third roiroi or "locus" or
division in philosophy (iii. 2, 1-5). As to the will, compare i. 17, note
10. Epictetus affirms that a man can not be compelled to assent, that is
to admit, to allow, or, to use another word, to believe in that which
seems to him to be false, or, to use the same word again, to believe in
that in which he does not believe. When the Christian uses the two
creeds, which begin with the words, "I believe, etc.," he knows or he
ought to know, that he can not compel an unbeliever to accept the same
belief. He may by pains and penalties of various kinds compel some
persons to profess or to express the same belief; but as no pains or
penalties could compel some Christians to deny their belief, so I suppose
that perhaps there are men who could not be compelled to express this
belief when they have it not. The case of the believer and the unbeliever
however are not the same. The believer may be strengthened in his
belief by the belief that he will in some way be punished by God, if he
denies that which he believes. The unbeliever will not have the same
motive or reason for not expressing his assent to that which he does
not believe. He believes that it is and will be all the same to him with
respect to God, whether he gives his assent to that which he does not
believe or refuses his assent. There remains nothing then to trouble
him if he expresses his assent to that which he does not believe, except
the opinion of those who know that he does not believe, or his own re-
flections on expressing his assent to that which he does not believe ; or
in other words his publication of a lie, which may probably do no harm
to any man or in any way. I believe that some men are strong enough,
DISCOURSES 3 1 5
under some circumstances at least, to refuse their assent to any thing
which they do not believe; but I do not affirm that they would do this
under all circumstances.
To return to the matter under consideration, a man can not be com-
pelled by any power to accept voluntarily a thing as true, when he
believes that it is not true ; and this act of his is quite independent of the
matter whether his unbelief is well founded or not. He does not believe
because he can not believe. Yet it is said ( Mark xvi. i6) in the received
text, as it now stands, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved ;
but he that believeth not, shall be damned" (condemned). The cause, as
it is called, of this unbelief is explained by some theologians ; but all men
do not admit the explanation to be sufficient ; and it does not concern the
present subject.
" The word "admire" is 6av/idd^? in the original. The word is often
used by Epictetus, and Horace uses "admirari" in this Stoical sense. See
i. 29. 2, note.
"The word hayyapEta,a word of Persian origin (Herodotus, viii.
p8). It means here the seizure of animals for military purposes when it
IS necessary. Upton refers to Matthew 5, v. 41, Mark 15, c. 21 for similar
uses of the verb dyyaftevoo.
" Here he speaks of asses being shod. The Latin translation of the
word ( vitc^Tf/idria ) in Epictetus is "ferreae calces." I suppose they
could use nothing but iron.
" The word is aTeoretxiXoo, which means what I have translated. The
purpose of circumvallation was to take and sometimes also to destroy a
fortress. Schweig. translates the word by "destruam," and that is per-
haps not contrary to the meaning of the text; but it is not the exact
meaning of the word.
" In this passage and in what follows we find the emphatic affirmation
of the duty of conformity and of the subjection of man's will to the will
of God. The words are conclusive evidence of the doctrine of Epictetus
that a man ought to subject himself in all things to the will of God or
to that which he believes to be the will of God. No Christian martyr ever
proclaimed a more solemn obedience to God's will. The Christian martyr
indeed has given perfect proof of his sincerity by enduring torments and
death : the heathen philosopher was not put to the same test, and we can
not therefore say that he would have been able to bear it.
"In this passage the distinction must be observed between BeXao and
BovXofiai which the Latin translators have not observed, nor Mrs. Car-
ter. See Schweig.' s note on s. 90.
**^v T(S K66fxop .'he means "on earth."
^** Schweig. expresses his surprise that Epictetus has applied this word
{opjudi) to God. He says that Wolf has translated it "Dei appetitio-
nem," and Upton "impetum." He says that he has translated it "con-
silium."
It is not unusual for men to speak of God in the same words In which
they speak of man.
" See ii. i, 18. Schweig. expected that Epictetus would have said
"body and possessions, etc." I assume that Epictetus did say "body and
possessions, etc.," and that his pupil or some copyist of manuscripts has
omitted the word "body."
** "The Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away. Job i. 21." Mrs.
Carter.
"The initiated ( jitij6rca) are those who were introduced with solemn
ceremonies into some great religious body. These ceremonies are de-
scribed by Dion Prus. Orat. xii., quoted by Upton.
3i6
EPICTETUS
" "And this is all the comfort, every serious reader will be apt to say,
which one of the best philosophers, in one of his noblest discourses, can
give to the good man under severe distress? 'Either tell yourself that
present suffering void of future hope, is no evil, or give up your exist-
ence and mingle with the elements of the Universe' ! Unspeakably more
rational and more worthy of infinite goodness is our blessed Master's ex-
hortation to the persecuted Christian: 'Rejoice and be exceedingl> glad,
for great is your reward in heaven.' " Mrs. Carter.
I do not think that Mrs. Carter has represented correctly the teaching
of Epictetus. He is addressing men who were not Christians, but were,
as he assumes, believers in God or in the gods, and his argument is that
a man ought to be contented with things as they are, because they are
from God. If he can not be contented with things as they are, and make
the best of them, the philosopher can say no more to the man. He tells
him to depart. What else could he say to a grumbler, who is also a be-
liever in God? If he is not a believer, Epictetus might say the same to
him also. The case is past help or advice.
The Christian doctrine, of which probably Epictetus knew nothing, is
very different. It promises future happiness on certain conditions to
Christians, but to Christians only, if I understand it right.
" See the same story in Aulus Gellius (ii. c. l8), who says that Xeni-
ades, a Corinthian, bought Diogenes, manumitted him and made him the
master of his children.
** I do not know if dogs sweat : at least in a state of health I have
never seen it. But this is a question for the learned in dog science.
"* As Upton remarks, Epictetus is referring to the four categories of
the Stoics.
*" "Stoicus occidit Baream, delator amicura,
Discipulumque senex."
Juvenal, iii. ii6.
Epictetus is supposed to allude to the crime of Egnatius Celer who ac-
cused Barea Soranus at Rome in the reign of Nero (Tacit. Ann. xvi.
32).
" Mrs. Carter says that "there is much obscurity and some variety of
reading in the lines of the original." But see Schweig.'s notes. Epic-
tetus is showing that talk about philosophy is useless : philosophy should
be practical.
*■ Horace Sat. ii. 5.
"Aprulla is a Roman woman's name. It means some old woman who
is courted for her money.
** Compare Plato ( Ssmiposium, p. 206) : " All men conceive both as to
the body and as to the soul, and when they have arrived at a certain age,
our nature desires to procreate. But it can not procreate in that which is
ugly, but in that which is beautiful. For the conjunction of man and
woman is generation ; but this act is divine, and this in the animal which
is mortal is divine, conceiving and begetting." See what is said in ii. 23,
note 5 on marrying. In a certain sense the procreation of children is a
duty, and consequently the providing for them is also a duty. It is the
fulfilling of the will and purpose of the Deity to people the earth ; and
therefore the act of procreation is divine. So a man's duty is to labour in
some way, and if necessary, to earn his living and sustain the life which
he has received; and this is also a divine act. Paul's opinion of marriage
is contained in Cor. i. 7. Some of his teaching on this matter has been
justly condemned. He has no conception of the true nature of marriage;
DISCOURSES 317
at least he does not show that he has in this chapter. His teaching is im-
practicable, contrary to that of Epictetus, and to the nature and consti-
tution of man; and it is rejected by the good sense of Christians who
affect to receive his teaching; except, I suppose, by the superstitious body
of Christians, who recommend and commend the so-called religious, and
unmarried life.
" Felicion. See i. 19.
*• Epictetus alludes to his lameness : compare i. 8. 14, i. 16. 20, and other
passages. Upton.
" The sense of "law" ( ovofio^ ), can be collected from what follows.
Compare the discourse of Socrates on obedience to the law. (Criton, c.
II, etc.)
" Socrates fought at Potidaea, Amphipolis and Delium. He is said to
have gained the prize for courage at Delium. He was a brave soldier as
well as a philosopher, a union of qualities not common. (Plato's Apol-
ogy.)
" Socrates with others was ordered by the Thirty tyrants, who at that
time governed Athens, to arrest Leon in the island of Salamis and to
bring him to be put to death. But Socrates refused to obey the order. Few
men would have done what he did under the circumstances. (Plato's
Apology; M. Antoninus, vii. 66.)
** Cicero, Tuscul. Disp. i. 29.
" The Dialogue of Plato, named Criton, contains the arguments which
were used by his friends to persuade Socrates to escape from prison, and
the reply of Socrates.
" This alludes to the behaviour of Socrates when he refused to put to
the vote the matter of the Athenian generals and their behaviour after
the naval battle of Arginusae. The violence of the weather prevented the
commanders from collecting and honourably burying those who fell in
the battle; and the Athenians after their hasty fashjon, wished all the
commanders to be put to death. But Socrates, who was in office at this
time resisted the unjust clamour of the people. Xenophon Hellenica,
i. c. 7, IS ; Plato, Apologia ; Xenophon, Memorab. i. i, 18.
**The original isitov yap av ertejueroy itceivot; this seems to mean,
if we had escaped and left the country, where would those have been to
whom we might have been useful? They would have been left behind,
and we could have done nothing for them.
** This is the conclusion about Socrates, whom Epictetus highly valued :
the remembrance of what Socrates did and said is even more useful than
his life. "The life of the dead," says Cicero of Servius Sulpicius, the
great Roman jurist and Cicero's friend, "rests in the remembrance of the
living." Epictetus has told us of some of the acts of Socrates, which
prove him to have been a brave and honest man. He does not tell us here
what Socrates said, which means what he taught; but he knew what it
was. Modem writers have expounded the matter at length, and in a form
which Epictetus would not or could not have used. — Socrates left to oth-
ers the questions which relate to the material world, and he first taught,
as we are told, the things which concern man's daily life and his inter-
course with other men : in other words he taught Ethic (the principles of
morality). Fields and trees, he said, will teach me nothing, but man in
his social state will : and man then is the proper subject of the philosophy
of Socrates. The beginning of this knowledge was, as he said, to know
himself according to the precept of the Delphic oracle "Know thy^^elf '
(yvobQt deavTov): and the object of his philosophy was to comprehend
the nature of man as a moral being in all relations ; and among these the
3i8
EPICTETUS
relation of man to God as the father of all, creator and ruler of all, as
Plato expresses it. Socrates taught that what we call death is not the
end of man; death is only the road to another life. "The death of Soc-
rates was conformable to his life and teaching. Socrates died not
only with the noblest courage and tranquillity, but he also refused, as we
are told, to escape from death, which the laws of the state permitted, by
going into exile or paying a fine, because as he said, if he had himself
consented to a fine or allowed others to propose it, (Xenophon, Apol.
2 22), such an act would have been an admission of his guilt. Both
(Socrates and Jesus) offered themselves with the firmest resolution
for a holy cause, which was so far from being lost through their death
that it only served rather to make it the general cause of mankind."
(Das Christliche des Platonismus oder Socrates and Christus, by F. C.
Baur.)
This essay by Baur is very ingenious. Perhaps there are some readers
who will disagree with him on many points in the comparison of
Socrates and Christ. However the essay is well worth the trouble of
reading.
The opinion of Rousseau in his comparison of Jesus and Socrates is
in some respects more just than that of Baur, though the learning of the
Frenchman is very small when compared with that of the German.
"What prejudices, what blindness must a man have," says Rousseau,
"when he dares to compare the son of Sophronicus with the son of
Mary ! — the death of Socrates philosophising tranquil with his friends is
the most gentle that a man could desire : that of Jesus expiring in tor-
ments, insulted, jeered, cursed by a whole people, is the most horrible
that a man could dread. Socrates taking the poisoned cup blesses him
who presents it and weeps ; Jesus in his horrible punishment prays for
his savage executioners. Yes, if the life and the death of Socrates are
those of a sage, the life and the death of Jesus are those of a God."
(Rousseau, Emile, vol. iii. p. 166. Amsterdam, 1765.)
CHAPTER II
ON FAMILIAR INTIMACY
TO this matter before all you must attend, that you be
never so closely connected with any of your former
intimates or friends as to come down to the same
acts as he does.^ If you do not observe this
rule, you will ruin yourself. But if the thought arises
in your mind, "I shall seem disobliging to him and he
will not have the same feeling towards me," remem-
ber that nothing is done without cost, nor is it possi-
ble for a man if he does not do the same things to be
the same man that he was. Choose then which of the
two you will have, to be equally loved by those by
whom you were formerly loved, being the same with your
former self; or, being superior, not to obtain from your
friends the same that you did before. For if this is better, im-
mediately turn away to it, and let no other considerations
draw you in a different direction. For no man is able to make
progress (improvement), when he is wavering between op-
posite things; but if you have preferred this (one thing) to
all things, if you choose to attend to this only, to work out
this only, give up every thing else. But if you will not do
this, your wavering will produce both these results : you will
neither improve as you ought, nor will you obtain what you
formerly obtained. For before by plainly desiring the things
which were worth nothing, you pleased your associates. But
you can not excel in both kinds, and it is necessary that so far
as you share in the one, you must fall short in the other. You
can not, when you do not drink with those with whom you
used to drink, be agreeable to them as you were before.
Choose then whether you will be a hard drinker and pleasant
to your former associates or a sober man and disagreeable to
them. You can Yiot, when you do not sing with those with
whom you used to sing, be equally loved by them. Choose
then in this matter also which of the two you will have. For
if it is better to be modest and orderly than for a man to say
319
320
EPICTETUS
he is a jolly fellow, give up the rest, renounce it, turn away
from it, have nothing to do with such men. But if this be-
haviour shall not please you, turn altogether to the opposite :
become a catamite, an adulterer, and act accordingly, and you
will get what you wish. And jump up in the theatre and bawl
out in praise of the dancer. But characters so different can
not be mingled: you can not act both Thersites and Aga-
memnon. If you intend to be Thersites,^ you must be
hump-backed and bald : if Agamemnon, you must be tall and
handsome, and love those who are placed in obedience to you.
NOTES
* He means that you must not do as he does, because he does this or
that act. The advice is in substance, Do not do as your friend does
simply because he is your friend.
' See Iliad, ii. 216; and for the description of Agamemnon, Iliad, iii.
167.
CHAPTER III
WHAT THINGS WE SHOULD EXCHANGE FOR OTHER THINGS
KEEP this thought in readiness, when you lose any
thing external, what you acquire in place of it ; and
if it be worth more, never say, I have had a loss;
neither if you have got a horse in place of an ass, or
an ox in place of a sheep, nor a good action in place of a bit
of money, nor in place of idle talk such tranquillity as befits
a man, nor in place of lewd talk if you have acquired mod-
esty. If you remember this, you will always maintain your
character such as it ought to be. But if you do not, consider
that the times of opportunity are perishing, and that what-
ever pains you take about yourself, you are going to waste
them all and overturn them. And it needs only a few things
for the loss and overturning of all, namely a small deviation
from reason. For the steerer of a ship to upset it, he has no
need of the same means as he has need of for saving it : but
if he turns it a little to the wind, it is lost ; and if he does not
do this purposely, but has been neglecting his duty a little,
the ship is lost. Something of the kind happens in this case
also : if you only fall a nodding a little, all that you have up
to this time collected is gone. Attend therefore to the ap-
pearances of things, and watch over them; for that which
you have to preserve is no small matter, but it is modesty and
fidelity and constancy, freedom from the affects, a state of
mind undisturbed, freedom from fear, tranquillity, in a
word liberty. For what will you sell these things ? See what
is the value of the things which you will obtain in exchange
for these. — But shall I not obtain any such thing for it? —
See, and if you do in return get that, see what you receive in
place of it. I possess decency, he possesses a tribuneship : he
possesses a prsetorship, I possess modesty. But I do not
make acclamations where it is not becoming : I will not stand
up where I ought not ;^ for I am free, and a friend of God,
and so I obey him willingly. But I must not claim (seek) any
thing else, neither body nor possession, nor magistracy, nor
at 321
322 EPICTETUS
good report, nor in fact any thing. For he (God) does not al-
low me to claim (seek) them : for if he had chosen, he would
have made them good for me; but he has not done so, and
for this reason I can not transgress his commands. Preserve
that which is your own good in every thing ; and as to every
other thing, as it is permitted, and so far as to behave con-
sistently with reason in respect to them, content with this
only. If you do not, you will be unfortunate, you will fail in
all things, you will be hindered, you will be impeded. These
are the laws which have been sent from thence (from God) ;
these are the orders. Of these laws a man ought to be an ex-
positor, to these he ought to submit, not to those of Masurius
and Cassius.^
' He alludes to the factions in the theatres, iii. 4, 4 ; iv. 2-9. Upton.
' Masurius Sabinus was a great Roman jurisconsult in the times of
Augustus and Tiberius. He is sometimes named Masurius only (Per-
sius, V. 90). C. Cassius Longinus was also a jurist, and, it is said, a de-
scendant of the Cassius, who was one of the murderers of the dictator
Caius Caesar. He lived from the time of Tiberius to that of Vespasian.
CHAPTER IV
TO THOSE WHO ARE DESIROUS OF PASSING LIFE IN
TRANQUILLITY
REMEMBER that not only the desire of power and
of riches makes us mean and subject to others,
but even the desire of tranquillity, and of leisure,
and of travelling abroad, and of learning. For
to speak plainly, whatever the external thing may be, the
value which we set upon it places us in subjection to others.
What then is the difference between desiring to be a senator
or not desiring to be one ; what is the difference between de-
siring power or being content with a private station ; what is
the difference between saying, I am unhappy, I have nothing
to do, but I am bound to my books as a corpse ; or saying, I
am unhappy, I have no leisure for reading? For as saluta-
tions and power are things external and independent of the
will, so is a book. For what purpose do you choose to read ?
Tell me. For if you only direct your purpose to being amused
or learning something, you are a silly fellow and incapable of
enduring labour.* But if you refer reading to the proper end,
what else is this than a tranquil and happy life {evdoia)?
But if reading does not secure for you a happy and tranquil
life, what is the use of it ? But it does secure this, the man re-
plies, and for this reason I am vexed that I am deprived of it.
— And what is this tranquil and happy life, which any man
can impede, I do not say Csesar or Caesar's friend, but a
crow, a piper, a fever, and thirty thousand other things ? But
a tranquil and happy life contains nothing so sure as conti-
nuity and freedom from obstacle. Now I am called to do
something : I will go then with the purpose of observing the
measures (rules) which I must keep,^ of acting with mod-
esty, steadiness, without desire and aversion to things ex-
ternal,^ and then that I may attend to men, what they say,
how they are moved ;* and this not with any bad disposition,
or that I may have something to blame or to ridicule ; but I
turn to myself, and ask if I also commit the same faults.
323
324 EPICTETUS
How then shall I cease to commit them? Formerly I also
acted wrong, but now I do not ; thanks to God.
Come, when you have done these things and have attended
to them, have you done a worse act than when you have read
a thousand verses or written as many? For when you eat,
are you grieved because you are not reading? are you not
satisfied with eating according to what you have learned by
reading, and so with bathing and with exercise? Why then
do you not act consistently in all things, both when you ap-
proach Caesar, and when you approach any person? If you
maintain yourself free from perturbation, free from alarm,
and steady; if you look rather at the things which are done
and happen than are looked at yourself ; if you do not envy
those who are preferred before you ; if surrounding circum-
stances (vXat) do not strike you with fear or admiration,
what do you want ? Books ? How or for what purpose ? for
is not this (the reading of books) a preparation for life? and
is not life itself (living) made up of certain other things than
this ? This is just as if an athlete should weep when he enters
the stadium, because he is not being exercised outside of it.
It was for this purpose that you used to practise exercise ; for
this purpose were used the halteres (weights),*^ the dust, the
young men as antagonists ; and do you seek for those things
now when it is the time of action ? This is just as if in the
topic (matter) of assent when appearances present them-
selves, some of which can be comprehended, and some can
not be comprehended, we should not choose to distinguish
them but should choose to read what has been written about
comprehension (x-crrdAT/Vi?).
What then is the reason of this? The reason is that we
have never read for this purpose, we have never written for
this purpose, so that we may in our actions use in a way con-
formable to nature the appearances presented to us; but we
terminate in this, in learning what is said, and in being able
to expound it to another, in resolving a syllogism,® and in
handling the hypothetical syllogism. For this reason where
our study (purpose) is, there alone is the impediment. Would
you have by all means the things which are not in your
power ? Be prevented then, be hindered, fail in your purpose.
But if we read what is written about action (efforts, )6y07777,
DISCOURSES 325
not that we may see what is said about action, but that we
may act well : if we read what is said about desire and aver-
sion (avoiding things), in order that we may neither fail in
our desires, nor fall into that which we try to avoid ; if we
read what is said about duty (officium), in order that re-
membering the relations (of things to one another) we may
do nothing irrationally nor contrary to these relations; we
should not be vexed in being hindered as to our readings, but
we should be satisfied with doing the acts which are conform-
able (to the relations), and we should be reckoning not what
so far we have been accustomed to reckon : To-day I have
read so many verses, I have written so many ; but ( we should
say) , To-day I have employed my action as it is taught by the
philosophers; I have not employed my desire; I have used
avoidance (iKKXidet) only with respect to things which are
within the power of my will ; I have not been afraid of such a
person, I have not been prevailed upon by the entreaties of
another; I have exercised my patience,' my abstinence, my
co-operation with others; and so we should thank God for
what we ought to thank him.
But now we do not know that we also in another way are
like the many. Another man is afraid that he shall not have
power : you are afraid that you will. Do not do so, my man ;
but as you ridicule him who is afraid that he shall not have
power, so ridicule yourself also. For it makes no difference
whether you are thirsty like a man who has a fever, or have
a dread of water like a man who is mad. Or how will you
still be able to say as Socrates did, "If so it pleases God, so
let it be.''" Do you think that Socrates if he had been eager
to pass his leisure in the Lyceum or in the Academy and to
discourse daily with the young men, would have readily
served in military expeditions so often as he did, and would
he not have lamented and groaned, ''Wretch that I am; I
must now be miserable here, when I might be sunning my-
self in the Lyceum ?" Why, was this your business, to sun
yourself? And is it not your business to be happy, to be
free from hindrance, free from impediment ? And could he
still have been Socrates, if he had lamented in this way : how
would he still have been able to write Paeans in his prison ?®
In short remember this, that what you shall prize which is
326 EPICTETUS
beyond your will, so far you have destroyed your will. But
these things are out of the power of the will, not only power
(authority), but also a private condition: not only occupa-
tion (business), but also leisure. — Now then must I live in
this tumult? — Why do you say tumult? — I mean among
many men. — Well what is the hardship? Suppose that
you are at Olympia: imagine it to be a panegyris (pub-
lic assembly), where one is calling out one thing, an-
other is doing another thing, and a third is pushing
another person: in the baths there is a crowd: and who
of us is not pleased with this assembly, and leaves it
unwillingly? Be not difficult to please nor fastidious
about what happens. — Vinegar is disagreeable, for it is
sharp; honey is disagreeable, for it disturbs my habit
of body. I do not like vegetables. So also I do not like
leisure ; it is a desert : I do not like a crowd ; it is confusion. —
But if circumstances make it necessary for you to live alone
or with a few, call it quiet, and use the thing as you ought :
'talk with yourself, exercise the appearances (presented to
you), work up your preconceptions. If you fall into a crowd,
call it a celebration of games, a panegyris, a festival : try to
enjoy the festival with other men. For what is a more pleas-
ant sight to him who loves mankind than a number of men ?
We see with pleasure herds of horses or oxen : we are de-
lighted when we see many ships : who is pained when he sees
many men? — But they deafen me with their cries. — Then
your hearing is impeded. What then is this to you ? Is then
the power of making use of appearances hindered ? And who
prevents you from using according to nature inclination to a
thing and aversion from it ; and movement towards a thing
and movement from it? What tumult (confusion) is able to
do this?
, Do you only bear in mind the general rules : what is mine,
what is not mine; what is given (permitted) to me; what
does God will that I should do now ? what does he not will ?
A little before he willed you to be at leisure, to talk with
yourself, to write about these things, to read, to hear, to pre-
pare yourself. You had sufficient time for this. Now he says
to you : "Come now to the contest, show us what you have
learned, how you have practised the athletic art. How long
DISCOURSES 327
will you be exercised alone ? Now is the opportunity for you
to learn whether you are an athlete worthy of victory, or one
of those who go about the world and are defeated." Why
then are you vexed ? No contest is without confusion. There
must be many who exercise themselves for the contest, many
who call out to those who exercise themselves, many masters,
many spectators. — But my wish is to live quietly. — Lament
then and groan as you deserve to do. For what other is a
greater punishment than this to the untaught man and to him
who disobeys the divine commands, to be grieved, to lament,
to envy, in a word to be disappointed and to be unhappy?
Would you not release yourself from these things? — And
how shall I release myself ? — Have you not often heard, that
you ought to remove entirely desire, apply aversion (turn-
ing away) to those things only which are within your power,
that you ought to give up every thing, body, property, fame,
books, tumult, power, private station ? for whatever way you
turn, you are a slave, you are subjected, you are hindered, you
are compelled, you are entirely in the power of others. But
keep the words of Cleanthes in readiness.
" Lead me, O Zeus, and thou necessity." *
Is it your will that I should go to Rome? I will go to
Rome. To Gyara ? I will go to Gyara. To Athens ? I will go
to Athens. To prison? I will go to prison. If you should
once say, "When shall a man go to Athens?" you are un-
done. It is a necessary consequence that this desire, if it is
not accomplished, must make you unhappy ; and if it is ac-
complished, it must make you vain, since you are elated at
things at which you ought not to be elated ; and on the other
hand, if you are impeded, it must make you wretched be-
cause you fall into that which you would not fall into. Give
up then all these things. — Athens is a good place. — But hap-
piness is much better ; and to be free from passions, free from
disturbance, for your affairs not to depend on any man. There
is tumult at Rome and visits of salutation.^ ° But happiness
is an equivalent for all troublesome things. If then the time
comes for these things, why do you not take away the wish
to avoid them ? what necessity is there to carry a burden like
328 EPICTETUS
an ass, and to be beaten with a stick ? But if you do not so,
consider that you must always be a slave to him who has
it in his power to effect your release, and also to impede you,
and you must serve him as an evil genius.
There is only one way to happiness, and let this rule be
ready both in the morning and during the day and by night :
the rule is not to look towards things which are out of the
power of our will, to think that nothing is our own, to give
up all things to the Divinity, to Fortune ; to make them the
superintendents of these things, whom Zeus also has made
so; for a man to observe that only which is his own, that
which can not be hindered; and when we read, to refer our
reading to this only, and our writing and our listening. For
this reason I can not call the man industrious, if I hear this
only, that he reads and writes ; and even if a man adds that he
reads all night, I can not say so, if he knows not to what he
should refer his reading. For neither do you say that a man
is industrious if he keeps awake for a girl ; nor do I. But if
he does it (reads and writes) for reputation, I say that he is
a lover of reputation. And if he does it for money, I say that
he is a lover of money, not a lover of labour ; and if he does
it through love of learning, I say that he is a lover of learn-
ing. But if he refers his labour to his own ruling power
{rtrenovtK6v\ that he may keep it in a state conforma-
ble to nature and pass his life in that state, then only do I say
that he is industrious. For never commend a man on ac-
count of these things which are common to all, but on account
of his opinions (principles) ; for these are the things which
belong to each man, which make his actions bad or good. Re-
membering these rules, rejoice in that which is present, and
be content with the things which come in season.^ ^ If you
see any thing which you have learned and inquired about oc-
curring to you in your course of life (or opportunely applied
by you to the acts of life) , be delighted at it. If you have laid
aside or have lessened bad disposition and a habit of reviling;
if you have done so with rash temper, obscene words, hasti-
ness, sluggishness; if you are not moved by what you
formerly were, and not in the same way as you once were,
you can celebrate a festival daily, to-day because you have be-
haved well in one act, and to-morrow because you have be-
DISCOURSES
329
haved well in another. How much greater is this a reason for
making sacrifices than a consulship or the government of a
province ? These things come to you from yourself and from
the gods. Remember this, who gives these things and to
whom, and for what purpose. If you cherish yourself in these
thoughts, do you still think that it makes any difference
where you shall be happy, where you shall please God ? Are
not the gods equally distant from all places ? Do they not see
from all places alike that which is going on ?
NOTES
* See Bishop Butler's remarks in the Preface to his Sermons vol. ii.
He speaks of the "idle way of reading and considering things ; by this
means, time even in solitude is happily got rid of without the pain of at-
tention : neither is any part of it more put to the account of idleness, one
can scarce forbear saying, is spent with less thought than great part of
that which is spent in reading."
' "Sed verae numerosque modosque ediscere vitae." Hor. Epp. ii. 2,
144. M. Antoninus, iii. i.
■ "The readers perhaps may grow tired with being so often told what
they will find it very difficult to believe. That because externals are not
in our power, they are nothing to us. But in excuse for this frequent
repetition, it must be considered that the Stoics had reduced themselves
to a necessity of dwelling on this consequence, extravagant as it is, by
rejecting stronger aids. One can not indeed avoid highly admiring the
very few, who attempted to amend and exalt themselves on this founda-
tion. No one perhaps ever carried the attempt so far in practice, and no
one ever spoke so well in support of the argument as Epictetus. Yet, not-
withstanding his great abilities and the force of his example, one finds
him strongly complaining of the want of success ; and one sees from this
circumstance as well as from others in the Stoic writings, That virtue can
not be maintained in the world without the hope of a future reward."
Mrs. Carter.
* Compare Horace, Sat. i. 4, 133 ; "Noque enim cum lectulus," etc.
* See i. 4, note S, iii. 15, 4 ; and i. 24, i, i. 29, 34. The athletes were
oiled, but they used to rub themselves with dust to be enabled to lay
hold of one another.
' M. Antoninus, i. 17, thanks the Gods that he did not waste his time
in the resolution of syllogisms.
' See Aulus Gellius xvii. 19, where he quotes Epictetus on what Gellius
expresses by "intolerantia" and "incontinentia." Compare M. Antoninus
(v. 33) on the precept 'Avsxov and ^Anixov.
* Plato in the Phaedon (c. 4) says that Socrates in his prison wrote a
hymn to Apollo.
* Cleanthes was a Stoic philosopher, who also wrote some poetry.
" He alludes to the practice of dependents paying formal visits in the
morning at the houses of the great and powerful at Rome. Upton refers
to Virgil, Gecrgics, ii. 461.
" See Antoninus, vi. 2 ; and ix. 6. "Thy present opmion founded on un-
derstanding, and thy present conduct directed to social good, and thy
present disposition of contentment with everything which happens— that
is enough."
CHAPTER V
AGAINST THE QUARRELSOME AND FEROCIOUS
THE wise and good man neither himself fights with any
person, nor does he allow another, so far as he can
prevent it. And an example of this as well as of all
other things is proposed to us in the life of Socrates,
who not only himself on all occasions avoided fights (quar-
rels), but would not allow even others to quarrel. See in
Xenophon's "Symposium" how many quarrels he settled,
how further he endured Thrasymachus and Polus and Calli-
cles ; how he tolerated his wife, and how he tolerated his son
who attempted to confute him and to cavil with him. For he
remembered well that no man has in his power another man's
ruling principle. He wished therefore for nothing else than
that which was his own. And what is this ? Not that this or
that man may act according to nature; for that is a thing
which belongs to another; but that while others are doing
their own acts, as they choose, he may nevertheless be in a
condition conformable to nature and live in it, only doing
what is his own to the end that others also may be in a state
conformable to nature. For this is the object always set be-
fore him by the wise and good man. Is it to be commander (a
prsetor) of an army? No; but if it is permitted him, his ob-
ject is in this matter to maintain his own ruling principle. Is
it to marry ? No ; but if marriage is allowed to him, in this
matter his object is to maintain himself in a condition con-
formable to nature. But if he would have his son not to do
wrong or his wife, he would have what belongs to another
not to belong to another: and to be instructed is this, to learn
what things are a man's own and what belongs to another.
How then is there left any place for fighting (quarrelling)
to a man who has this opinion (which he ought to have) ? Is
he surprised at any thing which happens, and does it appear
new to him ? Does he not expect that which comes from the
bad to be worse and more grievous than what actually be-
falls him? And does he not reckon as pure gain whatever they
330
DISCOURSES 331
(the bad) may do which falls short of extreme wickedness?
Such a person has reviled you. Great thanks to him for not
having struck you. But he has struck me also. Great thanks
that he did not wound you. But he wounded me also. Great
thanks that he did not kill you. For when did he learn or in
what school that man is a tame^ animal, that men love one
another, that an act of injustice is a great harm to him who
does it. Since then he has not learned this and is not con-
vinced of it, why shall he not follow that which seems to be
for his own interest? Your neighbour has thrown stones.
Have you then done any thing wrong ? But the things in the
house have been broken. Are you then a utensil ? No ; but a
free power of will,^ What then is given to you (to do) in
answer to this? If you are like a wolf, you must bite in re-
turn, and throw more stones. But if you consider what is
proper for a man, examine your storehouse, see with what
faculties you came into the world. Have you the disposition
of a wild beast, have you the disposition of revenge for an in-
jury? When is a horse wretched? When he is deprived of
his natural faculties, not when he can not crow like a cock,
but when he can not run. When is a dog wretched ? Not
when he can not fly, but when he can not track his game. Is
then a man also unhappy in this way, not because he can not
strangle lions or embrace statues,^ for he did not come into
the world in the possession of certain powers from nature for
this purpose, but because he has lost his probity and his fidel-
ity? People ought to meet and lament such a man for the
misfortunes into which he has fallen ; not indeed to lament
because a man has been bom or has died,* but because it has
happened to him in his life time to have lost the things which
are his own, not that which he received from his father, not
his land and house, and his inn, and his slaves ; for not one
of these things is a man's own, but all belong to others, are
service, and subject to account (vTcevQwa), at different
times given to different persons by those who have them in
their power : but I mean the things which belong to him as
a man, the marks (stamps) in his mind with which he came
into the world, such as we seek also on coins, and if we find
them, we approve of the coins, and if we do not find the
marks, we reject them. What is the stamp on this sestertius ?
332
EPICTETUS
The stamp of Trajan. Present it. It is the stamp of Nero.
Throw it away : it can not be accepted, it is counterfeit.^ So
also in this case : What is the stamp of his opinions ? It is
gentleness, a sociable disposition, a tolerant temper, a disposi-
tion to mutual affection. Produce these qualities. I accept
them : I consider this man a citizen, I accept him as a neigh-
bour, a companion in my voyages. Only see that he has not
Nero's stamp. Is he passionate, is he full of resentment, is he
fault-finding? If the whim seizes him, does he break the
heads of those who come in his way? (If so), why then did
you say that he is a man? Is every thing judged (deter-
mined) by the bare form ? If that is so, say that the form in
wax*' is an apple and has the smell and taste of an apple. But
the external figure is not enough : neither then is the nose
enough and the eyes to make the man, but he must have the
opinions of a man. Here is a man who does not listen to
reason, who does not know when he is refuted : he is an ass :
in another man the sense of shame is become dead : he is good
for nothing, he is any thing rather than a man. This man
seeks whom he may meet and kick or bite, so that he is not
even a sheep or an ass, but a kind of wild beast.
What then? would you have me to be despised? — By
whom ? by those who know you ? and how shall those who
know you despise a man who is gentle and modest? Perhaps
you mean by those who do not know you ? What is that to
you ? For no other artisan cares for the opinion of those who
know not his art. — But they will be more hostile to me for
this reason. — Why do you say "me" ? Can any man injure
your will, or prevent you from using in a natural way the ap-
pearances which are presented to you? In no way can he.
Why then are you still disturbed and why do you choose to
show yourself afraid ? And why do you not come forth and
proclaim that you are at peace with all men whatever they
may do, and laugh at those chiefly who think that they can
harm you ? These slaves, you can say, know not either who I
am, nor where lies my good or my evil, because they have no
access to the things which are mine.
In this way also those who occupy a strong city mock the
besiegers, (and say) : "What trouble these men are now tak-
ing for nothing : our wall is secure, we have food for a very
DISCOURSES 333
long time, and all other resources." These are the things
which make a city strong and impregnable : but nothing else
than his opinions makes a man's soul impregnable. For what
wall is so strong, or what body is so hard, or what possession
is so safe, or what honour (rank, character) so free from as-
sault (as a man's opinions) ? All (other) things every where
are perishable, easily taken by assault, and if any man in any
way is attached to them, he must be disturbed, expect what is
bad, he must fear, lament, find his desires disappointed, and
fall into things which he would avoid. Then do we not
choose to make secure the only means of safety which are
offered to us, and do we not choose to withdraw ourselves
from that which is perishable and servile, and to labour at
the things which are imperishable and by nature free; and
do we not remember that no man either hurts another or
does good to another, but that a man's opinion about each
thing, is that which hurts him, is that which overturns him ;
this is fighting, this is civil discord, this is war ? That which
made Eteocles and Polynices'^ enemies was nothing else than
this opinion which they had about royal power, their opinion
about exile, that the one is the extreme of evils, the other the
greatest good. Now this is the nature of every man to seek
the good, to avoid the bad f to consider him who deprives
us of the one and involves us in the other an enemy and
treacherous, even if he be a brother, or a son, or a father.
For nothing is more akin to us than the good : therefore if
these things (externals) are good and evil, neither is a
father a friend to sons, nor a brother to a brother, but
all the world is every where full of enemies, treacherous
men, and sycophants. But if the will (itpoatpedtg, the pur-
pose, the intention) being what it ought to be, is the only
good ; and if the will being such as it ought not to be, is the
only evil, where is there any strife, where is there reviling?
about what ? about the things which do not concern us ? and
strife with whom ? with the ignorant, the unhappy, with those
who are deceived about the chief things ?
Remembering this Socrates managed his own house and
endured a very ill-tempered wife and a foolish (ungrateful?)
son.^ For in what did she show her bad temper? In pouring
water on his head as much as she liked, and in trampling on
334
EPICTETUS
the cake (sent to Socrates). And what is this to me, if I
think that these things are nothing to me? But this is my
business ; and neither tyrant shall check my will nor a master ;
nor shall the many check me who am only one, nor shall the
stronger check me who am the weaker; for this power of
being free from check (hindrance) is given by God to every
man. For these opinions make love in a house (family), con-
cord in a state, among nations peace, and gratitude to God ;
they make a man in all things cheerful (confident) in ex-
ternals as about things which belong to others, as about
things which are of no value.^*^ We indeed are able to write
and to read these things, and to praise them when they are
read, but we do not even come near to being convinced of
them. Therefore what is said of the Lacedaemonians, "Lions
at home, but in Ephesus foxes," will fit in our case also,
"Lions in the school, but out of it foxes."^^
NOTES
* See ii. lo, 14, iv. i. So Plato says (Legg. vi.), that a man who
has had right education is wont to be the most divine and the tamest of
animals. Upton.
On the doing wrong to another, see Plato's Crito and Epictetus iv. i.
^ See iii. i.
* Like Hercules and Diogenes. See iii. 12. 2.
* The allusion is to a passage (a fragment) in the Cresphontes of Eu-
ripides translated by Cicero into Latin Iambics (Tusc. Disp i. 48) —
edet yap rfjuS-i avA.Xoyov icotovfxevov^
Tov (pvvra Bprjveiv eie, od' epx^Tat icdica.
Tov S'av Qavovra koi Ttovoov itSTtavfxevov
Xcctpovra^y ezxprf/iovvrag kKiciuneiv Sofioov.
Herodotus (v. 4) ^ays of the Trausi, a Thracian tribe : "when a child is
born, the relatives sit round it and lament over all the evils which it
must suffer on coming into the world and enumerate all the calamities
of mankind : but when one dies, they hide him in the earth with rejoicing
and pleasure, reckoning all the evils from which he is now released and
in possession of all happiness."
' This does not mean, it is said, that Nero issued counterfeit coins, for
there are extant many coins of Nero which both in form and in the
purity of the metal are complete. A learned numismatist, Francis Wise,
fellow of Trinity College, Oxford, in a letter to Upton, says that he can
discover no reason for Nero's coins being rejected in commercial deal-
ings after his death except the fact of the tyrant having been declared by
the Senate to be an enemy to the Commonwealth. (Suetonius, Nero, c.
49-) When Domitian was murdered, the Senate ordered his busts to be
taken down, as the French now do after a revolution and all memorials
of him to be destroyed (Suetonius, Domitian, c. 23). Dion also reports
DISCOURSES 335
(lx) that when Caligula was murdered, it was ordered that all the trass
coin which bore his image should be melted, and, I suppose, coined again.
There is more on this subject in Wise's letter.
I do not believe that genuine coins would be refused in commercial
dealings for the reasons which Wise gives, at least not refused in parts
distant from Rome. Perhaps Epictetus means that some people would
not touch the coins of the detestable Nero.
' He says to Kr/ptvov, which Mrs. Carter translates "a piece of wax."
Perhaps it means "a piece of wax in the form of an apple."
' Eteocles and Polynices were the sons of the unfortunate CEdipus, who
quarrelled about the kingship of Thebes and killed one another. This
quarrel is the subject of the Seven against Thebes of .^schylus and the
PhoeniSsae of Euripides. See ii, 22, note 3.
* "Every man in everything he does naturally acts upon the fore-
thought and apprehension of avoiding evil or obtaining good." Bp. But-
ler, Analogy, Chap. 2. The bishop's "naturally" is the <pvaii of Epicte-
tus.
' Socrates' wife Xanthippe is charged by her eldest son Lamprocles
with being so ill-tempered as to be past all endurance (Xenophon,
Memorab. ii. 2, 7). Xenophon in this chapter has reported the conversa-
tion of Socrates with his son on this matter.
Diogenes Laertius (ii.) tells the story of Xanthippe pouring water on
the head of Socrates, and dirty water, as Seneca says (De Constantia,
c. 18). ^lian (xi. 12) reports that Alcibiades sent Socrates a large and
good cake, which Xanthippe trampled under her feet. Socrates only
laughed and said, "Well then, you will not have your share of it." The
philosopher showed that his philosophy was practical by enduring the
torment of a very ill-tempered wife, one of the greatest calamities that
can happen to a man, and the trouble of an undutiful son.
" This is one of the wisest and noblest expressions of Epictetus.
"See Aristophanes, the "Peace," v. 1188:
icoXXa. yap Sij //' rfSlKTfdav^
ovre? oiKoi jukv Xeovrsi,
iv jidxv ^' ccXatiteKSi.
CHAPTER VI
AGAINST THOSE WHO LAMENT OVER BEING PITIED
I AM grieved, a man says, at being pitied. Whether then
is the fact of your being pitied a thing which concerns
you, or those who pity you ? Well, is it in your power to
stop this pity ? — It is in my power, if I show them that I
do not require pity. — And whether then are you in the condi-
tion of not deserving (requiring) pity, or are you not in that
condition ? — I think that I am not : but these persons do not
pity me, for the things for which, if they ought to pity me, it
would be proper, I mean, for my faults ; but they pity me for
my poverty, for not possessing honourable offices, for dis-
eases and deaths and other such things. — Whether then are
you prepared to convince the many, that not one of these
things is an evil, but that it is possible for a man who is poor
and has no office ( dydpxovrt ) and enjoys no honour to be
happy ; or to shew yourself to them as rich and in power ?
For the second of these things belongs to a man who is boast-
ful, silly and good for nothing. And consider by what means
the pretence must be supported. It will be necessary for you
to hire slaves and to possess a few silver vessels, and to ex-
hibit them in public, if it is possible, though they are often
the same, and to attempt to conceal the fact that they are the
same, and to have splendid garments, and all other things for
display, and to show that you are a man honoured by the
great, and to try to sup at their houses, or to be supposed to
sup there, and as to your person to employ some mean arts,
that you may appear to be more handsome and nobler than
you are. These things you must contrive, if you choose to
go by the second path in order not to be pitied. But the first
way is both impracticable and long, to attempt the very thing
which Zeus has not been able to do, to convince all men what
things are good and bad.^ Is this power given to you?
This only is given to you, to convince yourself ; and you have
not convinced yourself. Then I ask you, do you attempt to
persuade other men ? and who has lived so long with you as
336
DISCOURSES 337
you with yourself ? and who has so much power of convinc-
ing you as you have of convincing yourself ; and who is bet-
ter disposed and nearer to you than you are to yourself?
How then have you not yet convinced yourself in order to
learn? At present are not things upside down? Is this
what you have been earnest about doing,^ to learn to be free
from grief and free from disturbance, and not to be humbled
(abject), and to be free? Have you not heard then that
there is only one way which leads to this end, to give up
(dismiss) the things which do not depend on the will, to
withdraw from them, and to admit that they belong to
others? For another man then to have an opinion about
you, of what kind is it? — It is a thing independent of the
will. — Then is it nothing to you ? — It is nothing. — When
then you are still vexed at this and disturbed, do you think
that you are convinced about good and evil?
Will you not then, letting others alone, be to yourself both
scholar and teacher? — The rest of mankind will look after
this, whether it is to their interest to be and to pass their lives
in a state contrary to nature : but to me no man is nearer than
myself. What then is the meaning of this, that I havie lis-
tened to the words of the philosophers and I assent to them,
but in fact I am no way made easier (more content) ? Am I
so stupid ? And yet in all other things such as I have chosen,
I have not been found very stupid; but I learned letters
quickly, and to wrestle, and geometry, and to resolve syllo-
gisms. Has not then reason convinced me? and indeed no
other things have I found from the beginning so approved
and chosen (as the things which are rational) : and now I
read about these things, hear about them, write about them ;
I have so far discovered no reason stronger than this (living
according to nature). In what then am I deficient? Have
the contrary opinions not been eradicated from me ? Have
the notions (opinions) themselves not been exercised nor
used to be applied to action, but as armour are laid aside and
rusted and can not fit me? And yet neither in the exercises
of the palsestra, nor in writing or reading am I satisfied with
learning, but I turn up and down the syllogisms which are
proposed, and I make others, and sophistical syllogisms also.
But the necessary theorems by proceeding from which a man
22
338 EPICTETUS
can become free from grief, fear, passions (affects), hin-
drance, and a free man, these I do not exercise myself in nor
do I practise in these the proper practice (study). Then I
care about what others will say of me, whether 1 shall appear
to them worth notice, whether I shall appear happy. —
Wretched man, will you not see what you are saying about
yourself? What do you appear to yourself to be? in your
opinions, in your desires, in your aversions from things ( hv
Tw kKK\ivEiv\ in your movements (purposes, kv op^^) in your
preparation (for anything), in your designs (plans), -and in
other acts suitable to a man? But do you trouble yourself
about this, whether others pity you? — Yes, but I am pitied
not as I ought to be. — Are you then pained at this ? and is he
who is pained, an object of pity ? — Yes. — How then are you
pitied not as you ought to be ? For by the very act that you
feel (suffer) about being pitied, you make yourself deserving
of pity. What then says Antisthenes? Have you not heard ?
"It is a royal thing, O Cyrus, to do right (well) and to be
ill spoken of." My head is sound, and all think that I have
the headache. What do I care for that? I am free from
fever, and people sympathize with me as if I had a fever,
(and say), "Poor man, for so long a time you have not
ceased to have fever." I also say with a sorrowful counte-
nance, "In truth it is now a long time that I have been ill."
What will happen then? As God may please: and at the
same time I secretly laugh at those who are pitying me.
What then hinders the same thing being done in this case
also ? I am poor, but I have a right opinion about pov-
erty. Why then do I care if they pity me for my pov-
erty? I am not in power (not a magistrate) : but
others are: and I have the opinion which I ought to
have about having and not having power. Let them look
to it who pity me : but I am neither hungry nor thirsty nor
do I suffer cold; but because they are hungry or thirsty
they think that I too am. What then shall I do for them ?
Shall I go about and proclaim and say, "Be not mistaken,
men, I am very well, I do not trouble myself about poverty,
nor want of power, nor in a word about anything else than
right opinions. These I have free from restraint. I care
for nothing at all." — What foolish talk is this? How
DISCOURSES 339
do I possess right opinions when I am not content with being
what I am, but am uneasy about what I am supposed to be ?
But you say, others will get more and be preferred to me. —
What then is more reasonable than for those who have la-
boured about any thing to have more in that thing in which
they have laboured ? They have laboured for power, you
have laboured about opinions ; and they have laboured for
wealth, you for the proper use of appearances. See if they
have more than you in this about which you have laboured,
and which they neglect ; if they assent better than you with
respect to the natural rules (measures) of things; if they are
less disappointed than you in their desires ; if they fall less
into things which they would avoid than you do ; if in their
intentions, if in the things which they propose to themselves,
if in their purposes, if in their motions towards an object they
take a better aim ; if they better observe a proper behaviour,
as men, as sons, as parents, and so on as to the other names
by which we express the relations of life. But if they exer-
cise power, and you do not, will you not choose to tell your-
self the truth, that you do nothing for the sake of this
(power), and they do all ? And it is most unreasonable that
he who looks after anything should obtain less than he who
does not look after it.
Not so : but since I care about right opinions, it is more
reasonable for me to have power. — Yes in the matter about
which you do care, in opinions. But in a matter in which
they have cared more than you, give way to them. The case
is just the same as if because you have right opinions, you
thought that in using the bow you should hit the mark better
than an archer, and in working in metal you should succeed
better than a smith. Give up then your earnestness about
opinions and employ yourself about the things which you
wish to acquire ; and then lament, if you do not succeed ; for
you deserve to lament. But now you say that you are occu-
pied with other things, that you are looking after other
things ; but the many say this truly, that one act has no com-
munity with another.^ He who has risen in the morning
seeks whom (of the house of Caesar) he shall salute, to
whom he shall say something agreeable, to whom he shall
send a present, how he shall please the dancing man, how by
340 EPICTETUS
bad behaviour to one he may please another. When he prays,
he prays about these things ; when he sacrifices, he sacrifices
for these things : the saying of Pythagoras
"Let sleep not come upon thy languid eyes"*
he transfers to these things. Where have I failed in the mat-
ters pertaining to flattery? What have I done? Any thing
like a free man, any thing like a noble minded man ? And if
he finds any thing of the kind, he blames and accuses him-
self : *' Why did you say this ? Was it not in your power to
lie ? Even the philosophers say that nothing hinders us from
telling a lie." But do you, if indeed you have cared about
nothing else except the proper use of appearances, as soon
as you have risen in the morning reflect, "What do I want in
order to be free from passion (affects), and free from per-
turbation ? What am I ? Am I a poor body, a piece of prop-
erty, a thing of which something is said? I am none of
these. But what am I ? I am a rational animal. What then is
required of me?" Reflect on your acts. Where have I
omitted the things which conduce to happiness ( evpotav ) ?
What have I done which is either unfriendly or unsocial?
what have I not done a*s to these things which I ought to
have done ?
So great then being the difference in desires, actions,
wishes, would you still have the same share with others in
those things about which you have not laboured, and they
have laboured? Then are you surprised if they pity you, and
are you vexed? But they are not vexed if you pity them.
Why ? Because they are convinced that they have that which
is good, and you are not convinced. For this reason you are
not satisfied with your own, but you desire that which they
have : btit they are satisfied with their own, and do not de-
sire what you have : since if you were really convinced, that
with respect to what is good, it is you who are the possessor
of it and that they have missed it, you would not even have
thought of what they say about you.
NOTES
* Here it is implied that there are things which God can not do. Per-
haps he means that as God has given man certain powers of will and
DISCOURSES 341
therefore of action, he can not at the same time exercise the contradic-
tory powers of forcing man's will and action ; for this would be at the
same time to give power and to take it away. Butler remarks (Analogy,
chap. 5) "the present is so far from proving in event a discipline of vir-
tue to the generality of men that on the contrary they seem to make it a
discipline of vice." In fact all men are not convinced and can not be
convinced in the present constitution of things "what things are good
and bad."
* Something is perhaps wrong in the text here.
* Schweig. says that he has not observed that this proverb is men-
tioned by any other writer, and that he does not quite see the meaning of
it, unless it be what he expresses in the Latin version (iv. 10, 24), "al-
terum opus cum altero nihil commune habet." I think that the context
explains it : if you wish to obtain a particular end, employ the proper
means, and not the means which do not make for that end.
* Epictetus is making a parody of the verses of Pythagoras. See
Schweig.'s remarks on the words "He who has risen, etc." I have of
necessity translated KaKOTfQicrduevoi in an active sense; but if this is
right, I do not understand how the word is used so.
CHAPTER VII
ON FREEDOM FROM FEAR
WHAT makes the tyrant formidable? The guards,
you say, and their swords, and the men of the bed-
chamber, and those who exclude them who would
enter. Why then if you bring a boy (child) to the
tyrant when he is with his guards, is he not afraid; or
is it because the child does not understand these things?
If then any man does understand what guards are and
that they have swords, and comes to the tyrant for this very
purpose because he wishes to die on account of some circum-
stance and seeks to die easily by the hand of another, is he
afraid of the guards ? No, for he wishes for the thing which
makes the guards formidable. If then any man neither wish-
ing to die nor to live by all means, but only as it may be per-
mitted, approaches the tyrant, what hinders him from ap-
proaching the tyrant without fear? Nothing, If then a man
has the same opinion about his property as the man whom I
have instanced has about his body ; and also about his chil-
dren and his wife, and in a word is so affected by some mad-
ness or despair that he cares not whether he possesses them
or not, but like children who are playing with shells care
(quarrel) about the play, but do not trouble themselves about
the shells, so he too has set no value on the materials
(things), but values the pleasure that he has with them and
the occupation, what tyrant is then formidable to him, or
what guards, or what swords ?
Then through madness is it possible for a man to be so
disposed towards these things, and the Galilaeans through
habit,^ and is it possible that no man can learn from reason
and from demonstration that God has made all the things in
the universe and the universe itself completely free from
hindrance and perfect, and the parts of it for the use of the
whole? All other animals indeed are incapable of compre-
hending the administration of it; but the rational animal
man has faculties for the consideration of all these things,
342
DISCOURSES 343'
and for understanding that it is a part, and what kind of a
part it is, and that it is right for the parts to be subordinate
to the whole. And besides this being naturally noble, mag-
nanimous and free, man sees that of the things which sur-
round him some are free from hindrance and in his power,
and the other things are subject to hindrance and in the
power of others ; that the things which are free from hind-
rance are in the power of the will ; and those which are sub-
ject to hindrance are the things which are not in the power
of the will. And for this reason if he thinks that his good
and his interest be in these things only which are free from
hindrance and in his own power, he will be free, prosperous,
happy, free from harm, magnanimous, pious, thankful to
God^ for all things; in no matter finding fault with any of
the things which have not been put in his power, nor blaming
any of them. But if he thinks that his good and his interest
are in externals and in things which are not in the power of
his will, he must of necessity be hindered, be impeded, be a
slave to those who have the power over the things which he
admires (desires) and fears: and he must of necessity be im-
pious because he thinks that he is harmed by God, and he
must be unjust because he always claims more than belongs
to him ; and he must of necessity be abject and mean.
What hinders a man, who has clearly separated (compre-
hended), these things, from living with a light heart and
bearing easily the reins, quietly expecting every thing which
can happen, and enduring that which has already happened?
Would you have me to bear poverty? Come and you will
know what poverty is when it has found one who can act well
the part of a poor man. Would you have me to possess
power ? Let me have power, and also the trouble of it. Well,
banishment ? Wherever I shall go, there it will be well with
me ; for here also where I am, it was not because of the place
that it was well with me, but because of my opinions which I
shall carry off with me : for neither can any man deprive me
of them ; but my opinions alone are mine and they can not be
taken from me, and I am satisfied while I have them, wher-
ever I may be and whatever I am doing. But now it is time
to die. Why do you say, to die? Make no tragedy show of
the thing, but speak of it as it is : it is now time for the matter
344 EPICTETUS
(of the body) to be resolved into the things out of which it
was composed. And what is the formidable thing here ? what
is going to perish of the things which are in the universe?^
what new thing or wondrous is going to happen? Is it for
this reason that a tyrant is formidable ? Is it for this reason
that the guards appear to have swords which are large and
sharp ? Say this to others : but I have considered about all
these things ; no man has power over me. I have been made
free; I know his commands, no man can now lead me as a
slave. I have a proper person to assert my freedom ; I have
proper judges. (I say) are you not the master of my body?
What then is that to me? Are you not the master of my
property ? What then is that to me ? Are you not the master
of my exile or of my chains ? Well, from all these things and
all the poor body itself I depart at your bidding, when you
please. Make trial of your power, and you will know how far
it reaches.
Whom then can I still fear ? Those who are over the bed-
chamber? Lest they should do, what? Shut me out? If they
find that I wish to enter, let them shut me out. Why then do
you go to the doors ? Because I think it befits me, while the
play (sport) lasts, to join in it. How then are you not shut
out? Because unless some one allows me to go in, I do not
choose to go in, but am always content with that which hap-
pens ; for I think that what God chooses is better than what
I choose.* I will attach myself as a minister and follower to
him ; I have the same movements (pursuits) as he has, I have
the same desires ; in a word, I have the same will (a-vvQeXoo).
There is no shutting out for me, but for those who would
force their way in. Why then do not I force my way in ? Be-
cause I know that nothing good is distributed within to those
who enter. But when I hear any man called fortunate be-
cause he is honoured by Csesar, I say, what does he happen
to get? A province (the government of a province). Does
he also obtain an opinion such as he ought ? The office of a
Prefect. Does he also obtain the power of using his office
well? Why do I still strive to enter (Csesar's chamber) ? A
man scatters dried figs and nuts : the children seize them, and
fight with one another ; men do not, for they think them to be
a small matter. But if a man should throw about shells, even
DISCOURSES 345
the children do not seize them. Provinces are distributed : let
children look to that. Money is distributed : let children look
to that. Praetorships, consulships are distributed : let chil-
dren scramble for them, let them be shut out, beaten, kiss the
hands of the giver, of the slaves : but to me these are only
dried figs and nuts. What then? If you fail to get them,
while Caesar is scattering them about, do not be troubled : if
a dried fig come into your lap, take it and eat it ; for so far
you may value even a fig. But if I shall stoop down and turn
another over, or be turned over by another, and shall flatter
those who have got into (Caesar's) chamber, neither is a
dried fig worth the trouble, nor any thing else of the things
which are not good, which the philosophers have persuaded
me not to think good.
Show me the swords of the guards. See how big they are,
and how sharp. What then do these big and sharp swords
do ? They kill. And what does a fever do ? Nothing else.
And what else a (falling) tile? Nothing else. Would you
then have me to wonder at these things and worship them,
and go about as the slave of all of them? I hope that this
will not happen : but when I have once learned that every
thing which has come into existence must also go out of
it, that the universe may not stand still nor be impeded, I no
longer consider it any difference whether a fever shall do it
or a tile, or a soldier. But if a man must make a comparison
between these things, I know that the soldier will do it with
less trouble (to me), and quicker. When then I neither fear
any thing which a tyrant can do to me, nor desire any thing
which he can give, why do I still look on with wonder (ad-
miration) ? Why am I still confounded? Why do I fear the
guards ? Why am I pleased if he speaks to me in a friendly
way, and receives me, and why do I tell others how he spoke
to me? Is he a Socrates, is he a Diogenes that his praise
should be a proof of what I am ? Have I been eager to imi-
tate his morals ? But I keep up the play and go to him, and
serve him so long as he does not bid me to do any thing
foolish or unreasonable. But if he says to me, "Go and bring
Leon of Salamis," I say to him, "Seek another, for I am no
longer playing." (The tyrant says) : "Lead him away (to
prison)." I follow; that is part of the play. But your
346 EPICTETUS
head will be taken off. — Does the tyrant's head always re-
main where it is, and the heads of you who obey him ? — But
you will be cast out unburied. — If the corpse is I, I shall be
cast out; but if I am different from the corpse, speak more
properly according as the fact is, and do not think of fright-
ening me. These things are formidable to children and
fools. But if any man has once entered a philosopher's
school and knows not what he is, he deserves to be full of
fear and to flatter those whom afterwards he used to flatter ;
(and) if he has not yet learned that he is not flesh nor bones
nor sinews (revpa), but he is that which makes use of these
parts of the body and governs them and follows (under-
stands) the appearances of things.®
Yes, but this talk makes us despise the laws. — And what
kind of talk makes men more obedient to the laws that em-
ploy such talk ? And the things which are in the power of a
fool are not law.® And yet see how this talk makes us dis-
posed as we ought to be even to these men (fools) ; since it
teaches us to claim in opposition to them none of the things
in which they are able to surpass us. This talk teaches us as
to the body to give it up, as to property to give that up also,
as to children, parents, brothers, to retire from these, to give
up all ; it only makes an exception of the opinions, which even
Zeus has willed to be the select property of every man. What
transgression of the laws is there here, what folly? Where
you are superior and stronger, there I gave way to you : on
the other hand, where I am superior, do you yield to me ; for
I have studied (cared for) this, and you have not. It is your
study to live in houses with floors formed of various stones,"
how your slaves and dependents shall serve you, how you
shall wear fine clothing, have many hunting men, lute play-
ers, and tragic actors. Do I claim any of these? have you
made any study of opinions, and of your own rational fac-
ulty ? Do you know of what parts it is composed, how they
are brought together, how they are connected, what powers
it has, and of what kind ? Why then are you vexed, if another
who has made it his study, has the advantage over you in
these things? But these things are the greatest. And who
hinders you from being employed about these things and
looking after them ? And who has a better stock of books, of
DISCOURSES
347
leisure, of persons to aid you ? Only turn your mind at last
to these things, attend, if it be only a short time, to your
own ruling faculty* {vyefiovtKov) : consider what this is
that you possess, and whence it came, this which uses all
other (faculties), and tries them, and selects and rejects. But
so long as you employ yourself about externals you will pos-
sess them (externals) as no man else does; but you will have
this (the ruling faculty) such as you choose to have it, sordid
and neglected.
NOTES
* See Schweig.'s note on the text. By the Galilaeans it is probable that
Epictetus means the Christians, whose obstinacy Antoninus also mentions
(xi. 3). Epictetus, a contemporary of St. Paul, knew little about tlie
Christians, and only knew some examples of their obstinate adherence
to the new faith and the fanatical behaviour of some of the converts.
That there were wild fanatics among the early Christians is proved on
undoubted authority; and also that there always have been such, and
now are such. The abuse of any doctrines or religious opinions is indeed
no argument against such doctrines or religious opinions; and it is a
fact quite consistent with experience that the best things are liable to be
perverted, misunderstood, and misused.
* "This agrees with Eph. v. 20 : 'Give thanks always for all things
to God.' " Mrs. Carter. The words are the same in both except that the
Apostle has evxapidrovrreg and Epictetus has X<^P^''^ ^'x^y-
He says that the body will be resolved into the things of which it is
composed : none of them will perish. The soul, as he has said elsewhere,
will go to him who gave it (iii. 13). But I do not suppose that he
means that the soul will exist as having a separate consciousness.
* "Nevertheless not as I will, but as thou wilt." Matthew xxvi. 39.
Mrs. Carter. "Our resignation to the will of God may be said to be
perfect, when our will is lost and resolved up into his ; when we rest in
his will as our end, as being itself most just and right and good." Bp.
Butler, Sermon on the Love of God.
* Here Epictetus admits that there is some power in man which uses
the body, directs and governs it. He does not say what the power is nor
what he supposes it to be. "Upon the whole then our organs of sense
and our limbs are certainly instruments, which the living persons, our-
selves, make use of to perceive and move with." Butler's Analogy,
chap. i.
* The will of a fool does not make law, he says. Unfortunately it does,
if we use the word law in the strict sense of law: for law is a general
command from a person, an absolute king, for example, who has power
to enforce it on those to whom the command is addressed, or if not to
enforce it, to punish for disobedience to it. This strict use of the word
"law" is independent of the quality of the command, which may be wise
or foolish, good or bad. But Epictetus does not use the word "law" in
the strict sense.
' The word is XtB oar poor oii which means what we name Mosaic
floors or pavements. The word XtOda-rpooroy is used by John xix. 13,
and rendered in our version by "pavement."
348 EPICTETUS
•This term (rbrfyeMovtKov) has been often ufeed by Epictetus (i. 26.
IS, etc.), and by Antoninus. Here Epictetus gives a definition or de-
scription of it: it is the faculty by which we reflect and judge and de-
termine, a faculty which no other animal has, a faculty which in many
men is neglected, and weak because it is neglected ; but still it ought to
be what its constitution forms it to be, a faculty which "plainly bears
upon it marks of authority over all the rest, and claims the absolute di-
rection of them all, to allow or forbid their gratification" (Bp. Butler,
Preface to his Sermons).
CHAPTER VIII
AGAINST THOSE WHO HASTILY RUSH INTO THE USE OF THE
PHILOSOPHIC DRESS
NEVER praise nor blame a man because of the things
which are common (to all, or to most), and do not
ascribe to him any skill or want of skill ; and thus
you will be free from rashness and from malevo-
lence. This man bathes very quickly. Does he then do
wrong? Certainly not. But what does he do? He bathes
very quickly. Are all things then done well ? By no means :
but the acts which proceed from right opinions are done
well ; and those which proceed from bad opinions are done
ill. But do you, until you know the opinion from which a
man does each thing, neither praise nor blame the act. But
the opinion is not easily discovered from the external things
(acts). This man is a carpenter. Why? Because he uses an
axe. What then is this to the matter? This man is a musi-
cian because he sings. And what does that signify? This
man is a philosopher. Because he wears a cloak and long
hair. And what does a juggler wear? For this reason if a
man sees any philosopher acting indecently, immediately he
says, "See what the philosopher is doing." But he ought
because of the man's indecent behaviour rather to say that
he is not a philosopher. For if this is the preconceived
notion ( icpoXriilni ) of a philosopher and what he professes, to
wear a cloak and long hair, men would say well ; but if what
he professes is this rather, to keep himself free from faults,
why do we not rather, because he does not make good his
professions, take from him the name of philosopher? For so
we do in the case of all other arts. When a man sees an-
other handling an axe badly, he does not say, "What is the
use of the carpenter's art? See how badly carpenters do
their work." But he says just the contrary, " This man is
not a carpenter, for he uses an axe badly." In the same way
if a man hears another singing badly, he does not say, "See
how musicians sing." But rather, "this man is not a musi-
349
350 EPICTETUS
cian." But it is in the matter of philosophy only that people
do this. When they see a man acting contrary to the pro-
fession of a philosopher, they do not take away his title, but
they assume him to be a philosopher, and from his acts deriv-
ing the fact that he is behaving indecently they conclude that
there is no use in philosophy.
What then is the reason of this ? Because we attach value
to the notion {xpSXrfrfnv) of a carpenter, and to that of a
musician, and to the notion of other artisans in like manner,
but not to that of a philosopher, and we judge from ex-
ternals only that it is a thing confused and ill defined. And
what other kind of art has a name from the dress and the
hair ; and has not both theorems and a material and an end ?
What then is the material (matter) of the philosopher? Is
it a cloak ? No, but reason. What is his end ? Is it to wear
a cloak ? No, but to possess the reason in a right state. Of
what kind are his theorems ? Are they those about the way
in which the beard becomes great or the hair long ? No, but
rather what Zeno says, to know the elements of reason, what
kind of a thing each of them is, and how they are fitted to
one another, and what things are consequent upon them?
Will you not then see first if he does what he professes when
he acts in an unbecoming manner, and then blame his study
(pursuit) ? But now when you yourself are acting in a so-
ber way, you say in consequence of what he seems to you to
be doing wrong, "Look at the philosopher," as if it were
proper to call by the name of philosopher one who does
these things; and further, "This is the conduct of a phi-
losopher." But you do not say, "Look at the carpenter,"
when you know that a carpenter is an adulterer or you see
him to be a glutton; nor do you say, "See the musician."
Thus to a certain degree even you perceive (understand) the
profession of a philosopher, but you fall away from the
notion, and you are confused through want of care.
But even the philosophers themselves as they are called
pursue the thing (philosophy) by beginning with things
which are common to them and others : as soon as they have
. assumed a cloak and grown a beard, they say, "I am a phi-
losopher."^ But no man will say, "I am a musician," if he
has bought a plectrum (fiddlestick) and a lute : nor will he
DISCOURSES
351
say, "I am a smith," if he has put.on'a cap and apron. But
the dress is fitted to the art ; and they take their name from
the art, and not from the dress. For this reason Euphrates
used to say well, "A long time I strove to be a philosopher
without people knowing it; and this," he said, "was useful
to me: for first I knew that when J. did any thing well, I
did not do it for the sake of the spectators, but for the sake
of myself: I ate well for the sake of myself: I had my
countenance well composed and my walk : all for myself
and for God. Then, as I struggled alone, so I alone also
was in danger: in no respect through me, if I did any-
thing base or unbecoming, was philosophy endangered:
nor did I injure the many by doing any thing wrong as a
philosopher. P'or this reason those who did not know my
purpose used to wonder how it was that while I conversed
and lived altogether with all philosophers, I was not a
philosopher myself. And what was the harm for me to
be known to be a philosopher by my acts and not by out-
ward marks ?^ See how I eat, how I drink, how I sleep,
how I bear and forbear, how I co-operate, how I employ de-
sire, how I employ aversion (turning from things), how I
maintain the relations (to things) those which are natural
or those which are acquired, how free from confusion, how
free from hindrance. Judge of me from this, if you can. But
if you are so deaf and blind that you can not conceive even
Hephaestus to be a good smith, unless you see the cap on his
head, what is the harm in not being recognized by so foolish
a judge?"
So Socrates was not known to be a philosopher by most
persons ; and they used to come to him and ask to be intro-
duced to philosophers. Was he vexed then as we are, and did
he say, "And do you not think that I am a philosopher?"
No, but he would take them and introduce them, being satis-
fied with one thing, with being a philosopher, and being
pleased also with not being thought to be a philosopher, he
was not annoyed: for he thought of his own occupation.
What is the work of an honourable and good man? To
have many pupils? By no means. They will look to this
matter who are earnest about it. But was it his business to
examine carefully difficult theorems? Others will look
352, EPICTETUS
after'" these matters also. In what then was he,* and
who was he and whom did he wish to be? He was
in that (employed in that) wherein there was hurt (dam-
age) and advantage. "If any man can damage me," he
says, "I am doing nothing: if I am waiting for another
man to do me good, I am nothing. If I wish for any thing,
and it does not happen, I am unfortunate." To such a
contest he invited every man, and I do not think that he
would have declined the contest with any one. What do you
suppose ? was it by proclaiming and saying, " I am such a
man ?" Far from it, but by being such a man. For further,
this is the character of a fool and a boaster to say, "I am
free from passions and disturbance : do not be ignorant, my
friends, that while you are uneasy and disturbed about things
of no value, I alone am free from all perturbation." So is it
not enough for you to feel no pain, unless you make this
proclamation: "Come together all who are suffering gout,
pains in the head, fever, ye who are lame, blind, and observe
that I am sound (free) from every ailment." This is empty
and disagreeable to hear, unless like yEsculapius you are able
to show immediately by what kind of treatment they also
shall be immediately free from disease, and unless you show
your own health as an example.
For such is the Cynic who is honoured with the sceptre
and the diadem by Zeus, and says, "That you may see, O
men, that you seek happiness and tranquillity not where it is,
but where it is not, behold I am sent to you by God as an ex-
ample, I who have neither property nor house, nor wife nor
children, not even a bed, nor coat nor household utensil ; and
see how healthy I am : try me, and if you see that I am free
from perturbations, hear the remedies and how I have been
cured (treated)." This is both philanthropic and noble.
But see whose work it is, the work of Zeus, or of him whom
he may judge worthy of this service, that he may never ex-
hibit any thing to the many, by which he shall make of no
effect his own testimony, whereby he gives testimony to vir-
tue, and bears evidence against external things:
"His beauteous face pales not, nor from his cheeks
He wipes a tear."*
And not this only, but he neither desires nor seeks any
DISCOURSES
353
thing, nor man, nor place, nor amusement, as children seek
the vintage or holidays; always fortified by modesty as
others are fortified by walls and doors and doorkeepers.
But now (these men) being only moved to philosophy,
as those who have a bad stomach are moved to some kinds
of food which they soon loathe, straightway (rush) towards
the sceptre and to the royal power. They let the hair grow,
they assume the cloak, they show the shoulder bare, they
quarrel with those whom they meet ; and if they see a man in
a thick winter coat, they quarrel with him. Man, first ex-
ercise yourself in winter weather: see your movements (in-
clinations) that they are not those of a man with a bad
stomach or those of a longing woman. First strive that it be
not known what you are : be a philosopher to yourself (or,
philosophize to yourself) a short time. Fruit grows thus:
the seed must be buried for some time, hid, grow slowly in
order that it may come to perfection. But if it produces the
ear before the jointed stem, it is imperfect, a produce of the
garden of Adonis.^ Such a poor plant are you also : you
have blossomed too soon ; the cold weather will scorch you
up. See what the husbandmen say about seeds when there
is warm weather too early. They are afraid lest the seeds
should be too luxuriant, and then a single frost should lay
hold of them and show that they are too forward. Do you
also consider, my man : you have shot out too soon, you
have hurried towards a little fame before the proper season :
you think that you are something, a fool among fools : you
will be caught by the frost, and rather you have been frost-
bitten in the root below, but your upper parts still blossom
a little, and for this reason you think that you are still alive
and flourishing. Allow us to ripen in the natural way:
why do you bare (expose) us? why do you force us? we
are not yet able to bear the air. Let the root grow, then
acquire the first joint, then the second, and then the third;
in this way then the fruit will naturally force itself out, even
if I do not choose. For who that is pregnant and filled with
such great principles does not also perceive his own powers
and move towards the corresponding acts? A bull is not
ignorant of his own nature and his powers, when a wild
beast shows itself, nor does he wait for one to urge him on ;
nor a dog when he sees a wild animal. But if I have the
23
354 EPICTETUS
powers of a good man, shall I wait for you to prepare me for
my own (proper) acts? At present I have them not, t)e-
lieve me. Why then do you wish me to be withered up
before the time, as you have been withered up?
NOTES ^
' Compare Horace, Ep. i. 19, 12, etc.
"Quid, si quis vultu torvo ferus et pede nudo
Exiguaeque togse simulet textore Catonem,
Virtutemne repraesentet moresque Catonis?"
* "Yea a man may say, Thou hast faith, and I have wotks : shew me
thy faith without thy works, and I will shew thee my faith by my works,"
Epistle of James, ii. 18. So a moral philosopher may say, I show my prin-
ciples, not by what I profess, but by that which I do.
* "In what then was he" seems to mean in what did he employ him-
self?
* Odyssey, xi. 528.
" "The gardens of Adonis" are things g:rowing in earthen vessels, car-
ried about for show only, not for use. "The gardens of Adonis" is a
proverbial expression applied to things of no value, to plants, for in-
stance, which last only a short time, have no roots, and soon wither. Such
things, we may suppose, were exhibited at the festivals of Adonis.
Schweighauser's note.
' CHAPTER IX
TO A PERSON WHO HAD BEEN CHANGED TO A CHARACTER OF
SHAMELESSNESS^
WHEN you see another man in the possession of
power (magistracy), set against this the fact that
you have not the want (desire) of power; when
you see another rich, see what you possess in place
of riches : for if you possess nothing in place of them, you
are miserable ; but if you have not the want of riches, know
that you possess more than this man possesses and what is
worth much more. Another man possesses a handsome
woman (wife) : you have the satisfaction of not desiring a
handsome wife. Do these things appear to you to be small ?
And how much would these persons give, these very men
who are rich, and in possession of power, and live with hand-
some women, to be able to despise riches, and power and
these very women whom they love and enjoy? Do you not
know then what is the thirst of a man who has a fever ? He
possesses that which is in no degree like the thirst of a man
who is in health : for the man who is in health ceases to be
thirsty after he has drunk ; but the sick man being pleased for
a short time has a nausea, he converts the drink into bile,
vomits, is griped, and more thirsty. It is such a thing to have
desire of riches and to possess riches, desire of power and to
possess power, desire of a beautiful woman and to sleep with
her : to this is added jealousy, fear of being deprived of the
thing which you love, indecent words, indecent thoughts,
unseemly acts.
And what do I lose? you will say. My man, you were
modest, and you are so no longer. Have you lost nothing?
In place of Chrysippus and Zeno you read Aristides and
Evenus;^ have you lost nothing? In place of Socrates and
Diogenes, you admire him who is able to corrupt and seduce
most women. You wish to appear handsome and try to make
yourself so, though you are not. You like to display splendid
clothes that you may attract women ; and if you find any fine
355
356 EPICTETUS
oil (for the hair), you imagine that you are happy. But
formerly you did not think of any such thing, but only where
there should be decent talk, a worthy man, and a generous
conception. Therefore you slept like a man, walked forth like
a man, wore a manly dress, and used to talk in a way becom-
ing a good man ; then do you say to me, I have lost nothing ?
So do men lose nothing more than coin ? Is not modesty lost?
Is not decent behaviour lost ? is it that he who has lost these
things has sustained no loss ? Perhaps you think that not one
of these things is a loss. But there was a time when you
reckoned this the only loss and damage, and you were anx-
ious that no man should disturb you from these (good)
words and actions.
Observe, you are disturbed from these good words and
actions by nobody, but by yourself. Fight with yourself,
restore yourself to decency, to modesty, to liberty. If any
man ever told you this about me, that a person forces me to
be an adulterer, to wear such a dress as yours, to perfume
myself with oils, would you not have gone and with
your own hand have killed the man who thus calumniated
me ? Now will you not help yourself ? and how much easier
is this help? There is no need to kill any man, nor to put
him in chains, nor to treat him with contumely, nor to enter
the Forum (go to the courts of law), but it is only necessary
for you to speak to yourself who will be most easily per-
suaded, with whom no man has more power of persuasion
than yourself. First of all, condemn what you are doing, and
then when you have condemned it, do not despair of yourself,
and be not in the condition of those men of mean spirit, who,
when they have once given in, surrender themselves com-
pletely and are carried away as if by a torrent. But see what
the trainers of boys do. Has the boy fallen ? Rise, they say,
wrestle again till you are made strong. Do you also do
something of the same kind : for be well assured that nothing
is more tractable than the human soul. You must exercise
the will,^ and the thing is done, it is set right: as on the
other hand, only fall a nodding (be careless), and the thing
is lost : for from within comes ruin and from within comes
help. Then (you say) what good do I gain? And what
greater good do you seek than this ?^ From a shameless maa
DISCOURSES 357
you will become a modest man, from a disorderly you will
become an orderly man, from a faithless you will become a
faithful man, from a man of unbridled habits a sober man.
If you seek any thing more than this, go on doing what you
are doing : not even a God can now help you.
NOTES
* "They, who are desirous of taking refuge in Heathenism from the
strictness of the Christian morality, will find no great consolation in read-
ing this chapter of Epictetus." Mrs. Carter.
Aristides was a Greek, but his period is not known. He was the au-
thor of a work named Milesiaca or Milesian stories. All that we know
of the work is that it was of a loose description, amatory and licentious.
It was translated into Latin by L. Cornelius Sisenna, a contemporary of
the Dictator Sulla; and it is mentioned by Plutarch (Life of Crassus, c.
32), and several times by Ovid (Tristia ii. 413 etc.). Evenus was per-
haps a poet. We know nothing of this Evenus, but we may conjecture
from being here associated with Aristides what his character was.
* The power of the will is a fundamental principle with Epictetus. The
will is strong in some, but very feeble in others ; and sometimes, as expe-
rience seems to show, it is incapable of resisting the power of old habits
* Virtue is its own reward, said the Stoics. This is the meaning of
Epictetus, and it is consistent with his principles that a man should live
conformably to his nature, and so he will have all the happiness of which
human nature is capable. Mrs. Carter has a note here, which I do not
copy, and I hardly understand. It seems to refer to the Christian doc-
trine of a man being rewarded in a future life according to his works:
but we have no evidence that Epictetus believed in a future life, and he
therefore could not go further than to maintain that virtuous behaviour
is the best thing in this .short life, and will give a man the happiness
which he can obtain in no other way.
CHAPTER X
WHAT THINGS WE OUGHT TO DESPISE, AND WHAT THINGS WE
OUGHT TO VALUE
THE difficulties of all men are about external things,
their helplessness is about externals. What shall I
do, how will it be, how will it turn out, will this hap-
pen, will that ? All these are the words of those who
are turning themselves to things which are not within the
power of the will. For who says, "How shall I not assent to
that which is false? how shall I not turn away from the
truth ?" If a man be of such a good disposition as to be anx-
ious about these things, I will remind him of this, Why are
you anxious ? The thing is in your own power : be assured :
do not be precipitate in assenting before you apply the nat-
ural rule. On the other side, if a man is anxious (uneasy)
about desire, lest it fail in its purpose and miss its end, and
with respect to the avoidance of things, lest he should fall
into that which he would avoid, I will first kiss (love) him,
because he throws away the things about which others are in
a flutter (others desire) and their fears, and employs his
thoughts about his own affairs and his own condition. Then
I shall say to him, if you do not choose to desire that which
you will fail to obtain nor to attempt to avoid that into which
you will fall, desire nothing which belongs to (which is in
the power of) others, nor try to avoid any of the things
which are not in your power. If you do not observe this rule,
you must of necessity fail in your desires and fall into that
which you would avoid. What is the difficulty here? where
is there room for the words. How will it be ? and How will
it turn out ? and will this happen or that ?
Now is not that which will happen independent of the
will ? Yes. And the nature of good and of evil is it not in the
things which are within the power of the will ? Yes. Is it in
your power then to treat according to nature every thing
which happens ? Can any person hinder you ? No man. No
longer then say to me, How will it be? For however it may
358
DISCOURSES 359
be, you will dispose of it well/ and the result to you will be
a fortunate one. What would Hercules have been if he said,
*'How shall a great lion not appear to me, or a great boar, or
savage men ?" And what do you care for that ? If a great
boar appear, you will fight a greater fight : if bad men appear,
you will relieve the earth of the bad. Suppose then that I lose
my life in this way. You will die a good man, doing a noble
act. For since we must certainly die, of necessity a man must
be found doing something either following the employment
of a husbandman, or digging, or trading, or serving in a
consulship, or suffering from indigestion or from diarrhoea.
What then do you wish to be doing when you are found by
death ? I for my part would wish to be found doing some-
thing which belongs to a man, beneficent, suitable to the gen-
eral interest, noble. But if I can not be found doing things
so great, I would be found doing at least that which I can not
be hindered from doing, that which is permitted me to do,
correcting myself , cultivating the faculty which makes use of
appearances, labouring at freedom from the affects (labour-
ing at tranquillity of mind), rendering to the relations of life
their due; if I succeed so far, also (I would be found) touch-
ing on (advancing to) the third topic (or head), safety in
the forming judgments about things.^ If death surprises me
when I am busy about these things, it is enough for me if I
can stretch out my hands to God and say : "The means which
I have received from thee for seeing thy administration (of
the world) and following it, I have not neglected : I have not
dishonoured thee by my acts : see how I have used my per-
ceptions, see how I have used my preconceptions : have I ever
blamed thee? have I been discontented with any thing that
happens, or wished it to be otherwise? have I wished to
transgress the (established) relations (of things) ? That
thou hast given me life, I thank thee for what thou hast
given : so long as I have used the things which are thine I
am content; take them back and place them wherever thou
mayest choose ; for thine were all things, thou gavest them to
me."^ Is it not enough to depart in this state of mind, and
what life is better and more becoming than that of a man
who is in this state of mind? and what end is more happy?*
But that this may be done (that such a declaration may be
360 EPICTETUS
made), a man must receive (bear) no small things, nor are
the things small which he must lose (go without). You can
not both wish to be a consul and to have these things (the
power of making such a dying speech), and to be eager to
have lands, and these things also ; and to be solicitous about
slaves and about yourself. But if you wish for any thing
which belongs to another, that which is your own is lost.
This is the nature of the thing : nothing is given or had for
nothing.** And where is the wonder? If you wish to be a
consul, you must keep awake, run about, kiss hands, waste
yourself with exhaustion at other men's doors, say and do
many things unworthy of a free man, send gifts to many,
daily presents to some. And what is the thing that is got?
Twelve bundles of rods (the consular fasces), to sit three or
four times on the tribunal, to exhibit the games in the Circus
and to give suppers in small baskets.® Or, if you do not
agree about this, let some one show me what there is besides
these things. In order then to secure freedom from pas-
sions (ccTtoQe^ai), tranquillity, to sleep well when you do sleep,
to be really awake when you are awake, to fear nothing, to
be anxious about nothing, will you spend nothing and give
no labour ? But if any thing belonging to you be lost while
you are thus busied, or be wasted badly, or another obtains
what you ought to have obtained, will you immediately be
vexed at what has happened ? Will you not take into the ac-
count on the other side what you receive and for what, how
much for how much? Do you expect to have for nothing
things so great? And how can you? One work (thing) has
no community with another. You can not have both exter-
nal things after bestowing care on them and your own ruling
faculty : "^ but if you would have those, give up this. If you
do not, you will have neither this nor that, while you are
drawn in different ways to both. ® The oil will be spilled, the
household vessels will perish: (that may be), but I shall be
free from passions (tranquil). — There will be a fire when I
am not present, and the books will be destroyed : but I shall
treat appearances according to nature. — Well; but I shall
have nothing to eat. If I am so unlucky, death is a harbour;
and death is the harbour for all; this is the place of refuge;
and for this reason not one of the things in life is difficult; as
DISCOURSES 361
soon as you choose, you are out of the house, and are smoked
no more.® Why then are you anxious, why do you lose your
sleep, why do you not straightway, after considering wherein
your good is and your evil, say, "Both of them are in my
power? Neither can any man deprive me of the good, nor
involve me in the bad against my will. Why do I not throw
myself down and snore ? for all that I have is safe. As to the
things which belong to others, he will look to them who gets
them, as they may be given by him who has the power. Who
am I who wish to have them in this way or in that? is a
power of selecting them given to me ? has any person made
me the dispenser of them ? Those things are enough for me
over which I have power : I ought to manage them as well
as I can : and all the rest, as the master of them (God) may
choose."
When a man has these things before his eyes, does he keep
awake and turn hither and thither ? What would he have, or
what does he regret, Patroclus or Antilochus or Menelaus?^"
For when did he suppose that any of his friends was im-
mortal, and when had he not before his eyes that on the mor-
row or the day after he or his friend must die ? Yes, he says,
but I thought that he would survive me and bring up my son.
— You were a fool for that reason, and you were thinking of
what was uncertain. Why then do you not blame yourself,
and sit crying like girls ? — But he used to set my food before
me. — Because he was alive, you fool, but now he can not;
but Automedon*^ will set it before you, and if Automedon
also dies, you will find another. But if the pot, in which
your meat was cooked, should be broken, must you die of
hunger, because you have not the pot which you are accus-
tomed to ? Do you not send and buy a new pot ? He says :
"No greater ill than this could fall on me.""
Why is this your ill? Do you then instead of removing it
blame your mother (Thetis) for not foretelling it to you that
you might continue grieving, from that time? What do you
think? do you not suppose that Homer wrote this that we
may learn that those of noblest birth, the strongest and the
richest, the most handsome, when they have not the opinions
362 EPICTETUS
which they ought to have, are not prevented from being most
wretched and unfortunate?
' See a passage in Plutarch on Tranquillity from Euripides, the great
storehouse of noble thoughts, from which ancient writers drew much
good matter ; and perhaps it was one of the reasons why so many of his
plays and fragments have been preserved.
" We must not quarrel with the things that are,
For they care not for us : but he who feels them
If he disposes well of things, fares well."
* See iii. c. 2.
* "Thine they were, and thou gavest them to me." John xviL 6. —
Mrs. Carter.
* "I wish it were possible to palliate the ostentation of this passage, by
applying it to the ideal perfect character ; but it is in a general way that
Epictetus hath proposed such a dying speech, as can not without shocking
arrogance be uttered by any one born to die. Unmixed as it is with any
acknowledgment of faults or imperfections, at present, or with any sense
of guilt on account of the past, it must give every sober reader a very
disadvantageous opinion of some principles of the philosophy on which
it is founded, as contradictory to the voice of conscience, and formed on
absolute ignorance or neglect of the condition and circumstances of such
a creature as man." — Mrs. Carter.
I am inclined to think that Epictetus does refer to the "ideal perfect
character" : but others may not understand him in this way. When
Mrs. Carter says "but it is in a general . . . dying speech," she can hardly
suppose, as her words seem to mean, that Epictetus proposed such a
dying speech, for every man or even for many men, for he knew and has
told us how bad many men are, and how few are good according to his
measure and rule : in fact his meaning is plainly expressed. The dying
speech may even be stronger in the sense in which Mrs. Carter under-
stands it, in my translation, where I have rendered one passage in the
text by the words "I have not dishonoured thee by my acts." which she
translates, "as far as in me lay, I have not dishonoured thee ;" which ap-
parently means, "as far as I could, I have not dishonoured thee." The
Latin translation "quantum in me fuit," seems rather ambiguous to me.
There is a general confession of sins in the prayer book of the Church
of England, part of which Epictetus would not have rejected. I think.
Of course the words which form the peculiar Christian character of the
confession would have been unintelligible to him. It is a confession
which all persons of all conditions are supposed to make. If all persons
made the confession with sincerity, it ought to produce a corresponding
behaviour and make men more ready to be kind to one another, for all
who use it confess that they fail in their duty, and it ought to lower
pride and banish arrogance from the behaviour of those who in wealth
and condition are elevated above the multitude. But I have seen it
somewhere said, I can net remember where, but said in no friendly spirit
to Christian prayer, that some men both priests and laymen prostrate
themselves in humility before God and indemnify themselves by arro-
gance to man.
* See iv. 2, 2.
DISCOURSES 363
* These were what the Romans named "sportulae," in which the rich
used to give some eatables to poor dependents who called to pay their
respects to the great at an early hour.
"Nunc sportula primo
Limine parva sedet turbae rapienda togatae."
Juvenal, Sat. i. 95.
' ^ "You can not serve God and Mammon." Matthew vi. 24. Mrs.
Carter.
* See iv. 2, 5.
' Compare i. 25, 18, and i. 9, 20.
" Epictetus refers to the passage in the Iliad xxiv. 5, where Achilles
is lamenting the death of Patroclus and can not sleep.
" "This is a wretched idea of friendship ; but a necessary consequence
of the Stoic system. What a fine contrast to this gloomy consolation
are the noble sentiments of an Apostle? Value your deceased friend,
says Epictetus, as a broken pipkin ; forget him, as a thing worthless,
lost and destroyed. St. Paul, on the contrary, comforts the mourning
survivors; bidding them not sorrow, as those who have no hope: but
remember that the death of good persons is only a sleep; from which
they will soon arise to a happy immortality." Mrs. Carter.
Epictetus does not say, "value your deceased friend as a broken pipkin."
Achilles laments that he has lost the services of his friend at table, a
vulgar kind of complaint ; he is thinking of his own loss, instead of his
friend. The answer is such a loss as he laments is easily repaired ; the
loss of such a friend is as easily repaired as the loss of a cooking vessel.
Mrs. Carter in her zeal to contrast the teaching of the Apostle with that
of Epictetus seems to forget for the time that Epictetus, so far as we
know, did not accept or did not teach the doctrine of a future life. As
to what he thought of friendship, if it was a real friendship, such as we
can conceive, I am sure that he did not think of it, as Mrs. Carter says
that he did; for true friendship implies many of the virtues which Epic-
tetus taught and practised. He has a chapter on Friendship, ii. 22, which
I suppose that Mrs. Carter did not think of, when she wrote this note.
" Iliad xix. 321.
CHAPTER XI
ABOUT PURITY ( CLEANLINESS)
SOME persons raise a question whether the social feel-
ing is contained in the nature of man ; and yet I think
that these same persons would have no doubt that
love of purity is certainly contained in it, and that if
man is distinguished from other animals by any thing, he is
distinguished by this. When then we see any other animal
cleaning itself, we are accustomed to speak of the act with
surprise, and to add that the animal is acting like a man : and
on the other hand, if a man blames an animal for being dirty,
straightway as if we were making an excuse for it, we say
that of course the animal is not a human creature. So we
suppose that there is something superior in man, and that
we first receive it from the gods. For since the gods by their
nature are pure and free from corruption, so far as men ap-
proach them by reason, so far do they cling to purity and to
a love (habit) of purity. But since it is impossible that man's
nature (ov6ta) can be altogether pure being mixed (com-
posed) of such materials, reason is applied, as far as it is pos-
sible, and reason endeavours to make human nature love
purity.
The first then and highest purity is that which is in the
soul ; and we say the same of impurity. Now you could not
discover the impurity of the soul as you could discover that
of the body : but as to the soul, what else could you find in
it than that which makes it filthy in respect to the acts which
are her own? Now the acts of the soul are movement to-,
wards an object or movement from it, desire, aversion, prep-
aration, design (purpose), assent. What then is it which in
these acts makes the soul filthy and impure? Nothing else
than her own bad judgments ( Kpifxara). Consequently the
impurity of the soul is the soul's bad opinions ; and the puri-
fication of the soul is the planting in it of proper opinions;
and the soul is pure which has proper opinions, for the soul
364
DISCOURSES 365
alone in her own acts is free from perturbation and pollu-
tion.
Now we ought to work at something like this in the body
also, as far as we can. It was impossible for the defluxions
of the nose not to run when man has such a mixture in his
body. For this reason nature has made hands and the nostrils
themselves as channels for carrying off the humours. If then
a man sucks up the defluxions, I say that he is not doing the
act of a man. It was impossible for a man's feet not to be
made muddy and not be soiled at all w*hen he passes through
dirty places. For this reason nature (God) has made water
and hands. It was impossible that some impurity should not
remain in the teeth from eating: for this reason, she says,
wash the teeth. Why ? In order that you may be a man and
not a wild beast or a hog. It was impossible that from the
sweat and the pressing of the clothes there should not re-
main some impurity about the body which requires to be
cleaned away. For this reason water, oil, hands, towels,
scrapers (strigils),^ nitre, sometimes all other kinds of
means are necessary for cleaning the body. You do not act
so : but the smith will take off the rust from the ir^on (instru-
ments), and he will have tools prepared for this purpose, and
you yourself wash the platter when you are going to eat, if
you are not completely impure and dirty : but will you not
wash the body nor make it clean ? Why ? he replies. I will
tell you again ; in the first place, that you may do the acts of
a man ; then, that you may not be disagreeable to those with
whom you associate. You do something of this kind even in
this matter, and you do not perceive it : you think that you
deserve to stink. Let it be so : deserve to stink. Do you think
that also those who sit by you, those who recline at table with
you, that those who kiss you deserve the same? Either go
into a desert, where you deserve to go, or live by yourself,
and smell yourself. For it is just that you alone should en-
joy your own impurity. But when you are in a city, to behave
so inconsiderately and foolishly, to what character do you
think that it belongs? If nature had entrusted to you a horse,
would you have overlooked and neglected him? And now
think that you have been entrusted with your own body as
with a horse; wash it, wipe it, take care that no man turns
366 EPICTETUS
away from it, that no one gets out of the way for it. But who
does not get out of the way of a dirty man, of a stinking man,
of a man whose skin is foul, more than he does out of the
way of a man who is daubed with muck ? That smell is from
without, it is put upon him ; but the pther smell is from want
of care, from within, and in a manner from a body in putre-
faction.
But Socrates washed himself seldom. — Yes, but his body
was clean and fair: and it was so agreeable and sweet that
the most beautiful and the most noble loved him, and desired
to sit by him rather than by the side of those who had the
handsomest forms. It was in his power neither to use the
bath nor to wash himself, if he chose; and yet the rare use of
water had an effect. [If you do not choose to wash with
warm water, wash with cold.^] But Aristophanes says
"Those who are pale, unshod, 'tis those I mean."*
For Aristophanes says of Socrates that he also walked the
air and stole clothes from the palaestra.^ But all who have
written about Socrates bear exactly the contrary evidence in
his favour ; they say that he was pleasant not only to hear,
but also to see.^ On the other hand they write the same about
Diogenes.® For we ought not even by the appearance of
the body to deter the multitude from philosophy ; but as in
other things a philosopher should show himself cheerful and
tranquil, so also he should in the things that relate to the
body ; "See, ye men, that I have nothing, that I want noth-
ing : see how I am without a house, and without a city, and
an exile, if it happens to be so,"^ and without a hearth I live
more free from trouble and more happily than all of noble
birth and than the rich. But look at my poor body also and
observe that it is not injured by my hard way of living." But
if a man says this to me, who has the appearance (dress) and
face of a condemned man, what God shall persuade me to ap-
proach philosophy, if it makes men such persons ? Far from
it ; I would not choose to do so, even if I were going to be-
come a wise man. I indeed would rather that a young man,
who is making his first movements towards philosophy,
should come to me with his hair carefully trimmed than
DISCOURSES 367
with it dirty and rough, for there is seen in him a certain
notion (appearance) of beauty and a desire of (attempt
at) that which is becoming; and where he supposes it
to be, there also he strives that it shall be. It is only nec-
essary to show him (what it is) and to say : "Young man,
you seek beauty, and you do well; you must know then
that it (is produced) grows in that part of you where
you have the rational faculty; seek it there where you
have the movements towards and the movements from
things, where you have the desires towards, and the
aversion from things ; for this is what you have in yourself
of a superior kind ; but the poor body is naturally only earth :
why do you labour about it to no purpose ? if you shall learn
nothing else, you will learn from time that the body is noth-
ing." But if a man comes to me daubed with filth, dirty, with
a moustache down to his knees, what can I say to him, by
what kind of resemblance can I lead him on? For about
what has he busied himself which resembles beauty, that I
may be able to change him and say. Beauty is not in this,
but in that? Would you have me to tell him, that beauty
consists not in being daubed with muck, but that it Kes in the
rational part? Has he any desire of beauty? has he any
form of it in his mind ? Go and talk to a hog, and tell him
not to roll in the mud.
For this reason the words of Xenocrates touched Polemon
also, since he was a lover of beauty, for he entered (the
room) having in him certain incitements (ivavdMara) to love
of beauty, but he looked for it in the wrong place.^ For
nature has not made even the animals dirty which live with
man. Does a horse ever wallow in the mud, or a well bred
dog? But the hog, the dirty geese, and worms and spi-
ders do, which are banished furthest from human inter-
course. Do you then being a man choose to be not as one of
the animals which live with man, but rather a worm, or a
spider? Will you not wash yourself somewhere some time
in such manner as you choose?* Will you not wash off the
dirt from your body? Will you not come clean that those
with whom you keep company may have pleasure in being
with you ? But do you go with us even into the temples in
368 EPICTETUS
such a state, where it is not permitted to spit or blow the
nose, being a heap of spittle and of snot?
What then? does any man (that is, do I) require you to
ornament yourself ? Far from it ; except to ornament that
which we really are by nature, the rational faculty, the opin-
ions, the actions; but as to the body only so far as purity,
only so far as not to give offence. But if you are told that
you ought not to wear garments dyed with purple, go and
daub your cloak with muck or tear it.^^ But how shall I
have a neat cloak ? Man, you have water ; wash it. Here is
a youth worthy of being loved,^^ here is an old man worthy
of loving and being loved in return, a fit person for a man to
intrust to him a son's instruction, to whom daughters and
young men shall come, if opportunity shall so happen, that
the teacher shall deliver his lessons to them on a dunghill.
Let this not be so : every deviation comes from something
which is in man's nature; but this (deviation) is near being
something not in man's nature.
NOTES
* The ZvdTfla, as Epictetus names it, was the Roman "strigilis."
which was used for the scraping and cleaning of the body in bathing.
Persius (v. 126) writes —
"I, puer, et strigiles Crispini ad balnea defer."
The strigiles "were of bronze or iron of various forms. They were
applied to the body much in the same way as we see a piece of hoop
applied to a sweating horse." Pompeii, edited by Dr. Dyer.
See what is said of this passage in the latter part of this chapter.
* Nubes, V. 102.
* Aristophanes, Nubes, v. 225, and v. 179.
* Zenophon, Memorab. iii. 12.
' See iii. 22.
' Diogenes, it is said, was driven from his native town Sinope in Asia
on a charge of having debased or counterfeited the coinage. Upton.
It is probable that this is false.
* As to Polemon see iii. i, 14.
* It has been suggested that the words "if you do not choose to wash
with warm water, wash with cold," p. 366, belong to this place.
" This is the literal translation : but it means "will you go, etc., tear
it?"
" "The youth, probably, means the scholar, who neglects neatness ;
and the old man, the tutor, that gives him no precept or example of it"
Mrs. Carter.
CHAPTER XII
ON ATTENTION
WHEN you have remitted your attention for a short
time, do not imagine this, that you will recover
it when you choose ; but let this thought be pres-
ent to you, that in consequence of the fault com-
mitted to-day your affairs must be in a worse condition for
all that follows. For first, and what causes most trouble, a
habit of not attending is formed in you ; then a habit of de-
ferring your attention. And continually from time to time
you drive away by deferring it the happiness of life, proper
behaviour, the being and living conformably to nature. If
then the procrastination of attention is profitable, the com-
plete omission of attention is more profitable ; but if it is not
profitable, why do you not maintain your attention constant?
— To-day I choose to play. — Well then, ought you not to
play with attention ? — I choose to sing. — What then hinders
you from doing so with attention ? Is there any part of life
excepted, to which attention does not extend ? For will you
do it (any thing in life) worse by using attention, and better
by not attending at all ? And what else of the things in life
is done better by those who do not use attention ? Does he
who works in wood work better by not attending to it ? Does
the captain of a ship manage it better by not attending ? and
is any of the smaller acts done better by inattention? Do
you not see that when you have let your mind loose, it is no
longer in your power to recall it, either to propriety, or to
modesty, or to moderation: but you do every thing that
comes into your mind in obedience to your inclinations.
To what things then ought I to attend? First to those
general (principles) and to have them in readiness, and with-
out them not to sleep, not to rise, not to drink, not to eat, not
to converse (associate) with men; that no man is master of
another man's will, but that in the will alone is the good and
the bad. No man then has the power either to procure for
me good or to involve me in any evil, but I alone myself over.
24 369
370 EPICTETUS
myself have power in these things. When then these things
are secured to me, why need I be disturbed about external
things ? What tyrant is formidable, what disease, what pov-
erty, what offence (from any man)? Well, I have not
pleased a certain person. Is he then (the pleasing of him)
my work, my judgment? No. Why then should I trouble
myself about him? — But he is supposed to be some one (of
importance).— He will look to that himself; and those who
think so will also. But I have one whom I ought to please,
to whom I ought to subject myself, whom I ought to obey,
God and those who are next to him. He has placed me with
myself, and has put my will in obedience to myself alone,
and has given me rules for the right use of it; and when I
follow these rules in syllogisms, I do not care for any man
who says any thing else (different) : in sophistical argu-
ment, I care for no man. Why then in greater matters do
those annoy me who blame me? What is the cause of this
perturbation? Nothing else than because in this matter
(topic) I am not discipHned. For all knowledge (science)
despises ignorance and the ignorant; and not only the
sciences, but even the arts. Produce any shoemaker that
you please, and he ridicules the many in respect to his own
work (business). Produce any carpenter.
First then we ought to have these (rules) in readiness,
and to do nothing without them, and we ought to keep the
soul directed to this mark, to pursue nothing external, and
nothing which belongs to others (or is in the power of
others), but to do as he has appointed who has the power;
we ought to pursue altogether the things which are in the
power of the will, and all other things as it is permitted.
Next to this we ought to remember who we are, and what
is our name, and to endeavour to direct our duties towards
the character (nature) of our several relations (in life) in
this manner: what is the season for singing, what is the
season for play, and in whose presence ; what will be the con-
sequence of the act ; whether our associates will despise us,
whether we shall despise them; when to jeer (dK&ipat), and
whom to ridicule ; and on what occasion to comply and with
whom ; and finally, in complying how to maintain our own
character. But wherever you have deviated from any of
DISCOURSES 37 1
these rules, there is damage immediately, not from any thing
external, but from the action itself.
What then? is it possible to be free from faults (if you
do all this) ? It is not possible ; but this is possible, to direct
your efforts incessantly to being faultless. For we must be
content if by never remitting this attention we shall escape
at least a few errors. But now when you have said, "To-
morrow I will begin to attend," you must be told that you
are saying this, "To-day I will be shameless, disregardful of
time .and place, mean; it will be in the power of others to
give me pain ; to-day I will be passionate, and envious." See
how many evil things you are permitting yourself to do. If
it is good to use attention to-morrow, how much better is it
to do so to-day ? if to-morrow it is in your interest to attend,
much more is it to-day, that you may be able to do so to-
morrow also, and may not defer it again to the third day.
CHAPTER XIII
AGAINST OR TO THOSE WHO READILY TELL THEIR AFFAIRS
WHEN a man has seemed to us to have talked with
simphcity (candour) about his own affairs, how
is it that at last we are ourselves also induced to
discover to him our own secrets and we think
this to be candid behaviour? In the first place because it
seems unfair for a man to have listened to the affairs of his
neighbour, and not to communicate to him also in turn our
own affairs ; next, because we think that we shall not present
to them the appearance of candid men when we are silent
about our own affairs. Indeed men are often accustomed to
say, I have told you all my affairs, will you tell me nothing
of your own? where is this done? — Besides, we have also
this opinion that we can safely trust him who has already
told us his own affairs ; for the notion rises in our mind that
this man could never divulge our affairs because he would
be cautious that we also should not divulge his. In this way
also the incautious are caught by the soldiers at Rome. A
soldier sits by you in a common dress and begins to speak
ill of Csesar; then you, as if you had received a pledge of
his fidelity by his having begun the abuse, utter yourself also
what you think, and then you are carried off in chains.^
Something of this kind happens to us also generally.
Now as this man has confidently intrusted his affairs to me,
shall I also do so to any man whom I meet? (No), for
when I have heard, I keep silence, if I am of such a disposi-
tion ; but he goes forth and tells all men what he has heard.
Then if I hear what has been done, if I be a man like him, I
resolve to be revenged, I divulge what he has told me; I
both disturb others and am disturbed myself. But if I re-
member that one man does not injure another, and that every
man's acts injure and profit him, I secure this, that I do not
any thing like him, but still I suffer what I do suffer through
my own silly talk.
True : but it is unfair when you have heard the secrets of
37a
DISCOURSES 373
your neighbour for you in your turn to communicate nothing
to him. — Did I ask you for your secrets, my man? did you
communicate your affairs on certain terms, that you should
in return hear mine also? If you are a babbler and think
that all who meet you are friends, do you wish me also to be
like you ? But why, if you did well in intrusting your affairs
to me, and it is not well for me to intrust mine to you, do you
wish me to be so rash ? It is just the same as if I had a cask
which is water-tight, and you one with a hole in it, and you
should come and deposit with me your wine that I might put
it into my cask, and then should complain that I also did not
intrust my wine to you, for you have a cask with a hole in it.
How then is there any equality here? You intrusted your
affairs to a man who is faithful, and modest, to a man who
thinks that his own actions alone are injurious and (or) use-
ful, and that nothing external is. Would you have me in-
trust mine to you, a man who has dishonoured his own fac-
ulty of will, and who wishes to gain some small bit of money
or some office or promotion in the court (emperor's palace),
even if you should be going to murder your own children,
like Medea? Where (in what) is this equality (fairness) ?
But show yourself to me to be faithful, modest, and steady :
show me that you have friendly opinions; show that your
cask has no hole in it ; and you will see how I shall not wait
for you to trust me with your affairs, but I myself shall come
to you and ask you to hear mine. For who does not choose
to make use of a good vessel ? Who does not value a benevo-
lent and faithful adviser? who will not willingly receive a
man who is ready to bear a share, as we may say, of the diffi-
culty of his circumstances, and by this very act to ease the
burden, by taking a part of it.
True : but I trust you ; you do not trust me. — In the first
place, not even do you trust me, but you are a babbler, and
for this reason you can not hold anything ; for indeed, if it
is true that you trust me, trust your affairs to me only ; but
now whenever you see a man at leisure, you seat yourself by
him and say : "Brother, I have no friend more benevolent
than you nor dearer ; I request you to listen to my affairs."
And you do this even to those who are not known to you at
374 EPICTETUS
all. But if you really trust me, it is plain that you trust me
because I am faithful and modest, not because I have told
my affairs to you. Allow me then to have the same opinion
about you. Show me that if one man tells his affairs to
another, he who tells them is faithful and modest. For if
this were so, I would go about and tell my affairs to every
man, if that would make me faithful and modest. But the
thing is not so, and it requires no common opinions (princi-
ples). If then you see a man who is busy about things not
dependent on his will and subjecting his will to them, you
must know that this man has ten thousand persons to compel
and hinder him. He has no need of pitch or the wheel to
compel him to declare what he knows •? but a little girl's nod,
if it should so happen, will move him, the blandishment of
one who belongs to Caesar's court, desire of a magistracy or
of an inheritance, and things without end of that sort. You
must remember then among general principles that secret
discourses (discourses about secret matters) require fidelity
and corresponding opinions. But where can we now find
these easily? Or if you can not answer that question, let
some one point out to me a man who can say : I care only
about the things which are my own, the things which are not
subject to hindrance, the things which are by nature free.
This I hold to be the nature of the good : but let all other
things be as they are allowed; I do not concern myself.
NOTES
^ The man, whether a soldier or not, was an informer, one of those
vile men who carried on this shameful business under the empire. He
was what Juvenal names a "delator." Upton, who refers to the life of
Hadrian by .^lius Spartianus, speaks even of this emperor employing
soldiers named Frumentarii for the purpose of discovering what was
said and done in private houses. John the Baptist (Luke iii. 14) in
answer to the question of the soldiers, "And what shall we do?" said
unto them "Do violence to no man, neither accuse any falsely; and be
content with your wages." Upton.
* The wheel and pitch were instruments of torture to extract con-
fessions. See ii. 6, 18, and Schweighauser's note there.
END OF THE DISCOURSES OF EPICTETUS
MEDITATIONS OF
MARCUS AURELIUS ANTONINUS
Meditations of Aurelius
George Long
HantmarKs of Ctbili^atton
MARCUS AURELIUS
From a bust in Rome
Meditations of
Marcus Aurelius Antoninus
Translated by
George Long
With a Critical and Biographical Introduction
by John Lancaster Spalding
Illustrated
New York
D. Appleton and Company
1904
COHYRIGHT, 1900,
Bv D. APPLETON AND COMPANY.
MARCUS AURELIUS
THE intimate thoughts of a wise and noble man con-
cerning whatever touches the human heart most
nearly are necessarily interesting, and when he who
utters them has stood for years at the head of a vast and
powerful empire his words receive a new significance,
which is still further heightened by the fact that he writes
not for the public, but simply to render to himself an ac-
count of himself. This is what we have in the " Medita-
tions " of Marcus Aurelius, the Roman emperor, a man
so modest, so sincere, so kindly, so magnanimous, that to
know him is to conceive a higher opinion of the race which
in him attains to such dignity and virtue. He was born
at Rome in the year 121 of the Christian era, and died in
180, a few weeks before his fifty-ninth birthday. He was
the nephew and adopted son of Antoninus Pius, whom from
early manhood he assisted in administering public affairs.
He became emperor at the age of forty, and reigned nine-
teen years, twelve of which he passed in Asia Minor, Syria,
Greece, Egypt, and the countries on the Danube, putting
down rebellion or defending the empire against the at-
tacks of the barbarians, having at the same time to face
various public misfortunes — inundations, famines, earth-
quakes, fires, and pestilence — which caused widespread
misery and dismay. But though constantly surrounded by
g^ave difficulties and dangers, and compelled to travel to
iv MARCUS AURELIUS
almost every part of the empire, he not only found time
to devote himself, as a wise and careful ruler, to even the
minor interests and details of government, but also to
occupy himself with the study of philosophy and his own
improvement. It is the history of his inner life, as re-
corded in his journal, which has made him immortal, and
placed him in the company of the few in whom the lovers
of wisdom and perfection find it possible to take genuine
delight. The book has small literary merit. The lan-
guage is without elegance or distinction. He tells us that
he had learned to abstain from rhetoric and poetry and
fine writing. He studied simplicity and plainness in all
things. He jots down detached thoughts, often merely
gives us notes or indications, and his views are seldom
profound or original. He is a Stoic, but does not develop
or follow consistently any system of philosophy. He
wavers and is uncertain precisely in those things in which
a firm-rooted faith is most inspiring and invigorating.
Running all through his " Meditations " there is an under-
current of sadness and despondency. Is it because he is
compelled to labour in a vocation for which Nature did not
intend him, or is it due to the sight of the corruption and
worthlessness of those by whom he was surrounded, indi-
cating plainly to him that the fabric of Roman civilization
was falling to ruin, or is it to be attributed to the fatalism
which determines and controls his world-view? There was
little either in the condition of society or in his own re-
ligious faith to cheer and strengthen; and yet it is impos-
sible to live with him in his book without feeling that we
are in the company of one of the best, wisest, and bravest
of men, of one who, placed on the summit of power and
splendour, was never for a moment blinded by the glitter
and the show, but, looking steadfastly at the heart of things,
remained simple, sincere, modest, self-controlled, and lov-
ing. We forget that he was an emperor; we care not in
MARCUS AURELIUS V
what style he utters himself; we are not curious about his
metaphysical theories, or disposed to argue and dispute;
it is enough that we are in his presence, that we hear his
words of wisdom and Stoic piety, with the reverence,
candour, and devoutness with which he speaks them.
He is a born teacher of morals, a born preacher of the
surpassing worth of the inner life; and this natural bent
was confirmed by his education, of which he has given an
account in the first book of the " Meditations," where he
mentions with gratitude that he was not sent to a public
school, and that his tutors were men of character and learn-
ing. " To the gods," he says, " I am indebted for having
good grandfathers, good parents, a good sister, good
teachers, good associates, good kinsmen and friends —
nearly everything good." He began his studies, as was
the custom of the time, with rhetoric and poetry, but at
the age of twelve he became a pupil of the Stoics, and
adopted their austere practices as well as their dress, lead-
ing a life so abstemious and laborious as to injure his health,
which remained delicate. Much of his youth was passed
in the country, at the villa of Lorium, where, while con-
tinuing to read, he engaged in the pleasures of the chase,
mingled with the vintagers, and occupied himself with ath-
letic sports. Here, too, he enjoyed more exclusively the
society and conversation of his mother, from whom, he
tells us, he learned piety and beneficence, and abstinence
not only from evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts, and
simplicity in his way of living far removed from the habits
of the rich. By her influence also he was strengthened to
preserve intact the virginal flower of his youth. Nor does
he forget to mention the admirable precepts given by his
tutors, who taught him to love work, to deny himself,
to endure misfortunes without complaint, not to deviate
from his purpose, to be considerate of others, not to listen
to evil speech, to be grave without affectation, and not
Vi MARCUS AURELIUS
to seek excuses for neglecting duty. Rusticus, whom he
thanks for having made him acquainted with the " Dis-
courses of Epictetus," warned him against the study of
what is merely speculative or ornamental. The example
of his masters made a greater impression even than their
words; and what touched him most was their patience,
firmness, equanimity, mildness, beneficence, uprightness,
and sincerity. In these " Meditations " there is not the
faintest trace of vanity. He is lowly minded and the most
modest of men. His candour and truthfulness are per-
fect. A lie seems to him to be an outrage upon his nature,
upon the divinity that dwells in him. He strives not only
to think and feel, but to love what he speaks. He is present
in these thoughts, and we almost seem to have bodily sight
of him as he lived and bore himself nearly eighteen hun-
dred years ago.
The habit of recollection, of self-examination was recom-
mended and practised by the Stoics before the time of
Marcus Aurelius. " Each day," says Seneca, " we should
call our soul to account. This was the custom of Sextius,
who, before taking his nightly rest, invariably passed his
conduct in review: Of what fault hast thou cured thyself
to-day? What passion hast thou combated? In what hast
thou become better? " And the philosopher goes on to
tell us how each evening, when the light was taken from
his room, and his wife, from respect for his pious practice,
became silent, he also was accustomed to recall whatever
he had done or spoken during the day, without dissimulat-
ing or omitting anything whatever; and that when he found
aught blameworthy, he pardoned himself only on condi-
tion that the fault should not again be committed. All
that concerns a good life was brought into this inquiry —
the right use of time, the avoidance of the occasions of
wrongdoing, human respect, the keeping guard over one's
thoughts and words, mindfulness of the presence of God,
MARCOS AURELIUS vii
of the certainty of death, and of the necessity of being pre-
pared to meet it with courage and dignity. We do not
know that Marcus AureHus practised this daily and me-
thodical examination of conscience, but he certainly habit-
ually meditated the great moral truths, living in ideas,
not in material interests; in principles, not in passions. In
his youth even, as we learn from one of his letters to
Fronto, he was accustomed to make extracts from the
books he read, and to these little volumes, into which he
had gathered the fine essence of the best writers, he doubt-
less often recurred. In this way he cultivated a taste for
the brief and pregnant sayings of the Stoic and other phi-
losophers, and found in them new incentives to lead a
worthy life. A great thought, a winged word may have
power not only to rouse the conscience and the will, but
it may remain with us as a permanent stimulus to virtuous
conduct. A phrase may fasten itself in the mind as though
rivetted with bolts of steel, or it may insinuate itself into
the current of our opinions and beliefs, and, blending with
it, make the waters of life purer and sweeter. He loved
thoughts of this kind, and he has written many which will
continue to be a source of joy and strength as long as gen-
erous minds and hearts shall be found on earth. What he
says has additional charm and power because he says it,
because it is the utterance of a genuine man, the purity
and nobleness of whose character can not be called in ques-
tion, the testimony which his contemporaries bore to his
wisdom, magnanimity, and goodness being confirmed by
the consenting voice of succeeding generations. How
pleasant and invigorating it is to read considerations like
these: " Such as thy habitual thoughts, such also will be
the character of thy mind, for the soul is dyed by the
thoughts. Dye it then with a continuous series of such
thoughts as these; for instance, that where a man can live,
there he can also live well. Live with the gods. Hold
Viii MARCUS AURtLIUS '
good to consist in the disposition to justice and the prac-
tice of it, and in this let thy desire terminate. The greatest
part of what we say or do being unnecessary, if a man
takes this away, he will have more leisure and less uneasi-
ness. We ought to check in the series of our thoughts
everything that is without a purpose and useless. What
more dost thou want when thou hast done a man a service?
Art thou not content that thou hast done something con-
formable to thy nature, and dost thou seek to be paid for
it, just as if the eye demanded a recompense for seeing or
the feet for walking? Have I done something" for the gen-
eral good? Well, then, I have had my reward. Let it
not be in any man's power to say truly of thee that thou
art not simple or that thou art not good, but let him be
a liar whoever shall think anything of this kind about thee.
Let men see, let them know a real man who lives accord-
ing to Nature. If they can not endure him, let them kill
him. Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and
it will ever bubble up if thou wilt ever dig."
Epictetus and Seneca had taught much of what is best
in the " Thoughts " of Marcus Aurelius, but in his com-
pany we seem to breathe the air of a higher and serener
world. He is meek and patient, affectionate and helpful.
In his words there is nothing to recall the hard and haughty
spirit of stoicism. He lives with his soul, but he finds
the good of life in doing good. He is a worker, not a
dreamer. He strives always to behave like a Roman, like
a man; he never thinks of himself apart from his fellow-
men. What is not useful for the swarm is not useful for
the bee. His purpose is to keep himself holy, and to labour
for the salvation of men, for the welfare of society. He
seeks inner perfection in the midst of courts and camps,
but neglects no duty which his high office imposes. In his
tent, surrounded by barbarous hordes, he directs his armies,
and still has time to write his tender and lofty thoughts.
MARCUS AURELIUS ix
In these he finds the strength to bear the awful burden
which is laid upon him. Each morning he reminds him-
self that he awakens to do a man's work. Philosophy is
his mother, while the court is but a stepmother, " Return
to philosophy frequently, and repose in her, through whom
what thou meetest with in the court appears to thee toler-
able, and thou appearest tolerable in the court." He is
conscious of the temptations and dangers of his exalted
position, and frequently makes them the subject of his
" Meditations." " Take care that thou art not made into a
Csesar, that thou art not dyed with this dye, for such
things happen. Keep thyself then simple, good, pure, seri-
ous, free from affectation, a friend of justice, a worshipper
of the gods, kind, affectionate, strenuous in all proper acts.
Strive to continue to be such as philosophy wished to make
thee. Reverence the gods, and help men." He encour-
ages himself in this noble purpose by recalling the exam-
ple of Antoninus, his adoptive father — his constancy, his
evenness in all things, his piety, the serenity of his counte-
nance, his sweetness, his disregard of empty fame, and his
efforts to understand things. He remembers how he bore
with those who blamed him unjustly; how he did nothing
in a hurry; how he refused to listen to calumnies; how he
was content with little; how laborious, patient, and firm
he was; how tolerant of those who opposed his opinions;
how eager to learn.
Men must have a chief, as the world a ruler, the herd
a leader; but this chief is not above the laws. His ideal
is that " of a polity in which there is the same law for all,
a polity administered with regard to equal rights and equal
freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly government
which respects most of all the freedom of the governed."
He abhors whatever is arbitrary or unjust, and finds noth-
ing so odious as the character of a tyrant, which. he couples
with such epithets as black, bestial, animal, stupid, coun-
X MARCUS AURELIUS
terfeit, scurrilous, and fraudulent. He admires the martyrs
of patriotism who have been the victims of tyrannical em-
perors. His knowledge of the incredible cruelties of some
of his predecessors on the imperial throne seemed to drive
him almost to excessive leniency. When he heard of the
assassination of Avidius Cassius, who at the head of
the armies of Asia had revolted, and against whom he was
marching, he said he was sorry to be deprived of the pleas-
ure of pardoning him. He does not think with the elder
Stoics that to be virtuous one must be harsh and unbend-
ing. " In mildness and goodness," he says, " there is a
higher quality of manliness." His constant aim is to unite
benignity with firmness. He does not wish to be too
severe even with himself. " It is not right that I should
afflict myself, I who have never willingly given pain to any
one." He has the tenderness and delicacy of soul of a
noble woman. There is a large benevolence and sympathy
in his judgment of men, even when they are perverse. He
is ever ready to be of help ; he is full of aflfection and clem-
ency. The temple he built he dedicated to Goodness, a
divinity hitherto unknown in Rome. " Love men," he
says, " but with a genuine love." " Thou dost not yet love
men with all thy heart." " It is not enough to forgive;
thou must love those who do thee wrong." The only
revenge he permits is to make one's self unlike the evil-
doer. Correct, if thou canst, the wicked; if not, suffer
them: for this good-will has been given thee. Be like the
vine, which bears its fruit and asks no reward. For the
rest, to be a blessing to others is to be a friend to one's
self. When there is question of doing good, one should
be of those who know not what they do — a benefactor
without thinking that any one is his debtor. What may
be called his great precept is: Love mankind; follow God.
He has no weak thoughts about his own happiness. It is
well enough with him when he lives in accord with uni-
MARCUS AURELIUS ' xi
versal law, when he fulfils his duties as a child of God and
a member of the whole human family. Besides, has he not
a sure refuge within his own heart, where at every mo-
ment he may live with the thoughts which give peace to
the soul? It is not necessary for him to seek the seashore
or the mountains to avoid distractions, for it is always in
his power to retire into himself, and to find there the things
which induce the tranquil mind — those brief and funda-
mental principles which, whenever he recurs to them, make
him calm and strong, and send him back free from all dis-
content to his appointed work. Thus he lives in intimate
communion with the divinity present within him, and
seeks in the contemplation of the laws of reason protec-
tion from temptation, discouragement, and weakness. His
favourite virtues are justice and truth; but he is in tune
with whatever makes for magnanimity, freedom, strength,
and holiness of life. He cares not for fame, or wealth, or
power, or pleasure. Things are largely what we think
they are, and if we but understand that virtue is the only
essential good, we shall not deem poverty, or ill health, or
pain, or death an evil. One may be a divine man and be
unknown, while they who are praised are praised, for the
most part, ignorantly or by the false and the fickle. What,
after all, is man? The earth is but a point, and the present
in which alone we can live but a moment lost between
two infinities. Fame is good when it increases the will
and the power to do good, else it is naught, mere sound,
and emptiness. The clapping of hands and the clapping
of tongues are vanities in which none but the childish take
delight. The emotion with which he touches on the favour-
ite theme of dull and gloomy declaimers — the hollowness
and evanescence of human life and grandeur — imparts a
certain charm and freshness to his words: " Consider the
times of Vespasian! Thou wilt see all these things — peo-
ple marrying, bringing up children, sick, dying, warring.
301
MARCUS AURELIUS
feasting, trafficking, cultivating the ground, flattering, ob-
stinately arrogant, suspecting, plotting, wishing for some-
body to die, grumbling about the present, loving, heaping
up treasure, desiring to be consuls or kings. We see, then,
that life of these people no longer exists at all. Again,
go to the times of Trajan. All is again the same. Their
life, too, is gone." He is full of commonplaces on this and
kindred subjects. He does not weary of them, but hunts
for arguments and comparisons to express his sense of the
worthlessness of fame, of the shortness of life, and the van-
ity of all things, especially of those which attract with the
bait of pleasure or terrify by pain, or are noised abroad by
the voices of men. What belongs to the body is a stream,
and what belongs to the soul is a dream and a vapour. All
pass quickly and are buried in oblivion, both they who
remember and they who are remembered. As he grows
older his sense of the hopeless sadness of life grows keener.
He is still resigned, still obedient to the eternal laws, but
he advances into ever-deepening gloom, where no ray of
light falls. His health was broken, and the evils which
he had worn himself out in trying to overcome were break-
ing forth again on every side. In the midst of his own
family he was unhappy. His wife, though she has doubt-
less been the victim of calumny, had ceased to sympathize
with him, and hated his friends. She had grown weary
of his philosophy and of the society of philosophers. His
austerity, his melancholy, his aversion to gaiety and splen-
dour, his grave maxims, were offensive to her pleasure-
craving nature. Though he gave no heed to the malicious
rumours about her, though he continued to love her as
" his good and faithful spouse," he was depressed by the
knowledge of her lack of heart for him. Commodus, his
son and successor, was a cause of still more poignant sor-
row than Faustina. He was a mere animal, without intel-
ligence or feeling, and though but seventeen years old at
MARCUS AURELIUS xiii
the time of his father's death, he had already manifested
something of the dispositions which made him later one
of the most brutal tyrants by whom the world has been
cursed.
The emperor has been blamed for not disinheriting him
and adopting some one worthy to rule; but he had been
proclaimed Caesar while yet a boy, and by the time his
evil nature had revealed itself Marcus was too infirm to
take so decisive a step. In fact, it would have been neces-
sary to murder him, for had he been left alive the military
party, already disgusted with the rule of the philosophers,
as shown in the revolt of Avidius, would have placed him
at the head of the army, and plunged the empire into the
horrors of civil war. And then what is more natural than
that a father should believe that time and responsibility
would correct the faults of his youthful son? Neverthe-
less, Commodus filled him with forebodings and increased
his weight of care and pain, which already was too heavy
for his declining strength. His friends are dead, the bar-
barians are in arms, the corruption of morals is spreading,
faith in the gods has degenerated into gross superstition,
the reforms which he had laboured to bring about are
superficial and ineflfectual, the laws had been made better,
but the Hfe of the people continued to become more false
and brutal, the army was losing its old-time loyalty and
discipline — on all sides the signs of decadence were mani-
fest.
In the midst of a falling world, in the presence of the
northern hordes, menacing destruction and ruin, the em-
peror still meditates, still studies how he may fortify his
soul. He does not despise death, but waits for it, content
to see it come. It will deliver him from the sight of the
corruption by which he is surrounded. His departure will
not be from men who have the same principles as himself.
" Come quick, O Death! lest perchance I, too, should for-
xiv MARCUS AURELIUS
get myself." There will not be lacking those who are
glad to see him go, whose lives his very presence con-
demns: " Let us at last breathe freely, being relieved from
this schoolmaster." In dying he will go away from those
for whom he strove, prayed, and cared so much, but who
nevertheless wish to see him depart, hoping thereby to get
some little advantage. " Why, then, should he desire to
stay longer? " It is better to be dead than to live as they.
Thou art in the grasp of fatal laws; be not like a pig that
squeals and struggles when it is sacrificed, but accept with
resignation what destiny decrees. Men are but leaves
which the wind seizes and scatters on the ground. Thus
weariness of life grows upon him, until he seems to be
without God and without hope in the world. In fact, he
had neither a philosophy nor a religion which can satisfy
the human heart. He was never able to settle for himself
the ultimate problems, the foundations of all ethical prin-
ciples— God, immortality, and the freedom of the will.
He speaks as a polytheist, or a deist, or a pantheist, ac-
cording to his mood. At Athens he founded chairs of phi-
losophy for the Platonic, Stoic, Peripatetic, and Epicurean
schools, giving the same honour to the atheist as to the
believer in the gods. At times he seems to doubt even
that to which he holds most firmly. His grasp of specula-
tive truth is feeble; he is strong and helpful only as a
teacher of the conduct of life. Outside of this we find in
him little but uncertainty and confusion. His moral prin-
ciples even rest on no foundation of dogma, or, if on any,
it is that of cosmic pantheism. His theology is as vague
and variable as his philosophy. He has no settled con-
victions concerning the soul and its immortality. When
our little boat comes to shore and we get out, he leaves it
undecided whether it is to enter on another life or simply
to lose all sensation, to cease to be. His thought moves
between alternatives. " To go from among men, if there
MARCUS AURELIUS XV
are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will
not involve thee in evil; but if, indeed, they do not exist,
or if they have no concern about human aflfairs, what is it
to me to live in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of
providence? " Then he reassures himself and declares that
the gods do exist, and that they do care for human things;
at least they place the avoidance of real evils in a man's
power. But death and life, honour and dishonour, pain
and pleasure, are neither good nor evil, and therefore they
happen alike to all. God is for him the universal reason,
the immutable law which governs all things. He is the
whole, he is nature itself; the indwelling force which
gives order and beauty to the universe. How this divin-
ity, this inexorable fate, is to be reconciled with Providence
and with the freedom of the will, or be made an object of
prayer and adoration, he does not attempt to explain.
" Out of the universe from the beginning everything which
happens has been apportioned and spun out to thee."
" Accept everything which happens, even if it seem dis-
agreeable, because it leads to this, to the health of the
universe and to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus." Here
he joins theism and pantheism, but by Zeus he really means
the universe, the universal substance of which the individ-
ual has but a very small portion. As this universal sub-
stance exists necessarily, from it by fatal laws the thread
of each one's destiny is spun. " Whatever may happen
to thee was prepared for thee from all eternity, and the
implication of causes was from eternity spinning the thread
of thy being." At times he seems to regard the universe
as an immense animal, " one living being, having one sub-
stance and one soul." But it is perhaps wrong to insist
on the theoretical views of a man who had little intellectual
curiosity, and cared hardly at all for what is speculative.
Still it is impossible not to recognise that he himself felt
that the help which pantheism can offer the soul is inef-
25
xvi MARCUS AURELIUS
factual. Even a philosopher can derive small comfort from
the thought that his absorption into the mass of matter is
for the interest of the All, which contains nothing that is
not for its advantage. For the multitude such a belief is
without worth or meaning. Stoic morality is interesting
chiefly on account of its influence upon men like Epictetus
and Marcus Aurelius, who found in it a source of strength
in the midst of the universal corruption in which Greco-
Roman civilization was disappearing. It could never have
become a principle of social regeneration. The fatalism
on which it rests makes enthusiasm impossible. Its resig-
nation is despondency; its indifference, hopelessness. It
lacks vitality and joyousness. There is in it no love of
life, no belief in progress. The Stoic sage stands alone,
conscious of his own virtue, in the midst of a world of liars
and hypocrites. He is not angry with men; he is kind
even, and glad to be of help; but, in truth, he has little
sympathy with them. They are blind and perverse, an
infinite number of fools, who are deprived of that which
alone can make life bearable. Hence stoicism necessarily
fails. It can neither interest nor influence the mass of man-
kind. It is dry and hard. It inspires no glad emotion,
no immortal hope. It does not thrill the soul with the con-
sciousness that Life is lord of Death, that truth and love lie
at the heart of being, that whether we live or whether we die
we are borne in the arms of the eternal Father, who knows
and cares for each, even the least of his children. It can
not make us feel that the loving spirit of God leads us
forth into the land of righteousness, that we are reborn
into a kingdom of peace and joy and blessedness. It can
not give the faith which overcomes all things, and guides
us through the portals of death into everlasting life. It
has no words of pardon and comfort for sinners who re-
pent. The power that was to regenerate the world was
already active under the eyes of Marcus Aurelius, but was
MARCUS AURELIUS ^ xvii
wholly misunderstood by him. He alludes to the Christian
religion once only. " What a soul," he writes, " that is
which is ready, if at any moment it must be separated from
the body, and ready either to be extinguished, or dispersed,
or to continue to exist; but so that this readiness comes
from a man's own judgment, not from mere obstinacy, as
with the Christians! " From his point of view the mar-
tyrs were obdurate fanatics and enemies of the empire.
Of his humanity and tolerance there can be no doubt, but,
unfortunately, there can be just as little doubt that he per-
secuted the Christians, or at the least permitted them to be
persecuted. Intensely moral natures are apt to be narrow
and rigid, and though several apologies for the new faith
were addressed to him, he either never read them or was
incapable of taking a world -view so utterly opposed to
that of the Stoic philosophy. They who are placed in high
stations are often the last to see the real trend of things,
for the possession of power, like the possession of wealth
or the indulgence of appetite, seems to impede insight;
and this kind-hearted and spiritual-minded man had not a
suspicion of the true nature of the teaching of Christ. It
did not appeal to him as a philosophy, and as a religion
it seemed to him atheistic, for it denied the existence of
the gods whom he revered and whose worship he thought
inseparable from loyalty to the empire. He felt, as all
the thoughtful minds of the time felt, that here was a new
spirit, which, if it should prevail, would lead to the over-
throw of the old civilization. He may not have held with
Tacitus that the Christians were convicted of hatred of the
human race, but he believed that they were the enemies
of the Roman state. The ancients looked upon religion
as essentially a national affair. They had no conception
of what we mean by liberty of conscience. The appeal
from Caesar to God was for them meaningless, if not im-
pious. When the Christians declared that they were ready
xviii MARCUS AURELIUS
to obey all civil and military laws, but reserved to them-
selves freedom to worship God according to the principles
of their faith, which forbade them to ofTer sacrifice to idols,
they uttered words which their enemies could not under-
stand, words which Christians themselves in later ages
have often been unable or unwilling to understand.
It was but two or three years before the death of Marcus
Aurelius that the persecution broke forth at Lyons. The
emperor, who became prematurely old, was in feeble health
and surrounded by dangers and difficulties. The populace,
eager to believe the Christians guilty of the most atrocious
crimes, attributed whatever evils befell the state to the
anger of the gods against their contemners, and clamoured
for their punishment. The emperor yielded to the popular
fury, and the church of Lyons gave to the world an ex-
ample of heroism which, if ever equalled, has never been
surpassed. It is the very irony of fate that Marcus Aurelius
should be counted among the persecutors of the Christians,
that his name should be coupled with those of Nero and
Domitian. It is doubtful whether he himself issued a new
edict or simply permitted those of his predecessors to be
enforced. Melito, Bishop of Sardis, who addressed a letter
to the emperor, leads us to suppose that he had sent forth
decrees which resulted in the martyrdom of St. Polycarp,
Bishop of Smyrna, ten years before the persecution at
Lyons.
On the other hand, Tertullian, writing twenty years after
the death of Marcus Aurelius, affirms in the most positive
manner that he protected the Christians; that if he did not
expressly revoke the edicts of former emperors against
them, he at least rendered them ineffective by establishing
penalties against their accusers. It seems probable that
he was not an active persecutor; but he certainly lived and
died with an utter misconception of the religion which
even then was the only vital force left to a perishing world.
MARCUS AURELIUS xix
He was, nevertheless, one of the most just and clement
of men. There is little genuine wisdom and goodness any-
where, and what there is is rarely found in the palaces of
kings and emperors. Let us try to imagine a European
ruler or an American President of our day who should
be busy with the thoughts and aspirations of Marcus Aure-
lius. The mere idea seems to be grotesque. He is one in
whom the wise have recognised the genuine goodness
which has the mark of universality, which, like the best
culture, lifts its possessor above party and country, and
makes him a blessing for mankind and for all time.
In reading his " Meditations " we are always in the
presence of a magnanimous man, of a great soul whose
kindliness and good faith we can not doubt unless we our-
selves lack love and truth. He will remain in literature
as one of its great spiritual forces. He has the vital touch
which gives immortality, because it reveals a noble and
interesting personality. There is in him the indefinable
something which makes writing literature. It is doubtless
largely sincerity, the perfect truthfulness which makes the
word the mirror of the man. Much of what he says is said
by Seneca and Epictetus, but in it there is an accent of
his own which gives it a fresh meaning, a new quality. In
these disconnected " Thoughts," in spite of repetitions, of
incorrectness, and obscurity, there breathes a soul that can
not die, there stands forth a character which all men must
deem it a privilege to know. The book is alive with the
high and rare qualities which go to the making of a true
and noble man. In the little casket found in the tent on
the Danube where he died there was stored a life which
death could not extinguish. The " Meditations " with
which he fortified his own spirit in the struggle for better
and higher life have consoled and will continue to console
kindred spirits in every age; for whatever his doubts and
misgivings, his faith in duty and affection, in the supreme
XX MARCUS AURELIUS
worth of righteousness, was never shaken. His victories
are forgotten; his efforts to improve the laws, to spread
enlightenment, to help the orphans, are hardly remembered;
but fame, for which he cared not at all, is his forever, and
of our many vanities perhaps the least vain is the fame
which rests on words that never lose their power to inspire,
to illumine, and to strengthen. The whole earth is the
sepulchre of illustrious men, but it is so only when the
greatness of soul which shone forth in their lives is kept in
imperishable vigojir in some immortal book.
John Lancaster Spalding.
CONTENTS
PACK
Book I i
^ Book II lo
Book III i6
Book IV 24
Book V 36
Book VI 47
Book VII 59
Book VIII 72
Book IX 84
Book X • • 95
Book XI 107
Book XII 118
zxi
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
FACING
PAGE
The Fates Frontispiece
From a painting by Paul Thumann.
Diogenes 66
From a painting by Jean L^on G^rfime.
The Augurs 202
From a painting by Jean L£on Gdrfime.
MEDITATIONS
Marcus Aurelius Frontispiece
From a bust in Rome.
Hadrian's Tomb 78
26
i.lU
MEDITATIONS
BOOK I
FROM my grandfather Verus* [I learned] good morals
and the government of my temper.
From the reputation and remembrance of my
father,^ modesty and manly character.
From my mother,^ piety and beneficence, and abstinence,
not only from evil deeds, but even from evil thoughts ; and
further, simplicity in my way of living, far removed from the
habits of the rich.
From my great-grandfather,* not to have frequented public
schools, and to have had good teachers at home, and to know
that on such things a man should spend liberally.
From my governor, to be neither of the green nor of the
blue party at the games in the Circus, nor a partizan either
of the Parmularius or the Scutarius at the gladiators' fights ;
from him too I learned endurance of labour, and to want
little, and to work with my own hands, and not to meddle
with other people's affairs, and not to be ready to listen to
slander.
From Diognetus,** not to busy myself about trifling things,
and not to give credit to what was said by miracle-workers
and jugglers about incantations and the driving away of
daemons and such things; and not to breed quails [for fight-
ing] , nor to give myself up passionately to such things ; and
to endure freedom of speech ; and to have become intimate
with philosophy ; and to have been a hearer, first of Bacchius,
2 MARCUS AURELIUS
then of Tandasis and Marcianus; and to have written dia-
logues in my youth; and to have desired a plank bed and
a skin, and whatever else of the kind belongs to the Grecian
discipline.
From Rusticus^ I received the impression that my char-
acter required improvement and discipline; and from him I
learned not to be led astray to sophistic emulation, nor to
writing on speculative matters, nor to delivering little horta-
tory orations, nor to showing myself off as a man who prac-
tises much discipline, or does benevolent acts in order to
make a display ; and to abstain from rhetoric, and poetry, and
fine writing; and not to walk about in the house in my out-
door dress, nor to do other things of the kind; and to
write my letters with simplicity, like the letter which Rus-
ticus wrote from Sinuessa to my mother; and with respect
to those who have offended me by words, or done me wrong,
to be easily disposed to be pacified and reconciled, as soon as
they have shown a readiness to be reconciled; and to read
carefully, and not to be satisfied with a superficial under-
standing of a book; nor hastily to give my assent to those
who talk overmuch ; and I am indebted to him for being ac-
quainted with the discourses of Epictetus,'^ which he com-
municated to me out of his own collection.
From Apollonius^ I learned freedom of will and undevia-
ting steadiness of purpose; and to look to nothing else, not
even for a moment, except to reason ; and to be always the
same, in sharp pains, on the occasion of the loss of a child,
and in long illness ; and to see clearly in a living example that
the same man can be both most resolute and yielding, and
not peevish in giving his instruction; and to have had be-
fore my eyes a man who clearly considered his experience
and his skill in expounding philosophical principles as the
smallest of his merits ; and from him I learned how to receive
from friends what are esteemed favours, without being either
humbled by them or letting them pass unnoticed.
From Sextus,® a benevolent disposition, and the example
of a family governed in a fatherly manner, and the idea of
living conformably to nature; and gravity without affecta-
tion, and to look carefully after the interests of friends, and
to tolerate ignorant persons, and those who form opinions
MEDITATIONS 3
without consideration :*^** he had the power of readily accom-
modating himself to all, so that intercourse with him was
more agreeable than any flattery ; and at the same time he was
most highly venerated by those who associated with him:
and he had the faculty both of discovering and ordering, in
an intelligent and methodical way, the principles necessary
for Irfe ; and he never showed anger or any other passion, but
was entirely free from passion, and also most affectionate;
and he could express approbation without noisy display, and
he possessed much knowledge without ostentation.
From Alexander^ ^ the grammarian, to refrain from fault-
finding, and not in a reproachful way to chide those who
uttered any barbarous or solecistic or strange-sounding ex-
pression; but dexterously to introduce the very expression
which ought to have been used, and in the way of answer or
giving confirmation, or joining in an inquiry about the thing
itself, not about the word, or by some other fit suggestion.
From Fronto^^ I learned to observe what envy, and
duplicity, and hypocrisy are in a tyrant, and that generally
those among us who are called Patricians are rather deficient
in paternal affection.
From Alexander the Platonic, not frequently nor without
necessity to say to any one, or to write in a letter, that I have
no leisure; nor continually to excuse the neglect of duties
required by our relation to those with whom we live, by
alleging urgent occupations.
From Catulus,^^ not to be indifferent when a friend finds
fault, even if he should find fault without reason, but to try
to restore him to his usual disposition; and to be ready to
speak well of teachers, as it is reported of Domitius and
Athenodotus ; and to love my children truly.
From my brother** Severus, to love my kin, and to
love truth, and to love justice; and through him I learned to
know Thrasea, Helvidius, Cato, Dion, Brutus;**^ and from
him I received the idea of a polity in which there is the same
law for all, a polity administered with regard to equal rights
and equal freedom of speech, and the idea of a kingly govern-
ment which respects most of all the freedom of the governed ;
I learned from him also * consistency and undeviating stead-
iness in my regard for philosophy; and a disposition to do
4 MARCUS AURELIUS
good, and to give to others readily, and to cherish good
hopes, and to beUeve that I am loved by my friends ; and in
him I observed no concealment of his opinions with respect
to those whom he condemned, and that his friends had no
need to conjecture what he wished or did not wish, but it was
quite plain.
From Maximus*^ I learned self-government, and not to
be led aside by anything; and cheerfulness in all circum-
stances, as well as in illness; and a just admixture in the
moral character of sweetness and dignity, and to do what
was set before me without complaining. I observed that
everybody believed that he thought as he spoke, and that in
all that he did he never had any bad intention ; and he never
showed amazement and surprise, and was never in a hurry,
and never put ofif doing a thing, nor was perplexed nor de-
jected, nor did he ever laugh to disguise his vexation, nor, on
the other hand, was he ever passionate or suspicious. He
was accustomed to do acts of beneficence, and was ready to
forgive, and was free from all falsehood; and he presented
the appearance of a man who could not be diverted from
right rather than of a man who had been improved. I ob-
served, too, that no man could ever think that he was de-
spised by Maximus, or ever venture to think himself a better
man. He had also the art of being humorous in an agree-
able way.*
In my father^'' I observed mildness of temper, and un-
changeable resolution in the things which he had determined
lafter due deliberation; and no vain glory in those things
whichmencall honours ;anda loveof labour and perseverance;
and a readiness to listen to those who had anything to pro-
pose for the common weal ; and undeviating firmness in giv-
ing to every man according to his deserts ; and a knowledge
derived from experience of the occasions for vigorous action
and for remission. And I observed that he had overcome all
passion for boys; and he considered himself no more than
any other citizen ; and he released his friends from all obliga-
tion to sup with him or to attend him of necessity when he
went abroad, and those who had failed to accompany him, by
reason of any urgent circumstances, always found him the
same. I observed too his habit of careful inquiry in all mat-
MEDITATIONS . 5
ters of deliberation, and his persistency, and that he never
stopped his investigation through being satisfied with ap-
pearances which first present themselves; and that his dis-
position was to keep his friends, and not to be soon tired of
them, nor yet to be extravagant in his affection; and to be
satisfied on all occasions, and cheerful ; and to foresee things
a long way off, and to provide for the smallest without dis-
play ; and to check immediately popular applause and all flat-
tery; and to be ever watchful over the things which were
necessary for the administration of the empire, and to be a
good manager of the expenditure, and patiently to endure
the blame which he got for such conduct ; and he was neither
superstitious with respect to the gods, nor did he court men
by gifts or by trying to please them, or by flattering the popu-
lace; but he showed sobriety and firmness in all things and
never any mean thoughts or action, nor love of novelty.
And the things which conduce in any way to the commodity
of life, and of which fortune gives an abundant supply, he
used without arrogance and without excusing himself; so
that when he had them, he enjoyed them without affectation,
and when he had them not, he did not want them. No one
could ever say of him that he was either a sophist or a
[home-bred] flippant slave or a pedant; but every one ac-
knowledged him to be a man ripe, perfect, above flattery, able
to manage his own and other men's affairs. Besides this, he
honoured those who were true philosophers, and he did not
reproach those who pretended to be philosophers, nor yet
was he easily led by them. He was also easy in conversa-
tion, and he made himself agreeable without any offensive
affectation. He took a reasonable care of his body's health,
not as one who was greatly attached to life, nor out of re-
gard to personal appearance, nor yet in a careless way, but
so that, through his own attention, he very seldom stood in
need of the physician's art, or of medicine or external appli-
cations. He was most ready to give way without envy to
those who possessed any particular faculty, such as that of
eloquence, or knowledge of the law or of morals, or of any-
thing else; and he gave them his help, that each might enjoy
reputation according to his deserts ; and he always acted con-
formably to the institutions of his country, without showing
6 MARCUS AURELIUS
any affectation of doing so. Further, he was not fond of
change nor unsteady, but he loved to stay in the same places,
and to employ himself about the same things; and after his
paroxysms of headache he came immediately fresh and
vigorous to his usual occupations. His secrets were not
many, but very few and very rare, and these only about pub-
lic matters; and he showed prudence and economy in the
exhibition of the public spectacles and the construction of
public buildings, his donations to the people, and in such
things, for he was a man who looked to what ought to be
done, not to the reputation which is got by a man's acts. He
did not take the bath at unseasonable hours ; he was not fond
of building houses, nor curious about what he ate, nor about
the texture and colour of his clothes, nor about the beauty
of his slaves.^* His dress came from Lorium, his villa on
the coast, and from Lanuvium generally. ^^ We know how
he behaved to the toll-collector at Tusculum who asked his
pardon ; and such was all his behaviour. There was in him
nothing harsh, nor implacable, nor violent, nor, as one may
say, anything carried to the sweating point ; but he examined
all things severally, as if he had abundance of time, and with-
out confusion, in an orderly way, vigorously and consist-
ently. And that might be applied to him which is recorded
of Socrates,^" that he was able both to abstain from, and to
enjoy, those things which many are too weak to abstain from,
and can not enjoy without excess. But to be strong enough
both to bear the one and to be S9ber in the other is the mark
of a man who has a perfect and invincible soul, such as he
showed in the illness of Maximus.
To the gods I am indebted for having good grandfathers,
good parents, a good sister, good teachers, good associates,
good kinsmen and friends, nearly everything good. Further,
I owe it to the gods that I was not hurried into any offence
against any of them, though I had a disposition which, if
opportunity had offered, might have led me to do something
of this kind ; but, through their favour, there never was such
a concurrence of circumstances as put me to the trial. Further,
I am thankful to the gods that I was not longer brought up
with my grandfather's concubine, and that I preserved the
flower of my youth, and that I did not make proof of my
MEDITATIONS f
virility before the proper season, but even deferred the time ;
that I was subjected to a ruler and a father who was able to
take away all pride from me, and to bring me to the knowl-
edge that it is possible for a man to live in a palace without
wanting either guards or embroidered dresses, or torches and
statues, and similar show; but that it is in such a man's
power to bring himself very near to the fashion of a private
person, without being for this reason either meaner in
thought, or more remiss in action, with respect to the things
which must be done for the public interest in a manner that
befits a ruler. I thank the gods for giving me such a
brother,^^ who was able by his moral character to rouse me
to vigilance over myself, and who, at the same time, pleased
me by his respect and affection; that my children have not
been stupid nor deformed in body ; that I did not make more
proficiency in rhetoric, poetry, and the other studies, in which
I should perhaps have been completely engaged, if I had seen
that I was making progress in them; that I made haste to
place those who brought me up in the station of honour,
which they seemed to desire, without putting them off with
hope of my doing it some time afterward, because
they were then still young; that I knew Apollonius,
Rusticus, Maximus; that I received clear and fre-
quent impressions about living according to nature,
and what kind of a life that is, so that, so far
as depended on the gods, and their gifts, and help, and
inspirations, nothing hindered me from forthwith living ac-
cording to nature, though I still fall short of it through my
own fault, and through not observing the admonitions of the
gods, and, I may almost say, their direct instructions; that
my body has held out so long in such a kind of life ; that I
never touched either Benedicta or Theodotus, and that, after
having fallen into amatory passions, I was cured; and,
though I was often out of humour with Rusticus, I never did
anything of which I had occasion to repent ; that, though it
was my mother's fate to die young, she spent the last years of
her life with me ; that, whenever I wished to help any man in
his need, or on any other occasion, I was never told that I
had not the means of doing it ; and that to myself the same
necessity never happened, to receive anything from another ;
8 MARCUS AURELIUS
that I have such a wife, so obedient, and so affection-
ate, and so simple; that I had abundance of good
masters for my children ; and that remedies have been shown
to me by dreams, both others, and against bloodspitting and
giddiness^^ ****** . ^j^^j ^-j^^^^ when I had an inclina-
tion to philosophy, I did not fall into the hands of any
sophist, and that I did not waste my time on writers [of his-
tories], or in the resolution of syllogisms, or occupy myself
about the investigation of appearances in the heavens ; for all
these things require the help of the gods and fortune.
Among the Quadi at the Granua.^'
NOTES
*Annius Verus was his grandfather's name. There is no verb in this
section connected with the word "from," nor in the following sections
of this book; and it is not quite certain what verb should be supplied.
What I have added may express the meaning here, though there are
sections which it will not fit. If he does not mean to say that he learned
all these good things from the several persons whom he mentions, he
means that he observed certain good qualities in them, or received
certain benefits from them, and it is implied that he was the better for
it, or at least might have been ; for it would be a mistake to understand
Marcus as saying that he possessed all the virtues which he observed in
his kinsmen and teachers.
' His father's name was Annius Verus.
* His mother was Domitia Calvilla, named also Lucilla.
* Perhaps his mother's grandfather, Catilius Severus.
' In the works of Justinus there is printed a letter to one Diognetus,
whom the writer names "most excellent." He was a Gentile, but he
wished very much to know what the religion of the Christians was,
what God they worshipped, and how this worship made them despise
the world and death, and neither believe in the gods of the Greeks nor
observe the superstition of the Jews ; and what was this love to one
another which they had, and why this new kind of religion was intro-
duced now and not before. My friend Mr. Jenkins, rector of Lyminge
in Kent, has suggested to me that this Diognetus may have been the
tutor of M. Antoninus.
* Q. Junius Rusticus was a Stoic philosopher, whom Antoninus valued
highly, and often took his advice.
Antoninus says, rots ^EittKrijTEioi^ vitoiJ.vr}).ia6tv, which must not
be translated, "the writings of Epictetus," for Epictetus wrote nothing.
His pupil Arrian has preserved for us all that we know of Epictetus.
' Apollonius of Chalcis came to Rome in the time of Pius to be Mar-
cus's preceptor. He was a rigid Stoic.
* Sextus of Chaeronea, a grandson of Plutarch, or nephew, as some
say; but more probably a grandson.
"I have placed in some passages an *, which indicates corruption in
the text or great uncertainty in the meaning." — Long's Preface.
MEDITATIONS 9
" Alexander was a Grammaticus, a native of Phrygia. He wrote a
commentary on Homer ; and the rhetorician Aristides wrote a panegyric
on Alexander in a funeral oration.
" M. Cornelius Fronto was a rhetorician, and in great favour with
Marcus. There are extant various letters between Marcus and Fronto.
" Cinna Catulus, a Stoic philosopher.
" The word brother may not be genuine. Antoninus had no brother.
It has been supposed that he may mean some cousin. Schultz in his
translation omits "brother," and says that this Severus is probably
Claudius Severus, a peripatetic.
"We know from Tacitus (Annal. xiii; xvi, 21; and other passages),
who Thrasea and Helvidius were. Plutarch has written the lives of the
two Catos, and of Dion and Brutus. Antoninus probably alludes to
Cato of Utica, who was a Stoic.
" Claudius Maximus was a Stoic philosopher, who was highly es-
teemed also by Antoninus Pius, Marcus' predecessor. The character
of Maximus is that of a perfect man.
" He means his adoptive father, his predecessor, the Emperor An-
toninus Pius.
" This passage is corrupt, and the exact meaning is uncertain.
" Lorium was a villa on the coast north of Rome, and there An-
toninus was brought up, and he died there. This also is corrupt.
" Xenophon, Memorab. i, 3, 15.
" The emperor had no brother, except L. Verus, his brother by adop-
tion.
" This is corrupt.
" The Quadi lived in the southern part of Bohemia and Moravia ;
and Antoninus made a campaign against them. Granua is probably
the river Graan, which flows into the Danube.
If these words are genuine, Antoninus may have written this first
book during the war with the Quadi. In the first edition of Antoninus,
and in the older editions, the first three sections of the second book
make the conclusion of the first book. Gataker placed them at the
beginning of the second book.
BOOK II,
BEGIN the morning by saying to thyself, I shall meet
with the busybody, the ungrateful, arrogant, deceitful,
envious, unsocial. All these things happen to them by
reason of their ignorance of what is good and evil.
But I who have seen the nature of the good that it is beautiful,
and of the bad that it is ugly, and the nature of him who does
wrong, that it is akin to me, not [only] of the same blood or
seed, but that it participates in [the same] intelligence and
[the same] portion of the divinity, I can neither be injured
by any of them, for no one can fix on me what is ugly, nor
can I be angry with my kinsman, nor hate him. For we are
made for co-operation, like feet, like hands, like eyelids, like
the rows of the upper and lower teeth.^ To act against one
another then is contrary to nature; and it is acting against
one another to be vexed and to turn away.
Whatever this is that I am, it is a little flesh and breath,
and the ruling part. Throw away thy books ; no longer dis-
tract thyself: it is not allowed; but as if thou wast now
dying, despise the flesh ; it is blood and bones and a network,
a contexture of nerves, veins, and arteries. See the breath
also, what kind of a thing it is, air, and not dlways the same,
but every moment sent out and again sucked in. The third
then is the ruling part : consider thus : Thou art an old man ;
no longer let this be a slave, no longer be pulled by the strings
like a puppet to unsocial movements, no longer be either dis-
satisfied with thy present lot, or shrink from the future.
All that is from the gods is full of providence. That
which is from fortune is not separated from nature or with-
out an interweaving and involution with the things which
are ordered by providence. From thence all things flow ; and
there is besides necessity, and that which is for the advantage
of the whole universe, of which thou art a part. But that is
MEDITATIONS 1 1
good for every part of nature which the nature of the whole
brings, and what serves to maintain this nature. Now the
universe is preserved, as by the changes of the elements so
by the changes of things compounded of the elements. Let
these principles be enough for thee, let them always be fixed
opinions. But cast away the thirst after books, that thou
mayest not die murmuring, but cheerfully, truly, and from
thy heart thankful to the gods.
Remember how long thou hast been putting off these
things, and how often thou hast received an opportunity
from the gods, and yet dost not use it. Thou must now at
last perceive of what universe thou art a part, and of what
administrator of the universe thy existence is an efflux, and
that a limit of time is fixed for thee, which if thou dost not
use for clearing away the clouds from thy mind, it will go
and thou wilt go, and it will never return.
Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to
do what thou hast in hand with perfect and simple dignity,
and feeling of affection, and freedom, and justice; and to
give thyself relief from all other thoughts. And thou wilt
give thyself relief, if thou doest every act of thy life as if it
were the last, laying aside all carelessness and passionate aver-
sion from the commands of reason, and all hypocrisy, and
self-love, and discontent with the portion which has been
given to thee. Thou seest how few the things are, the which
if a man lays hold of, he is able to live a life which flows in
quiet, and is like the existence of the gods ; for the gods on
their part will require nothing more from him who observes
these things.
Do wrong^ to thyself, do wrong to thyself, my soul; but
thou wilt no longer have the opportunity of honouring thy-
self. Every man's life is sufficient.* But thine is nearly
finished, though thy soul reverences not itself, but places thy
felicity in the souls of others.
Do the things external which fall upon thee, distract thee?
Give thyself time to learn something new and good, and
cease to be whirled around. But then thou must also avoid
being carried about the other way. For those too are triflers
who have wearied themselves in life by their activity, and
12 MARCUS AURELIUS
yet have no object to which to direct every moyement, and,
in a word, all their thoughts.
Through not observing what is in the mind of another a
man has seldom been seen to be unhappy ; but those who do
not observe the movements of their own minds must of
necessity be unhappy.
This thou must always bear in mind, what is the nature of
the whole, and what is my nature, and how this is related to
that, and what kind of a part it is of what kind of a whole ;
and that there is no one who hinders thee from always doing
and saying the things which are according to the nature of
which thou art a part.
Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts — such a com-
parison as one would make in accordance with the common
notions of mankind — says, like a true philosopher, that the
oflfences which are committed through desire are more
blameable than those which are committed through anger.
For he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from
reason with a certain pain and unconscious contraction ; but
he who offends through desire, being overpowered by pleas-
ure, seems to be in a manner more intemperate and more
womanish in his offences. Rightly then, and in a way
worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence which is com-
mitted with pleasure is more blameable than that which is
committed with pain ; and on the whole the one is more like
a person who has been first wronged and through pain is
compelled to be angry; but the other is moved by his own
impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing something
by desire.
Since it is possible^ that thou mayest depart from life
this very moment, regulate every act and thought accord-
ingly. But to go away from among men, if there are gods,
is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods will not involve
thee in evil ; but if indeed they do not exist, or if they have no
concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live in a uni-
verse devoid of gods or devoid of providence ? But in truth
they do exist, and they do care for human things, and they
have put all the means in man's power to enable him not to
fall into real evils. And as to the rest, if there was anything
evil, they would have provided for this also, that it should be
MEDITATIONS 1 3
altogether in a man's power not to fall into it. Now that
which does not make a man worse, how can it make a man's
life worse ? But neither through ignorance, nor having the
knowledge but not the power to guard against or correct
these things, is it possible that the nature of the universe has
overlooked them ; nor is it possible that it has made so great
a mistake, either through want of power or want of skill, that
good and evil should happen indiscriminately to the good
and the bad. But death certainly, and life, honour and dis-
honour, pain and pleasure, all these things equally happen to
good men and bad, being things which make us neither better
nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil.
How quickly all things disappear, in the universe the bodies
themselves, and in time the remembrance of them; what is
the nature of all sensible things, and particularly those which
attract with the bait of pleasure or terrify by pain, or are
noised abroad by vapoury fame; how worthless, and con-
temptible, and sordid, and perishable, and dead they are — all
this it is the part of the intellectual faculty to observe. To
observe too who these are whose opinions and voices give
reputation; what death is, and the fact that, if a man looks
at it in itself, and by the abstractive power of reflection re-
solves into their parts all the things which present themselves
to the imagination in it, he will then consider it to be nothing
else than an operation of nature ; and if any one is afraid of
an operation of nature, he is a child. This, however, is not
only an operation of nature, but it is also a thing which con-
duces to the purposes of nature. To observe too how man
comes near to the deity, and by what part of him, and when
this part of man is so disposed.*
Nothing is more wretched than a man who traverses
everything in a round, and pries into the things beneath the
earth, as the poet* says, and seeks by conjecture what is in
the minds of his neighbours, without perceiving that it is
sufficient to attend to the daemon within him, and to rever-
ence it sincerely. And reverence of the daemon consists in
keeping it pure from passion and thoughtlessness, and dis-
satisfaction with what comes from gods and men. For the
things from the gods merit veneration for their excellence;
and the things from men should be dear to us by reason of
14 MARCUS AURELIUS
kinship; and sometimes even, in a manner, they move our
pity by reason of men's ignorance of good and bad; this
defect being not less than that which deprives us of the
power of distinguishing things that are white and black.
Though thou shouldest be going to live three thousand
years, and as many times ten thousand years, still remember
that no man loses any other life than this which he now lives,
nor lives any other than this which he now loses. The
longest and shortest are thus brought to the same. For the
present is the same to all, though that which perishes is not
the same ;* and so that which is lost appears to be a mere mo-
ment. For a man can not lose either the past or the future :
for what a man has not, how can any one take this from
him? These two things then thou must bear in mind; the
one, that all things from eternity are of like forms and come
round in a circle, and that it makes no difference whether
a man shall see the same things during a hundred years or
two hundred, or an infinite time; and the second, that the
longest liver and he who will die soonest lose just the same.
For the present is the only thing of which a man can be de-
prived, if it is true that this is the only thing which he has,
and that a man can not lose a thing if he has it not.
Remember that all is opinion. For what was said by the
Cynic Monimus is manifest : and manifest too is the use of
what was said, if a man receives what may be got out of it
as far as it is true.
The soul of man does violence to itself, first of all, when
it becomes an abscess and, as it were, a tumour on the uni-
verse, so far as it can. For to be vexed at anything which
happens is a separation of ourselves from nature, in some
part of which the natures of all other things are contained.
In the next place, the soul does violence to itself when it
turns away from any man, or even moves towards him with
the intention of injuring, such as are the souls of those who
are angry. In the third place, the soul does violence to itself
when it is overpowered by pleasure or by pain. Fourthly,
when it plays a part, and does or says anything insincerely and
untruly. Fifthly, when it allows any act of its own and any
movement to be without an aim and does anything thought-
lessly and without considering what it is, it being right that
MEDITATIONS " 15
even the smallest things be done with reference to an end;
and the end of rational animals is to follow the reason and
the law of the most ancient city and polity.
Of human life the time is a point, and the substance is in
a flux, and the perception dull, and the composition of the
whole body subject to putrefaction, and the soul a whirl, and
fortune hard to divine, and fame a thing devoid of judg-
ment. And, to say all in a word, everything which belongs
to the body is a stream, and what belongs to the soul is a
dream and vapour, and life is a warfare and a stranger's so-
journ, and after-fame is oblivion. What then is that which
is able to conduct a man ? One thing and only one, philoso-
phy. But this consists in keeping the daemon within a man
free from violence and unharmed, superior to pains and
pleasures, doing nothing without a purpose, nor yet falsely
and with hypocrisy, not feeling the need of another man's
doing or not doing anything ; and besides, accepting all that
happens, and all that is allotted, as coming from thence,
wherever it is, from whence he himself came; and, finally,
waiting for death with a cheerful mind, as being nothing else
than a dissolution of the elements of which every living being
is compounded. But if there is no harm to the elements
themselves in each continually changing into another, why
should a man have any apprehension about the change and
dissolution of all the elements ? For it is according to nature
and nothing is evil which is according to nature.
This in Camuntum."
NOTES
' Xenophon, Mem. n, 3, 18.
* Perhaps it should be "thou art doing violence to thyself," vftpi^etiy
not vPptt,s.
* Or it may mean "since it is in thy power to depart ;" which gives
a meaning somewhat different.
* Pindar in the "Theaetetus" of Plato.
* Carnuntum was a town of Pannonia, on the south side of the Dan-
ube, about thirty miles east of Vindobona (Vienna). Orosius (vii, 15)
and Eutropius (viii, 13) say that Antoninus remained three years at
Carnuntum during his *rar with the Marcomanni.
BOOK III
WE ought to consider not only that our life is daily
wasting away and a smaller part of it is left, but
another thing also should be taken into account,
that if a man should live longer, it is quite un-
certain whether the understanding will still continue suffi-
cient for the comprehension of things, and retain the power
of contemplation which strives to acquire the knowledge of
the divine and the human. For if he shall begin to fall into
dotage, perspiration, and nutrition, and imagination, and
appetite, and whatever else there is of the kind, will not fail ;
but the power of making use of ourselves, and filling up the
measure of our duty, and clearly separating all appearances,
and considering whether a man should now depart from life,
and whatever else of the kind absolutely requires a dis-
ciplined reason, all this is already extinguished. We must
make haste then, not only because we are daily nearer to
death, but also because the conception of things and the
understanding of them cease first.
We ought to observe also that even the things which
follow after the things which are produced according to
nature contain something pleasing and attractive. For in-
stance, when bread is baked some parts are split at the
surface, and these parts which thus open, and have a certain
fashion contrary to the purpose of the baker's art, are beauti-
ful in a manner, and in a peculiar way excite a desire for
eating. And again, figs, when they are quite ripe, gape
open, and in the ripe olives the very circumstance of their
being near to rottenness adds a peculiar beauty to the fruit.
And the ears of corn bending down, and the lion's eyebrows,
and the foam which flows from the mouth of wild boars, and
many other things — though they are far from being beauti-
ful, if a man should examine them severally — still, because
i6
MEDITATIONS 1 7
they are consequent upon the things which are formed by
nature, help to adorn them, and they please the mind ; so that
if a man should have a feeling and deeper insight with re-
spect to the things which are produced in the universe, there
is hardly one of those which follow by way of conse-
quence which will not seem to him to be in a manner disposed
so as to give pleasure. And so he will see even the real gap-
ing jaws of wild beasts with no less pleasure than those
which painters and sculptors show by imitation ; and in an
old woman and an old man he will be able to see a certain
maturity and comeliness; and the attractive loveliness of
young persons he will be able to look on with chaste eyes;
and many such things will present themselves, not pleasing
to every man, but to him only who has become truly familiar
with nature and her works.
Hippocrates, after curing many diseases himself, fell sick
and died. The Chaldaei foretold the deaths of many, and
then fate caught them too. Alexander, and Pompeius, and
Caius Caesar, after so often completely destroying whole
cities, and in battle cutting to pieces many ten thousands of
cavalry and infantry, themselves too at last departed from
life. Heraclitus, after so many speculations on the confla-
gration of the universe, was filled with water internally and
died smeared all over with mud. And lice destroyed De-
mocritus; and other lice killed Socrates. What means all
this? Thou hast embarked, thou hast made the voyage,
thou art come to shore ; get out. If indeed to another life,
there is no want of gods, not even there. But if to a state
without sensation, thou wilt cease to be held by pains and
pleasures, and to be a slave to the vessel, which is as much
inferior as that which serves it is superior :* for the one is
intelligence and deity ; the other is earth and corruption.
Do not waste the remainder of thy life in thoughts about
others, when thou dost not refer thy thoughts to some object
of common utility. For thou losest the opportunity of do-
ing something else when thou hast such thoughts as these,
What is such a person doing, and why, and what is he say-
ing, and what is he thinking of, and what is he contriving,
and whatever else of the kind makes us wander away from
the observation of our own ruling power. We ought then
1 8 MARCUS AURELIUS
to check in the series of our thoughts everything that is
without a purpose and useless, but most of all the over curi-
ous feeling and the malignant; and a man should use him-
self to think of those things only about which if one should
suddenly ask, What hast thou now in thy thoughts? with
perfect openness thou mightest immediately answer, This or
That ; so that from thy words it should be plain that every-
thing in thee is simple and benevolent, and such as befits a
social animal, and one that cares not for thoughts about
pleasure or sensual enjoyments at all, nor has any rivalry, or
envy and suspicion, or anything else for which thou wouldst
blush if thou shouldst say that thou hadst it in thy mind. For
the man who is such and no longer delays being among the
number of the best, is like a priest and minister of the
gods, using too the [deity] which is planted within him,
which makes the man uncontaminated by pleasure, un-
harmed by any pain, untouched by any insult, feel-
ing no wrong, a fighter in the noblest fight, one
who can not be overpowered by any passion, dyed
deep with justice, accepting with all his soul everything
which happens and is assigned to him as his portion; and
not often, nor yet without great necessity and for the general
interest, imagining what another says, or does, or thinks.
For it is only what belongs to himself that he makes the mat-
ter for his activity; and he constantly thinks of that which
is allotted to himself out of the sum total of things, and he
makes his own acts fair, and he is persuaded that his own
portion is good. For the lot which is assigned to each man
is carried along with him and carries him along with it.*
And he remembers also that every rational animal is his kins-
man, and that to care for all men is according to man's na-
ture ; and a man should hold on to the opinion not of all, but
of those only who confessedly live according to nature. But
as to those who live not so, he always bears in mind what kind
of men they are both at home and from home, both by night
and by day, and what they are, and with what men they live
an impure life. Accordingly, he does not value at all the
praise which comes from such men, since they are not even
satisfied with themselves.
Labour not unwillingly, nor without regard to the com-
MEDITATIONS 1 9
mon interest, nor without due consideration, nor with dis-
traction ; nor let studied ornament set off thy thoughts, and
be not either a man of many words, or busy about too many
things. And further, let the deity which is in thee be the
guardian of a living being, manly and of ripe age, and en-
gaged in matter political, and a Roman, and a ruler, who has
taken his post like a man waiting for the signal which sum-
mons him from life, and ready to go, having need neither
of oath nor of any man's testimony. Be cheerful also, and-
seek not external help nor the tranquillity which others give.
A man then must stand erect, not be kept erect by others.
If thou findest in human life anything better than justice,
truth, temperance, fortitude, and, in a word, anything better
than thy own mind's self-satisfaction in the things which it
enables thee to do according to right reason, and in the con-
dition that is assigned to thee without thy own choice ; if, I
say, thou seest anything better than this, turn to it with all
thy soul, and enjoy that which thou hast found to be the best.
But if nothing appears to be better than the deity which is
planted in thee, which has subjected to itself all thy appetites,
and carefully examines all the impressions, and, as Socrates
said, has detached itself from the persuasions of sense, and
has submitted itself to the gods, and cares for mankind; if
thou findest everything else smaller and of less value than
this, give place to nothing else, for if thou dost once diverge
and incline to it, thou wilt no longer without distraction be
able to give the preference to that good thing which is thy
proper possession and thy own for it is not right that any-
thing of any other kind, such as praise from the many, or
power, or enjoyment of pleasure, should come into competi-
tion with that which is rationally and politically [or, prac-
tically] good. All these things, even though they may seem
to adapt themselves [to the better things] in a small degree,
obtain the superiority all at once, and carry us away. But
do thou, I say, simply and freely choose the better, and hold
to it. — But that which is useful is the better. — Well then, if
it is useful to thee as a rational being, keep to it ; but if it is
only useful to thee as an animal, say so, and maintain thy
judgment without arrogance: only take care that thou mak-
est the inquiry by a sure method.
2d MARCUS AURELIUS
Never value anything as profitable to thyself which shall
compel thee to break thy promise, to lose thy self-respect, to
hate any man, to suspect, to curse, to act the hypocrite, to
desire anything which needs walls and curtains : for he who
has preferred to everything else his own intelligence, and
daemon, and the worship of its excellence, acts no tragic
part, does not groan, will not need either solitude or much
company ; and, what is chief of all, he will live without either
pursuing or flying from [death] ; but whether for a longer
or a shorter time he shall have the soul inclosed in the body,
he cares not at all : for even if he must depart immediately,
he will go as readily as if he were going to do anything else
which can be done with decency and order; taking care of
this only all through life, that his thoughts turn not away
from anything which belongs to an intelligent animal and a
member of a civil community.
In the mind of one who is chastened and purified thou
wilt find no corrupt matter, nor impurity, nor any sore
skinned over. Nor is his life incomplete when fate over-
takes him, as one may say of an actor who leaves the stage
before ending and finishing the play. Besides, there is in
him nothing servile, nor affected, nor too closely bound [to
other things], nor yet detached [from other things], noth-
ing worthy of blame, nothing which seeks a hiding-place.
Reverence the faculty which produces opinion. On this
faculty it entirely depends whether there shall exist in thy
ruling part any opinion inconsistent with nature and the con-
stitution of the rational animal. And this faculty promises
freedom from hasty judgment, and friendship towards men,
and obedience to the gods.
Throwing away then all things, hold to these only which
are few ; and besides bear in mind that every man lives only
this present time, which is an indivisible point, and that all
the rest of his life is either past or it is uncertain. Short
then is the time which every man lives, and small the nook of
the earth where he lives ; and short too the longest posthu-
mous fame, and even this only continued by a succession of
poor human beings, who will very soon die, and who know
not even themselves, much less him who died long ago.
To the aids which have been mentioned let this one still
MEDITATIONS 21
be added: — Make for thyself a definition or description of
the thing which is presented to thee, so as to see distinctly
what kind of a thing it is in its substance, in its nudity, in its
complete entirety, and tell thyself its proper name, and the
names of the things of which it has been compounded, and
into which it will be resolved. For nothing is so productive
of elevation of mind as to be able to examine methodically
and truly every object which is presented to thee in life, and
always to look at things so as to see at the same time what
kind of universe this is, and what kind of use everything
performs in it, and what value everything has with reference
to the whole, and what with reference to man, who is a citi-
zen of the highest city, of which all other cities are like fam-
ilies; what each thing is, and of what it is composed, and
how long it is the nature of this thing to endure which now
makes an impression on me, and what virtue I have need of
with respect to it, such as gentleness, manliness, truth, fidel-
ity, simplicity, contentment, and the rest. Wherefore, on
every occasion a man should say : this comes from god ; and
this is according to the apportionment* and spinning of the
thread of destiny, or similar coincidence and chance; and
this is from one of the same stock, and a kinsman and partner,
one who knows not however what is according to his nature.
But I know; for this reason I behave towards him, accord-
ing to the natural law of fellowship, with benevolence and
justice. At the same time however in things indifferent^ I
attempt to ascertain the value of each.
If thou workest at that which is before thee, following
right reason seriously, vigorously, calmly, without allowing
anything else to distract thee, but keeping thy divine part
pure, as if thou shouldst be bound to give it back immedi-
ately; if thou boldest to this, expecting nothing, fearing
nothing, but satisfied with thy present activity according to
nature, and with heroic truth in every word and sound which
thou utterest, thou wilt live happy. And there is no man
who is able to prevent this.
As physicians have always their instruments and knives
ready for cases which suddenly require their skill, so do thou
have principles ready for the understanding of things divine
and human, and for doing everything, even the smallest, with
22 MARCUS AURELIUS
a recollection of the bond which unites the divine and human
to one another. For neither wilt thou do anything well
which pertains to man without at the same time having a ref-
erence to things divine ; nor the contrary.
No longer wander at hazard; for neither wilt thou read
thy own memoirs,^ nor the acts of the ancient Romans and
Hellenes, and the selections from books which thou wast re-
serving for thy old age.^ Hasten then to the end which
thou hast before thee, and, throwing away idle hopes, come
to thy own aid, if thou carest at all for thyself, while it is in
thy power.
They know not how many things are signified by the
words stealing, sowing, buying, keeping quiet, seeing what
ought to be done ; for this is not effected by the eyes, but by
another kind of vision.
Body, soul, intelligence: to the body belongs sensations,
to the soul appetites, to the intelligence principles. To re-
ceive the impressions of forms by means of appearances be-
longs even to animals; to be pulled by the strings of desire
belongs both to wild beasts and to men who have made
themselves into women, and to a Phalaris and a Nero : and to
have the intelligence that guides to the things which appear
suitable belongs also to those who do not believe in the gods,
and who betray their country, and do their impure deeds
when they have shut the doors. If then everything else is
common to all that I have mentioned, there remains that
which is peculiar to the good man, to be pleased and content
with what happens, and with the thread which is spun for
him; and not to defile the divinity which is planted in his
breast, nor disturb it by a crowd of images, but to preserve it
tranquil, following it obediently as a god, neither saying any-
thing contrary to the truth, nor doing anything contrary to
justice. And if all men refuse to believe that he lives a sim-
ple, modest, and contented life, he is neither angry with any
of them, nor does he deviate from the way which leads to the
end of life, to which a man ought to come pure, tranquil,
ready to depart, and without any compulsion, perfectly re-
conciled to his lot.
MEDITATIONS 23
NOTES
* "Est et horum quae media appellamus grande discrimen." — Seneca
Ep. 82.
^'Titofivrjfiara: or memoranda, notes and the like.
'Compare Pronto, 11, 9; a letter of Marcus to Fronto, who was then
consul : "Feci tamen mihi per hos dies excerpta ex libris sexaginta in
quinque tomis." But he says some of them were small books.
«7
BOOK IV
THAT which rules within, when it is according to na-
ture, is so affected with respect to the events which
happen, that it always easily adapts itself to that
which is possible and is presented to it. For it re-
quires no definite material, but it moves toward its purpose,
under certain conditions however; and it rpakes a material
for itself out of that which opposes it, as fire lays hold of
what falls into it, by which a small light would have been
extinguished : but when the fire is strong, it soon appropri-
ates to itself the matter which is heaped upon it, and con-
sumes it, and rises higher by means of this very material.
Let no act be done without a purpose, nor otherwise than
according to the perfect principles of art.
Men seek retreats for themselves, houses in the country,
sea-shores, and mountains; and thou too art wont to desire
such things very much. But this is altogether a mark of the
most common sort of men, for it is in thy power, whenever
thou shalt choose, to retire into thyself. For nowhere either
with more quiet or more freedom from trouble does a man
retire than into his own soul, particularly when he has within
him such thoughts that by looking into them he is immedi-
ately in perfect tranquillity ; and I affirm that tranquillity is
nothing else than the good ordering of the mind. Con-
stantly then give to thyself this retreat, and renew thyself;
and let thy principles be brief and fundamental, which, as
soon as thou shalt recur to them, will be sufficient to cleanse
the soul completely, and to send thee back free from all dis-
content with the things to which thou returnest. For with
what art thou discontented? With the badness of men?
Recall to thy mind this conclusion, that rational animals exist
for one another, and that to endure is a part of justice, and
that men do wrong involuntarily; and consider how many
34
MEDITATIONS 25
already, after mutual enmity, suspicion, hatred, and fighting,
have been stretched dead, reduced to ashes ; and be quiet at
last. — But perhaps thou art dissatisfied with that which is
assigned to thee out of the universe. — Recall to thy recol-
lection this alternative; either there is providence or atoms
[fortuitous concurrence of things] ; or remember the argu-
ments by which it has been proved that the world is a kind of
political community [and be quiet at last]. — But perhaps
corporeal things will still fasten upon thee. — Consider then
further that the mind mingles not with the breath, whether
moving gently or violently, when it has once drawn itself
apart and discovered its own power, and think also of all
that thou hast heard and assented to about pain and pleasure
.[and be quiet at last]. — But perhaps the desire of the
thing called fame will torment thee. — See how soon every-
thing is forgotten, and look at the chaos of infinite time on
each side of [the present], and the emptiness of applause,
and the changeableness and want of judgment in those who
pretend to give praise, and the narrowness of the space
within which it is circumscribed [and be quiet at last] . For
the whole earth is a point, and how small a nook in it is this
thy dwelling, and how few are there in it, and what kind of
people are they who will praise thee.
This then remains: Remember to retire into this little
territory of thy own,* and above all do not distract or strain
thyself, but be free, and look at things as a man, as a human
being, as a citizen, as a mortal. But among the things read-
iest to thy hand to which thou shalt turn, let there be these,
which are two. One is that things do not touch the soul,
for they are external and remain immovable; but our per-
turbations come only from the opinion which is within.
The other is that all these things, which thou seest, change
immediately and will no longer be; and constantly bear in
mind how many of these changes thou hast already wit-
nessed. The universe is transformation : life is opinion.
If our intellectual part is common, the reason also, in re-
spect of which we are rational beings, is common : if this is
so, common also is the reason which commands us what to
do, and what not to do ; if this is so, there is a common law
also ; if this is so, we are fellow-citizens ; if this is so, we
26 MARCUB AURELIUS
are members of some political community; if this is so, tlie
world is in a manner a state.^ For of what other common
political community will any one say that the whole human
race are members? And from thence, from this common
political community comes also our very intellectual faculty
and reasoning faculty, and our capacity for law ; or whence
do they come ? For as my earthly part is a portion given to
me from certain earth, and that which is watery from an-
other element, and that which is hot and fiery from some
peculiar source ( for nothing comes out of that which is noth-
ing, as nothing also returns to non-existence), so also the
intellectual part comes from some source.
Death is such as generation is, a mystery of nature; a
composition out of the same elements, and a decomposition
into the same ; and altogether not a thing of which any man
should be ashamed, for it is not contrary to [the nature of]
a reasonable animal, and not contrary to the reason of our
constitution.
It is natural that these things should be done by such
persons, it is a matter of necessity; and if a man will not
have it so, he will not allow the fig-tree to have juice. But
by all means bear this in mind, that within a very short time
both thou and he will be dead ; and soon not even your names
will be left behind.
Take away thy opinion, and then there is taken away the
complaint, "I have been harmed." Take away the com-
plaint, "I have been harmed," and the harm is taken away.
That which does not make a man worse than he was,
also does not make his life worse, nor does it harm him
either from without or from within.
The nature of that which is [universally] useful has been
compelled to do this.
Consider that everything which happens, happens justly,
and if thou observest carefully, thou wilt find it to be so.
I do not say only with respect to the continuity of the series
of things, but with respect to what is just, and as if it were
done by one who assigns to each thing its value. Observe
then as thou hast begun ; and whatever thou doest, do it in
conjunction with this, the being good, and in the sense in
MEDITATIONS 2/
which a man is properly understood to be good. Keep to
this in every action.
Do not have such an opinion of things as he has who
does thee wrong, or such as he wishes thee to have, but look
at them as they are in truth.
A man should always have these two rules in readiness;
the one, to do only whatever the reason of the ruling
and legislating faculty may suggest for the use of men ; the
other, to change thy opinion, if there is any one at hand who
sets thee right and moves thee from any opinion. But this
change of opinion must proceed only from a certain per-
suasion, as of what is just or of common advantage, and the
like, not because it appears pleasant or brings reputation.
Hast thou reason? I have. — Why then dost not thou
use it? For if this does its own work, what else dost thou
wish?
Thou hast existed as a part. Thou shalt disappear in that
which produced thee ; but rather thou shalt be received back
into its seminal principle by transmutation.
Many grains of frankincense on the same altar : one falls
before, another falls after ; but it makes no difference.
Within ten days thou wilt seem a god to those to whom
thou art now a beast and an ape, if thou wilt return to thy
principles and the worship of reason.
Do not act as if thouwert going to live ten thousand years.
Death hangs over thee. While thou livest, while it is in
thy power, be good.
How much trouble he avoids who does not look to see
what his neighbour says or does or thinks, but only to what
he does himself, that it may be just and pure ; or as Agathon*
says, look not round at the depraved morals of others, but
run straight along the line without deviating from it.
He who has a vehement desire for posthumous fame does
not consider that every one of those who remember him will
himself die very soon; then again also they who have suc-
ceeded them, until the whole remembrance shall have been
extinguished as it is transmitted through men who foolishly
admire and perish. But even suppose that those who will
remember are immortal, and that the remembrance will be
immortal, what then is this to thee? And I say not what
iS MARCUS AURELIUS
is it to the dead, but what is it to the living. What is praise,
except* indeed so far as it has* a certain utiHty ? For thou
now rejectest unseasonably the gift of nature, clinging to
something else . . . *.
Everything which is in any way beautiful is beautiful in
itself, and terminates in itself, not having praise as part of
itself. Neither worse then nor better is a thing made by be-
ing praised. I affirm this also of the things which are called
beautiful by the vulgar, for example, material things and
works of art. That which is really beautiful has no need
of anything; not more than law, not more than truth, not
more than benevolence or modesty. Which of these things
is beautiful because it is praised, or spoiled by being blamed ?
Is such a thing as an emerald made worse than it was, if it
is not praised ? or gold, ivory, purple, a lyre, a little knife, a
flower, a shrub?
If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them
from eternity? — But how does the earth contain the bodies
of those who have been buried from time so remote? For
as here the mutation of these bodies after a certain con-
tinuance, whatever it may be, and their dissolution make
room for other dead bodies ; so the souls which are removed
into the air after subsisting for some time are transmuted
and diffused, and assume a fiery nature by being received
into the seminal intelligence of the universe, and in this way
make room for the fresh souls which come to dwell there.
And this is the answer which a man might give on the
hypothesis of souls continuing to exist. But we must not
only think of the number of bodies which are thus buried,
but also of the number of animals which are daily eaten by
us and the other animals. For what a number is consumed,
and thus in a manner buried in the bodies of those who feed
on them? And nevertheless this earth receives them by
reason of the changes [of these bodies] into blood, and the
transformations into the aerial or of the fiery element.
What is the investigation into the truth in this matter?
The division into that which is material and that which is
the cause of form [the formal].
Do not be whirled about, but in every movement have
respect to justice, and on the occasion of every impression
MEDITATIONS 29
maintain the faculty of comprehension [or understanding].
Everything harmonizes with me, which is harmonious to
thee, O Universe. Nothing for me is too early nor too
late, which is in due time for thee. Everything is fruit to
me which thy seasons bring, O Nature: from thee are all
things, in thee are all things, to thee all things return. The
poet says. Dear city of Cecrops ; and wilt not thou say, Dear
city of Zeus ?
Occupy thyself with few things, says the philosopher, if
thou wouldst be tranqail. — But consider if it would not be
better to say, Do what is necessary, and whatever the reason
of the animal which is naturally social requires, and as it
requires. For this brings not only the tranquillity which
comes from doing well, but also that which comes from do-
ing few things. For the greatest part of what we say and do
being unnecessary, if a man takes this away, he will have
more leisure and less uneasiness. Accordingly on every
occasion a man should ask himself. Is this one of the un-
necessary things? Now a man should take away not only
unnecessary acts, but also unnecessary thoughts, for thus
superfluous acts will not follow after.
Try how the life of the good man suits thee, the life of
him who is satisfied with his portion out of the whole, and
satisfied with his own just acts and benevolent disposition.
Hast thou seen those things? Look also at these. Do
not disturb thyself. Make thyself all simplicity. Does any
one do wrong? Is it to himself that he does the wrong.
Has anything happened to thee ? Well ; out of the universe
from the beginning everything which happens has been ap-
portioned and spun out of thee. In a word, thy life is short.
Thou must turn to profit the present by the aid of reason
and justice. Be sober in thy relaxation.
Either it is a well arranged universe* or a chaos huddled
together, but still a universe. But can a certain order sub-
sist in thee, and disorder in the All ? And this too when al!
things are so separated and diffused and sympathethic.
A black character, a womanish character, a stubborn char-
acter, bestial, childish, animal, stupid, counterfeit, scurrilous,
fraudulent, tyrannical !
If he is a stranger to the universe who does not know
3© MARCUS AURELIUS
what is in it, no less is he a stranger who does not know what
is going on in it. He is a runaway, who flies from social rea-
son ; he is blind, who shuts the eyes of the understanding ; he
is poor, who has need of another, and has not from himself
all things which are useful for life. He is an abscess on the
universe who withdraws and separates himself from the
reason of our common nature through being displeased with
the things which happen, for the same nature produces this,
and has produced thee too : he is a piece rent asunder from
the state, who tears his own soul from that of reasonable
animals.
The one is a philosopher without a tunic, and the other
without a book : here is another half naked : Bread I have
not, he says, and I abide by reason^ — And I do not get the
means of living out of my learning,* and I abide [by my
reason].
Love the art, poor as it may be, which thou hast learned,
and be content with it; and pass through the rest of life
like one who has intrusted to the gods with his whole soul
all that he has, making thyself neither the tyrant nor the
slave of any man.
Consider, for example, the times of Vespasian. Thou
wilt see all these things, people marrying, bringing up chil-
dren, sick, dying, warring, feasting, trafficking, cultivating
the ground, flattering, obstinately arrogant, suspecting, plot-
ting, wishing for some to die, grumbling about the present,
loving, heaping up treasure, desiring consulship, kingly
power. Well then that life of these people no longer exists
at all. Again, remove to the times of Trajan. Again, all
is the same. Their life too is gone. In like manner view
also the other epochs of time and of whole nations, and see
how many after great efforts soon fell and were resolved into
the elements. But chiefly thou shouldst think of those whom
thou hast thyself known distracting themselves about idle
things, neglecting to do what was in accordance with their
proper constitution, and to hold firmly to this and to be con-
tent with it. And herein it is necessary to remember that
the attention given to everything has its proper value and
proportion. For thus thou wilt not be dissatisfied, if thou
appliest thyself to smaller matters no further than is fit
MEDITATIONS 3 1
The words which were formerly famiHar are now anti-
quated : so also the names of those who were famed of old,
are now in a manner antiquated, Camillus, Caeso, Volesus,
Leonnatus, and a little afterward, also Scipio and Cato, then
Augustus, then also Hadrianus and Antoninus. For all
things soon pass away and become a mere tale, and complete
oblivion soon buries them. And I say this of those who have
shone in a wondrous way. For the rest, as soon as they have
breathed out their breath, they are gone, and no man speaks
of them. And, to conclude the matter, what is even an
eternal remembrance? A mere nothing. What then is
that about which we ought to employ our serious pains?
This one thing, thoughts just, and acts social, and words
which never lie, and a disposition which gladly accepts all
that happens, as necessary, as usual, as flowing from a prin-
ciple and source of the same kind.
Willingly give thyself up to Clotho, allowing her to spin
thy thread* into whatever things she pleases.
Everything is only for a day, both that which remembers
and that which is remembered.
Observe constantly that all things take place by change,
and accustom thyself to consider that the nature of the Uni-
verse loves nothing so much as to change the things which
are and to make new things like them. For everything that
exists is in a manner the seed of that which will be. But
thou art thinking only of seeds which are cast into the earth
or into a womb : but this is a very vulgar notion.
Thou wilt soon die, and thou art not yet simple, nor free
from perturbations, nor without suspicion of being hurt by
external things, nor kindly disposed towards all; nor dost
thou yet place wisdom only in acting justly.
Examine men's ruling principles, even those of the wise,
what kind of things they avoid, and what kind they pursue.
What is evil to thee does not subsist in the ruling prin-
ciple of another ; nor yet in any turning and mutation of thy
corporeal covering. Where is it then ? It is in that part of
thee in which subsists the power of forming opinions about
evils. Let this power then not form [such] opinions, and
all is well. And if that which is nearest to it, the poor body,
is cut, burnt, filled with matter and rottenness, neverthe-
32 MARCUS AURELIUS
less let the part which forms opinions about these things be
quiet, that is, let it judge that nothing is either bad or good
which can happen equally to the bad man and the good.
For that which happens equally to him who lives contrary
to nature and to him who lives according to nature, is neither
according to nature nor contrary to nature.
Constantly regard the universe as one living being, hav-
ing one substance and one soul ; and observe how all things
have reference to one perception, the perception of this one
living being ; and how all things act with one movement ; and
how all things are the co-operating causes of all things which
exist ; observe too the continuous spinning of the thread and
the contexture of the web.
Thou art a little soul bearing about a corpse, as Epictetus
used to say.
It is no evil for things to undergo change, and no good for
things to subsist in consequence of change.
Time is like a river made up of the events which happen,
and a violent stream : for as soon as a thing has been seen,
it is carried away, and another comes in its place, and this
will be carried away too.
Everything which happens is as familiar and well known
as the rose in spring and the fruit in summer; for such is
disease, and death, and calumny, and treachery, and what-
ever else delights fools or vexes them.
In the series of things those which follow are always aptly
fitted to those which have gone before; for this series is not
like a mere enumeration of disjointed things, which has
only a necessary sequence, but it is a rational connection:
and as all existing things are arranged together harmoni-
ously, so the things which come into existence exhibit no
mere succession, but a wonderful relationship.
Always remember the saying of Heraclitus, that the death
of earth is to become water, and the death of water is to
become air, and the death of air is to become fire, and re-
versely. And think too of him who forgets whither the
way leads, and that men quarrel with that with which they
are most constantly in communion, the reason which governs
the universe; and the things which they daily meet with
seem to them strange : and consider that we ought not to act
MEDITATIONS 33
and speak as if we were asleep, for even in sleep we seem to
act and speak; and that* we ought not, like children who
learn from their parents, simply to act and speak as we have
been taught.*
If any god told thee that thou shalt die to-morrow, or
certainly on the day after to-morrow, thou wouldst not care
much whether it was on the third day or on the morrow,
unless thou wast in the highest degree mean-spirited, — for
how small is the difference? — so think it no great thing to
die after as many years as thou canst name rather than to-
morrow.
Think continually how many physicians are dead after
often contracting their eyebrows over the sick; and how
many astrologers after predicting with great pretensions the
deaths of others; and how many philosophers after endless
discourses on death or immortality ; how many heroes after
killing thousands; and how many tyrants who have used
their power over men's lives with terrible insolence as if they
were immortal ; and how many cities are entirely dead, so to
speak, Helice* and Pompeii and Herclanum, and others
innumerable. Add to the reckoning all whom thou hast
known, one after another. One man after burying another
has been laid out dead, and another buries him ; and all this
in a short time. To conclude, always observe how ephem-
eral and worthless human things are, and what was yester-
day a little mucus, to-morrow will be a mummy or ashes.
Pass then through this little space of time conformably to
nature, and end thy journey in content, just as an olive falls
off when it is ripe, blessing nature who produced it, and
thanking the tree on which it grew.
Be like the promontory against which the waves contin-
ually break, but it stands firm and tames the fury of the
water around it.
Unhappy am I, because this has happened to me — Not so,
but happy am I, though this has happened to me, because I
continue free from pain, neither crushed by the present nor
fearing the future. For such a thing as this might have
happened to every man ; but every man would not have con-
tinued free from pain on such an occasion. Why then is
that rather a misfortune than this a good fortune? And
34 MARCUS AURELIUS
dost thou in all cases call that a man's misfortune, which is
not a deviation from man's nature? And does a things seem
to thee to be a deviation from man's nature, when it is not
contrary to the will of man's nature. Well, thou knowest
the will of nature. Will then this which has happened
prevent thee from being just, magnanimous, temperate, pru-
dent, secure against inconsiderate opinions and falsehood;
will it prevent thee from having modesty, freedom, and
everything else by the presence of which man's nature ob-
tains all that is its own ? Remember too on every occasion
which leads thee to vexation to apply this principle : not that
this is a misfortune, but that to bear it nobly is good fortune.
It is a vulgar, but still a useful help towards contempt of
death, to pass in review those who have tenaciously stuck to
life. What more then have they gained than those who
have died early? Certainly they lie in their tombs some-
where at last, Cadicianus, Fabius, Julianus, Lepidus, or any
one else like them, who have carried out many to be buried,
and then were carried out themselves. Altogether the in-
terval is small [between birth and death] ; and consider with
how much trouble, and in company with what sort of people
and in what a feeble body this interval is laboriously passed.
Do not then consider life a thing of any value.* For look
to the immensity of time behind thee, and to the time which
is before thee, another boundless space. In this infinity then
what is the difference between him who lives three days and
him who lives three generations?''
Always run to the short way; and the short way is the
natural: accordingly say and do everything in conformity
with the soundest reason. For such a purpose frees a man
from trouble,* and warfare, and all artifice and ostentatious
display.
NOTES
* Tecum habita, noris quam sit tibi curta supellex. — Persius, iv, 52.
* Compare Cicero, De Legibus, i. 7.
•Antoninus here uses the word Kodjuo? both in the sense of the Uni-
verse and of Order ; and it is difficult to express his meaning.
* Ovid, Met. xv, 293 :
Si quaeras Helicen et Burin Achaidas urbes,
Invenies sub aquis.
* An allusion to Homer's Nestor who was living at the war of Troy
among the third generation, like old Parr with his hundred and fifty-
MEDITATIONS 35
two years, and some others in modem times who have beaten Parr by
twenty or thirty years, if it is true; and yet they died at last. The
word is Tpiyeptfviov in Antoninus. Nestor is named rptyapcov by some
writers ; but here perhaps there is an allusion to Homer's rspr/vtoi iic-
icora NidToop.
' BOOK V
IN the morning when thou risest unwilHngly, let this
thought be present — I am rising to the work of a human
being. Why then am I dissatisfied if I am going to do
the things for which I exist and for which I was
brought into the world? Or have I been made for this, to
lie in the bedclothes and keep myself warm? — But this is
more pleasant — Dost thou exist then to take thy pleasure,
and not at all for action or exertion ? Dost thou not see the
little plants, the little birds, the ants, the spiders, the bees
working together to put in order their several parts of the
universe? And art thou unwilling to do the work of a
human being, and dost thou not make haste to do that which
is according to thy nature ? — But it is necessary to take rest
also — It is necessary: however nature has fixed bounds to
this too : she has fixed bounds both to eating and drinking,
and yet thou goest beyond these bounds, beyond what is
sufficient ; yet in thy acts it is not so, but thou stoppest short
of what thou canst do. So thou lovest not thyself, for if
thou didst, thou wouldst love thy nature and her will. But
those who love their several arts exhaust themselves in
working at them unwashed and without food ; but thou val-
uest thy own nature less than the turner values the turning
art, or the dancer the dancing art, or the lover of money val-
ues his money, or the vainglorious man his little glory. And
such men, when they have a violent affection to a thing,
choose neither to eat nor to sleep rather than to perfect the
things which they care for. But are the acts which concern
society more vile in thy eyes and less worthy of thy labour ?
How easy it is to repel and to wipe away every impression
which is troublesome or unsuitable, and immediately to be in
all tranquillity.
Judge every word and deed which are according to na-
96
MEDITATIONS 37
ture to be fit for thee; and be not diverted by the blame
which follows from any people nor by their words, but if a
thing is good to be done or said, do not consider it unworthy
of thee. For those persons have their peculiar leading prin-
ciple and follow their peculiar movement; which things do
not thou regard, but go straight on, following thy own na-
ture and the common nature ; and the way of both is one.
I go through the things which happen according to nature
until I shall fall and rest, breathing out my breath into that
element out of which I daily draw it in, and falling upon
that earth out of which my father collected the seed, and
my mother the blood, and my nurse the milk ; out of which
during so many years I have been supplied with food and
drink: which bears me when I tread on it and abuse it for
so many purposes.
Thou sayest. Men can admire the sharpness of thy wits —
Be it so: but there are many other things of which thou
canst not say, I am not formed for them by nature. Show
those qualities then which are altogether in thy power : sin-
cerity, gravity, endurance of labour, aversion to pleasure,
contentment with thy portion and with few things, benevo-
lence, frankness, no love of superfluity, freedom from tri-
fling, magnanimity. Dost thou not see how many qualities
thou art immediately able to exhibit, in which there is no
excuse of natural incapacity and unfitness, and yet thou still
remainest voluntarily below the mark? or art thou com-
pelled through being defectively furnished by nature to mur-
mur, and to be stingy, and to flatter, and to find fault with
thy poor body, and to try to please men, and to make great
display, and to be so restless in thy mind ? No by the gods :
but thou mightest have been delivered from these things long
ago. Only if in truth thou canst be charged with being
rather slow and dull of comprehension, thou must exert thy-
self about this also, not neglecting it nor yet taking pleasure
in thy dulness.
One man, when he has done a service to another, is ready
to set it down to his account as a favour conferred. Another
is not ready to do this, but still in his own mind he thinks
of the man as his debtor, and he knows what he has done.
A third in a manner does not even know what he has done,
$8 MARCUS AURELIUS
but he is like a vine which has produced grapes, and seeks
for nothing more after it has once produced its proper fruit.
As a horse when he has run, a dog when he has tracked the
game, a bee when it has made the honey, so a man when he
has done a good act, does not call out for others to come and
see, but he goes on to another act, as a vine goes on to pro-
duce again the grapes in season — Must a man then be one
of these, who in a manner act thus without observing it? —
Yes — But this very thing is necessary, the observation of
what a man is doing : for, it may be said, it is characteristic
of the social animal to perceive that he is working in a social
manner, and indeed to wish that his social partner also
should perceive it — It is true what thou sayest, but thou dost
not rightly understand what is now said : and for this reason
thou wilt become one of those of whom I spoke before, for
even they are misled by a certain show of reason. But if
thou wilt choose to understand the meaning of what is said,
do not fear that for this reason thou wilt omit any social act.
A prayer of the Athenians: "Rain, rain, O dear Zeus,
down on the ploughed fields of the Athenians and on the
plains." In truth we ought not to pray at all, or we ought to
pray in this simple and noble fashion.
Just as we must understand when it is said, That ^scu-
lapius prescribed to this man horse-exercise, or bathing in
cold water or going without shoes; so we must understand
it when it is said. That the nature of the universe prescribed
to this man disease or mutilation or loss or anything else of
the kind. For in the first case Prescribed means something
like this : he prescribed this for this man as a thing adapted
to procure health; and in the second case it means. That
which happens^ to [or, suits] every man is fixed in a manner
for him suitably to his destiny. For this is what we mean
when we say that things are suitable to us, as the workmen
say of squared stones in walls .or the pyramids, that they are
suitable, when they fit them to one another in some kind of
connection. For there is altogether one fitness [harmony].
And as the universe is made up out of all bodies to be such a
body as it is, so out of all existing causes necessity [destiny]
is made up to be such a cause as it is. And even those who
are completely ignorant understand what I mean, for they
MEDITATIONS 39
say, It [necessity, destiny] brought this to such a person. —
This then was brought and this was prescribed to him. Let
us then receive these things, as well as those which ^scu-
lapius prescribes. Many as a matter of course even among
his prescriptions are disagreeable, but we accept them in the
hope of health. Let the perfecting and accomplishment of
the things, which the common nature judges to be good, be
judged by thee to be of the same kind as thy health. And so
accept everything which happens, even if it seem disagree-
able, because it leads to this, to the health of the universe and
to the prosperity and felicity of Zeus [the universe]. For
he would not have brought on any man what he has brought,
if it were not useful for the whole. Neither does the nature
of anything, whatever it may be, cause anything which is
not suitable to that which is directed by it. For two reasons
then it is right to be content with that which happens to
thee ; the one, because it was done for thee and prescribed for
thee, and in a manner had reference to thee, originally from
the most ancient causes spun with thy destiny ; and the other,
because even that which comes severally to every man is to
the power which administers the universe a cause of felicity
and perfection, nay even of its very continuance. For the
integrity of the whole is mutilated, if thou cuttest ofif any-
thing whatever from the conjunction and the continuity
either of the parts or of the causes. And thou dost cut off,
as far as it is in thy power, when thou art dissatisfied, and in
a manner triest to put anything out of the way.
Be not disgusted, nor discouraged, nor dissatisfied, if thou
dost not succeed in doing everything according to right prin-
ciples but when thou hast failed, return back again, and be
content if the greater part of what thou doest is consistent
with man's nature, and love this to which thou retumest ; and
do not return to philosophy as if she were a master, but act like
those who have sore eyes and apply a bit of sponge and egg,
or as another applies a plaster, or drenching with water.
For thus thou wilt not fail to* obey reason, and thou wilt
repose in it. And remember that philosophy requires only
the things which thy nature requires ; but thou wouldst have
something else which is not according to nature — It may
be objected, Why what is more agreeable than this [which I
40 MARCUS AURELIUS
am doing] ? — But is not this the very reason why pleasure
deceives us? And consider if magnanimity, freedom, sim-
plicity, equanimity, piety, are not more agreeable. For
what is more agreeable than wisdom itself, when thou think-
est of the security and the happy course of all things which
depend on the faculty of understanding and knowledge?
Things are in such a kind of envelopment that they have
seemed to philosophers, not a few nor those common philos-
ophers, altogether unintelligible; nay even to the Stoics
themselves they seem difficult to understand. And all our
assent is changeable; for where is the man who never
changes? Carry thy thoughts then to the objects them-
selves, and consider how short-lived they are and worthless,
and that they may be in the possession of a filthy wretch or a
whore or a robber. Then turn to the morals of those who
live with thee, and it is hardly possible to endure even the
most agreeable of them, to say nothing of a man being
hardly able to endure himself. In such darkness then and
dirt and in so constant a flux both of substance and of time,
and of motion and of things moved, what there is worth be-
ing highly prized or even an object of serious pursuit, I can
not imagine. But on the contrary it is a man's duty to com-
fort himself, and to wait for the natural dissolution and not
to be vexed at the delay, but to rest in these principles only :
the one, that nothing will happen to me which is not con-
formable to the nature of the universe; and the other, that
it is in my power never to act contrary to my god and dae-
mon : for there is no man who will compel me to this.
About what am I now employing my own soul? On
every occasion I must ask myself this question, and inquire,
what have I now in this part of me which they call the ruling
principle ? and whose soul have I now ? that of a child, or of
a young man, or of a feeble woman, or of a tyrant, or of a
domestic animal, or of a wild beast?
What kind of things those are which appear good to the
many we may learn even from this. For if any man should
conceive certain things as being really good, such as pru-
dence, temperance, justice, fortitude, he would not after
having first conceived these endure to listen to anything*
which should not be in harmony with what is really good.*
MEDITATIONS 4 1
But if a man has first conceived as good the things which
appear to the many to be good, he will listen and readily re-
ceive as very applicable that which was said by the comic
writer.* Thus even the many perceive the difference.* For
were it not so, this saying would not offend and would not be
rejected [in the first case], while we receive it when it is said
of wealth, and of the means which further luxury and fame,
as said fitly and wittily. Go on then and ask if we should
value and think those things to be good, to which after their
first conception in the mind the words of the comic writer
might be aptly applied — that he who has them, through pure
abundance has not a place to ease himself in.
I am composed of the formal and the material ; and neither
of them will perish into non-existence, as neither of them
came into existence out of non-existence. Every part of me
then will be reduced by change into some part of the uni-
verse, and that again will change into another part of the
universe, and so on forever. And by consequence of such a
change I too exist, and those who begot me, and so on for
ever in the other direction. For nothing hinders us from
saying so, even if the universe is administered according to
definite periods [of revolution].
Reason and the reasoning art [philosophy] are powers
which are sufficient for themselves and for their own works.
They move then from a first principle which is their own,
and they make their way to the end which is proposed to
them ; and this is the reason why such acts are named Cator-
thoseis or right acts, which word signifies that they proceed
by the right road.
None of these things ought to be called a man's, which
do not belong to a man, as man. They are not required of a
man, nor does man's nature promise them, nor are they the
means of man's nature attaining its end. Neither then does
the end of man lie in these things, nor yet that which aids to
the accomplishment of this end, and that which aids towards
this end is that which is good. Besides, if any of these
things did belong to man, it would not be right for a man to
despise them and to set himself against them ; nor would a
man be worthy of praise who showed that he did not want
these things, nor would he who stinted himself in any of
42 MARCUS AURELIUS
them be good, if indeed these things were good. But now
the more of these things a man deprives himself of, or of
other things like them, or even when he is deprived of any
of them, the more patiently he endures the loss, just in the
same degree he is a better man.
Such as are thy habitual thoughts, such also will be the
character of thy mind ; for the soul is dyed by the thoughts.
Dye it then with a continuous series of such thoughts as
these: for instance, that where a man can live, there he
can also live well. But he must live in a palace ; — well then,
he can also live well in a palace. And again, consider that
for whatever purpose each thing has been constituted, for
this it has been constituted, and towards this it is carried;
and its end is in that towards which it is carried ; and where
the end is, there also is the advantage and the good of each
thing. Now the good for the reasonable animal is society ;
for that we are made for society has been shown above. Is
it not plain that the inferior exist for the sake of the supe-
rior? but the things which have life are superior to those
which have not life, and of those which have life the supe-
rior are those which have reason.
To seek what is impossible is madness : and it is impossi-
ble that the bad should not do something of this kind.
Nothing happens to any man which he is not formed by
nature to bear. The same things happen to another, and
either because he does not see that they have happened or be-
cause he would show a great spirit, he is firm and remains
unharmed. It is a shame then that ignorance and conceit
should be stronger than wisdom.
Things themselves touch not the soul, not in the least
degree; nor have they admission to the soul, nor can they
turn or move the soul : but the soul turns and moves itself
alone, and whatever judgments it may think proper to make,
such it makes for itself the things which present themselves
to it.
In one respect man is the nearest thing to me, so far
as I must do good to men and endure them. But so far as
some men make themselves obstacles to my proper acts, man
becomes to me one of the things which are indifferent, no
less than the sun or wind or a wild beasL Now it is true
MEDITATIONS 43
that these may impede my action, but they are no impedi-
ments to my affects and disposition, which have the power
of acting conditionally and changing : for the mind converts
and changes every hindrance to its activity into an aid ; and
so that which is a hindrance is made a furtherance to an act ;
and that which is an obstacle on the road helps us on this
road.
Reverence that which is best in the universe; and this is
that which makes use of all things and directs all things.
And in like manner also reverence that which is best in thy-
self; and this is of the same kind as that. For in thyself
also, that which makes use of everything else, is this, and
thy life is directed by this.
That which does no harm to the state, does no harm to
the citizen. In the case of every appearance of harm apply
this rule: if the state is not harmed by this, neither am I
harmed. But if the state is harmed, thou must not be angry
with him who does harm to the state. Show him where his
error is.
Often think of the rapidity with which things pass by and
disappear, both the things which are and the things which
are produced. For substance is like a river in a continual
flow, and the activities of things are in constant change, and
the causes work in infinite varieties ; and there is hardly any-
thing which stands still. And consider this which is near
to thee, this boundless abyss of the past and of the future
in which all things disappear. How then is he not a fool
who is puffed up with such things or plagued about them and
makes himself miserable? for they vex him only for a time,
and a short time.
Think of the universal substance, of which thou hast a
very small portion ; and of universal time, of which a short
and indivisible interval has been assigned to thee; and of
that which is fixed by destiny, and how small a part of it
thou art.
Does another do me wrong ? Let him look to it. He has
his own disposition, his own activity. I now have what the
universal nature wills me to have ; and I do what my nature
now wills me to do.
Let the part of thy soul which leads and governs be un-
44 MARCUS AURELIUS
disturbed by the movements in the flesh, whether of pleas-
ure or of pain ; and let it not unite with them, but let it cir-
cumscribe itself and limit those affects to their parts. But
when these affects rise up to the mind by virtue of that other
sympathy that naturally exists in a body which is all one,
then thou must not strive to resist the sensation, for it is
natural : but let not the ruling part of itself add to the sen-
sation the opinion that it is either good or bad.
Live with the gods. And he does live with the gods who
constantly shows to them that his own soul is satisfied with
that which is assigned to him, and that it does all that the
daemon wishes, which Zeus hath given to every man for
his guardian and guide, a portion of himself. And this is
every man's understanding and reason.
Art thou angry with him whose arm-pits stink? art thou
angry with him whose mouth smells foul ? What good will
this anger do thee ? He has such a mouth, he has such arm-
pits : it is necessary that such an emanation must come from
such things — but the man has reason, it will be said, and he
is able, if he takes pains, to discover wherein he offends — I
wish thee well of thy discovery. Well then, and thou hast
reason : by thy rational faculty stir up his rational faculty ;
show him his error, admonish him. For if he listens, thou
wilt cure him, and there is no need of anger.
^_ As thou intendest to live when thou art gone out .... so
it is in thy power to live here. But if men do not permit
thee, then get away out of life, yet so as if thou wert suffer-
ing no harm. The house is smoky, and I quit it. Why
dost thou think that this is any trouble? But so long as
nothing of the kind drives me out, I remain, am free, and
no man shall hinder me from doing what I choose; and I
choose to do what is according to the nature of the rational
and social animal.
The intelligence of the universe is social. Accordingly
it has made the inferior things for the sake of the superior,
and it has fitted the superior to one another. Thou seest
how it has subordinated, co-ordinated and assigned to every-
thing its proper portion, and has brought together into con-
cord with one another the things which are the best.
How hast thou behaved hitherto to the gods, thy parents,
MEDITATIONS 45
brethren, children, teachers, to those who looked after thy in-
fancy, to thy friends, kinsfolk, to thy slaves? Consider if
thou hast hitherto behaved to all in such a way that this may
be said of thee:
"Never has wronged a man in deed or word."
And call to recollection both how many things thou hast
passed through, and how many things thou hast been able to
endure : and that the history of thy life is now complete and
thy service is ended : and how many beautiful things thou
hast seen : and how many pleasures and pains thou hast de-
spised; and how many things called honourable thou hast
spumed ; and to how many ill-minded folks thou hast shown
a kind disposition.
Why do unskilled and ignorant souls disturb him who
has skill and knowledge? What soul then has skill and
knowledge? That which knows beginning and end, and
knows the reason which pervades all substance and through
all time by fixed periods [revolutions] administers the uni-
verse.
Soon, very soon, thou wilt be ashes, or a skeleton, and
either a name or not even a name; but name is sound and
echo. And the things which are much valued in life are
empty and rotten and trifling, and [like] little dogs biting
one another, and little children quarrelling, laughing, and
then straightway weeping. But fidelity and modesty and
justice and truth are fled
"Up to Olympus from the wide-spread earth.**
What then is there which still detains thee here? if the ob-
jects of sense are easily changed and never stand still, and
the organs of perception are dull and easily receive false im-
pressions; and the poor soul itself is an exhalation from
blood. But to have good repute amidst such a world as this
is an empty thing. Why then dost thou not wait in tran-
quillity for thy end, whether it is extinction or removal to
another state? And until that time comes, what is suffi-
cient? Why, what else than to venerate the gods and bless
them, and to do good to men, and to practise tolerance and
46 MARCUS AURELIUS
self-restraint f but as to everything which is beyond the lim-
its of the poor flesh and breath, to remember that this is
neither thine nor in thy power.
Thou canst pass thy life in an equable flow of happiness,
if thou canst go by the right way, and think and act in the
right way. These two things are common both to the soul
of god and to the soul of man, and to the soul of every
rational being, not to be hindered by another; and to hold
good to consist in the disposition to justice and the practice
of it, and in this to let thy desire find its termination.
If this is neither my own badness, nor an effect of my
own badness, and the common weal is not injured, why am I
troubled about it? and what is the harm to the common
weal?
Do not be carried along inconsiderately by the appear-
ance of things, but give help [to all] according to thy ability
and their fitness; and if they should have sustained loss in
matters which are indifferent, do not imagine this to be a
damage. For it is a bad habit. But as the old man, when
he went away, asked back his foster-child's top, remembering
that it was a top, so do thou in this case also.
When thou art calling out on the Rostra, hast thou for-
gotten, man, what these things are? — Yes; but they are
objects of great concern to these people — wilt thou too then
be made a fool for these things? — I was once a fortunate man,
but I lost it, I know not how. — But fortunate means that a
man has assigned to himself a good fortune : and a good for-
tune is good disposition of the soul, good emotions, good
actions.^
NOTES
* In this section there is a^play on the meaning of 6vfiftaivBiv.
*This is the Stoic precept avexov Kai ditexov. The first part teaches
us to be content with men and things as they are. The second part
teaches us the virtue of self-restraint, or the government of our pas-
sions.
•This section is unintelligible. Many of the words may be corrupt,
and the general purport of the section can not be discovered. Perhaps
several things have been improperly joined in one section. I have
translated it nearly literally. Different translators give the section a
different turn, and the critics have tried to mend what they can not
vmderstand.
BOOK VI
THE substance of the universe is obedient and com-
pliant ; and the reason which governs it has in itself
no cause for doing evil, for it has no malice, nor
does it do evil to anything, nor is anything harmed
by it. But all things are made and perfected according to
this reason.
Let it make no difference to thee whether thou art cold
or warm, if thou art doing thy duty; and whether thou art
drowsy or satisfied with sleep; and whether ill-spoken of or
praised; and whether dying or doing something else. For
it is one of the acts of life, this act by which we die: it is
sufficient then in this act also to do well what we have in
hand.
Look within. Let neither the peculiar quality of anything
nor its value escape thee.
All existing things soon change, and they will either be
reduced to vapour, if indeed all substance is one, or they will
be dispersed.
The reason which governs knows what its own disposi-
tion is, and what it does, and on what material it works.
The best way of avenging thyself is not to become like
[the wrong doer] .
Take pleasure in one thing and rest in it, in passing from
one social act to another social act, thinking of God.
The ruling principle is that which rouses and turns itself,
and while it makes itself such as it is and such as it wills j:o
be, it also malces everything which happens appear to itself
to be such as it wills.
In conformity to the nature of the universe every single
thing is accomplished, for certainly it is not in conformity
to any other nature that each thing is accomplished, either a
nature which externally comprehends this, or a nature which
47
48 MARCUS AURELIUS
is comprehended within this nature, or a nature external and
independent of this.
The universe is either a confusion, and a mutual involution
of things, and a dispersion; or it is unity, and order, and
providence. If then it is the former, why do I desire to tarry
in a fortuitous combination of things and such a disorder?
and why do I care about anything else than how I shall at
last become earth ? and why am I disturbed, for the disper-
sion of my elements will happen whatever I do. But if the
other supposition is true, I venerate, and I am firm, and I
trust in him who governs.
When thou hast been compelled by circumstances to be
disturbed in a manner, quickly return to thyself and do not
continue out of tune longer than the compulsion lasts; for
thou wilt have more mastery over the harmony by contin-
ually recurring to it.
If thou hadst a step-mother and a mother at the same
time, thou wouldst be dutiful to thy step-mother, but still
thou wouldst constantly return to thy mother. Let the court
and philosophy now be to thee step-mother and mother : re-
turn to philosophy frequently and repose in her, through
whom what thou meetest with in the court appears to thee
tolerable, and thou appearest tolerable in the court.
When we have meat before us and such eatables, we re-
ceive the impression, that this is the dead body of a fish, and
this is the dead body of a bird or of a pig; and again, that
this Falernian is only a little grape juice, and this purple robe
some sheep's wool dyed with the blood of a shell-fish : such
then are these impressions, and they reach the things them-
selves and penetrate them, and so we see what kind of things
they are. Just in the same way ought we to act all through
life, and where there are things which appear most worthy
of our approbation, we ought to lay them bare and look at
their worthlessness and strip them of all the words by which
they are exalted. For outward show is a wonderful per-
verter of the reason, and when thou art most sure that thou
art employed about things worth thy pains, it is then that it
cheats thee most. Consider then what Crates says of Xeno-
crates himself.
Most of the things which the multitude admire are re-
MEDITATIONS 49
f erred to objects of the most general kind, those which are
held together by cohesion or natural organization, such as
stones, wood, fig-trees, vines, olives. But those which are ad-
mired by men, who are a little more reasonable, are referred
to the things which are held together by a living principle, as
flocks, herds. Those which are admired by men who are
still more instructed are the things which are held together
by a rational soul, not however a universal soul, but rational
so far as it is a soul skilled in some art, or expert in some
other way, or simply rational so far as it possesses a number
of slaves. But he who values a rational soul, a soul uni-
versal and fitted for political life, regards nothing else except
this; and above all things he keeps his soul in a condition
and in an activity conformable to reason and social life, and
he co-operates to this end with those who are of the same
kind as himself.
Some things are hurrying into existence, and others are
hurrying out of it; and of that which is coming into exist-
ence part is already extinguished. Motions and changes are
continually renewing the world, just as the uninterrupted
course of time is always renewing the infinite duration of
ages. In this flowing stream then, on which there is no
abiding, what is there of the things which hurry by on which
a man would set a high price? It would be just as if a man
should fall in love with one of the sparrows which fly by, but
it has already past out of sight. Something of this kind is
the very life of every man, like the exhalation of the blood
and the respiration of the air. For such as it is to have once
drawn in the air and to have given it back, which we do every
moment, just the same is it with the whole respiratory power
which thou didst receive at thy birth yesterday and the day
before, to give it back to the element from which thovt didst
first draw it.
Neither is transpiration, as in plants, a thing to be valued,
nor respiration, as in domesticated animals and wild beasts,
nor the receiving of impressions by the appearances of things,
nor being moved by desires as puppets by strings, nor as-
sembling in herds, nor being nourished by food ; for this is
just like the act of separating and parting with the useless
part of our food. What then is worth being valued? To
5o MARCUS AURELIUS
be received with clapping of hands ? No. Neither must we
value the clapping of tongues, for the praise which comes
from the many is a clapping of tongues. Suppose then that
thou hast given up this worthless thing called fame, what
remains that is worth valuing? This in my opinion, to move
thyself and to restrain thyself in conformity to thy proper
constitution, to which end both all employments and arts
lead. For every art aims at this, that the thing which has
been made should be adapted to the work for which it has
been made; and both the vine-planter who looks after the
vine, and the horse-breaket, and he who trains the dog, seek
this end. But the education and the teaching of youth aim
at something. In this then is the value of the education and
the teaching. And if this is well, thou wilt not seek any-
thing else. Wilt thou not cease to value many other things
too? Then thou wilt be neither free, nor sufficient for thy
own happiness, nor without passion. For of necessity thou
must be envious, jealous, and suspicious of those who can
take away those things, and plot against those who have that
which is valued by thee. Of necessity a man must be alto-
gether in a state of perturbation who wants any of these
things; and besides, he must often find fault with the gods.
But to reverence and honour thy own mind will make thee
content with thyself, and in harmony with society, and in
agreement with the gods, that is, praising all that they give
and have ordered.
Above, below, all around are the movements of the
elements. But the motion of virtue is in none of these : it is
something more divine, and advancing by a way hardly ob-
served it goes happily on its road.
How strangely men act. They will not praise those who
are living at the same time and living with themselves ; but
to be themselves praised by posterity, by those whom they
have never seen or ever will see, this they set much value on.
But this is very much the same as if thou shouldst be grieved
because those who have lived before thee did not praise thee.
If a thing is difficult to be accomplished by thyself, do not
think that it is impossible for man : but if anything is possible
for man and conformable to his nature, think that this can be
attained by thyself too.
MEDITATIONS 5 1
In the gymnastic exercises suppose that a man has torn
thee with his nails, and by dashing against thy head has
inflicted a wound. Well, we neither show any signs of
vexation, nor are we offended, nor do we suspect him after-
wards as a treacherous fellow ; and yet we are on our guard
against him, not however as an enemy, nor yet with sus-
picion, but we quietly get out of his way. Something like
this let thy behaviour be in all the other parts of life ; let us
overlook many things in those who are like antagonists in
the gymnasium. For it is in our power, as I said, to get out
of the way, and to have no suspicion nor hatred.
If any man is able to convince me and show me that I do
not think or act rightly, I will gladly change ; for I seek the
truth by which no man was ever injured. But he is injured
who abides in his error and ignorance.
I do my duty : other things trouble me not ; for they are
either things without life, or things without reason, or things
that have rambled and know not the way.
As to the animals which have no reason and generally all
things and objects, do thou, since thou hast reason and they
have none, make use of them with a generous and liberal
spirit. But towards human beings, as they have reason, be-
have in a social spirit. And on all occasions call on the gods,
and do not perplex thyself about the length of time in which
thou shalt do this; for even three hours so spent are suffi-
cient.
Alexander the Macedonian and his groom by death were
brought to the same state; for either they were received
among the same seminal principles of the universe, or they
were alike dispersed among the atoms.
Consider how many things in the same indivisible time
take place in each of us, things which concern the body and
things which concern the soul : and so thou wilt not wonder
if many more things, or rather all things which come into
existence in that which is the one and all, which we call
Cosmos, exist in it at the same time.
If any man should propose to thee the question, how the
name Antoninus is written, wouldst thou with a straining
of the voice utter each letter? What then if they grow
angry, wilt thou be angry too? Wilt thou not go on with
5-2 MARCUS AURELIUS
composure and number every letter? Just so then in this
life also remember that every duty is made up of certain
parts.. These it is thy duty to observe and without being
disturbed or showing anger towards those who are angry
with thee to go on thy way and finish that which is set be-
fore thee.
How cruel it is not to allow men to strive after the things
which appear to them to be suitable to their nature and profit-
able ! And yet in a manner thou dost not allow them to do
this, when thou art vexed because they do wrong. For they
are certainly moved towards things because they suppose
them to be suitable to their nature and profitable to them —
But it is not so — Teach them then, and show them without
being angry.
Death is a cessation of the impressions through the senses,
and of the pulling of the strings which move the appetites,
and of the discursive movements of the thoughts, and of the
service to the flesh.
It is a shame for the soul to be first to give way in this
life, when thy body does not give way.
Take care that thou art not made into a Caesar, that thou
art not dyed with this dye; for such things happen. Keep
thyself then simple, good, pure, serious, free from affecta-
tion, a friend of justice, a worshipper of the gods, kind, af-
fectionate, strenuous in all proper acts. Strive to continue to
be such as philosophy wished to make thee. Reverence the
gods, and help men. Short is life. There is only one fruit
of this earthly life, a pious disposition and social acts. Do
everything as a disciple of Antoninus. Remember his con-
stancy in every act which was conformable to reason, and his
evenness in all things, and his piety, and the serenity of his
countenance, and his sweetness, and his disregard of empty
fame, and his efforts to understand things; and how he
would never let anything pass without having first most
carefully examined it and clearly understood it ; and how he
bore with those who blamed him unjustly without blaming
them in return ; how he did nothing in a hurry ; and how he
listened not to calumnies, and how exact an examiner of
manners and actions he was ; and not given to reproach peo-
ple, nor timid, nor suspicious, nor a sophist; and with how
MEDITATIONS 53
little he was satisfied, such as lodging, bed, dress, food, ser-
vants ; and how laborious and patient ; and how he was able
on account of his sparing diet to hold out to the evening, not
even requiring to relieve himself by any evacuations except
at the usual hour; and his firmness and uniformity in his
friendships ; and how he tolerated freedom of speech in those
who opposed his opinions ; and the pleasure that he had when
any man showed him anything better ; and how religious he
was without superstition. Imitate all this that thou mayest
have as good a conscience, as he had, when thy last hour
comes.
Return to thy sober senses and call thyself back; and
when thou hast roused thyself from sleep and hast perceived
that they were only dreams which troubled thee, now in thy
waking hours look at these [the things about thee] as thou
didst look at those [the dreams].
I consist of a little body and a soul. Now to this little body
all things are indifferent, for it is not able to perceive differ-
ences. But to the understanding those things only are in-
different, which are not the works of its own activity. But
whatever things are the works of its own activity, all these
are in its power. And of these however only those which
are done with reference to the present ; for as to the future
and the past activities of the mind, even these are for the
present indifferent.
Neither the labour which the hand does nor that of the
foot is contrary to nature, so long as the foot does the foot's
work and the hand the hand's. So then neither to a man as
a man is his labour contrary to nature, so long as it does the
things of a man. But if the labour is not contrary to his
nature, neither is it an evil to him.
How many pleasures have been enjoyed by robbers,
patricides, tyrants.
Dost thou not see how the handicraftsmen accommodate
themselves up to a certain point to those who are not skilled
in their craft, — nevertheless they cling to the reason [the
principles] of their art and do not endure to depart from it ?
Is it not strange if the architect and the physician shall have
more respect to the reason [the principles] of their own arts
54 MARCUS AURELIUS
than man to his own reason, which is common to him and
the gods ?
Asia, Europe are corners of the universe : all the sea a drop
in the universe ; Athos a little clod of the universe : all the
present time is a point in eternity. All things are little,
changeable, perishable. All things come from thence, from
that universal ruling power either directly proceeding or by
way of sequence. And accordingly the lion's gaping jaws,
and that which is poisonous, and every harmful thing, as a
thorn, as mud, are after-products of the grand and the beau-
tiful. Do not then imagine that they are of another kind
from that which thou dost venerate, but form a just opinion
of the source of all.
He who has seen present things has seen all, both every-
thing which has taken place from all eternity and everything
which will be for time without end ; for all things are of one
kin and of one form.
Frequently consider the connection of all things in the
universe and their relation to one another. For in a manner
all things are implicated with one another, and all in this way
are friendly to one another; for one thing comes in order
after another, and this is by virtue of the* active movement
and mutual conspiration and the unity of the substance.
Adapt thyself to the things with which thy lot has been
cast : and the men among whom thou hast received thy por-
tion, love them, and do it truly [sincerely].
Every instrument, tool, vessel, if it does that for which
it has been made, is well, and yet he who made it is not there.
But in the things which are held together by nature there is
within and there abides in them the power which made them ;
wherefore the more is it fit to reverence this power, and to
think, that, if thou dost live and act according to its will,
everything in thee is in conformity to intelligence. And
thus also in the universe the things which belong to it are in
conformity to intelligence.
Whatever of the things which are not within thy power
thou shalt suppose to be good for thee or evil, it must of
necessity be that, if such a bad thing befall thee or the loss of
such a good thing, thou wilt blame the gods, and hate men
too, those who are the cause of the misfortune or the loss, or
MEDITATIONS 55
those who are suspected of being likely to be the cause ; and
indeed we do much injustice, because we make a difference
between these things [because we do not regard these things
as indifferent*]. But if we judge only those things which
are in our power to be good or bad, there remains no reason
either for finding fault with god or standing in a hostile at-
titude to man.^
We are all working together to one end, some with knowl-
edge and design, and others without knowing what they do ;
as men also when they are asleep, of whom it is Heraclitus,
I think, who says that they are labourers and co-operators in
the things which take place in the universe. But men co-
operate after different fashions; and even those co-operate
abundantly, who find fault with what happens and those who
try to oppose it and to hinder it ; for the universe has need
even of such men as these. It remains then for thee to un-
derstand among what kind of workmen thou placest thyself ;
for he who rules all things will certainly make a right use of
thee, and he will receive thee among some part of the co-
operators and of those whose labours conduce to one end.
But be not thou such a part as the mean and ridiculous verse
in the play, which Chrysippus speaks of .^
Does the sun undertake to do -the work of the rain, or
^sculapius the work of the Fruit-bearer [the earth] ? And
how is it with respect to each of the stars, are they not differ-
ent and yet they work together to the same end ?
If the gods have determined about me and about the things
which must happen to me, they have determined well, for it is
not easy even to imagine a deity without forethought;
and as to doing me harm, why should they have any desire
towards that ? for what advantage would result to them from
this or to the whole, which is the special object of their pro-
vidence? But if they have not determined about me in-
dividually, they have certainly determined about the whole at
least, and the things which happen by way of sequence in this
general arrangement I ought to accept with pleasure and to
be content with them. But if they determine about nothing
— which it is wicked to believe, or if we do believe it, let us
neither sacrifice, nor pray, nor swear by them, nor do any-
thing else which we do as if the gods were present and
29
56 MARCUS AURELIUS
lived with us — but if however the gods determine about
none of the things which concern us, I am able to determine
about myself, and I can inquire about that which is useful :
and that is useful to every man which is conformable to his
own constitution and nature. But my nature is rational and
social ; and my city and country, so far as I am Antoninus, is
Rome, but so far as I am a man, it is the world. The things
then which are useful to these cities are alone useful to me.
Whatever happens to every man, this is for the interest
of the universal : this might be sufficient. But further thou
wilt observe this also as a general truth, if thou dost observe,
that whatever is profitable to any man is profitable also to
other men. But let the word profitable be taken here in the
common sense as said of things of the middle kind [neither
good nor bad].
As it happens to thee in the amphitheatre and such places,
that the continual sight of the same things and the uniform-
ity make the spectacle wearisome, so it is in the whole of life ;
for all things above, below, are the same and from the same.
How long then ?
Think continually that all kinds of men and of all kinds
of pursuits and of all nations are dead, so that thy thoughts
come down even to Philistion and Phoebus and Origanion.
Now turn thy thoughts to the other kinds [of men]. To
that place then we must remove, where there are so many
great orators, and so many noble philosophers, Heraclitus,
Pythagoras, Socrates; so many heroes of former days, and
so many generals after them, and tyrants; besides these,
Eudoxus, Hipparchus, Archimedes, and other men of acute
natural talents, great minds, lovers of labour, versatile, con-
fident, mockers even of the perishable and ephemeral life of
man, as Menippus and such as are like him. As to all these
consider that they have long been in the dust. What harm
then is this to them; and what to those whose names are
altogether unknown ? One thing here is worth a great deal,
to pass thy life in truth and justice, with a benevolent dispo-
sition even to liars and unjust men.
When thou wishest to delight thyself, think of the virtues
of those who live with thee ; for instance, the activity of one,
and the modesty of another, and the liberality of a third, and
MEDITATIONS 5/
some other good quality of a fourth. For nothing delights
so much as the examples of the virtues, when th^ are ex-
hibited in the morals of those who live with us and present
themselves in abundance, as far as is possible. Wherefore
we must keep them before us.
Thou art not dissatisfied, I suppose, because thou weighest
only so many litrae and not three hundred. Be not dissatis-
fied then that thou must live only so many years and not
more ; for as thou are satisfied with the amount of substance
which has been assigned to thee, so be content with the
time.
Let us try to persuade them [men], but act even against
their will, when the principles of justice lead that way. If
however any man by using force stands in thy way, betake
thyself to contentment and tranquillity, and at the same time
employ the hindrance towards the exercise of some other
virtue; and remember that thy attempt was with a reserva-
tion [conditionally], that thou didst not desire to do impossi-
bilities. What then didst thou desire? — Some such effort
as this — But thou attainest thy object, if the things to which
thou wast moved are [not] accomplished.*
He who loves fame considers another man's activity to
be his own good ; and he who loves pleasure, his own sensa-
tions ; but he who has understanding, considers his own acts
to be his own good.
It is in our power to have no opinion about a thing, and
not to be disturbed in our soul ; for things themselves have
no natural power to form our judgments.
Accustom thyself to attend carefully to what is said by
another, and as much as it is possible, be in the speaker's
mind.
That which is not good for the swarm, neither is it good
for the bee.
If sailors abused the helmsman or the sick the doctor,
would they listen to anybody else; or how could the helms-
man secure the safety of those in the ship or the doctor the
health of those whom he attends ?
How many together with whom I came into the world are
already gone out of it.
To the jaundiced honey tastes bitter, and to those bitten by
58 MARCUS AURELIUS
mad dogs water causes fear ; and to little children the ball is a
fine thing. Why then am I angry ? Dost thou think that a
false opinion has less power than the bile in the jaundiced
or the poison in him who is bitten by a mad dog ?
No man will hinder thee from living according to the rea-
son of thy own nature : nothing will happen to thee contrary
to the reason of the universal nature.
What kind of people are those whom men wish to please,
and for what objects, and by what kind of acts? How soon
will time cover all things, and how many it has covered
already.
KOTES
• Cicero, De Natura Deorum, in, 32.
• Plutarch, adversus Stoicos, c 14.
BOOK VII
WHAT is badness ? It is that which thou hast often
seen. And on the occasion of everything which
happens, keep this in mind, that it is that which
thou hast often seen. Everywhere up and down
thou wilt find the same things, with which the old histories
are filled, those of the middle ages and those of our own day ;
with which cities and houses are filled now. There is noth-
ing new : all things are both familiar and short-lived.
How can our principles become dead, unless the impres-
sions [thoughts] which correspond to them are extin-
guished? But it is in thy power continuously to fan these
thoughts into a flame. I can have that opinion about any-
thing, which I ought to have. If I can, why am I disturbed ?
The things which are external to my mind have no relation
at all to my mind. — Let this be the state of thy affects, and
thou standest erect. To recover thy life is in thy power.
Look at things again as thou didst use to look at them ; for
in this consists the recovery of thy life.
The idle business of show, plays on the stage, flocks of
sheep, herds, exercises with spears, a bone cast to little dogs,
a bit of bread into fish-ponds, labourings of ants and burden-
carrying, runnings about of frightened little mice, puppets
pulled by strings — [all alike]. It is thy duty then in the
midst of such things to show good humour and not a proud
air; to understand however that every man is worth just
so much as the things are worth about which he busies him-
self.
In discourse thou must attend to what is said, and in every
movement thou must observe what is doing. And in the
one thou shouldst see immediately to what end it refers, but
in the other watch carefully what is the thing signified.
Is my understanding sufficient for this or not? If it is
59
6o MARCUS AURELIUS
sufficient, I use it for the work as an instrument given by the
universal nature. But if it is not sufficient, then either I
retire from the work and give way to him who is able to do
it better, unless there be some reason why I ought not to do
so; or I do it as well as I can, taking to help me the man
who with the aid of my ruling principle can do what is now
fit and useful for the general good. For whatsoever either
by myself or with another I can do, ought to be directed to
this only, to that which is useful and well suited to society.
How many after being celebrated by fame have been given
up to oblivion ; and how many who have celebrated the fame
of others have long been dead.
Be not ashamed to be helped ; for it is thy business to do
thy duty like a soldier in the assault on a town. How then,
if being lame thou canst not mount up on the battlements
alone, but with the help of another it is possible?
Let not future things disturb thee, for thou wilt come
to them, if it shall be necessary, having with thee the same
reason which now thou usest for present things.
All things are implicated with one another, and the bond
is holy; and there is hardly anything unconnected with any
other thing. For things have been co-ordinated, and they
combine to form the same universe [order]. For there is
one universe made up of all things, and one god who per-
vades all things, and one substance, and one law, [one] com-
mon reason in all intelligent animals, and one truth ; if
indeed there is also one perfection for all animals which are
of the same stock and participate in the same reason.
Everything material soon disappears in the substance of
the whole; and everything formal [causal] is very soon
taken back into the universal reason; and the memory of
everything is very soon overwhelmed in time.
To the rational animal the same act is according to nature
and according to reason.
Be thou erect, or be made erect.
Just as it is with the members in those bodies which are
united in one, so it is with rational beings which exist sep-
arately, for they have been constituted for one co-operation.
And the perception of this will be more apparent to thee, if
thou often sayest to thyself that I am a member [ jue^o? ] of
MEDITATIONS 6 1
the system of rational beings. But if [using the letter r]
thou sayest that thou art a part [Mepoi] , thou dost not yet love
men from thy heart ; beneficence does not yet delight thee for
its own sake; thou still doest it barely as a thing of pro-
priety-, and not yet as doing good to thyself.
Let there fall externally what will on the parts which can
feel the effects of this fall. For those parts which have felt
will complain, if they choose. But I, unless I think that
what has happened is an evil, am not injured. And it is in
my power not to think so.
Whatever any one does or says, I must be good, just
as if the gold, or the emerald, or the purple were always say-
ing this. Whatever any one does or says, I must be emerald
and keep my colour.
The ruling faculty does not disturb itself; I mean, does
not frighten itself or cause itself pain.* But if any one else
can frighten or pain it, let him do so. For the faculty itself
will not by its own opinion turn itself into such ways. Let
the body itself take care, if it can, that it suffer nothing, and
let it speak, if it suffers. But the soul itself, that which is
subject to fear, to pain, which has completely the power of
forming an opinion about these things, will suffer nothing,
for it will never deviate* into such a judgment. The lead-
ing principle in itself wants nothing, unless it makes a want
for itself; and therefore it is both free from perturbation
and unimpeded, if it does not disturb and impede itself.
Eudaemonia [happiness] is a good daemon, or a good
thing. What then art thou doing here, O imagination? go
away, I entreat thee by the gods, as thou didst come, for I
want thee not. But thou art come according to thy old
fashion. I am not angry with thee : only go away.
Is any man afraid of change? Why what can take place
without change ? What then is more pleasing or more suit-
able to the universal nature? And canst thou take a bath
unless the wood undergoes a change ? and canst thou be nour-
ished, unless the food undergoes a change? And can any-
thing else that is useful be accomplished without change?
Dost thou not see then that for thyself also to change is just
the same, and equally necessary for the universal nature?
Through the universal substance as through a furious
62 • MARCUS AURELIUS
torrent all bodies are carried, being by their nature united
with and co-operating with the whole, as the parts of our
body with one another. How many a Chrysippus, how
many a Socrates, how many an Epictetus has time already
swallowed up ? And let the same thought occur to thee with
reference to every man and thing.
One thing only troubles me, lest I should do something
which the constitution of man does not allow, or in the way
which it does not allow, or what it does not allow now.
Near is thy forgetfulness of all things ; and near the for-
getfulness of thee by all.
It is peculiar to man to love even those who do wrong.
And this happens, if when they do wrong it occurs to thee
that they are kinsmen, and that they do wrong through
ignorance and unintentionally, and that soon both of you will
die; and above all, that the wrong-doer has done thee no
harm, for he has not made thy ruling faculty worse than it
was before.
The universal nature out of the universal substance, as
if it were wax, now moulds a horse, and when it has broken
this up, it uses the material for a tree, then for a man, then
for something else; and each of these things subsists for a
very short time. But it is no hardship for the vessel to be
broken up, just as there was none in its being fastened to-
gether.
A scowling look is altogether unnatural ; when it is often
assumed,^ the result is that all comeliness dies away, and at
last is so completely extinguished that it can not be again
lighted up at all. Try to conclude from this very fact that
it is contrary to reason. For if even the perception of doing
wrong shall depart, what reason is there for living any
longer ?
Nature which governs the whole will soon change all
things which thou seest, and out of their substance will make
other things, and again other things from the substance of
them, in order that the world may be ever new.
When a man has done thee any wrong, immediately con-
sider with what opinion about good or evil he has done
wrong. For when thou hast seen this, thou wilt pity him,
and wilt neither wonder nor be angry. For either thou thy-
MEDITATIONS 63
self thinkest the same thing to be good that he does or
another thing of the same kind. It is thy duty then to par-
don him. But if thou dost not think such things to be good
or evil, thou wilt more readily be well disposed to him who is
in error.
Think not so much of what thou hast not as of what
thou hast : but of the things which thou hast select the best,
and then reflect how eagerly they would have been sought, if
thou hadst them not. At the same time however take care
that thou dost not through being so pleased with them ac-
custom thyself to overvalue them, so as to be disturbed if
ever thou shouldst not have them.
Retire into thyself. The rational principle which rules
has this nature, that it is content with itself when it does
what is just, and so secures tranquillity.
Wipe out the imagination. Stop the pulling of the strings.
Confine thyself to the present. Understand well what hap-
pens either to thee or to another. Divide and distribute
every object into the causal [formal] and the material.
Think of thy last hour. Let the wrong which is done by a
man stay there where the wrong was done.
Direct thy attention to what is said. Let thy understand-
ing enter into the things that are doing and the things which
do them.
Adorn thyself with simplicity and modesty and with in-
difference towards the things which lie between virtue and
vice. Love mankind. Follow God. The poet says that
Law rules all — * And it is enough to remember that law
rules all.^ — *
About death: whether it is a dispersion, or a resolution
into atoms, or annihilation, it is either extinction or change.
About pain: the pain which is intolerable carries us off;
but that which lasts a long time is tolerable; and the mind
maintains its own tranquillity by retiring into itself,* and the
ruling faculty is not made worse. But the parts which are
harmed by pain, let them, if they can, give their opinion
about it.
About fame: look at the minds [of those who seek fame],
observe what they are, and what kind of things they avoid,
and what kind of things they pursue. And consider that as
30
64 MARCUS AURELIUS
the heaps of sand piled on one another hide the former sands,
so in life the events which go before are soon covered by
those which come after.
From Plato :^ the man who has an elevated mind and takes
a view of all time and of all substance, dost thou suppose it
possible for him to think that human life is anything great ?
it is not possible, he said. — Such a man then will think that
death also is no evil — Certainly not.
From Antisthenes : It is royal to do good and to be abused.
It is a base thing for the countenance to be obedient and
to regulate and compose itself as the mind commands, and for
the mind not to be regulated and composed by itself.
It is not right to vex ourselves at things.
For they care nought about it.*
To the immortal gods and us give joy.
Life must be reaped like the ripe ears of corn :
One man is born ; another dies."
If gods care not for me and for my children.
There is a reason for it.
For the good is with me, and the just.'
No joining others in their wailing, no violent emotion.
From Plato 'J But I would make this man a sufficient
answer, which is this : Thou sayest not well, if thou think-
est that a man who is good for anything at all ought to com-
pute the hazard of life or death, and should not rather look
to this only in all that he does, whether he is doing what is
just or unjust, and the works of a good or a bad man.
For thus it is, men of Athens,'^ in truth : wherever a man
has placed himself thinking it the best place for him, or has
been placed by a commander, there in my opinion he ought
to stay and to abide the hazard, taking nothing into the reck-
oning, either death or anything else, before the baseness [of
deserting his post] .
But, my good friend, reflect whether that which is noble
and good is not something different from saving and being
saved ; for* as to a man living such or such a time, at least
one who is really a man, consider if this is not a thing to be
dismissed from the thoughts :* and there must be no love of
life : but as to these matters a man must intrust them to the
deity and believe what the women say, that no man can
MEDITATIONS 65
escape his destiny, the next inquiry being how he may best
Hve the time that he has to live.*
Look round at the courses of the stars, as if thou wert
going along with them ; and constantly consider the changes
of the elements into one another; for such thoughts purge
away the filth of the earthly life.
This is a fine saying of Plato :* That he who is discours-
ing about men should look also at earthly things as if he
viewed them from some higher place; should look at them
in their assemblies, armies, agricultural labours, marriages,
treaties, births, deaths, noise of the courts of justice, desert
places, various nations of barbarians, feasts, lamentations,
markets, a mixture of all things and an orderly combination
of contraries.
Consider the past ; such great changes of political suprem-
acies. Thou mayest foresee also the things which will be.
For they will certainly be of like form, and it is not possible
that they should deviate from the order of the things which
take place now : accordingly to have contemplated human life
for forty years is the same as to have contemplated it for ten
thousand years. For what more wilt thou see ?
"That which has grown from the earth, to the earth;
But that which has sprung from heavenly seed,
Back to the heavenly realms returns.""
This is either a dissolution of the mutual involution of the
atoms, or a similar dispersion of the unsentient elements. ,
"With food and drinks and cunning masric arts
Turning the channel's course to 'scape from death.""
"The breeze which heaven has sent
We must endure, and toil without complaining."
Another may be more expert in casting his opponent ; but
he is not more social, nor more modest, nor better disciplined
to meet all that happens, nor more considerate with respect to
the faults of his neighbours.
Where any work can be done conformably to the reason
which is common to gods and men, there we have nothing to
fear: for where we are able to get profit by means of the
66 ' MARCUS AURELIUS
activity which is successful and proceeds according to our
constitution, there no harm is to be suspected.
Everywhere and at all times it is in thy power piously to
acquiesce in thy present condition, and to behave justly to
those who are about thee, and to exert thy skill upon thy
present thoughts, that nothing shall steal into them without
being well examined.
Do not look around thee to discover other men's ruling
principles, but look straight to this, to what nature leads thee,
both the universal nature through the things which happen to
thee, and thy own nature through the acts which must be
done by thee. But every being ought to do that which is ac-
cording to its constitution; and all other things have been
constituted for the sake of rational beings, just as among
irrational things the inferior for the sake of the superior, but
the rational for the sake of one another.
The prime principle then in man's constitution is the
social. And the second is not to yield to the persuasions of
the body, for it is the peculiar office of the rational and intelli-
gent motion to circumscribe itself, and never to be over-
powered either by the motion of the senses or of the appe-
tites, for both are animal ; but the intelligent motion claims
superiority and does not permit itself to be overpowered by
the others. And with good reason, for it is formed by
nature to use all of them. The third thing in the rational
constitution is freedom from error and from deception. Let
then the ruling principle holding fast to these things go
straight on, and it has what is its own.
Consider thyself to be dead, and to have completed thy
life up to the present time; and live according to nature the
remainder which is allowed thee.
Love that only which happens to thee and is spun with the
thread of thy destiny. For what is more suitable?
In everything which happens keep before thy eyes those
to whom the same things happened, and how they were
vexed, and treated them as strange things, and found fault
with them : and now where are they ? Nowhere. Why
then dost thou too choose to act in the same way? and why
dost thou not leave these agitations which are foreign to
nature, to those who cause them and those who are moved
MEDITATIONS 6/
by them? and why art thou not altogether intent upon the
right way of making use of the things which happen to thee ?
for then thou wilt use them well, and they will be a material
for thee [to work on] . Only attend to thyself, and resolve
to be a good man in every act which thou doest: and re-
member ^^
Look within. Within is the fountain of good, and it will
ever bubble up, if thou wilt ever dig.
The body ought to be compact, and to show no irregu-
larity either in motion or attitude. For what the mind
shows in the face by maintaining in it the expression of in-
telligence and propriety, that ought to be required also in the
whole body. But all these things should be observed with-
out affectation.
The art of life is more like the wrestler's art than the
dancer's, in respect of this, that it should stand ready and
firm to meet onsets which are sudden and unexpected.
Constantly observe who those are whose approbation thou
wishest to have, and what ruling principles they possess.
For then thou wilt neither blame those who offend involun-
tarily, nor wilt thou want their approbation, if thou lookest
to the sources of their opinions and appetites.
Every soul, the philosopher says, is involuntarily deprived
of truth; consequently in the same way it is deprived of jus-
tice and temperance and benevolence and everything of the
kind. It is most necessary to bear this constantly in mind,
for thus thou wilt be more gentle towards all.
In every pain let this thought be present, that there is no
dishonour in it, nor does it make the governing intelligence
worse, for it does not damage the intelligence either so far
as the intelligence is rational or so far as it is social. Indeed
in the case of most pains let this remark of Epicurus aid
thee, that pain is neither intolerable nor everlasting, if thou
bearest in mind that it has its limits, and if thou addest noth-
ing to it in imagination : and remember this too, that we do
not perceive that many things which are disagreeable to us
are the same as pain, such as excessive drowsiness, and the
being scorched by heat, and the having no appetite. When
then thou art discontented about any of these things, say to
thyself, that thou art yielding to pain.
68 MARCUS AURELIUS
Take care not to feel towards the inhuman, as they feel
towards men.
How do we know that Telauges was not superior in char-
acter to Socrates? for it is not enough that Socrates died a
more noble death, and disputed more skilfully with the
sophists, and passed the night in the cold with more endur-
ance, and that when he was bid to arrest Leon of Salamis,
he considered it more noble to refuse, and that he walked
in a swaggering way in the streets — though as to this fact
one may have great doubts if it was true. But we ought to
inquire, what kind of a soul it was that Socrates possessed,
and if he was able to be content with being just towards men
and pious towards the gods ; neither idly vexed on account of
men's villany, nor yet making himself a slave to any man's
ignorance, nor receiving as strange anything that fell to his
share out of the universal, nor enduring it as intolerable, nor
allowing his understanding to sympathize with the affects of
the miserable flesh.
Nature has not so mingled* [the intelligence] with the
composition of the body, as not to have allowed thee the
power of circumscribing thyself and of bringing under sub-
jection to thyself all that is thy own; for it is very possible
to be a divine man and to be recognized as such by no one.
Always bear this in mind ; and another thing too, that very
little indeed is necessary for living a happy life. And be-
cause thou hast despaired of becoming a dialectician and
skilled in the knowledge of nature, do not for this reason re-
nounce the hope of being both free and modest and social and
obedient to God.
It is in thy power to live free from all compulsion in the
greatest tranquillity of mind, even if all the world cry out
against thee as much as they choose, and even if wild beasts
tear in pieces the members of this kneaded matter which has
grown around thee. For what hinders the mind in the
midst of all this from maintaining itself in tranquillity, and
in a just judgment of all surrounding things, and in a ready
use of the objects which are presented to it, so that the judg-
ment may say to the thing which falls under its observation :
This thou art in substance [reality], though in men's opinion
thou mayest appear to be of a different kind ; and the use
MEDITATIONS 69
shall say to that which falls under the hand : Thou art the
thing that I was seeking ; for to rfle that which presents itself
is always a material for virtue both rational and political, and
in a word, for the exercise of art, which belongs to man or
God. For everything which happens has a relationship
either to God or to man, and is neither new nor difficult to
handle, but usual and apt matter to work on.
The perfection of moral character consists in passing every
day as the last, and in being neither violently excited nor
torpid nor playing the hypocrite.
The gods, who are immortal, are not vexed because during
so long a time they must tolerate continually men such as
they are and so many of them bad ; and besides this, they also
take care of them in all ways. But thou, who art destined to
end so soon, art thou wearied of enduring the bad, and this
too when thou art one of them?
It is a ridiculous thing for a man not to fly from his own
badness, which is indeed possible, but to fly from other men's
badness, which is impossible.
Whatever the rational and political [social] faculty finds
to be neither intelligent nor social, it properly judges to be
inferior to itself.
When thou hast done a good act and another has received
it, why dost thou still look for a third thing besides these, as
fools do, either to have the reputation of having done a good
act or to obtain a return?
No man is tired of receivingwhat is useful. But it is useful
to act according to nature. Do not then be tired of receiv-
ing what is useful by doing it to others.
The nature of the All moved to make the universe. But
now either everything that takes place comes by way of con-
sequence or [continuity] ; or even the chief things towards
which the ruling power of the universe directs its own move-
ment are governed by no rational principle. If this is re-
membered it will make thee more tranquil in many things.**
NOTES
* This is corrupt.
* The end of this section is unintelligfible.
* Plato. Pol. VI, 486.
* From the Bellerophon of Euripides.
yO MARCUS AURELIUS
"From the Hypsipyle of Euripides. Cicero (Tuscul. in, 25.) has
translated six lines from Euripides, and among them are these two
lines, —
"Reddenda terrae est terra: turn vita omnibus
Metenda ut fruges: Sic jubet necessitas."
* See Aristophanes, Acharnenses, v. 661.
' From the Apologia, c. 16.
* Plato, Gorgias, c. 68 (512). In this passage the text of Antoninus
has kareov which is perhaps right ; but there is a difficulty in the^ words
jirf yap tovto niv, to tjjv oTtodovStf xpoyov rovys (hi dXijQ&i
avSpa kareov idti, Kai ov, etc.
* It is said that tftis is not in the extant writings of Plato.
" From the Chrysippus of Euripides.
" The first two lines are from the Supplices of Euripides, v, iiio.
" This section is obscure, and the conclusion is so corrupt that it is
impossible to give any probable meaning to it. It is better to leave it as
it is than to patch it up, as some critics and translators have done.
" It is not easy to understand this section. It has been suggested that
there is some error in 7 aXoyidra. etc. Some of the translators have
made nothing of the passage, and they have somewhat perverted the
words. The first proposition is, that the universe was made by some
sufficient power. A beginning of the universe is assumed, and a power
which framed an order. The next question is. How are things produced
now; or, in other words, by what power do forms appear in continuous
succession ? The answer, according to Antoninus, may be this : It is by
virtue of the original constitution of things that all change and succes-
sion have been effected and are effected. And this is intelligible in a
sense, if we admit that the universe is always one and the same, a con-
tinuity of identity; as much one and the same as man is one and the
same, which he believes himself to be, though he also believes and can
not help believing that both in his body and in his thoughts there is
change and succession. There is no real discontinuity then in the uni-
verse; and if we say that there was an order framed in the beginning
and that the things which are now produced are a consequence of a
previous arrangement, we speak of things as we are compelled to view
them, as forming a series or succession; just as we speak of the changes
in our own bodies and the sequence of our own thoughts. But as there
are no intervals, not even intervals infinitely small, between any two
supposed states of any one thing, so there are no intervals, not even in-
finitely small, between what we call one thing and any other thing which
we speak of as immediately preceding or following it. What we call
time is an idea derived from our notion of a succession of things or
events, an idea which is a part of our constitution, but not an idea which
we can suppose to belong to an infinite intelligence and power. The
conclusion then is certain that the present and the past, the production
of present things and the supposed original order, out of which we say
that present things now come, are one : and the present productive
power and the so-called past arrangement are only different names for
one thing. I suppose then that Antoninus wrote here as people some-
times talk now, and that his real meaning is not exactly expressed by
his words. There are certainly other passages from which, I think, that
we may collect that he had notions of production something like what
I have expressed.
We now come to the alternative : "or even the chief things
MEDITATIONS 7 1
principle." I do not exactly know what he means by ra Kvptdbrara
"the chief," or, "the most excellent," or whatever it is. But as he
speaks elsewhere of inferior and superior things, and of the inferior
being for the .use of the superior, and of rational beings being the high-
est, he may here mean rational beings. He also in this alternative as-
sumes a governing power of the universe, and that it acts by directing
its power towards these chief objects, or making its special, proper,
motion towards them. And here he uses the noun {opfxrf) "movement,''
which contains the same motion as the verb {wpfXTf^e) "moved," which
he used at the beginning of the paragraph when he was speaking of
the making of the universe. If we do not accept the first hypothesis,
he says, we must take the conclusion of the second, that the "chief thing
towards which the ruling power of the universe directs its own move-
ment are governed by no rational principle." The meaning then is. if
there is a meaning in it, that though there is a governing power, which
strives to give effect to its efforts, we must conclude that there is no
rational direction of anything, if the power which first made the uni-
verse does not in some way govern it still. Besides, if we assume that
anything is now produced or now exists without the action of the su-
preme intelligence, and yet that this intelligence makes an effort to act,
we obtain a conclusion which can not be reconciled with the nature of a
supreme power, whose existence Antoninus always assumes. The tran-
quillity that a man may gain from these reflections must result from his
rejecting the second hypothesis, and accepting the first; whatever may
be the exact sense in which the emperor understood the first. Or, as he
says elsewhere, if there is no providence which governs the world, man
has at least the power of governing himself according to the constitu-
tion of his nature ; and so he may be tranquil, if he does the best that he
can.
If there is no error in the passage, it is worth the labour to discover
the writer's exact meaning; for I think that he had a meaning, though
people may not agree what it was. If I have rightly explained the em-
peror's meaning in this and other passages, he has touched the solution
of a great question.
BOOK VIII
THIS reflection also tends to the removal of the desire
of empty fame, that it is no longer in thy power to
have lived the whole of thy life, or at least thy life
from thy youth upwards, like the philosopher; but
both to many others and to thyself it is plain that thou art far
from philosophy. Thou hast fallen into disorder then, so
that it is no longer easy for thee to get the reputation of a
philosopher; and thy plan of life also opposes it. If then
thou hast truly seen where the matter lies, throw away the
thought. How thou shalt seem to others, and be content if
thou shalt live the rest of thy life in such wise as thy nature
wills. Observe then what it wills, and let nothing else dis-
tract thee ; for thou hast had experience of many wanderings
without having found happiness anywhere ; not in syllogisms
nor in wealth, nor in reputation, nor in enjoyment, nor
anywhere. Where is it then ? In doing what man's nature
requires. How then shall a man do this ? If he has prin-
ciples from which come his affects and his acts. What prin-
ciples ? Those which relate to good and bad : the belief that
there is nothing good for man, which does not make him
just, temperate, manly, free; and that there is nothing bad,
which does not do the contrary to what has been mentioned.
On the occasion of every act ask thyself. How is this with
respect to me? Shall I repent of it? A little time and I
am dead, and all is gone. What more do I seek, if what I
am now doing is the work of an intelligent living being, and
a social being, and one who is under the same law with God ?
Alexander and Caius^ and Pompeius, what are they in
comparison with Diogenes and Heraclitus and Socrates?
For they were acquainted with things, and their causes
[forms], and their matter, and the ruling principles of these
men were conformable to their pursuits. But as to the
72
MEDITATIONS 73
others, how many things had they to care for, and to how
many things were they slaves.
Consider that men will do the same things nevertheless,
even though thou shouldst burst.
This is the chief thing : Be not perturbed, for all things are
according to the nature of the universal ; and in a little time
thou wilt be nobody and nowhere, like Hadrianus and
Augustus. In the next place having fixed thy eyes steadily
on thy business look at it, and at the same time remembering
that it is thy duty to be a good man, and what man's nature
demands, do that without turning aside; and speak as it
seems to thee most just, only let it be with a good disposition
and with modesty and without hypocrisy.
The nature of the universal has this work to do, to remove
to that place the things which are in this, to change them,
to take them away hence, and to carry them there. All
things are change, yet we need not fear anything new. All
things are familiar to us; but the distribution of them still
remains the same.
Every nature is contented with itself when it goes on its
way well ; and a rational nature goes on its way well, when
in its thoughts it assents to nothing false or uncertain, and
when it directs its movements to social acts only, and
when it confines its desires and aversions to the things which
are in its power, and when it is satisfied with everything that
is assigned to it by the common nature. For of this common
nature every particular nature is a part, as the nature of the
leaf is a part of the nature of the plant; except that in the
plant the nature of the leaf is part of a nature which has not
perception or reason, and is subject to be impeded; but the
nature of man is part of a nature which is not subject to
impediments, and is intelligent and just, since it gives to
everything in equal portions and according to its worth,
times, substance, cause [form], activity and incident. But
examine, not to discover that any one thing compared with
any other single thing is equal in all respects, but by taking
all the parts together of one thing and comparing them with
all the parts together of another.
Thou hast not leisure [or ability] to read. But thou hast
leisure [or ability] to check arrogance : thou hast leisure to
74 MARCUS AURELIUS
be superior to pleasure and pain : thou hast leisure to be su-
perior to love of fame, and not to be vexed at stupid and un-
grateful people, nay even to care for them.
Let no man any longer hear thee finding fault with the
court life or with thy own.
Repentance is a kind of self-reproof for having neglected
something useful ; but that which is good must be something
useful, and the perfect good man should look after it. But
no such man would ever repent of having refused any sen-
sual pleasure. Pleasure then is neither good nor useful.
This thing, what is it in itself, in its own constitution?
What is its substance and material? And what its causal
nature [or form]? And what is it doing in the world?
And how long does it subsist ?
When thou risest from sleep with reluctance, remember
that it is according to thy constitution and according to
human nature to perform social acts, but sleeping is common
also to irrational animals. But that which is according to
each individual's nature is also more peculiarly its own, and
more suitable to its nature, and indeed also more agreeable.
Constantly and, if it be possible, on the occasion of every
impression on the soul, apply to it the principles of Physics,
of Ethics, and of Dialectics.
Whatever man thou meetest with, immediately say to thy-
self: What opinions has this man about good and bad?
For if with respect to pleasure and pain and the causes of
each, and with respect to fame and ignominy, death and
life he has such and such opinions, it will seem nothing won-
derful or strange to me, if he does such and such things ; and
I shall bear in mind that he is compelled to do so.
Remember that as it is a shame to be surprised if the fig-
tree produces figs, so it is to be surprised if the world pro-
duces such and such things of which it is productive; and
for the physician and the helmsman it is a shame to be sur-
prised, if a man has a fever, or if the wind is unfavourable.
Remember that to change thy opinion and to follow him
who corrects thy error is as consistent with freedom as it is
to persist in thy error. For it is thy own, the activity which
is exerted according to thy own movement and judgment,
and indeed according to thy own understanding too.
MEDITATIONS 75
If a thing is in thy own power, why dost thou do it ? but
if it is in the power of another, whom dost thou blame? the
atoms [chance] or the gods ? Both are fooHsh. Thou must
blame nobody. For if thou canst, correct that which is the
cause ; but if thou canst not do this, correct at least the thing
itself; but if thou canst not do even this, of what use is it
to thee to find fault? for nothing should be done without a
purpose.
That which has died falls not out of the universe. If
it stays here, it also changes here, and is dissolved into its
proper parts, which are elements of the universe and of thy-
self. And these too change, and they murmur not.
Everything exists for some end, a horse, a vine. Why
dost thou wonder? Even the sun will say, I am for some
purpose, and the rest of the gods will say the same. For
what purpose then art thou ? to enjoy pleasure ? See if com-
mon sense allows this.
Nature has had regard in everything no less to the end
than to the beginning and the continuance, just like the man
who throws up a ball. What good is it then for the ball to
be thrown up, or harm for it to come down, or even to have
fallen? and what good is it to the bubble while it holds
together, or what harm when it is burst ? The same may be
said of a light also.
Turn it [the body] inside out, and see what kind of
thing it is ; and when it has grown old, what kind of thing it
becomes ; and when it is diseased.
Short lived are both the praiser and the praised, and the
rememberer and the remembered : and all this in a nook of
this part of the world; and not even here do all agree,
no, not any one with himself; and the whole earth too is a
point.
Attend to the matter which is before thee, whether it is
an opinion or an act or a word.
Thou sufferest this justly : for thou choosest rather to be-
come good to-morrow than to be good to-day.
Am I doing anything ? I do it with reference to the good
of mankind. Does anything happen to me? I receive it
and refer it to the gods, and the source of all things, from
which all that happens is derived.
76 MARCUS AURELIUS
Such as bathing appears to thee — oil, sweat, dirt, filthy
water, all things disgusting — rso is every part of life and
everything.
Lucilla saw Verus die, and then Lucilla died. Secunda
saw Maximus die, and then Secunda died. Epitynchanus
saw Diotimus die, and then Epitynchanus died. Antoninus
saw Faustina die, and then Antoninus died. Such is every-
thing. Celer saw Hadrianus die, and then Celer died. And
those sharp-witted men, either seers or men inflated with
pride, where are they? for instance the sharpwitted men,
Charax and Demetrius the Platonist and Eudaemon, and any
one else like them. All ephemeral, dead long ago. Some
indeed have not been remembered even for a short time, and
others have become the heroes of fables, and again others
have disappeared even from fables. Remember this then,
that this little compound, thyself, must either be dissolved, or
thy poor breath must be extinguished, or be removed and
placed elsewhere.
It is a satisfaction to a man to do the proper works of a
man. Now it is a proper work of a man to be benevolent to
his own kind, to despise the movements of the senses, to form
a just judgment of plausible appearances, and to take a sur-
vey of the nature of the universe and of the things which
happen in it.
There are three relations [between thee and other things] :
the one to the body which surrounds thee ; the second to the
divine cause from which all things come to all ; and the third
to those who live with thee.
Pain is either an evil to the body — then let the body say
what it thinks of it — or to the soul; but it is in the power
of the soul to maintain its own serenity and tranquillity, and
not to think that pain is an evil. For every judgment and
movement and desire and aversion is within, and no evil
ascends so high.
Wipe out thy imaginations by often saying to thyself:
now it is in my power to let no badness be in this soul, nor
desire nor any perturbation at all ; but looking at all things
I see what is their nature, and I use each according to its
value. — Remember this power which thou hast from nature.
Speak both in the senate and to every man, whoever he
MEDITATIONS TJ
may be appropriately, not with any affectation: use plain
discourse.
Augustus' court, wife, daughter, descendants, ancestors,
sister, Agrippa, kinsmen, intimates, friends, Areius,^ Maece-
nas, physicians and sacrificing priests — the whole court is
dead. Then turn to the rest, not considering the death of a
single man, but of a whole race, as of the Pompeii ; and that
which is inscribed on the tombs — The last of his race. Then
consider what trouble those before them have had that
they might leave a successor ; and then, that of necessity some
one must be the last. Again here consider the death of a
whole race.
It is thy duty to order thy life well in every single act;
and if every act does its duty, as far as is possible, be con-
tent ; and no one is able to hinder thee so that each act shall
not do its duty.
But something external will stand in the way — Nothing
will stand in the way of thy acting justly and soberly and
considerately — But perhaps some other active power will be
hindered — Well, but by acquiescing in the hindrance and by
being content to transfer thy efforts to that which is allowed,
another opportunity of action is immediately put before thee
in place of that which was hindered, and one which will adapt
itself to this ordering of which we are speaking.
Receive [wealth or prosperity] without arrogance; and be
ready to let it go.
If thou didst ever see a hand cut off, or a foot, or a head,
lying anywhere apart from the rest of the body, such does
a man make himself, as far as he can, who is not content
with what happens, and separates himself from others, or
does anything unsocial. Suppose that thou hast detached
thyself from the natural unity — for thou wast made by na-
ture a part, but now thou hast cut thyself off — yet here there
is this beautiful provision, that it is in thy power again
to unite thyself. God has allowed this to no other part, after
it has been separated and cut asunder, to come together
again. But consider the kindness by which he has distin-
guished man, for he has put it in his power not to be sep-
arated at all from the universal ; and when he has been sep-
^S MARCUS AURELIUS
arated, he has allowed him to return and to be united and to
resume his place as a part.
As the nature of the universal has given to every rational
being all the other powers that it has,* so we have received
from it this power also. For as the universal nature con-
verts and fixes in its predestined place everything which
stands in the way and opposes it, and makes such things a
part of itself, so also the rational animal is able to make every
hindrance its own material, and to use it for such purposes as
it may have designed.
Do not disturb thyself by thinking of the whole of thy
life. Let not thy thoughts at once embrace all the various
troubles which thou mayest expect to befall thee: but on
every occasion ask thyself. What is there in this which is in-
tolerable and past bearing? for thou wilt be ashamed to
confess. In the next place remember that neither the future
nor the past pains thee, but only the present. But this is re-
duced to a very little, if thou only circumscribest it, and
chidest thy mind, if it is unable to hold out against even this.
Does Panthea orPergamusnowsit by the tomb of Verus?^
Does Chaurias or Diotimus sit by the tomb of Hadrianus?
That would be ridiculous. Well, suppose they did sit there,
would the dead be conscious of it ? and if the dead were con-
scious, would they be pleased? and if they were pleased,
would that make them immortal ? Was it not in the order
of destiny that these persons too should first become old wo-
men and old men and then die? What then would those do
after these were dead? All this is foul smell and blood in a
bag.
If thou canst see sharply, look and judge wisely,* says the
philosopher.
In the constitution of the rational animal I see no virtue
which is opposed to justice; but I see a virtue which is op-
posed to love of pleasure, and that is temperance.
If thou takest away thy opinion about that which appears
to give thee pain, thou thyself standest in perfect security —
Who is this self ? — The reason — But I am not reason — Be it
so. Let then the reason itself not trouble itself. But if any
other part of thee suffers let it have its own opinion about
itself.
MEDITATIONS
79
Hindrance to the perceptions of sense is an evil to the
animal nature. Hindrance to the movements [desires] is
equally an evil to the animal nature. And something else
also is equally an impediment and an evil to the constitution
of plants. So then that which is a hindrance to the intelli-
gence is an evil to the intelligent nature. Apply all these
things then to thyself. Does pain or sensuous pleasure af-
fect thee? The senses will look to that. — Has any obstacle
opposed thee in thy efforts towards an object? if indeed thou
wast making this effort absolutely [unconditionally, or with-
out any reservation], certainly this obstacle is an evil to
thee considered as a rational animal. But if thou takest into
consideration the usual course of things, thou hast not yet
been injured nor even impeded. The things however which
are proper to the understanding no other man is used to im-
pede, for neither fire, nor iron, nor tyrant, nor abuse, touches
it in any way. When it has been made a sphere, it continues
a sphere.
It is not fit that I should give myself pain, for I have
never intentionally g^ven pain even to another.
Different things delight different people. But it is my
delight to keep the ruling faculty sound without turning
away either from any man or from any of the things which
happen to men, but looking at and receiving all with welcome
eyes and using everything according to its value.
See that thou secure this present time to thyself : for those
who rather pursue posthumous fame do not consider that the
men of after time will be exactly such as these whom they
can not bear now ; and both are mortal. And what is it in
any way to thee if these men of after time utter this or that
sound, or have this or that opinion about thee?
Take me and cast me where thou wilt; for there I shall
keep my divine part tranquil, that is, content, if it can feel
and act conformably to its proper constitution. Is this
change of place sufficient reason why my soul should be un-
happy and worse than it was, depressed, expanded, shrink-
ing, affrighted? and what wilt thou find which is sufficient
reason for this ?
Nothing can happen to any man which is not a human
accident, nor to an ox which is not according to the nature
8o MARCUS AURELIUS
of an ox, nor to a vine which is not according to the nature
of a vine, nor to a stone which is not proper to a stone. If
then there happens to each thing both what is usual and
natural, why shouldst thou complain? For the common
nature brings nothing which may not be borne by thee.
If thou art pained by any external thing, it is not this thing
that disturbs thee, but thy own judgment about it. And it
is in thy power to wipe out this judgment now. But if any-
thing in thy own disposition gives thee pain, who hinders
thee from correcting thy opinion? And even if thou art
pained because thou art not doing some particular thing
which seems to thee to be right, why dost thou not rather
act than complain ? — But some insuperable obstacle is in the
way ? — Do not be grieved then, for the cause of its not being
done depends not on thee — But it is not worth while to live,
if this can not be done — Take thy departure then from life
contentedly, just as he dies who is in full activity, and well
pleased too with the things which are obstacles.
Remember that the ruling faculty is invincible, when self-
collected it is satisfied with itself, if it does nothing which
it does not choose to do, even if it resist from mere obstinacy.
What then will it be when it forms a judgment about any-
thing aided by reason and deliberately? Therefore the
mind which is free from passions is a citadel, for man has
nothing more secure to which he can fly for refuge and for
the future be inexpugnable. He then who has not seen this
is an ignorant man ; but he who has seen it and does not fly
to this refuge is unhappy.
Say nothing more to thyself than what the first appear-
ances report. Suppose that it has been reported to thee that
a certain person speaks ill of thee. This has been reported ;
but that thou hast been injured, that has not been reported.
I see that my child is sick. I do see; but that he is in dan-
ger, I do not see. Thus then always abide by the first ap-
pearances, and add nothing thyself from within, and then
nothing happens to thee. Or rather add something, like a
man who knows everything that happens in the world.
A cucumber is bitter. — Throw it away. — There are briars
in the road. — Turn aside from them. — This is enough. Do
not add. And why were such things made in the world ? For
MEDITATIONS 8 1
thou wilt be ridiculed by a man who is acquainted with na-
ture, as thou wouldst be ridiculed by a carpenter and shoe-
maker if thou didst find fault because thou seest in their
workshop shavings and cuttings from the things which they
make. And yet they have places into which they can throw
these shavings and cuttings, and the universal nature has no
external space; but the wondrous part of her art is that
though she has circumscribed herself, everything within her
which appears to decay and to grow old and to be useless she
changes into herself, and again makes other new things from
these very same, so that she requires neither substance from
without nor wants a place into which she may cast that
which decays. She is content then with her own space, and
her own matter and her own art.
Neither in thy actions be sluggish, nor in thy conversa-
tion without method, nor wandering in thy thoughts, nor
let there be in thy soul inward contention nor external effu-
sion, nor in life be so busy as to have no leisure.
Suppose that men kill thee, cut thee in pieces, curse thee.
What then can those things do to prevent thy mind from re-
maining pure, wise, sober, just? For instance, if a man
should stand by a limpid, pure spring, and curse it, the spring
never ceases sending up potable water ; and if he should cast
clay into it or filth, it will speedily disperse them and wash
them out, and will not be at all polluted. How then shalt thou
possess a perpetual fountain [and not a mere well] ? By
forming* thyself hourly, to freedom, conjoined with con-
tentment, simplicity, and modesty.
He who does not know what the world is, does not know
where he is. And he who does not know for what purpose
the world exists, does not know who he is, nor what the
world is. And he who has failed in any one of these things
could not even say for what purpose he exists himself.
What then dost thou think of him who seeks the praise of
those who applaud, of men who know not either where they
are or who they are?
Dost thou wish to be praised by a man who curses him-
self thrice every hour? wouldst thou wish to please a man
who does not please himself? Does a man please himself
who repents of nearly everything that he does?
82 MARCUS AURELIUS
No longer let thy breathing only act in concert with the
air which surrounds thee, but let thy intelligence also now
be in harmony with the intelligence which embraces all
things. For the intelligent power is no less diffused in all
parts and pervades all things for him who is willing to draw
it to him than the aerial power for him who is able to re-
spire it.
Generally, wickedness does no harm at all to the uni-
verse; and particularly, the wickedness of one man does no
harm to another. It is only harmful to him who has it in
his power to be released from it, as soon as he shall choose.
To my own free will the free will of my neighbour is just
as indifferent as his poor breath and flesh. For though we
are made especially for the sake of one another, still the ru-
ling power of each of us has its own office for otherwise my
neighbour's wickedness would be my harm, which God has
not willed in order that my unhappiness may not depend on
another.
The sun appears to be poured down, and in all directions
indeed it is diffused, yet it is not effused. For this diffu-
sion is extension : Accordingly its rays are called Extensions
[axTives] because they are extended [androv itcTsivedQai].* But
one may judge what kind of a thing a ray is, if he looks at
the sun's light passing through a narrow opening into a
darkened room, for it is extended in a right line, and as it
were is divided when it meets with any solid body which
stands in the way and intercepts the air beyond; but there
the light remains fixed and does not glide or fall off. Such
then ought to be the out-pouring and diffusion of the under-
standing, and it should in no way be an effusion, but an ex-
tension, and it should make no violent or impetuous colli-
sion with the obstacles which are in its way; nor yet fall
down, but be fixed and enlighten that which receives it. For
a body will deprive itself of the illumination, if it does not
admit it.
He who fears death either fears the loss of sensation or a
different kind of sensation. But if thou shalt have no sen-
sation, neither wilt thou feel any harm; and if thou shalt
acquire another kind of sensation, thou wilt be a different
kind of living being and thou wilt not cease to live.
MEDITATIONS 83
Men exist for the sake of one another. Teach them then
or bear with them.
In one way an arrow moves, in another way the mind.
The rnind indeed both when it exercises caution and when it
is employed about inquiry, moves straight onward not the
less, and to its object.
Enter into every man's ruling faculty ; and also let every
other man enter into thine.
NOTES
' Caius is Caius Julius Caesar, the dictator; and Pompeius is Cneius
Pompeius, named Magnus.
* Areius was a philosopher, who was intimate with Augustus.
* " Verus " is a conjecture of Saumaise, and perhaps the true reading.
* A piece of bad etymology.
BOOK IX
HE who acts unjustly acts impiously. For since the
universal nature has made rational animals for the
sake of one another to help one another according
to their deserts, but in no way to injure one an-
other, he who transgresses her will, is clearly guilty of im-
piety towards the highest divinity. And he too who lies is
guilty of impiety to the same divinity ; for the universal na-
ture is the nature of things that are ; and things that are have
a relation to all things that come into existence.^ And
further, this universal nature is named truth, and is the
prime cause of all things that are true. He then who lies
intentionally is guilty of impiety inasmuch as he acts un-
justly by deceiving; and he also who lies unintentionally,
inasmuch as he is at variance with the universal nature, and
inasmuch as he disturbs the order by fighting against the
nature of the world; for he fights against it, who is moved
of himself to that which is contrary to truth, for he had re-
ceived powers from nature through the neglect of which he
is not able now to distinguish falsehood from truth. And
indeed he who pursues pleasure as good, and avoids
pain as evil is guilty of impiety. For of necessity such a
man must often find fault with the universal nature, alleging
that it assigns things to the bad and the good contrary to
their deserts, because frequently the bad are in the enjoy-
ment of pleasure and possess the things which procure pleas-
ure, but the good have pain for their share and the things
which cause pain. And further, he who is afraid of pain
will sometimes also be afraid of some of the things which
will happen in the world, and even this is impiety. And
he who pursues pleasure will not abstain from injustice, and
this is plainly impiety. Now with respect to the things to-
wards which the universal nature is equally affected — for
MEDITATIONS 85
it would not have made both, unless it was equally affected
towards both — towards these they who wish to follow nature
should be of the same mind with it, and equally affected.
With respect to pain, then, and pleasure, or death and life, or
honour and dishonour, which the universal nature employs
equally, whoever is not equally affected is manifestly act-
ing impiously. And I say that the universal nature employs
them equally, instead of saying that they happen alike to
those who are produced in continuous series and to those
who come after them by virtue of a certain original move-
ment of Providence, according to which it moved from a
certain beginning to this ordering of things, having con-
ceived certain principles of the things which were to be, and
having determined powers productive of beings and of
changes and of such like successions.
It would be a man's happiest lot to depart from mankind
without having had any taste of lying and hypocrisy and
luxury and pride. However to breathe out one's life when
a man has had enough of these things is the next best voy-
age, as the saying is. Hast thou determined to abide with
vice, and has not experience yet induced thee to fly from this
pestilence? For the destruction of the understanding is a
pestilence, much more indeed than any such corruption and
change of this atmosphere which surrounds us. For this
corruption is a pestilence of animals so far as they are ani-
mals ; but the other is a pestilence of men so far as they are
men.
Do not despise death, but be well content with it, since
this too is one of those things which nature wills. For such
as it is to be young and to grow old, and to increase and to
reach maturity, and to have teeth and beard and gray hairs,
and to beget, and to be pregnant and to bring forth, and all
the other natural operations which the seasons of thy life
bring, such also is dissolution. This, then, is consistent with
the character of a reflecting man, to be neither careless nor
impatient nor contemptuous with respect to death, but to
wait for it as one of the operations of nature. As thou now
waitest for the time when the child shall come out of thy
wife's womb, so be ready for the time when thy soul shall
fall out of this envelope. But if thou requirest also a vul-
86 MARCUS AURELIUS
gar kind of comfort which shall reach thy heart, thou wilt
be made best reconciled to death by observing the objects
from which thou art going to be removed, and the morals of
those with whom thy soul will no longer be mingled. For
it is no way right to be offended with men, but it is thy duty
to care for them and to bear with them gently; and yet to
remember that thy departure will be not from men who have
the same principles as thyself. For this is the only thing,
if there be any, which could draw us the contrary way and
attach us to life, to be permitted to live with those who have
the same principles as ourselves. But now thou seest how
great is the trouble arising from the discordance of those
who live together, so that thou mayst say, Come quick, O
death, lest perchance I, too, should forget myself.
He who does wrong does wrong against himself. He
who acts unjustly acts unjustly to himself, because he makes
himself bad.
He often acts unjustly who does not do a certain thing;
not only he who does a certain thing.
Thy present opinion founded on understanding, and thy
present conduct directed to social good, and thy present dis-
position of contentment with everything which happens* —
that is enough.
Wipe out imagination : check desire : extinguish appetite :
keep the ruling faculty in its own power.
Among the animals which have not reason one life is dis-
tributed ; but among reasonable animals one intelligent soul
is distributed : just as there is one earth of all things which
are of an earthy nature, and we see by one light, and breathe
one air, all of us that have the faculty of vision and all that
have life.
All things which participate in anything which is com-
mon to them all move towards that which is of the same
kind with themselves. Everything which is earthly turns
towards the earth, everything which is liquid flows together
and everything which is of an aerial kind does the same, so
that they require something to keep them asunder, and the
application of force. Fire indeed moves upwards on account
of the elemental fire, but it is so ready to be kindled together
with all the fire which is here, that even every substance
MEDITATIONS 87
which is somewhat dry, is easily ignited because there is less
mingled with it of that which is a hindrance to ignition.
Accordingly then everything also which participates in the
common intelligent nature moves in like manner towards
that which is of the same kind with itself, or moves even
more. For so much as it is superior in comparison with all
other things, in the same degree also is it more ready to
mingle with and to be fused with that which is akin to it.
Accordingly among animals devoid of reason we find swarms
of bees, and herds of cattle, and the nurture of young birds,
and in a manner, loves ; for even in animals there are souls,
and that power which brings them together is seen to exert
itself in the superior degree, and in such a way as never has
been observed in plants nor in stones nor in trees. But in
rational animals there are political communities and friend-
ships, and families and meetings of people; and in wars,
treaties and armistices. But in the things which are still
superior, even though they are separated from one another,
unity in a manner exists, as in the stars. Thus the ascent to
the higher degree is able to produce a sympathy even in
things which are separated. See, then, what now takes
place. For only intelligent animals have now forgotten this
mutual desire and inclination, and in them alone the property
of flowing together is not seen. But still though men
strive to avoid [this union], they are caught and held
by it, for their nature is too strong for them ; and thou wilt
see what I say if thou only observest. Sooner, then, will
one find anything earthy which comes in contact with no
earthy thing than a man altogether separated from other
men.
Both man and God and the universe produce fruit; at
the proper seasons each produce it. But if usage has espe-
cially fixed these terms to the vine and like things, this is
nothing. Reason produces fruit both for all and for itself,
and there are produced from it other things of the same kind
as reason itself.
If thou art able, correct by teaching those who do wrong;
but if thou canst not, remember that indulgence is given to
thee for this purpose. And the gods, too, are indulgent to
such persons ; and for some purposes they even help them to
3x
88 MARCUS AURELIUS
get health, wealth, reputation; so kind they are. And it is
in thy power also ; or say, who hinders thee ?
Labour not as one who is wretched, nor yet as one who
would be pitied or admired : but direct thy will to one thing
only, to put thyself in motion and to check thyself, as the
social reason requires.
To-day I have got out of all trouble, or rather I have cast
out all trouble, for it was not outside, but within and in my
opinions.
All things are the same, familiar in experience, and ephem-
eral in time, and worthless in the matter. Everything
now is just as it was in the time of those whom we have
buried.
Things stand outside of us, themselves by themselves,
neither knowing aught of themselves, nor expressing any
judgment. What is it, then, which does judge about them?
The ruling faculty.
Not in passivity, but in activity lie the evil and the good
of the rational social animal, just as his virtue and his vice
lie not in passivity, but in activity.
For the stone which has been thrown up it is no evil to
come down, nor indeed any good to have been carried up.
Penetrate inwards into men's leading principles, and thou
wilt see what judges thou art afraid of, and what kind of
judges they are of themselves.
All things are changing: and thou thyself art in contin-
uous mutation and in a manner in continuous destruction,
and the whole universe too.
It is thy duty to leave another man's wrongful act there
where it is.
Termination of activity, cessation from movement and
opinion, and in a sense their death, is no evil. Turn thy
thoughts now to the consideration of thy life, thy life as a
child, as a youth, thy manhood, thy old age, for in these also
every change was a death. Is this anything to fear ? Turn
thy thoughts now to thy life under thy grandfather, then to
thy life under thy mother, then to thy life under thy father ;
and as thou findest many other differences and changes and
terminations, ask thyself. Is this anything to fear? In like
MEDITATIONS 89
manner, then, neither are the termination and cessation and
change of thy whole Hfe a thing to be afraid of.
Hasten [to examine] thy own ruHng faculty and that of
the universe and that of thy neighbour : thy own that thou
mayst make it just : and that of the universe, that thou mayst
remember of what thou art a part ; and that of thy neighbour,
that thou mayst know whether he has acted ignorantly or
with knowledge, and that thou mayst also consider that his
ruling faculty is akin to thine.
As thou thyself art a component part of a social system,
so let every act of thine be a component part of a social life.
Whatever act of thine then has no reference either immedi-
ately or remotely to a social end, this tears asunder thy life,
and does not allow it to be one, and it is of the nature of a
mutiny, just as when in a popular assembly a man acting by
himself stands apart from the general agreement.
Quarrels of little children and their sports, and poor spir-
its carrying about dead bodies [such is everything] ; and so
what is exhibited in the representation of the mansions of
the dead strikes our eyes more clearly.
Examine into the quality of the form of an object, and
detach it altogether from its material part, and then contem-
plate it; then determine the time, the longest which a thing
of this peculiar form is naturally made to endure.
Thou hast endured infinite troubles through not being
contented with thy ruling faculty, when it does the things
which it is constituted by nature to do. But enough* [of
this] .
When another blames thee or hates thee, or when men say
about thee anything injurious, approach their poor souls,
penetrate within, and see what kind of men they are. Thou
wilt discover that there is no reason to take any trouble that
these men may have this or that opinion about thee. How-
ever thou must be well disposed towards them, for by nature
they are friends. And the gods too aid them in all ways, by
dreams, by signs, towards the attainment of those things on
which they set a value.*
The periodic movements of the universe are the same, up
and down from age to age. And either the universal intel-
ligence puts itself in motion for every separate effect, and
90 MARCUS AURELIUS
if this is so, be thou content with that which is the result of
its activity; or it puts itself in motion once, and everything
else comes by way of sequence in a manner; or indivisible
elements are the origin of all things. — In a word, if there is
a god, all is well; and if chance rules, do not thou also be
governed by it.
Soon will the earth cover us all : then the earth, too, will
change, and the things also which result from change will
continue to change for ever, and these again for ever. For
if a man reflects on the changes and transformations which
follow one another like wave after wave, and their rapidity,
he will despise everything which is perishable.
The universal cause is like a winter torrent: it carries
everything along with it. But how worthless are all these
poor people who are engaged in matters political, and, as
they suppose, are playing the philosopher! All drivellers.
Well then, man : do what nature now requires. Set thyself
in motion, if it is in thy power, and do not look about thee
to see if any one will observe it; nor yet expect Plato's Re-
public : but be content if the smallest thing goes on well, and
consider such an event to be no small matter. For who can
change men's opinions? and without a change of opinions
what else is there than the slavery of men who groan while
they pretend to obey ? Come now and tell me of Alexander
and Philippus and Demetrius of Phalerum. They them-
selves shall judge whether they discovered what the common
nature required, and trained themselves accordingly. But if
they acted like tragedy heroes, no one has condemned me to
imitate them. Simple and modest is the work of philosophy.
Draw me not aside to insolence and pride.
Look down from above on the countless herds of men and
their countless solemnities, and the infinitely varied voyag-
ings in storms and calms, and the differences among those
who are bom, who live together, and die. And consider,
too, the life lived by others in olden time, and the life of
those who will live after thee, and the life now lived among
barbarous nations, and how many know not even thy name,
and how many will soon forget it, and how they who perhaps
now are praising thee will very soon blame thee, and that
MEDITATIONS 9 1
neither a posthumous name is of any value, nor reputation,
nor anything else.
Let there be freedom from perturbations with respect to
the things which come from the external cause ; and let there
be justice in the things done by virtue of the internal cause,
that is, let there be movement and action terminating in this,
in social acts, for this is according to thy nature.
Thou canst remove out of the way many useless things
among those which disturb thee, for they lie entirely in thy
opinion ; and thou wilt then gain for thyself ample space by
comprehending the whole universe in thy mind, and by con-
templating the eternity of time, and observing the rapid
change of every several thing, how short is the time from
birth to dissolution, and the illimitable time before birth as
well as the equally boundless time after dissolution.
All that thou seest will quickly perish, and those who
have been spectators of its dissolution will very soon perish
too. And he who dies at the extremest old age will be
brought into the same condition with him who died pre-
maturely.
What are these men's leading principles, and about what
kind of things are they busy, and for what kind of reasons
do they love and honour? Imagine that thou seest their
poor souls laid bare. When they think that they do harm
by their blame or good by their praise, what an idea !
Loss is nothing else than change. But the universal na-
ture delights in change, and in obedience to her all things
are now done well, and from eternity have been done in like
form, and will be such to time without end. What, then,
dost thou say? That all things have been and all things al-
ways will be bad, and that no power has ever been found in
so many gods to rectify these things, but the world has been
condemned to be bound in never ceasing evil ?
The rottenness of the matter which is the foundation of
everything ! water, dust, bones, filth : or again, marble rocks,
the callosities of the earth; and gold and silver, the sedi-
ments; and garments, only bits of hair; and purple dye,
blood: and everything else is of the same kind. And that
which is of the nature of breath is also another thing of the
same kind, changing from this to that.
92 MARCUS AURELIUS
Enough of this wretched Hfe and murmuring and apish
tricks. Why art thou disturbed? What is there new in
this? What unsettles thee? Is it the form of the thing?
Look at it. Or is it the matter? Look at it. But besides
these there is nothing. Towards the gods, then, now be-
come at last more simple and better. It is the same whether
we examine these things for a hundred years or three.
If any man has done wrong, the harm is his own. But
perhaps he has not done wrong.
Either all things proceed from one intelligent source and
come together as in one body, and the part ought not to find
fault with what is done for the benefit of the whole : or
there are only atoms, and nothing else than mixture and dis-
persion. Why, then, art thou disturbed ? Say to the ruling
faculty, Art thou dead, art thou corrupted, art thou playing
the hypocrite, art thou become a beast, dost thou herd and
feed with the rest?^
Either the gods have no power or they have power. If,
then, they have no power, why dost thou pray to them ? But
if they have power, why dost thou not pray for them to give
thee the faculty of not fearing any of the things which thou
fearest, or of not desiring any of the things which thou de-
sirest, or not being pained at anything, rather than pray
that any of these things should not happen or happen? for
certainly if they can co-operate with men, they can co-operate
for these purposes. But perhaps thou wilt say, the gods
have placed them in thy power. Well, then, is it not better
to use what is in thy power like a free man than to desire in
a slavish and abject way what is not in thy power? And
who has told thee that the gods do not aid us even in the
things which are in our power? Begin, then, to pray for
such things, and thou wilt see. One man prays thus : How
shall I be able to lie with that woman ? Do thou pray thus :
How shall I desire to lie with her? Another prays thus:
How shall I be released from this ? Another prays : How
shall I not desire to be released ? Another thus : How shall
I not lose my little son? Thou thus: How shall I not be
afraid to lose him ? In fine, turn thy prayers this way, and
see what comes.
Epicurus says, In my sickness my conversation was not
MEDITATIONS
93
about my bodily sufferings, nor, says he, did I talk on such
subjects to those who visited me; but I continued to dis-
course on the nature of things as before, keeping to this
main point, how the mind, while participating in such move-
ments as go on in the poor flesh, shall be free from perturba-
tions and maintain its proper good. Nor did I, he says,
give the physicians an opportunity of putting on solemn
looks, as if they were doing something great, but my life
went on well and happily. Do, then, the same that he did
both in sickness, if thou art sick, and in any other circum-
stances; for never to desert philosophy in any events that
may befall us, nor to hold trifling talk either with an igno-
rant man or with one unacquainted with nature, is a princi-
ple of all schools of philosophy ; but to be intent only on that
which thou art now doing and on the instrument by which
thou doest it.
When thou art offended with any man's shameless con-
duct, immediately ask thyself. Is it possible, then, that shame-
less men should not be in the world? It is not possible.
Do not, then, require what is impossible. For this man also
is one of those shameless men who must of necessity be in
the world. Let the same considerations be present to thy
mind in the case of the knave, and the faithless man, and of
every man who does wrong in any way. For at the same
time that thou dost remind thyself that it is impossible that
such kind of men should not exist, thou wilt become more
kindly disposed towards every one individually. It is useful
to perceive this, too, immediately when the occasion arises,
what virtue nature has given to man to oppose to every
wrongful act. For she has given to man, as an antidote
against the stupid man, mildness, and against another kind
of man some other power. And in all cases it is possible for
thee to correct by teaching the man who is gone astray : for
every man who errs misses his object and is gone astray.
Besides wherein hast thou been injured? For thou wilt find
that no one among those against whom thou art irritated has
done anything by which thy mind could be made worse : but
that which is evil to thee and harmful has its foundation only
in the mind. And what harm is done or what is there
strange, if the man who has not been instructed does the
94 MARCUS AURELIUS
acts of an uninstructed man? Consider whether thou
shouldst not rather blame thyself, because thou didst not ex-
pect such a man to err in such a way. For thou hadst means
given thee by thy reason to suppose that it was likely that he
would commit this error, and yet thou hast forgotten and art
amazed that he has erred. But most of all when thou blam-
est a man as faithless or ungrateful, turn to thyself. For
the fault is manifestly thy own, whether thou didst trust that
a man who had such a disposition would keep his promise,
or when conferring thy kindness thou didst not confer it ab-
solutely, nor yet in such way as to have received from thy
very act all the profit. For what more dost thou want when
thou hast done a man a service? art thou not content that
thou hast done something conformable to thy nature, and
dost thou seek to be paid for it? just as if the eye demanded
a recompense for seeing, or the feet for walking. For as
these members are formed for a particular purpose, and by
working according to their several constitutions obtain what
is their own ; so also as man is formed by nature to acts of
benevolence, when he has done anything benevolent or in
any other way conducive to the common interest, he has acted
conformably to his constitution, and he gets what is his own.
NOTES
* " As there is not any action or natural event, which we are ac-
quainted with, so single and unconnected as not to have a respect to
some other actions and events, so, possibly each of them, when it has
not an immediate, may yet have a remote, natural relation to other
actions and events, much beyond the compass of this present world."
Again : "Things seemingly the most in significant imaginable, are per-
petually observed to be necessary conditions to other things of the great-
est importance ; so that any one thing whatever, may, for aught we
know to the contrary, be a necessary condition to any other." — Butler's
Analogy, Chap. 7. See all the chapter.
* There is some corruption at the end of this section : but I think
that the translation expresses the emperor's meaning. Whether intelli-
gence rules all things or chance rules, a man must not be disturbed. He
must use the power that he has, and be tranquil.
BOOKX
WILT thou, then, my soul, never be good and simple
and one and naked, more manifest than the body
which surrounds thee? Wilt thou never enjoy
an affectionate and contented disposition ? Wilt
thou never be full and without a want of any kind, longing
for nothing more, nor desiring anything,, either animate or
inanimate, for the enjoyment of pleasures? nor yet desiring
time wherein thou shalt have longer enjoyment, or place, or
pleasant climate, or society of men with whom thou mayst
live in harmony? but wilt thou be satisfied with thy present
condition, and pleased with all that is about thee, and wilt
thou convince thyself that thou hast everything and that it
comes from the gods, that everything is well for thee, and
will be well whatever shall please them, and whatever they
shall give for the conservation of the perfect living being,*
the good and just and beautiful, which generates and holds
together all things, and contains and embraces all things
which are dissolved for the production of other like things?
Wilt thou never be such that thou shalt so dwell in com-
munity with gods and men as neither to find fault with them
at all, nor to be condemned by them?
Observe what thy nature requires, so far as thou art gov-
erned by nature only : then do it and accept it, if thy nature,
so far as thou art a living being, shall not be made worse by
it. And next thou must observe what thy nature requires
so far as thou art a living being. And all this thou mayst
allow thyself, if thy nature, so far as thou art a rational ani-
mal, shall not be made worse by it. But the rational animal
is consequently also a political [social] animal. Use these
rules, then, and trouble thyself about nothing else.
Everything which happens either happens in such wise as
thou art formed by nature to bear it, or as thou art not
32 95
96 MARCUS AURELIUS
formed by nature to bear it. If, then, it happens to thee in
such way as thou art formed by nature to bear it, do not
complain, but bear it as thou art formed by nature to bear it.
But if it happens in such wise as thou art not formed by
nature to bear it, do not complain, for it will perish after it
has consumed thee. Remember, however, that thou art
formed by nature to bear everything, with respect to which
it depends on thy opinion to make it endurable and tolerable,
by thinking that it is either thy interest or thy duty to do this.
If a man is mistaken, instruct him kindly and show him
his error. But if thou art not able, blame thyself, or blame
not even thyself.
Whatever may happen to thee, it was prepared for thee
from all eternity; and the implication of causes was from
eternity spinning the thread of thy being, and of that which
is incident to it.
Whether the universe is [a concourse of] atoms, or na-
ture [is a system], let this first be established, that I am a
part of the whole which is governed by nature; next, I am
in a manner intimately related to the parts which are of the
same kind with myself. For remembering this, inasmuch
as I am a part, I shall be discontented with none of the things
which are assigned to me out of the whole; for nothing is
injurious to the part, if it is for the advantage of the whole.
For the whole contains nothing which is not for its advan-
tage ; and all natures indeed have this common principle, but
the nature of the universe has this principle besides, that it
can not be compelled even by an external cause to generate
anything harmful to itself. By remembering, then, that I am
a part of such a whole, I shall be content with everything
that happens. And inasmuch as I am in a manner inti-
mately related to the parts which are of the same kind with
myself, I shall do nothing unsocial, but I shall rather direct
myself to the things which are of the same kind with myself,
and I shall turn all my efforts to the common interest, and
divert them from the contrary. Now, if these things are
done so, life must flow on happily, just as thou mayst observe
that the life of a citizen is happy, who continues a course of
action which is advantageous to his fellow-citizens, and is
content with whatever the state may assign to him.
MEDITATIONS 97
The parts of the whole, everything, I mean, which is nat-
urally comprehended in the universe, must of necessity per-
ish ; but let this be understood in this sense, that they must
undergo change. But if this is naturally both an evil and
a necessity for the parts, the whole would not continue to
exist in a good condition, the parts being subject to change
and constituted so as to perish in various ways. For
whether did nature herself design to do evil to the things
which are parts of herself, and to make them subject to evil
and of necessity fall into evil, or have such results happened
without her knowing it? Both these suppositions, indeed,
are incredible. But if a man should even drop the term
Nature [as an efficient power], and should speak of these
things as natural, even then it would be ridiculous to affirm
at the same time that the parts of the whole are in their na-
ture subject to change, and at the same time to be surprised
or vexed as if something were happening contrary to nature,
particularly as the dissolution of things is into those things
of which each thing is composed. For there is either a dis-
persion of the elements out of which everything has been
compounded, or a change from the solid to the earthy and
from the airy to the aerial, so that these parts are taken back
into the universal reason, whether this at certain periods is
consumed by fire or renewed by eternal changes. And do
not imagine that the solid and the airy part belong to thee
from the time of generation. For all this received its accre-
tion only yesterday and the day before, as one may say, from
the food and the air which is inspired. This, then, which
has received [the accretion], changes, not that which thy
mother brought forth. But suppose that this [which thy
mother brought forth] implicates thee very much with that
other part, which has the peculiar quality [of change], this
is nothing in fact in the way of objection to what is said.^
When thou hast assumed these names, good, modest, true,
rational, a man of equanimity, and magnanimous, take care
that thou dost not change these names ; and if thou shouldst
lose them, quickly return to them. And remember that the
term Rational was intended to signify a discriminating at-
tention to every several thing and freedom from negligence;
and that Equanimity is the voluntary acceptance of the
9$ MARCUS AURELIUS
things which are assigned to thee by the common nature;
and that Magnanimity is the elevation of the intelHgent part
above the pleasurable or painful sensations of the flesh, and
above that poor thing called fame, and death, and all such
things. If, then, thou maintainest thyself in the possession
of these names, without desiring to be called by these names
by others, thou wilt be another person and wilt enter on an-
other life. For to continue to be such as thou hast hitherto
been, and to be torn in pieces and defiled in such a life, is the
character of a very stupid man and one overfond of his life,
and like those half-devoured fighters with wild beasts, who
though covered with wounds and gore, still entreat to be
kept to the following day, though they will be exposed in
the same state to the same claws and bites.^ Therefore fix
thyself in the possession of these few names : and if thou art
able to abide in them, abide as if thou wast removed to cer-
tain islands of the Happy.* But if thou shalt perceive that
thou fallest out of them and dost not maintain thy hold, go
courageously into some nook where thou shalt maintain
them, or even depart at once from life, not in passion, but
with simplicity and freedom and modesty, after doing this
one [laudable] thing at least in thy life, to have gone out of
it thus. In order, however, to the remembrance of these
names, it will greatly help thee, if thou rememberest the
gods, and that they wish not to be flattered, but wish all rea-
sonable beings to be made like themselves; and if thou re-
memberest that what does the work of a fig-tree is a fig-tree,
and that what does the work of a dog is a dog, and that what
does the work of a bee is a bee, and that what does the work
of a man is a man.
Mimi,*^ war, astonishment, torpor, slavery, will daily
wipe out those holy principles of thine. *How many things
without studying nature dost thou imagine, and how many
dost thou neglect? But it is thy duty so to look on and so
to do every thing, that at the same time the power of dealing
with circumstances is perfected, and the contemplative fac-
ulty is exercised, and the confidence which comes from the
knowledge of each several thing is maintained without show-
ing it, but yet not concealed. For when wilt thou enjoy
simplicity, when gravity, and when the knowledge of every
MEDITATIONS
99
several thing, both what it is in substance, and what place
it has in the universe, and how long it is formed to exist and
of what things it is compounded, and to whom it can belong,
and who are able to give it and take it away?
A spider is proud when it has caught a fly, and another
when he has caught a poor hare, and another when he has
taken a little fish in a net, and another when he has taken
wild-boars, and another when he has taken bears, and an-
other when he has taken Sarmatians. Are not these rob-
bers, if thou examinest their opinions?*
Acquire the contemplative way of seeing how all things
change into one another, and constantly attend to it, and
exercise thyself about this part [of philosophy]. For noth-
ing is so much adapted to produce magnanimity. Such a
man has put off the body, and he sees that he must, no one
knows how soon, go away from among men and leave every-
thing here, he gives himself up entirely to just doing in all
his actions, and in everything else that happens he resigns
himself to the universal nature. But as to what any man
shall say or think about him or do against him, he never
even thinks of it, being himself contented with these two
things, with acting justly in what he now does, and being
satisfied with what is now assigned to him ; and he lays aside
all distracting and busy pursuits, and desires nothing else
than to accomplish the straight course through the law,'^ and
by accomplishing the straight course to follow God.
What need is there of suspicious fear, since it is in thy
power to inquire what ought to be done ? And if thou seest
clear, go by this way content, without turning back : but if
thou dost not see clear, stop and take the best advisers. But
if any other things oppose thee, go on according to thy pow-
ers with due consideration, keeping to that which appears
to be just. For it is best to reach this object, and if thou
dost fail, let thy failure be in attempting this. He who
follows reason in all things is both tranquil and active at the
same time, and also cheerful and collected.
Inquire of thyself as soon as thou wakest from sleep
whether it will make any difference to thee, if another does
what is just and right. It will make no difference.
Thou hast not forgotten, I suppose, that those who assume
lOO MARCUS AURELIUS
arrogant airs in bestowing their praise or blame on others,
are such as they are at bed and at board, and thou hast not
forgotten what they do, and what they avoid and what they
pursue, and how they steal and how they rob, not with hands
and feet, but with their most valuable part, by means of
which there is produced, when a man chooses, fidelity, mod-
esty, truth, law, a good daemon [happiness] ?
To her who gives and takes back all, to Nature, the man
who is instructed and modest says, Give what thou wilt;
take back what thou wilt. And he says this not proudly,
but obediently and well pleased with her.
Short is the little which remains to thee of life. Live as
on a mountain. For it makes no difference whether a man
lives there or here, if he lives everywhere in the world as in
a state [political community]. Let men see, let them know
a real man who lives according to nature. If they can not
endure him, let them kill him. For that is better than to
live thus [as men do].
No longer talk at all about the kind of man that a good
man ought to be, but be such.
Constantly contemplate the whole of time and the whole
of substance, and consider that all individual things as to
substance are a grain of a fig, and as to time, the turning of
a gimlet.
Look at every thing that exists, and observe that it is al-
ready in dissolution and in change, and as it were putrefac-
tion or dispersion, or that everything is so constituted by
nature as to die.
Consider what men are when they are eating, sleeping,
generating, easing themselves and so forth. Then what
kind of men they are when they are imperious* and arrogant,
or angry and scolding from their elevated place. But a
short time ago to how many they were slaves and for what
things; and after a little time consider in what a condition
they will be.
That is for the good of each thing, which the universal
nature brings to each. And it is for its good at the time
when nature brings it.
"The earth loves the shower;" and "the solemn sether
loves;" and the universe loves to make whatever is about to
MEDITATIONS lOl
be. I say then to the universe, that I love as thou lovest. And
is not this too said, that "this or that loves [is wont] to be
produced?"®
Either thou livest here and hast already accustomed thy-
self to it, or thou art going away, and this was thy own will ;
or thou art dying and hast discharged thy duty. But be-
sides these things there is nothing. Be of good cheer, then.
Let this always be plain to thee, that this piece of land
is like any other; and that all things here are the same with
things on the top of a mountain, or on the sea-shore, or
wherever thou choosest to be. For thou wilt find just what
Plato says, Dwelling within the walls of a city as in a shep-
herd's fold on a mountain. [The three last words are
omitted in the translation.]®
What is my ruling faculty now to me? and of what na-
ture am I now making it? and for what purpose am I now
using it? is it void of understanding? is it loosed and rent
asunder from social life? is it melted into and mixed with
the poor flesh so as to move together with it ?
He who flies from his master is a runaway; but the law
is master, and he who breaks the law is a runaway. And
he also who is grieved or angry or afraid,* is dissatisfied
because something has been or is or shall be of the things
which are appointed by him who rules all things, and he is
Law, and assigns to every man what is fit. He then who
fears or is grieved or is angry is a runaway.^®
A man deposits seed in a womb and goes away, and then
another cause takes it, and labours on it and makes a child.
What a thing from such a material ! Again, the child passes
food down through the throat, and then another cause takes
it and makes perception and motion, and in fine life and
strength and other things; how many and how strange!
Observe then the things which are produced in such a hidden
way, and see the power just as we see the power which car-
ries things downwards and upwards, not with the eyes, but
still no less plainly.
Constantly consider how all things such as they now are,
in time past also were; and consider that they will be the
same again. And place before thy eyes entire dramas and
stages of the same form, whatever thou hast learned from
I02 MARCUS AURELIUS
thy experience or from older history ; for example, the whole
court of Hadrianus, and the whole court of Antoninus, and
the whole court of Philippus, Alexander, Croesus; for all
those were such dramas as we see now, only with different
actors.
Imagine every man who is grieved at anything or dis-
contented to be like a pig which is sacrificed and kicks and
screams.
Like this pig also is he who on his bed in silence laments
the bonds in which we are held. And consider that only to
the rational animal is it given to follow voluntarily what
happens ; but simply to follow is a necessity imposed on all.
Severally on the occasion of everything that thou doest,
pause and ask thyself, if death is a dreadful thing because it
deprives thee of this.
When thou art offended at any man's fault, forthwith
turn to thyself and reflect in what like manner thou dost err
thyself ; for example, in thinking that money is a good thing,
or pleasure, or a bit of reputation, and the like. For by
attending to this thou wilt quickly forget thy anger, if this
consideration also is added, that the man is compelled: for
what else could he do? or, if thou art able, take away from
him the compulsion.
When thou hast seen Satyron^* the Socratic,* think of
either Eutyches or Hymen, and when thou hast seen Eu-
phrates, think of Eutychion or Silvanus, and when thou hast
seen Alciphron think of Tropaeophorus, and when thou hast
seen Xenophon think of Crito^^ or Severus, and when thou
hast looked on thyself, think of any other Caesar, and in the
case of every one do in like manner. Then let this thought
be in thy mind. Where then are those men? Nowhere, or
nobody knows where. For thus continuously thou wilt look
at human things as smoke and nothing at all; especially if
thou reflectest at the same time that what has once changed
will never exist again in the infinite duration of time. But
thou, in what a brief space of time is thy existence? And
why art thou not content to pass through this short time in
an orderly way ? What matter and opportunity [ for thy ac-
tivity] art thou avoiding? For what else are all these
things, except exercises for the reason, when it has viewed
MEDITATIONS IO3
carefully and by examination into their nature the things
which happen in life? Persevere then until thou shalt have
made these things thy own, as the stomach which is strength-
ened makes all things its own, as the blazing fire makes flame
and brightness out of everything that is thrown into it.
Let it not be in any man's power to say truly of thee that
thou art not simple or that thou art not good; but let him
be a liar whoever shall think anything of this kind about
thee; and thi§ is altogether in thy power. For who is he
that shall hinder thee from being good and simple? Do
thou only determine to live no longer, unless thou shalt be
such. For neither does reason allow [thee to live], if thou
art not such.
What is that which as to this material [our life] can be
done or said in the way most conformable to reason. For
whatever this may be, it is in thy power to do it or to say
it, and do not make excuses that thou art hindered. Thou
wilt not cease to lament till thy mind is in such a condition
that, what luxury is to those who enjoy pleasure, such shall
be to thee, in the matter which is subjected and presented
to thee, the doing of the things which are conformable to
man's constitution; for a man ought to consider as an en-
joyment everything which it is in his power to do according
to his own nature. And it is in his power everywhere.
Now, it is not given to a cylinder to move everywhere by
its own motion, nor yet to water nor to fire, nor to anything
else which is governed by nature or an irrational soul,
for the things which check them and stand in the way are
many. But intelligence and reason are able to go through
everything that opposes them, and in such manner as they
are formed by nature and as they choose. Place before thy
eyes this facility with which the reason will be carried
through all things, as fire upwards, as a stone downwards, as
a cylinder down an inclined surface, and seek for nothing
further. For all other obstacles either affect the body only
whichisa dead thing; or, except through opinion andtheyield-
ing of the reason itself, they do not crush nor do any harm of
any kind ; for if they did, he who felt it would immediately
become bad. Now, in the case of all things which have
a certain constitution, whatever harm may happen to any
I04 ' MARCUS AURELIUS
of them, that which is so affected becomes consequently
worse; but in the like case, a man becomes both better, if one
may say so, and more worthy of praise by making right
use of these accidents. And finally remember that nothing
harms him who is really a citizen, which does not harm the
state ; nor yet does anything harm the state, which does not
harm law [order] ; and of these things which are called mis-
fortunes not one harms law. What then does not harm law
does not harm either state or citizen.
To him who is penetrated by true principles even the brief-
est precept is sufficient, and any common precept, to remind
him that he should be free from grief and fear. For ex-
ample—
"Leaves, some the wind scatters on the ground —
So is the race of men."^*
Leaves, also, are thy children ; and leaves, too, are they who
cry out as if they were worthy of credit and bestow their
praise, or on the contrary curse, or secretly blame and sneer ;
and leaves, in like manner, are those who shall receive and
transmit a man's fame to after times. For all such things
as these "are produced in the season of spring," as the poet
says; then the wind casts them down; then the forest pro-
duces other leaves in their places. But a brief existence is
common to all things, and yet thou avoidest and pursuest all
things as if they would be eternal. A little time, and thou
shalt close thy eyes; and him who has attended thee to thy
grave another soon will lament.
The healthy eye ought to see all visible things and not to
say, I wish for green things; for this is the condition of a
diseased eye. And the healthy hearing and smelling ought
to be ready to perceive all that can be heard and smelled.
And the healthy stomach ought to be with respect to all food
just as the mill with respect to all things which it is formed
to grind. And accordingly the healthy understanding
ought to be prepared for everything which happens ; but that
which says. Let my dear children live, and let all men praise
whatever I may do, is an eye which seeks for green things,
or teeth which seek for soft things.
There is no man so fortunate that there shall not be by
him when he is dying some who are pleased with what is
MEDITATIONS Io5
going to happen.^* Suppose that he was a good and wise
man, will there not be at last some one to say to himself, Let
us at last breathe freely being relieved from this schoolmas-
ter? It is true that he was harsh to none of us, but I per-
ceived that he tacitly condemns us. — This is what is said of
a good man. But in our own case how many other things
are there for which there are many who wish to get rid of
us. Thou wilt consider this then when thou art dying, and
thou wilt depart more contentedly by reflecting thus : I am
going away from such a life, in which even my associates in
behalf of whom I have striven so much, prayed, and cared,
themselves wish me to depart, hoping perchance to get some
little advantage by it. Why then should a man cling to a
longer stay here ? Do not however for this reason go away
less kindly disposed to them, but preserving thy own char-
acter, and friendly and benevolent and mild, and on the other
hand not as if thou wast torn away; but as when a man dies
a quiet death, the poor soul is easily separated from the
body, such also ought thy departure from men to be, for
nature united thee to them and associated thee. But does
she now dissolve the union ? Well, I am separated as from
kinsmen, not however dragged resisting, but without com-
pulsion ; for this too is one of the things according to nature.
Accustom thyself as much as possible, on the occasion of
anything being done by any person, to inquire with thyself,
For what object is this man doing this? but begin with thy-
self, and examine thyself first.
Remember that this which pulls the strings is the thing
which is hidden within : this is the power of persuasion, this
is life, this, if one may so say, is man. In contemplating
thyself never include the vessel which surrounds thee and
these instruments which are attached about it. For they are
like to an axe, differing only in this that they grow to the
body. For indeed there is no more use in these parts without
the cause which moves and checks them than in the weaver's
shuttle, and the writer's pen, and the driver's whip.
NOTES
* That is, God, as he is defined by Zeno. But the confusion between
gods and God is strange.
* The end of this section is perhaps corrupt. The meaning is very ob-
I06 MARCUS AURELIUS
scure. I have given that meaning which appears to be consistent with
the whole argument. The emperor here maintains that the essential part
of man is unchangeable, and that the other parts, if they change or
perish, do not affect that which really constitutes the man.
* See Seneca, Epp. 70, on these exhibitions which amused the people
of those days. These fighters were the Bestiarii, some of whom may
have been criminals, but even if they were, the exhibition was equally
characteristic of the depraved habits of the spectators.
* The islands of the Happy or the Fortunatae Insulae are spoken of
by the Greek and Roman writers. They were the abode of Heroes, like
Achilles and Diomedes, as we see in the Scolion of Harmodius and Aris-
togilon. Sertorius heard of the islands at Cadiz from some sailors who
had been there, and he had a wish to go and live in them and rest from
his troubles. (Plutarch, Sertorius, c. 8.) In the Odyssey, Proteus told
Menelaus that he should not die in Argos, but be removed to a place at
the boundary of the earth where Rhadamanthus dwelt: (Odyssey, iv,
56s.)
"For there in sooth man's life is easiest :
Nor snow nor raging storm nor rain is there,
But ever gently breathing gales of Zephyr
Oceanus sends up to gladden man."
It is certain that the writer of the Odyssey only follows some old
legend without having any knowledge of any place which corresponds
to his description. The two islands which Sertorius heard of may be
Madeira and the adjacent^ island. Compare Pindar, Ol. 11, 129.
* Corais conjectured fxtdo^ "hatred" in place of Mimi, Roman plays
in which action and gesticulation were all or nearly all.
* Marcus means to say that conquerors are robbers. He himself
warred against Sarmatians, and was a robber, as he says, like the rest.
' By the law, he means the divine law, obedience to the will of God.
* These words are from Euripides. They are cited by Aristotle, Ethic.
Nicom. VIII, I. Athejiaeus (xiii, 296.) and Stobaeus quotes seven complete
lines beginning IpS. /uiv oM/3pov yaia. There is a similar fragment
of .Aeschylus, Danaides, also quoted by Althenaeus.
It was the fashion of the Stoics to work on the meanings of words.
So Antoninus here takes the verb (piXti, "loves," which has also the
sense of "is wont," "uses," and the like. He finds in the common lan-
guage of mankind a philosophical truth, and most great truths are ex-
pressed in the common language of life ; some understand them, but
most people utter them without knowing how much they mean.
' Plato Theaet. 174 D. E. But compare the original with the use that
Antoninus has made of it.
"Antoninus is here playing on the etymology of v6)ioii, law, assign-
ment, that which assigns (ve/iei) to every man his portion.
" Nothing is known of Satyron or Satyrion ; nor, I believe, of Euty-
ches or Hymen. Euphrates is honourably mentioned by Epictetus. Pliny
speaks very highly of him. He obtained the permission of the Emperor
Hadrian to drink poison, because he was old and in bad health.
" Crito is the friend of Socrates ; and he was, it appears, also a friend
of Xenophon. When the emperor says "seen" {iS<hv) he does not mean
with the eyes.
" Homer, II. vi, 146.
" He says xaxov, but as he affirms in other places that death is no
evil, he must mean what others may call an evil, and he means only
"what is going to happen."
BOOK XI
THESE are the properties of the rational soul : it sees
itself, analyses itself, and makes itself such as it
chooses; the fruit which it bears itself enjoys — for
the fruits of plants and that in animals which corre-
sponds to fruits others enjoy — it obtains its own end, where-
ever the limit of life may be fixed. Not as in a dance and
in a play and in such Hke things, where the whole action
is incomplete, if anything cuts it short ; but in every part and
wherever it may be stopped, it makes what has been set be-
fore it full and complete, so that it can say, I have what is my
own. And further it traverses the whole universe, and the
surrounding vacuum, and surveys its form, and it extends
itself into the infinity of time, and embraces and compre-
hends the periodical renovation of all things, and it compre-
hends that those who come after us will see nothing new, nor
have those before us seen anything more, but in a manner
he who is forty years old, if he has any understanding at all,
has seen by virtue of the uniformity that prevails all things
which have been and all that will be. This too is a prop-
erty of the rational soul, love of one's neighbour, and truth
and modesty, and to value nothing more than itself, which is
also the property of Law.^ Thus then right reason differs
not at all from the reason of justice.
Thou wilt set little value on pleasing song and dancing
and the pancratium, if thou wilt distribute the melody of
the voice into its several sounds, and ask thyself as to each, if
thou art mastered by this; for thou wilt be prevented by
shame from confessing it : and in the matter of dancing, if
at each movement and attitude thou wilt do the same ; and
the like also in the matter of the pancratium. In all things,
then, except virtue and the acts of virtue, remember to apply
107
I08 MARCUS AURELIUS
thyself to their several parts, and by this division to come to
value them little : and apply this rule also to thy whole life.
What a soul that is which is ready, if at any moment it
must be separated from the body, and ready either to be
extinguished or dispersed or continue to exist; but so that
this readiness comes from a man's own judgment, not from
mere obstinacy, as with the Christians,^ but considerately
and with dignity and in a way to persuade another, without
tragic show.
Have I done something for the general interest? Well
then I have had my reward. Let this always be present to
thy mind, and never stop [doing such good].
What is thy art? to be good. And how is this accom-
plished well except by general principles, some about the
nature of the universe, and others about the proper constitu-
tion of man?
At first tragedies were brought on the stage as means of
reminding men of the things which happen to them, and that
it is according to nature for things to happen so, and that, if
you are delighted with what is shown on the stage, you
should not be troubled with that which takes place on the
larger stage. For you see that these things must be accom-
plished thus, and that even they bear them who cry out^ "O
Cithseron." And, indeed, some things are said well by the
dramatic writers, of which kind is the following especially : —
"Me and my children if the gods neglect,
This has its reason too."
And again —
"We must not chafe and fret at that which happens."
And—
"Life's harvest reap like the wheat's fruitful ear."
And other things of the same kind.
After tragedy the old comedy was introduced, which had a
magisterial freedom of speech, and by its very plainness of
speaking was useful in reminding men to beware of inso-
lence ; and for this purpose too Diogenes used to take from
these writers.
But as to the middle comedy which came next, observe
MEDITATIONS IO9
what it was, and again, for what object the new comedy was
introduced, which gradually sunk down into a mere mimic
artifice. That some good things are said even by these
writers, everybody knows : but the whole plan of such poetry
and dramaturgy, to what end does it look !
How plain does it appear that there is not another condi-
tion of life so well suited for philosophizing as this in which
thou now happenest to be.
A branch cut off from the adjacent branch must of neces-
sity be cut off from the whole tree also. So too a man when
he is separated from another man has fallen off from the
whole social community. Now as to a branch, another cuts
it off, but a man by his own act separates himself from his
neighbour when he hates him and turns away from him, and
he does not know that he has at the same time cut himself
off from the whole social system. Yet he has this privilege
certainly from Zeus who framed society, for it is in our power
to grow again to that which is near to us, and again to be-
come a part which helps to make up the whole. However,
if it often happens, this kind of separation, it makes it diffi-
cult for that which detaches itself to be brought to unity and
to be restored to its former condition. Finally, the branch,
which from the first grew together with the tree, and has
continued to have one life with it, is not like that which
after being cut off is then ingrafted, for this is something
like what the gardeners mean when they say that it grows
with the rest of the tree, but* that it has not the same mind
with it.
As those who try to stand in thy way when thou art
proceeding according to right reason, will not be able to turn
thee aside from thy proper action, so neither let them drive
thee from thy benevolent feelings towards them, but be on
thy guard equally in both matters, not only in the matter of
steady judgment and action, but also in the matter of gentle-
ness towards those who try to hinder or otherwise trouble
thee. For this also is a weakness, to be vexed at them, as
well as to be diverted from thy course of action and to give
way through fear ; for both are equally deserters from their
posts, the man who does it through fear, and the man who
I lO MARCUS AURELIUS
is alienated from him who is by nature a kinsman and a
friend.
There is no nature which is inferior to art, for the arts
imitate the natures of things. But if this is so, that nature
which is the most perfect and the most comprehensive of all
natures, can not fall short of the skill of art. Now all arts
do the inferior things for the sake of the superior ; therefore
the universal nature does so too. And, indeed, hence is the
origin of justice, and in justice the other virtues have their
foundation : for justice will not be observed, if we either care
for middle things [things indifferent], or are easily deceived
and careless and changeable.
If the things do not come to thee, the pursuits and avoid-
ances of which disturb thee, still in a manner thou goest to
them. Let then thy judgment about them be at rest, and
they will remain quiet, and thou wilt not be seen either pursu-
ing or avoiding.
The spherical form of the soul maintains its figure, when
it is neither extended towards any object, nor contracted
inwards, nor dispersed nor sinks down, but is illuminated by
light, by which it sees the truth, the truth of all things and
the truth that is in itself.
Suppose any man shall despise me. Let him look to that
himself. But I will look to this, that I be not discovered
doing or saying anything deserving of contempt. Shall any
man hate me ? Let him look to it. But I will be mild and
benevolent towards every man, and ready to show even him
his mistake, not reproachfully, nor yet as making a display
of my endurance, but nobly and honestly, like the great Pho-
cion, unless indeed he only assumed it. For the interior
[parts] ought to be such, and a man ought to be seen by the
gods neither dissatisfied with anything nor complaining.
For what evil is it to thee, if thou art now doing what is
agreeable to thy own nature, and art satisfied with that which
at this moment is suitable to the nature of the universe, since
thou art a human being placed at thy post in order that what
is for the common advantage may be done in some way ?
Men despise one another and flatter one another ; and men
wish to raise themselves above one another, and crouch be-
fore one another.
MEDITATIONS I 1 1
How unsound and insincere is he who says, I have deter-
mined to deal with thee in a fair way. — What art thou doing,
man ? There is no occasion to give this notice. It will soon
show itself by acts. The voice ought to be plainly written
on the forehead. Such as a man's character is,* he imme-
diately shows it in his eyes, just as he who is beloved forth-
with reads everything in the eyes of lovers. The man who
is honest and good ought to be exactly like a man who smells
strong, so that the bystander as soon as he comes near him
must smell whether he choose or not. But the affectation of
simplicity is like a crooked stick.* Nothing is more dis-
graceful than a wolfish friendship [false friendship]. Avoid
this most of all. The good and simple and benevolent
show all these things in the eyes, and there is no mis-
taking.
As to living in the best way, this power is in the soul,
if it be indifferent to things which are indifferent. And it
will be indifferent, if it looks on each of these things sepa-
rately and all together, and if it remembers that not one of
them produces in us an opinion about itself, nor comes to us ;
but these things remain immovable, and it is we ourselves
who produce the judgments about them, and, as we may say,
write them in ourselves, it being in our power not to write
them, and it being in our power, if perchance these judgments
have imperceptibly got admission to our minds, to wipe them
out ; and if we remember also that such attention will only be
for a short time, and then life will be at an end. Besides,
what trouble is there at all in doing this? For if these
things are according to nature, rejoice in them, and they will
be easy to thee : but if contrary to nature, seek what is con-
formable to thy own nature, and strive towards this, even
if it bring no reputation; for every man is allowed to seek
his own good.
Consider whence each thing is come, and of what it con-
sists,* and into what it changes, and what kind of a thing
it will be when it has changed, and that it will sustain no
harm.
[If any have offended against thee, consider first] : What
is my relation to men, and that we are made for one another ;
and in another respect, I was made to be set over them, as a
112 MARCUS AURELIUS
ram over the flock or a bull over the herd. But examine the
matter from first principles, from this : If all things are not
mere atoms, it is nature which orders all things: if this is
so, the inferior things exist for the sake of the superior, and
these for the sake of one another.
Second, consider what kind of men they are at table, in
bed, and so forth : and particularly, under what compulsions
in respect of opinions they are ; and as to their acts, consider
with what pride they do what they do.
Third, that if men do rightly what they do, we ought not
to be displeased; but if they do not right, it is plain that
they do so involuntarily and in ignorance. For as every
soul is unwillingly deprived of the truth, so also is it unwill-
ingly deprived of the power of behaving to each man accord-
ing to his deserts. Accordingly men are pained when they
are called unjust, ungrateful, and greedy, and in a word
wrong-doers to their neighbours.
Fourth, consider that thou also doest many things wrong,
and that thou art a man like others; and even if thou dost
abstain from certain faults, still thou hast the disposition to
commit them, though either through cowardice, or concern
about reputation or some such mean motive, thou dost ab-
stain from such faults.
Fifth, consider that thou dost not even understand
whether men are doing wrong, or not, for many things are
done with a certain reference to circumstances. And in short,
a man must learn a great deal to enable him to pass a correct
judgment on another man's acts.
Sixth, consider when thou art much vexed or grieved, that
man's life is only a moment, and after a short time we are
all laid out dead.
Seventh, that it is not men's acts which disturb us, for
those acts have their foundation in men's ruling principles,
but it is our own opinions which disturb us. Take away
these opinions then, and resolve to dismiss thy judgment
about an act as if it were something grievous, and thy anger
is gone. How then shall I take away these opinions? By
reflecting that no wrongful act of another brings shame on
thee : for unless that which is shameful is alone bad, thou also
MEDITATIONS 1 1 3
must of necessity do many things wrong, and become a
robber and everything else.
Eighth, consider how much more pain is brought on us by
the anger and vexation caused by such acts than by the acts
themselves, at which we are angry and vexed.
Ninth, consider that a good disposition is invincible, if it
be genuine, and not an affected smile and acting a part. For
what will the most violent man do to thee, if thou continuest
to be of a kind disposition towards him, and if, as oppor-
tunity offers, thou gently admonishest him and calmly cor-
rectest his errors at the very time when he is trying to do thee
harm, saying, ''Not so, my child : we are constituted by na-
ture for something else : I shall certainly not be injured, but
thou art injuring thyself, my child." — And show him with
gentle tact and by general principles that this is so, and that
even bees do not do as he does, nor any animals which are
formed by nature to be gregarious. And thou must do this
neither with any double meaning nor in the way of reproach,
but affectionately and without any rancour in thy soul ; and
not as if thou wert lecturing him, nor yet that any bystander
may admire, but either when he is alone, and if others are
present'^
Remember these nine rules, as if thou hadst received them
as a gift from the Muses, and begin at last to be a man while
thou livest. But thou must equally avoid flattering men and
being vexed at them, for both are unsocial and lead to harm.
And let this truth be present to thee in the excitement of
anger, that to be moved by passion is not manly, but that
mildness and gentleness, as they are more agreeable to human
nature, so also are they more manly; and he who possesses
these qualities possesses strength, nerves, and courage, and
not the man who is subject to fits of passion and discontent.
For in the same degree in which a man's mind is nearer to
freedom from all passion, in the same degree also is it
nearer to strength : and as the sense of pain is a characteris-
tic of weakness, so also is anger. For he who yields to pain
and he who yields to anger, both are wounded and both
submit.
But if thou wilt, receive also a tenth present from the
leader of the [Muses, Apollo], and it is this — that to expect
114 MARCUS AURELIUS
bad men not to do wrong is madness, for he who expects this
desires an impossibihty. But to allow men to behave so to
others, and to expect them not to do thee any wrong, is irra-
tional and tyrannical.
There are four principal aberrations of the superior faculty
against which thou shouldst be constantly on thy guard, and
when thou hast detected them, thou shouldst wipe them out
and say on each occasion thus : this thought is not necessary :
this tends to destroy social union : this which thou art going
to say comes not from the real thoughts; for thou shouldst
consider it among the most absurd of things for a man not to
speak from his real thoughts. But the fourth is when thou
shalt reproach thyself for anything, for this is an evidence
of the diviner part within thee being overpowered and yield-
ing to the less honourable and to the perishable part, the
body, and to its gross pleasures.
Thy aerial part and all the fiery parts which are mingled
in thee, though by nature they have an upward tendency, still
in obedience to the disposition of the universe they are over-
powered here in the compound mass [the body] . And also
the whole of the earthly part in thee and the watery, though
their tendency is downward, still are raised up and occupy a
position which is not their natural one. In this manner then
the elemental parts obey the universal, for when they have
been fixed in any place perforce they remain there until again
the universal shall sound the signal for dissolution. Is it
not then strange that thy intelligent part only should be dis-
obedient and discontented with its own place? And yet no
force is imposed on it, but only those things which are con-
formable to its nature : still it does not submit, but is carried
in the opposite direction. For the movement towards injus-
tice and intemperance and to anger and grief and fear is
nothing else than the act of one who deviates from nature.
And also when the ruling faculty is discontented with any-
thing that happens, then too it deserts its post : for it is con-
stituted for piety and reverence towards the gods no less than
for justice. For these qualities also are comprehended under
the generic term of contentment with the constitution of
things, and indeed they are prior* to acts of justice.
He who has not one and always the same object in life,
MEDITATIONS 1 1 5
can not be one and the same all through his life. But what
I have said is not enough, unless this also is added, what this
object ought to be. For as there is not the same opinion
about all the things which in some way or other are consid-
ered by the majority to be good, but only about some certain
things, that is, things which concern the common interest ; so
also ought we to propose to ourselves an object which shall
be of a common kind [social] and political. For he who
directs all his own efforts to this object, will make all his acts
alike, and thus will always be the same.
Think of the country mouse and of the town mouse, and of
the alarm and trepidation of the town mouse.'^
Socrates used to call the opinions of the many by the name
of Lamise, bugbears to frighten children.
The Lacedaemonians at their public spectacles used to set
seats in the shade for strangers, but themselves sat down
anywhere.
Socrates excused himself to Perdiccas® for not going
to him, saying. It is because I would not perish by the worst
of all ends, that is, I would not receive a favour and then be
unable to return it.
In the writing of the [Ephesians] there was this precept,
constantly to think of some one of the men of former times
who practised virtue.
The Pythagoreans bid us in the morning look to the
heavens that we may be reminded of those bodies which con-
tinually do the same things and in the same manner perform
their work, and also be reminded of their purity and nudity.
For there is no veil over a star.
Consider what a man Socrates was when he dressed him-
self in a skin, after Xanthippe had taken his cloak and gone
out, and what Socrates said to his friends who were ashamed
of him and drew back from him when they saw him dressed
thus.
Neither in writing nor in reading wilt thou be able to lay
down rules for others before thou shalt have first learned to
obey rules thyself. Much more is this so in life.
A slave thou art : free speech is not for thee.
And my heart laughed within.*
And virtue they will curse speaking harsh words.**
Il6 MARCUS AURELIUS
To look for the fig in winter is a madman's act : such is he
who looks for his child when it is no longer allowed. ^^
When a man kisses his child, said Epictetus, he should
whisper to himself, "To-morrow perchance thou wilt die" —
But those are words of bad omen — "No word is a word of
bad omen," said Epictetus, "which expresses any work of
nature ; or if it is so, it is also a word of bad omen to speak
of the ears of corn being reaped."
The unripe grape, the ripe bunch, the dried grape all are
changes, not into nothing, but into something which exists
not yet.^^
No man can rob us of our free will.^^
Epictetus also said, a man must discover an art [or rules]
with respect to giving his assent ; and in respect to his move-
ments he must be careful that they be made with regard to
circumstances, that they be consistent with social interests,
that they have regard to the value of the object; and as to
sensual desire, he should altogether keep away from it ; and
as to avoidance [aversion] he should not show it with re-
spect to any of the things which are not in our power.
The dispute then, he said, is not about any common mat-
ter, but about being mad or not.
Socrates used to say. What do you want? Souls of
rational men or irrational? — Souls of rational men — Of
what rational men? Sound or unsound? — Sound — Why
then do you not seek for them? — Because we have them —
Why then do you fight and quarrel ?
NOTES
* Law is the order by which all things are governed.
*This is the only passage in which the emperor speaks of the
Christians. Epictetus (iv, 7,) names them Galilaei.
■ Sophocles, OEdipus Rex.
*Instead of cncdXut^ Saumaise reads cTKanfiri. There is a Greek pro-
verb, CTKanftov i,vXov ovSiTCOT^ op^ov: "You cannot make a crooked
slick straight."
The wolfish friendship is an allusion to the fable of the sheep and
the wolves.
' It appears that there is a defect in the text here.
*The word itpeaftvTspa, which is here translated "prior" may also
mean "superior ;" but Antoninus seems to say that piety and reverence
of the gods precede all virtues, and that other virtues are derived from
them, even justice, which in another passage (xi, 10) he makes the
foundation of all virtues. The ancient notion of justice is that of giving
MEDITATIONS 1 1 7
to every one his due. It is not a legal definition, as some have supposed,
but a moral rule which law can not in all cases enforce. Besides law
has its own rules, which are sometimes moral and sometimes immoral;
but it enforces them all simply because they are general rules, and if
it did not or could not enforce them, so far law would not be law.
Justice, or the doing what is just, implies a universal rule and obedience
to it; and as we all live under universal law, which commands both
our body and our intelligence, and is the law of our nature, that is the
law of the whole constitution of man, we must endeavour to discover
what this supreme law is. It is the will of the power that rules all.
By acting in obedience to this will, we do justice, and by consequence
everything else that we ought to do.
' The story is told by Horace in his Satires (ii, 6), and by others
since, but not better.
* Perhaps the emperor made a mistake here, for other writers say
that it was Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, who invited Socrates to
Macedonia.
•Od. IX. 413.
"Hesiod, Works and Days, 184.
"Epictetus, III, 24, 87.
"Epictetus, III, 24.
"Epictetus, m, 22, 105.
BOOK XII
ALL those things at which thou wishest to arrive by a
circuitous road, thou canst have now, if thou dost not
refuse them to thyself. And this means, if thou wilt
take no notice of all the past, and trust the future to
providence, and direct the present only conformably to piety
and justice. Conformably to piety, that thou mayst be con-
tent with the lot which is assigned to thee, for nature de-
signed it for thee and thee for it. Conformably to justice,
that thou mayst always speak the truth freely and without
disguise, and do things which are agreeable to law and ac-
cording to the worth of each. And let neither another man's
wickedness hinder thee, nor opinion nor voice, nor yet the
sensations of the poor flesh which has grown about thee;
for the passive part will look to this. If then, whatever the
time may be when thou shalt be near to thy departure, neg-
lecting everything else thou shalt respect only thy ruling
faculty and the divinity within thee, and if thou shalt be
afraid not because thou must some time cease to live, but if
thou shalt fear never to have beg^n to live according to
nature — then thou wilt be a man worthy of the universe
which has produced thee, and thou wilt cease to be a stranger
in thy native land, and to wonder at things which happen
daily as if they were something unexpected, and to be de-
pendent on this or that.
God sees the minds (ruling principles) of all men bared
of the material vesture and rind and impurities. For with
his intellectual part alone he touches the intelligence only
which has flowed and been derived from himself into these
bodies. And if thou also usest thyself to do this, thou wilt
rid thyself of thy much trouble. For he who regards not
the poor flesh which envelopes him, surely will not trouble
Ii8
MEDITATIONS II9
himself by looking after raiment and dwelling and fame and
such like externals and show.
The things are three of which thou art composed, a little
body, a little breath, [life], intelligence. Of these the first
two are thine, so far as it is thy duty to take care of them ;
but the third alone is properly thine. Therefore if thou
shalt separate from thyself, that is, from thy understanding,
whatever others do or say, and whatever thou hast done
or said thyself, and whatever future things trouble thee
because they may happen, and whatever in the body which
envelopes thee or in the breath [life], which is by nature as-
sociated with the body, is attached to thee independent of thy
will, and whatever the external circumfluent vortex whirls
round, so that the intellectual power exempt from the things
of fate can live pure and free by itself, doing what is just and
accepting what happens and saying the truth: if thou wilt
separate, I say, from this ruling faculty the things which
are attached to it by the impressions of sense, and the things
of time to come and of time that is past, and wilt make thy-
self like Empedocles' sphere, —
"All round, and in its joyous rest reposing :"*
and if thou shalt strive to live only what is really thy life,
that is, the present — then thou wilt be able to pass that por-
tion of life which remains for thee up to the time of thy
death, free from perturbations, nobly, and obedient to thy
own daemon [to the god that is within thee].
I have often wondered how it is that every man loves
himself more than all the rest of men, but yet sets less value
on his own opinion of himself than on the opinion of others.
If then a god or a wise teacher should present himself to man
and bid him to think of nothing and to design nothing which
he would not express as soon as he conceived it, he could not
endure it even for a single day. So much more respect have
we to what our neighbours shall think of us than to what
we shall think of ourselves.
How can it be that the gods after having arranged all
things well and benevolently for mankind, have overlooked
this alone, that some men and very good men, and men who,
as we may say, have had most communion with the divinity,
33
'7
1 20 MARCUS AURELIUS
and through pious acts and religious observances have been
most intimate with the divinity, when they have once died
should never exist again, but should be completely extin-
guished ?
But if this is so, be assured that if it ought to have been
otherwise, the gods would have done it. For if it were just,
it would also be possible ; and if it were according to nature,
nature would have had it so. But because it is not so, if in
fact it is not so, be thou convinced that it ought not to have
been so : — for thou seest even of thyself that in this inquiry
thou art disputing with the deity; and we should not thus
dispute with the gods, unless they were most excellent and
most just; — but if this is so, they would not have allowed
anything in the ordering of the universe to be neglected un-
justly and irrationally.
Practise thyself even in the things which thou despairest
of accomplishing. For even the left hand, which is ineffec-
tual for all other things for want of practice, holds the bridle
more vigorously than the right hand ; for it has been practised
in this.
Consider in what condition both in body and soul a man
should be when he is overtaken by death; and consider the
shortness of life, the boundless abyss of time past and future,
the feebleness of all matter.
Contemplate the formative principles [forms] of things
bare of their coverings; the purposes of actions; consider
what pain is, what pleasure is, and death, and fame; who is
to himself the cause of his uneasiness; how no man is
hindered by another ; that everything is opinion.
In the application of thy principles thou must be like the
pancratiast, not like the gladiator ; for the gladiator lets fall
the sword which he uses and is killed ; but the other always
has his hand, and needs to do nothing else than use it.
See what things are in themselves, dividing them into
matter, form, and purpose.
What a power man has to do nothing except what god will
approve, and to accept all that god may give him.
With respect to that which happens conformably to nature,
we ought to blame neither gods, for they do nothing wrong
either voluntarily or involuntarily, nor men, for they do
MEDITATIONS 121
nothing wrong except involuntarily. Consequently we
should blame nobody.
How ridiculous and what a stranger he is who is surprised
at anything which happens in life.
Either there is a fatal necessity and invincible order, or a
kind providence, or a confusion without a purpose and with-
out a director. If then there is an invincible necessity, why
dost thou resist? But if there is a providence which allows
itself to be propitiated, make thyself worthy of the help of the
divinity. But if there is a confusion without a governor, be
content that in such a tempest thou hast in thyself a certain
ruling intelligence. And even if the tempest carry thee
away, let it carry away the poor flesh, the poor breath, every-
thing else ; for the intelligence at least it will not carry away.
Does the light of the lamp shine without losing its splen-
dour until it is extinguished ; and shall the truth which is in
thee and justice and temperance be extinguished [before thy
death] ?
When a man has presented the appearance of having done
wrong, [say,] How then do I know that this is a wrongful
act ? And if he has done wrong, how do I know that he has
not condemned himself? and so this is like tearing his own
face. Consider that he, who would not have the bad man
do wrong, is like the man who would not have the fig-tree
to bear juice in the figs and infants to cry and the horse to
neigh, and whatever else must of necessity be. For what
must a man do who has such a character ? If then thou art
irritable,* cure this man's disposition.
If it is not right, do not do it : if it is not true, do not say
it. [For let thy efforts be. — Y
In everything always observe what the thing is which pro-
duces for thee an appearance, and resolve it by dividing it
into the formal, the material, the purpose, and the time
within which it must end.
Perceive at last that thou hast in thee something better and
more divine than the things which cause the various affects,
and as it were pull thee by the strings. What is there now
in my mind ? is it fear, or suspicion, or desire, or anything of
the kind ?
First, do nothing inconsiderately, nor without a purpose.
122 MARCUS AURELIUS
Second, make thy acts refer to nothing else than to a social
end.
Consider that before long thou wilt be nobody and no-
where, nor will any of the things exist which thou now seest,
nor any of those who are now living. For all things are
formed by nature to change and be turned and to perish in
order that other things in continuous succession may exist.
Consider that everything is opinion, and opinion is in thy
power. Take away then, when thou choosest, thy opinion,
and like a mariner, who has doubled the promontory, thou
wilt find calm, everything stable, and a waveless bay.
Any one activity whatever it may be, when it has ceased
at its proper time, suffers no evil because it has ceased ; nor
he who has done this act, does he suffer any evil for this
reason that the act has ceased. In like manner then the
whole which consists of all the acts, which is our life, if
it cease at its proper time, suffers no evil for this reason that
it has ceased; nor he who has terminated this series at the
proper time, has he been ill dealt with. But the proper
time and the limit nature fixes, sometimes as in old age the
peculiar nature of man, but always the universal nature, by
the change of whose parts the whole universe continues ever
young and perfect. And everything which is useful to the
universal is always good and in season. Therefore the ter-
mination of life for every man is no evil, because neither is it
shameful, since it is both independent of the will and not
opposed to the general interest, but it is good, since it is sea-
sonable and profitable to and congruent with the universal.
For thus too he is moved by the deity who is moved in the
same manner with the deity and moved towards the same
things in his mind.
These three principles thou must have in readiness. In
the things which thou doest do nothing either inconsiderately
or otherwise than as justice herself would act; but with re-
spect to what may happen to thee from without, consider that
it happens either by chance or according to providence, and
thou must neither blame chance nor accuse providence. Sec-
ond, consider what every being is from the seed to the time
of its receiving a soul, and from the reception of a soul to
the giving back of the same, and of what things every being
I ,
MEDITATIONS 123
IS compounded and into what things it is resolved. Third,
if thou shouldst suddenly be raised up above the earth, and
shouldst look down on human things, and observe the variety
of them how great it is, and at the same time also shouldst
see at a glance how great is the number of beings who dwell
all around in the air and the aether, consider that as often as
thou shouldst be raised up, thou wouldst see the same things,
sameness of form and shortness of duration. Are these
things to be proud of ?
Cast away opinion: thou art saved. Who then hinders
thee from casting it away ?
When thou art troubled about anything, thou hast for-
gotten this, that all things happen according to the universal
nature ; and forgotten this, that a man's wrongful act is noth-
ing to thee ; and further thou hast forgotten this, that every-
thing which happens, always happened so and will happen
so, and now happens so everywhere ; forgotten this too, how
close is the kinship between a man and the whole human race,
for it is a community, not of a little blood or seed, but of
intelligence. And thou hast forgotten this too, that every
man's intelligence is a god, and is an efflux of the deity ; and
forgotten this, that nothing is a man's own, but that his child
and his body and his very soul came from the deity; for-
gotten this, that everything is opinion ; and lastly thou hast
forgotten that every man lives the present time only, and
loses only this.
Constantly bring to thy recollection those who have com-
plained greatly about anything, those who have been most
conspicuous by the greatest fame or misfortunes or enmities
or fortunes of any kind : then think where are they all now ?
Smoke and ash and a tale, or not even a tale. And let there
be present to thy mind also everything of this sort, how
Fabius Catullinus lived in the country, and Lucius Lupus in
his gardens, and Stertinius at Baiae, and Tiberius at Capreae
and Velius Rufus [or Rufus at Velia] ; and in fine think of
the eager pursuit of anything conjoined with pride ; and how
worthless everything is after which men violently strain;
and how much more philosophical it is for a man in the
opportunities presented to him to show himself just, tem-
perate, obedient to the gods, and to do this with all sim-
124 MARCUS AURELIUS
plicity : for the pride which is proud of its want of pride is
the most intolerable of all.
To those who ask, Where hast thou seen the gods or how
dost thou comprehend that they exist and so worshipest
them, I answer, in the first place, they may be seen even with
the eyes;^ in the second place neither have I seen even my
own soul and yet I honour it. Thus then with respect to the
gods, from what I constantly experience of their power, from
this I comprehend that they exist and I venerate them.
The safety of life is this, to examine everything all
through, what it is itself, what is its material, what the
formal part; with all thy soul to do justice and to say the
truth. What remains except to enjoy life by joining one
good thing to another so as not to leave even the smallest
intervals between ?
There is one light of the sun, though it is interrupted by
walls, mountains, and other things infinite. There is one
common substance, though it is distributed among countless
bodies which have their several qualities. There is one soul,
though it is distributed among infinite natures and individual
circumscriptions [or individuals]. There is one intelligent
soul, though it seems to be divided. Now in the things
which have been mentioned all the other parts, such as those
which are air and matter, are without sensation and have no
fellowship : and yet even these parts the intelligent principle
holds together and the gravitation towards the same. But
intellect in a peculiar manner tends to that which is of the
same kin, and combines with it, and the feeling for com-
munion is not interrupted.
What dost thou wish? to continue to exist? Well, dost
thou wish to have sensation ? movement ? growth ? and then
again to cease to grow? to use thy speech? to think? What
is there of all these things which seems to thee worth desir-
ing? But if it is easy to set little value on all these things,
turn to that which remains, which is to follow reason and
god. But it is inconsistent with honouring reason and god
to be troubled because by death a man will be deprived of the
other things.
How small a part of the boundless and unfathomable time
is assigned to every man? for it is very soon swallowed up
MEDITATIONS 125
in the eternal. And how small a part of the whole sub-
stance ? and how small a part of the universal soul ? and on
what a small clod of the whole earth thou creepest ? Reflect-
ing on all this consider nothing to be great, except to act as
thy nature leads thee, and to endure that which the common
nature brings.
How does the ruling faculty make use of itself? for all
lies in this. But everything else, whether it is in the power
of thy will or not, is only lifeless ashes and smoke.
This reflection is njost adapted to move us to contempt
of death, that even those who think pleasure to be a good and
pain an evil still have despised it.
The man to whom that only is good which comes in
due season, and to whom it is the same thing whether he has
done piore or fewer acts conformable to right reason, and to
whom it makes no difference whether he contemplates the
world for a longer or a shorter time — for this man neither is
death a terrible thing.
Man, thou hast been a citizen in this great state [the
world] : what difference does it make to thee whether for
five years [or three] ? for that which is conformable to the
laws is just for all. Where is the hardship then, if no tyrant
nor yet an unjust judge sends thee away from the state, but
nature who brought thee into it ? the same as if a praetor who
has employed an actor dismisses him from the stage — "But
I have not finished the five acts, but only three of them" —
Thou sayest well, but in life the three acts are the whole
drama ; for what shall be a complete drama is determined by
him who was once the cause of its composition, and now of
its dissolution: but thou art the cause of neither. Depart
then satisfied, for he also who releases thee is satisfied.
NOTES
* The verse of Empedocles is corrupt in Antoninus. It has been re-
stored by Peyron from a Turin manuscript, thus :
2(paipoi KVKXoTsprii jnovip nepiyijOet yaicov.
•There is something wrong here, or incomplete.
• " Seen even with the eyes." It is supposed that this may be ex-
plained by the Stoic doctrine, that the universe is a god or living being
(iv, 40), and that the celestial bodies are gods (viii, 19). But the em-
126 MARCUS AURELIUS
peror may mean that we know that the gods exist, as he afterwards
states it, because we see what they do; as we know that man has intel-
lectual powers, because we see what he does, and in no other way do
we know it. This passage then will agree with the passage in the Epistle
to the Romans (i v. 20), and with the Epistle to the Colossians (i v.
15), in which Jesus Christ is named "the image of the invisible god;"
and with the passage in the Gospel of St. John (xiv v. 9).
Gataker, whose notes are a wonderful collection of learning, and all
of it sound and good, quotes a passage of Calvin which is founded on
St. Paul's language (Rom. i v. 20) : "God by creating the universe [or
world, mundum], being Himself invisible, has presented Himself to our
eyes conspicuously in a certain visible form." He also quotes Seneca
(De Benef. iv c. 8) : "Quocunque te flexeris, ibi ilium videbis oc-
currentem tibi : nihil ab illo vacat, opus suum ipse implet." Compare
also Cicero, De Senectute (c. 22), Xenophon's Cyropaedia (viii, 7),
and Mem. iv, 3; also Epictetus, i, 6, de Providentia. I think that my
interpretation of Antoninus is right.
m
THE END.
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